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ABSTRACT
The Governorship of Lord William Bentinck from 1803-7 
is  a crucial phase in the evolution of the Madras adm inistration. 
Between 1799 and 1803 the Madras Government had acquired 
vast territories which presented new problems in the administration 
of both land revenue and ju s tic e . The avowed policy of the 
Government of India for the extension of the Bengal Zamindary 
system to Madras was challenged. The alternative.w as the 
Rayatwari system which Bentinck ultim ately chose after a thorough 
enquiry into the m atter. The adm inistration of ju stice  in both the 
old and newly acquired areas of the Presidency and the creation 
of a police force were the next important issues  that Bentinck had 
to face. He examined the anomalies resulting from the existence 
of a dual judicial system and aimed at establishing a regular and uni­
form system of ju s tice . In the creation of a modern police force 
h is task  was made difficult by the hostility  of some of the judges 
of the Supreme Court.
The French menace and the Anglo-Maratha wars threatened 
the security of British possessions in South India. As the Governor 
of M adras, Bentinck played a significant role in these m atters of
all-Ind ia  importance. The question of security also  influenced 
h is relations with the dependent Indian chiefs.
The costly wars and military preparations aggravated the 
depressed treasury of M adras. Here Bentinck was confronted 
with the task  of economising without impairing the efficiency of 
the adm inistration. Among his various financial m easures, the 
creation of a Government Bank was a remarkable innovation.
The sudden outbreak of the mutiny at Vellore in July 1806 
led to his reca ll. The mutiny had since then figured prominently 
not only in Bentinck's career but a lso  in the h istory  of the British 
in South India.
This thesis  examines the Vellore mutiny in the la s t two 
chapters. The first four chapters deal respectively with foreign 
policy, land adm inistration, adm inistration of ju stice  and finances.
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INTRODUCTION
The family of Bentinck originated in the province of 
O verijssel in the Netherlands. Hans William Bentinck accom­
panied William of Orange to England in 1688 and acquired 
property, prestige and the title  of the Duke of Portland. He 
married an English lady and settled down in England."^ His 
grandson, the third Duke of Portland, William Henry Bentinck, 
married Lady Dorothy Cavendish, the only daughter of the 4th 
Duke of Devonshire, a man of great political influence during 
the reigns of George II and George III. The third Duke of Portland 
in his turn, enjoyed vast political pre-em inence among the 
Hanovarian Whigs and became the f r c c mi ~ t p
1 heading the Fox-North Coalition Administration. He
further assumed the premiership from 1807-9.
William Charles Cavendish Bentinck, 2nd son of the 3rd 
Duke of Portland, was born on 14th September 1774. After com­
pleting a moderate school education in London he entered the army 
in 1791 as an Ensign in the Cold Stream Guards. Soon he was 
promoted to a Captaincy in the 2nd Xight Dragoons and in 1794 he 
attained the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of the 24th Light Dragoons,
Boulger, D . , Lord William Bentinck, p. 13.
During the European wars against Revolutionary France, Bentinck 
gained considerable military experience. He served on the staff 
of the Duke of York in the campaign in Flanders in 1794. In 1799 
he was attached to M arshall Suwarrow's army in its  campaign in 
Northern Italy and Switzerland as the military representative of 
England. In 1801 he accompanied the Austrian forces against the 
French and w itnessed the battles of Trebbia, Novi, Sang/tano, 
Marengo, the passages of Mine to and Adige, the sieges of 
Alessandria and Coni and various other incidents. In 1802 he
1
went to Egypt to serve the British forces under Sir R. Abercromby.
In the interlude of the Treaty of Amiens between England and 
France Bentinck returned to England and married in February 1803 
Lady Mary Acheson, 2nd daughter of the 1st Earl of Gosford. Three 
months after his marriage Bentinck at the age of 29 was appointed 
by the East India Company as the Governor of M adras.
From August 1803 Bentinck worked as the Governor of Fort 
St. George until 1807 when he was recalled following the mutiny of
1Boulger, D. , Lord William Bentinck, pp. 16-18, and Dictionary of 
National Biography, Vol.IV, 1885, S irA .J. Arbuthnot, "Lord 
William Bentinck", p p .292-93.
the sepoys at Vellore. The incident left a mark of stigma on his 
career which he resented throughout the next decade. While in 
Madras Bentinck was promoted to the rank of Major General. In 
1808 he resumed his military=duties and served on the staff of 
Sir Henry Burrard's army in Portugal. Europe was then passing 
through the phase of struggle between the coalition of European 
powers and Napoleonic France. Soon Bentinck joined Sir John 
Moore marching against the French in Spain and commanded a 
brigade in the battle of Corunna. Thereafter Bentinck served for 
a short time as Lieutenant General of Sir Arthur W ellesley 's army 
in Portugal. From Portugal he was sent to Germany for raising a 
German contingent. Bentinck successfu lly  completed his German 
commission and served under W ellington's orders for some tim e.*
In 1811, Bentinck was sent as the British envoy to the Court of 
Sicily and as the Commander in Chief of the British forces stationed 
in that island . In the following three years Bentinck stayed nomin­
ally the British envoy but practically the Governor of Sicily. He 
introduced in Sicily the constitutional government on the pattern of
J j __________________________________________________________________________________
^Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. IV, Sir A. J.Arbuthnot,
"Lord William Bentinck, " pp. 293-4.
the British constitution. During these years he carefully looked 
after the defence of the strategic island of Sicily on which 
Napoleon always had a conqueror's eye. In 1813 Bentinck led a 
confederation of British, German and Calabrian troops on the 
east coast of Spain. But h is defeat at the hands of the French 
General Suchet at the Ordal damaged his military reputation. In 
1814 he repaired his credit by undertaking a successfu l expedition 
against the French garrison at Genoa. Bentinck left Sicily finally 
in 1814* and stayed at Rome and Florence for some time.
In the next 13 years of his life Bentinck was unemployed 
and cut off from the English public life. In 1819 he was offered 
by the East India Company the post of the Governor of Madras 
which he turned down as an inadequate reparation for his unjust 
removal in 1807. In 1822 when Marquis of H astings returned from 
his position as the Governor General of India, Bentinck wanted to 
become his successor. However, his candidature was ignored in 
favour of Lord Amherst. But at the end of the term of Amherst in 
1827 Bentinck secured the position. His Governor Generalship in
* Bentinck's Sicilian career is  adequately treated by John R osselli, 
in his book Lord William Bentinck and the British Occupation of 
S icily . 1811-14.
India (1827-35) was marked for various social and economic 
reforms. After his return from India in 1835, Bentinck wished 
to participate in English political life as a member of the House 
of Commons. In 1837 he was elected member for Glasgow as a 
Liberal. Bentinck died in Paris on 17th June 1839 at the age of 
65 and left no issu e .
Bentinck's appointment to the Governor Generalship was 
undoubtedly the climax of his whole career. This also  was an 
outstanding period of reforms in the history of the British Raj. 
Naturally, the Bengal period has received priority over the Madras 
period. The various aspects of his Governor G eneralship, there­
fore, have been studied by the historians and few more investig­
ations are presently in progress. But hardly any study has so far 
been made on his Madras Governorship,* which may be considered 
as the formative period in Bentinck's career and also  the most 
crucial years in the growth of the Madras adm inistration. Bentinck
*One chapter in D .Boulger's Lord William Bentinck in the Rulers of 
India series , and one chapter in P.Auber's Rise and Progress of 
British Power in India, Vol.II dealt, though quite insufficiently , 
with Bentinck's Madras period. Recently, S.AirMirajan, in his 
article on "Laissez Faire in M adras" in the Indian Economic and 
Social History Review (July 1965) has d iscussed  some of Bentinck's 
financial m easures in M adras.
for the first time assumed enormous responsib ilities, faced 
gigantic difficulties and suffered great frustrations. The extent 
of the influence of Bentinck's Madras career on his Governor 
Generalship does not come within the scope of th is  work. But 
an intensive study of his Governorship, which th is work intends 
to be, might enable a historian of h is Bengal period or h is general 
biographer to determine, as to what extent Governor General 
Bentinck was influenced by his experiences acquired at Madras 
in the first decade of the 19th century.
At the time of his appointment in January 1803, Bentinck 
was not a suitable candidate to hold the key position of the Gov­
ernor of Fort St. George. His training so far w as essen tia lly  
military and his experience was generally of the European w ars. 
Besides, he never had the occasion to acquire any d istinc t know­
ledge about India or its  adm inistration. He secured th is  appoint­
ment through the influence of his father over the W higs. In 1802 
the Duke sought to obtain a handsome situation for h is second son. 
When Lord C live 's tenure^(1798-1803) was to end in M adras, 
Bentinck's father approached William Pitt, who in h is turn, mentioned
the name of Bentinck as the successor of Clive to Henry Addington,
£
the then First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of Exchquer
(1801-4). Addington, being a close friend of P itt, accepted
the proposition and passed it over to Viscount C astlereagh,
President of the Board of Control. Castlereagh put forward
Bentinck's name to the Court of D irectors.  ^ The Duke of
Portland was also  helped by his old friend, Edward Monckton, M .P.
in influencing the Directors of the Company. Monckton was a
former servant of the Company in Madras Presidency and the son-
2in-law  of Lord Pigot, the Governor of Madras from 1755-63.
Together with his father's endeavours, however, Bentinck's 
military experience might have carried some weight to the 
Court of Directors at a time when the Indian territories were 
passing through a phase of war and apprehension of a French 
invasion in India.
Bentinck's personal reaction at his appointment in Madras
3
was one of sa tisfac tion . As the son of the Duke of Portland he
would have gone into public service anyway. The only objection 
“  —
Philips, C .H . , East India Company, p. 121.
2Two letters of Monckton i^ B .P . dated 7th July 1802 and 10th Aug.
1802, throw some light o ^ m anoeuvres.
3
Draft Address of Bentinck to the Chairman of the Court of Directors,
1803, B.P.
involved in an Indian appointment was the inconvenience of 
living in a foreign country. But to Bentinck the lure of the 
salary of a Presidency Governor (£16, 000)* might have out­
weighed this objection. Later on, Bentinck clearly admitted
that "pecuniary considerations . . .  pressed me to take up civil
2career and I accepted the post of the Governor of M adras".
Therefore, when Henry Plumer, M .P. and a family friend, offered 
to help Bentinck by securing a suitable job in England rather than 
to see him leaving for a foreign country, Bentinck firmly declined 
his proposal. To Plumer he pointed out; "It is  true that my first 
inducement in going to India is  pecuniary consideration". How­
ever, he also  thought "that millions of my fellow creatures m ay
3
be benefitted" from his services in India.
When Bentinck was appointed Governor, the Madras Presidency
- excluding the Indian sta tes -  covered about 140,000 square miles
4of Southern India. The population of the Presidency was 9.57
^Madras Civil Servant's List, Finance Dept. 1782-1801 (I.O .L .)
2 Bentinck to Minto, 1st Oct. 1806, B.P.
3
Bentinck to Plumer, 7th Jan. 1803, B.P.
4
Dharmaktfmar, Land and C aste in South India, p .7, and also 
Abbe Dubois, Hindu Manners and Customs, V ol.I, p .361.
millions in 1802 according to the calculations of the Madras
Government. This figure is  not wholly reliable as it included,
1
in some cases , calculations of population based on revenue.
The population was probably larger than estim ated and was pre­
dominantly Hindu with a very large percentage depending on 
agriculture. From the adm inistrative point of view the Presidency 
was divided into twenty-one d is tr ic ts . The d istric ts  of Godavari, 
Kistna, Vizagapatam and Ganjam stretched towards the North East. 
The d istric ts  of South Kanara and Malabar lay between the Indian 
Ocean and the W estern Ghat. Between the Bay of Bengal and the 
Eastern Ghat were situated the d istric ts  of Tinnevelly, Tanjore,
South Arcot, Madura, Nellore and Chingleput. In between the two 
coastal belts lay the d istric ts of Coimbatore, the N ilgiris, Salem-
Baramahal, North Arcot, Trichinopoly, Cuddapah, Kurnool,
2Anantapur and Bellary. Linguistically, the Presidency of Madras 
could be divided into four parts. Telegu w as the language of the 
d istric ts  of Cuddapah, Kumoool, Anantapur, Bellary, Godavari, 
Kistna, Ganjam, Vizagapatam and Nellore. Kanarese and Malayalum
^Dharma Kumar, Land and C aste in South India, p. 101.
2A Short Account of the Madras Presidency. Published by the Govt, 
of Mad. 1805, p p .1-3.
were spoken in Kanara and Malabar respectively . The remaining
districts were Tamil speaking areas. ^
The adm inistration of Madras Presidency was vested in a
Governor with a Council of three members, one of whom was the
Commander in Chief of the Presidency army. According to P itt's
India Act of 1784 (24 Geo. I l l t h e  Court of Directors
appointed the Governor of the Presidency, the members of his
Council and the Commander in Chief for a period of five years
2subject to the approbation of the Crown. Beside being the exec­
utive head of the Government, the Governor in C ouncil constituted 
the highest court of Civil and Criminal ju stice  in the Presidency. 
According to the Charter Act of 1793, the Governor in Council also 
had the power to make, repeal or suspend any general ru le , order, 
or regulation for the good order and civil adm inistration of the 
country. The Council of the Governor was essen tia lly  an advisory 
body. By the Act of 1793 (33 G eo.Ill C .52 SS 57-51) the Governor
3
could -  by virtue of his exceptional power -  override h is Council.
1 : _ _ _  
"Observations on the Land tenures of South India", by a Madras
civilian. Tracts relating to Ind ia. 1813-77, p .3.
2
M isra, B.B. , The Central Administration of the East India Company, 
p. 3 0.
^ fb e rt, Sir C . , The Government of Ind ia , 
It was a growing tendency among the Governors General: and 
the Governors to treat their Councils with scant respect. Lord 
W ellesley was an outstanding example of th is . He often with­
held from the Council his letters w ritten to the Governors of 
Madras and Bombay and encouraged them to do the same in 
relation with their Councils. ^
Apart from the Court of Directors and the Board of Control 
in England, the only check upon the enormous power of the Pres­
idency Governor was the Governor General in Council. Ever since 
the passing of the Regulating Act of 1773^$Aed,iij;£.£^ the
Governor General of Bengal was given the power of superintending 
and controlling the management of the Presidencies of Madras and 
Bombay. The Governors of these Presidencies were to transmit 
regular reports to the Governor General in Council and to receive 
advice. The Governor G eneral's control over the Governors was 
further enlarged by the P itt's  India Act of 1784 to cover "all such 
points as relate to any transaction with the country powers, or to 
war or peace or to the application of revenues or forces of such
^M isra, B.B. The Central Administration of the East India Company, 
p. 45.
19
Presidencies in time of war. " By th is Act the Governor General
could even suspend the Governors of Presidencies. Though subject
to such control in theory the Governors in practice could and did enjoy
enormous discretions. Often they disobeyed the orders and advices
of the Supreme Government. During the tenure of the office Lord
Cornwallis had had occasions to fear serious difference and insub-
2ordination of the Presidency Governors. The same distrust also
probably had influenced W ellesley, who always exercised a stronger
3control over the affairs of the Presidencies. The great distance 
between India and England as  well as between Bengal and other
» * * V
Presidencies, the inadequate communications and the very diverse 
conditions prevailing in the different parts of the country made the 
Governors very powerful in their own Presidency. Further, it was 
the policy of the Court of Directors not to allow the Presidencies to 
become mere provinces under the Supreme Government. In confor­
mity with this policy the Presidency Governors were authorised to 
communicate separately with the Court of Directors and to receive
"4lbert, Sir C. , The Government of Ind ia , p. 65.
2M isra, B .B ., The Central Administration of the East India Company.
p p .38-39. 
^Ibid.
direct instructions from the Court.
Under the Governor in Council in Madras ^ functioned three 
Boards, namely, the Board of Revenue, the Board of Trade and the 
Military Board. These boards were composed of four members and 
each was presided over by a member of the Council and the M ilitary 
Board by the Commander in Chief. The Board of Revenue exercised 
superintendence of revenue and control of a ll revenue offic ia ls.
The Board of Trade looked after the commercial in terests  of the 
Company and the M ilitary Board supervised the adm inistration of 
the army. Each Board submitted to the Governor in Council its  
annual reports and advised the Government on a ll points related 
to its  respective jurisdiction. The Government of Fort St. George 
functioned through a central Secretariat consisting of three 
departm ents, the Secret, Political and Foreign Department, the 
Revenue, Judicial and Public Department, and the M ilitary Depart­
ment. At the head of the Secretariate was a Chief Secretary with 
thBee subordinate secre taries. Through the Secretariat and the 
Board of Revenue the Governor in Council maintained a close touch 
with the D istrict Officers and the Collectors -  the head of the 
d istric t adm inistration.
In his term of office Bentinck had to deal with four 
Governors General -  W ellesley (1798-1805), Cornwallis (July 
to October 1805), Sir George Barlow (1805 to July 1807) and 
Minto (1807 to 1813). His Council consisted  of William Petrie, 
John Chamier and Lt. General Sir John Stuart -  a ll of whom had 
long experience of service in India. Among them Petrie was the 
most senior.
Bentinck accepted his position in India at a time when the 
adm inistration of Madras Presidency was in a fluid condition. 
Between the years 1793 to 1801 the Government of Fort St.George 
had acquired vast territories and rendered the previous administr­
ative set-up  of the Presidency ineffective. A v ital problem arose 
concerning the settlem ent of land, the main source of Government 
revenue. From 1793 Cornw allis's Permanent Zamindary System was 
the avowed land policy of the British authorites in India. But the 
Zamindary Settlement was found unsuited to the recently acquired 
vast territories in Madras Presidency. This posed a question of 
great magnitude to Bentinck's adm inistration, namely, with whom 
should the land settlem ent be made, on what principles and for how 
long ; The adm inistration of ju stice  was sim ilarly beset with new 
problems. Cornw allis's judicial reforms of 1793 had been extended
to certain d istric ts in the Madras Presidency in 1802, Should this 
be extended to the newly acquired territo ries?
Further, the establishm ent of a Supreme Court in  Madras in 
1801 with separate jurisdiction had introduced a new problem in the 
administration of ju stice  by arousing a conflict between the Court 
and the Council. On the financial side the recurring defic it in bud­
get of the Government of Madras had reached a critical stage in 1803. 
Scarcity of specie and wide flow of diverse and debased coins 
were also to press hard upon the capabilities of the new Governor.
In addition to the problems of adm inistration, Bentinck was 
to shoulder immense political responsib ilities . One such responsi­
bility was the British relations with the Indian statoasiLiri^Mddrak 
Presidency, where British intervention should always be harmonised 
with the sovereign status of the C hiefs. Further, W ellesley 's  policy 
led to the commencement of British h o stilitie s  with the M arathas.
The Anglo-Maratha wars imposed upon the Madras Government the 
dual responsibilities of safeguarding the Presidency limits and of 
assisting  the British armies fighting against the Maratha strong­
holds. But the most alarming issue before the authorities of Madras 
in 1803 was the apprehension of a revival of French power in South 
India.
CHAPTER I 
THE FRENCH MENACE AND THE RELATIONS
WITH THE INDIAN STATES
The British dealings w ith the Indian rulers at the 
beginning of the 19th century were considerably influenced 
by the apprehension of a revival of French power in India.
The Anglo-French rivalry over Indian possessions w as guided, 
not so much by the happenings in  India, as by the turn of 
events in  Europe. This was the reason why suspicion of a 
French revival always disturbed the British, even after the ir 
most decisive victory over the  French a t the battle  of 
W andiwash, in 1760. The British fear that the French would 
attempt a return to the Indian scene w as rev italised  when a 
Republican France in Europe passed into the hands of a 
conqueror -  Napoleon. The British endeavours in Europe to 
put a check on Napoleon's power were crushed when the first 
European coalition against France had failed in 1797 and when 
Napoleon routed the main British a lly , Austria a t Rivoli. On 
the open se a s , in different parts of the world, the supremacy 
of England and her a llie s  was seriously  challenged by France 
and her dependants. Under th is  circumstance the British 
authority in India would naturally apprehend that the French
would renew their ac tiv ities  in  India, where the strength of
the British Empire lay and where they had an in terest of their
own. The danger of collaboration between some of the
am bitious, powerful Indian rulers and the French with the
object of overthrowing the British rule in  India could by no
means be ruled out. *
When W ellesley became the Governor General of India,
in 1798/ he w as profoundly influenced by th is  fear of French
intrigues with the Indian ru lers, especially  with the  rulers of
Maraiha Kingdoms, Mysore and Hyderabad. In fac t, between
1798 and 1799 there were diplomatic overtures between the
2French and Tipu, the ruler of M ysore. The security of British 
possessions in India a t that point therefore, led W ellesley to  
adopt tough lin es . "It Is absolutely necessary  for the defeat of 
these  ( i .e .  the French) designs", declared George Barlow, the 
Chief Secretary of the Supreme Government in 1803, "that no
‘ 1Sen, S .P .,  The French in  Ind ia . 1763-1816, V ol.II, p .559. 
2 - , ,  .
native sta te  should be left to ex ist in India which is  not
upheld by the British power and the political control of which
is  not under its  absolute control. ^  W ellesley thus adopted
a policy of aggrandisement in respect of the Indian rulers and
2developed a system of subsidiary a lliance . The essen tia l 
object of W ellesley 's subsidiary alliance treaty  w as to  eradic­
a te  French influence from the Indian courts and the expulsion of 
French mercenaries like Perron a t Poona and Raymond a t 
Hyderabad from services of the ir Indian m asters. W ellesley 
further thought of sending an expedition to the French-occupied 
Is le  of France (Mauritius) to prevent the French from building 
it  as  a stronghold for the invasion of Indian co asts . Out of the
^Barlow to W ellesley , 12th July 1803, M. M artin, W ellesley 
D espatches, V ol.Ill, p. 187.
2The essence of a subsidiary treaty  was security  a t the price of 
dependence on the British. This system implied that the Indian 
powers woul d maintain a subsidiary native force commanded by 
British officers within their te rrito ries . The force, though i t  w as 
fully under the Company's control, the Indian ru ler would bear 
a ll its  expenses. Further, a British Resident w as to be stationed 
in the Court of the protected ruler and the la tte r would have no 
right to negotiate w ith any of the Indian or foreign powers without 
consulting the British Government. The advantage of th is  a lliance 
on the  Company's side was thfet, if  the allied  s ta tes  defaulted or 
desired to resume their independence the subsidiary force w as 
ready at the heart of their dominion to enforce the Company's 
in te re s ts . In internal affa irs , however, the allied  s ta te s  remained 
free from interference. Spear, P. India, p p .221-2 & Roberts, P.E. 
India under W elles ley , p .35.
fear of a growth of secret design on India between France 
and her ally  Holland, in  the Dutch East Ind ies, W ellesley 
contemplated a British occupation there a lso . And in 1801, 
he sen t a force from British India to the Red Sea under Sir 
David Baird to a s s is t  the English forces in  Egypt against 
Napoleon. *
The Peace of Amiens, concluded in March 1802, brought
a temporary cessa tion  of hostilities  between France and England
in Europe. By the terms of the Peace, England undertook to
return to the French their possessions in India, e .g .  Pondicherry,
M ahe, C alicut, Karikal and Chandemagore. But W ellesley w as
so doubtful about the peace lasting  and so suspicious about the
anti-B ritish attitude of the French in  India that he even took the
risk  of disobeying the orders of the home authorities and retained
the French posts in India under British control. In 1803 W ellesley '
apprehension was confirmed, when he received the in telligence
of some secret understanding between France and the Batavian
Republic of Holland, by which the Dutch possessions in  Cochin,
2
on the M alabar Coast were to be ceded to the French in  India.
^Roberts, F .E .,  India under W ellesley , p p .148-9.
2
Auber, P. Rise and Progress of the British Power in  Ind ia , V ol.II, 
p . 269.
This convinced W ellesley of the n ecessity  of extreme caution 
and vigilance in safeguarding not only the M alabar Coast, but 
also  the coast of Coromandel where some other Dutch se ttle ­
ments like Puli cat Tranquebar and Tuticyrorjexisted.
Besides French m enace, the recommencement of Maratha 
hostilities  in  1803 and the ex istence of a number of important 
Indian s ta tes  whose princes were capable of intriguing against 
the British in te re s ts , made W ellesley  greatly concerned about 
the m ilitary and political affairs of the South Indian te rrito rie s . 
At th is  v ital moment Bentinck reached Madras as the Governor, 
in August 1803. Of a ll the political and military issu es  of 1803 , 
the Government of Madras was primarily and directly responsible 
for the security of the Coromandel and M alabar co asts . Bentinck 
seemed to be peculiarly suited for th is ta sk . His military up­
bringing helped him in  taking precautionary m easures against 
any French move. He had an additional advantage of seeing the 
Napoleonic armies in action in  Europe.  ^ W ellesley a lso  fe lt  that 
Bentinck in Madras w as the right person to rea lise  the gravity of 
a French aggression in India. He informed the Court of Directors
^Bentinck's M inute, 14-th October 1805, Sec. Cons. B .P.
of h is expectation of receiving Bentinck's "'most cordial
and invariable support and cooperation" against any French 
1m enace.
W ellesley 's  anticipations were ju stified , for soon after
Bentinck's arrival in M adras, the Government of India came to
know about the renewal of w ar in  Europe in  September 1803.
The home authorities were alarmed of the safety of India and
directed the Madras Government to capture "any French ships
or v esse ls  or any forts or possessions which the French may
have in  IndiaJl in order to ensure the complete protection of the
2trade and dominions of the Company. As regards the Indian 
possessions of France's a lly  -  the Dutch, the home authorities
3
were in  favour of adopting sim ilar m easures. At the sudden 
outbreak of h o stilitie s  in Europe, Bentinck also  became anxious.
^W ellesley to the Court of D irectors, December D espt. 1803, B.P.
2
Letter from the Sec. Comm, to the Gov. Gen. in  Coun. and Govs, 
of Madras and Bombay, 16th May, 1803. Board's Draft of Sec. 
Letters to India, Vol.II.
3
Letters from the Sec. Comm, to the Gov. Gen. in  Coun. and Govs, 
of M adras and Bombay, 23rd June, 1803. Board's Draft of Sec. 
Letters to India, Vol.II
The Coromandel and M alabar coasts were dangerously exposed
to foreign a ttack s. To C astlereagh he w rote; "'It seems than
w ith regard to naval defence, that th is Presidency is  open to
attack  and I am sorry to add that its  m ilitary defence is  not
more adequate. The available force in Madras w as 1600
European Infantry and 2800 Indian Infantry, 60 European Cavalry
and 150 Indian Cavalry. Bentinck considered th is  force in
Madras establishm ent as insufficient and even not equal to
2the French force at M auritius. Apart from th a t, the availab le  
force in Madras was so scattered  over the country that it w as
L
difficult to collect them at short notice to meet an emergency. 
Bentinck was further fifraid of the defenceless s ta te  of Fort St. 
George which "from the badness of works (construction) and 
the defective sta te  of artillery (cannon),f would not be able to  
repulse any enemy attack on the South-Eastern coast. Bentinck 
warned the Governor General tha t in case of h o stilities  w ith 
France the defence of Madras would be "a subject of much anxiety
3
and consideration".
* Bentinck to C astlereagh, 12th Sept. 1803, B.P.
^Ibid.
3Bentinck to W ellesley, 2.0th Sept. 1803, B.P.
Bentinck was deeply concerned w ith the po litical, 
m ilitary and financial aspec ts  of the French m enace. The 
Anglo-Marafta conflict started  afresh in August, 1803 and the 
neighbouring Maratha chiefs were eagerly waiting for an 
opportunity to attack  and plunder the British territo ries. A 
junction between the French and the M arathas was thus highly 
probable and Bentinck believed that the French would try to 
find out a favourable locationr from where it  would be easy
1to make secret communication and union with the M arathas.
Such location would undoubtedly be some weak parts on the
coasta l region. But the pecuniary position handicapped
Bentinck from adopting m easures for the complete safety of the
co asts . The financial stra in  of w ar w ith Mysore and conflicts
w ith the  M arathas was strongly felt throughout British India
2
and particularly in M adras, leading to enormous defic it. It 
w as thus difficult for Bentinck to spare sufficient funds for the 
defence of the Presidency. Besides M adras, Bentinck w as also
^Bentinck to  W ellesley, 2.0th Sept. 1803 , B.P.
2Bentinck to Castlereagh, fftYi Sept. 1805, B.P.
worried about the vulnerability of Ceylon. If the French could 
occupy Ceylon, they would cause constant alarm to the  British 
authority in  India. Moreover,the French would also  obstruct 
and damage the British commerce in the East by using Ceylon 
as  their base . 1
Simultaneously, however, Bentinck received various 
alarming reports about the French movements. One Captain 
Page of Frigate Caroline reported that a French Squadron w ith
22500 troops on board had sailed towards the Cape in  July 1803. 
Captain Hawkins of Madras establishm ent, who had ju s t 
arrived from a v is it to the Is la  of France, informed Bentinck that the 
French Ftigates Atlante and Belle Poule were preparing to sa il
3
towards the East by July 1803. Some English prisoners, who 
la te ly  returned from the Isle  of France, stated  that the French 
"were preparing for an  expedition to Ceylon and probably against 
Penang or some other British settlem ents in the East. ” Information 
reached from the authorities in England that a French fleet with
^"Bentinck to W ellesley , 20th Sept. 1803 , B.P.
2 Bentinck to C astlereagh, 12th Sept. 1803, B.P.
3
Capt. Hawkins to Bentinck, 6th July 1804, W .P.
5000 troops had left French coast fo n d e s t  Indies. The 
home authorities in fact believed that the ultim ate destination 
of the fleet w as not the W est Indies but the East Indies. *
Such w as also  Bentinck's own apprehension. "If Bonaparte 
intends to make colonial war/' he observed, "he w ill certainly
9
send troops to India.
Bentinck w as , however, not upset with th is information.
He carefully calculated the preventive m easures and employed 
them w ith promptitude. By the Peace of Ainiens 1802, the 
British authorities were to resto re  to the French the ir p o ssess­
ions in  India. Accordingly on 15th June 1803, the French 
Republican Frigate Belle Poule under Captain Binot had arrived 
a t the Coast of Madras to receive  the return of the French 
Settlement of Pondicherry. But on the instruction of Lord 
W ellesley , the Madras Government postponed the restitu tion
3
of Pondicherry. When ho stilitie s  followed the Peace of Amiens
1 Letter from the Sec. Comm, to the Gov. Gen. and the Govs, of 
Mad. and Bombay, 4th June, 1805, Board's Draft of Sec. Letters 
to India, Vol.III.
2Bentinck to M aitland, 3rd Nov. 1805, B.P.
3
Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in Coun. 18th June 1803. 
Beng. Sec. 6c Pol. Cons. 10th Nov. 1803, V ol.119, N o .44.
In Europe, Bentinck on 6th September 1803, ordered His 
M ajesty 's  23rd Regiment to march to Pondicherry. The French 
detachment there was thus arrested and the prisoners including 
Col. Binot were temporarily removed to Poonamalle from where 
they were sent back to France on 1st November, 1803.*
The Dutch Settlement of Cochin, next drew Bentinck's 
a ttention. "Cochin was exposed to invasion”, he commented 
to W ellesley, "and very favourable for a French establishm ent. " 
The rebellious M alabar country in  the neighbourhood made the 
position of Cochin especia lly  favourable for any French design. 
W ellesley him self was aware of the danger and it  was a t  h is 
order that the Government of Madras demolished in  October 1803 
the Dutch fortifications in Cochin and the French fortifications 
in  Karikal. The M dlabar coast was thus rendered unfavourable 
for the French disembarkation to a certain extent. Regarding the 
Coromandel coast, Bentinck adopted sim ilar m easures and 
ordered the destruction of the Dutch Settlements of Pulicat and
*Gov. in Coun. Mad. to the Sec. Com. 6th O ct. 1803. See
Letters from Fort St. George, V ol.2 , Series I,
2Bentinck to W ellesley, 20th Sept. 1803, B.P.
Tuticyron. * Further the situation  of Tanjore, a weak native
sta te  on the Coromandel coast, appeared to Bentinck a  suitable
spot for landing of the enemy. Hence, the Commander-in-
Chief of M adras, Sir John Stuart, felt it  necessary  to keep a
substan tial British force in  the fort of Tanjore. Bentinck shared
the views of the Commander-in-Chief and convinced the Raja
of Tanjore, the owner of the Fort, of the necessity  of stationing
British troops there for the sake of the Raja's own safety as
2w ell as for the preservation of British in te re s ts . The Tanjore 
Fort was therefore occupied by the British and a number of 
Tanjore Provincial Battalions were ra ised  and placed under the 
command of Captain Butler.
By that tim e, the Government of Madras received an  
alarming intelligence from the m ilitary sources that the French 
were considering to despatch forces from the Is le  of France to India.
*Gov. in  Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in Coun. 5th O ct. 1803. Beng. 
Sec. & Pol. Cons. 29th Dec. 1803, Vol. 121, No. 100,
2Gov. in  Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in Coun. 21st Sept. 1803. Beng 
Sec. 6c Pol. Cons. 29th Dec. 1803, V ol.121, N o .92.
3
Minute of Sir John Stuart, Comm, in Chief, 13th Sept. 1803, Beng. 
Sec. of Pol. Cons. 29th Dec. 1803. V ol.121, N o .93.
This prompted Bentinck to take necessary  steps to prevent 
the  enemy from landing in the  coasta l a reas . Posting of troops 
a ll around the coastal border seemed to Bentinck the most politic 
measure which should be adopted firs t. But the military strength 
of Madras fe ll short of the requirem ents of the situation . The 
maximum force that could be collected in an emergency w as the 
sm all detachment of a European and Indian Cavalry and a detach­
ment of European and Indian Infantry of approximately 4500 men. 
To meet the deficiency of th is  force, the Commander in Chief 
suggested the employment of men from the civil adm inistration 
meaning the Peons (who collected revenue in  the villages) and the 
d istric t w atchers or guards. The duties of these  civil employees 
would essen tia lly  be to keep watch on the coastal regions and 
to  prevent the enemy from communicating or concluding any 
agreement with the inhabitants of these  p laces. In Case of 
emergency, the Commander-in-Chief further suggested the 
raising of corps of irregular cavalry and infantry and advocated 
an  increase of cavalry in the Madras army.* Bentinck enthus­
ia s tica lly  supported the recommendations of Stuart and promptly
* Minute of Sir John Stuart, 13th Sept. 1803, Beng. Sec. & Pol.
Cons. 29th Dec. 1803, Vol. 121, No. 93.
instructed the collectors of the maritime d istric ts  to adopt
eyery possible measure to prevent the intercourse between
an invading army and the local inhabitants. * The collectors
were a lso  authorised to employ the Peons as guard and to ra ise
2irregular Indian cavalry and infantry.
In March 1804 news reached Bentinck that a French
Squadron under the Command of Admiral L inais, attacked the
English establishm ent a t Bancoolen on the southern coast of
Sumatra, capturing two v e sse ls , burning a few others and
3
inflicting considerable damage on the English. This action 
of the French Admiral appeared to  Bentinck an obvious attem pt 
to capture the rich China convoy of the English company 
expected to start from Canton in January 1804 with a cargo
4
worth £200, 000. Bentinck felt concerned for the protection 
of valuable British trade in the Eastern se a s . He immediately
*Bentinck's M inute, 17th Sept. 1803. Board of Rev. Proc.
22nd Sept. 1803. Ran. 287, Vol. 42.
2Goy. in  Coun. Mad. to the Sec. Comm. 23rd Mar. 1804, See. 
Letters from Fort St George, Vol. 5, 1804-9.
3
Gov. in  Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in  Coun. 23rd March 1804, 
Beng. See & Pol. Cons. 17th May, 1804, V ol.136, N o .277.
^Sen, S. P .,  French in Ind ia , 1763-1816, V ol.II, p .569.
ordered Albion and Sceptre, two of His M ajesty 's sh ip s , to
sa il in  pursuit of the enemy. * The French Squadron at
Bencoolen, however, did not stay  there for long and sailed
away towards Batavia. Bentinck's endeavour for the safety
of British trade in  the Eastern seas  were highly praised by
W ellesley , who expressed h is  Hentire and most cordial
approbation i>f the zea l, judgment and promptitude manifested
2by the Right Honourable Lord Bentinck. " For the protection
of valuable British trade Bentinck further requested the British
3
Admiralty to station a convoy on the Indian Ocean. The
lack of vigilance of His M ajesty 's  ships w as considered by
4Bentinck "inadequate effectually to  control the situation . "
The threat to British trade in  the  Indian Ocean im pressed 
Bentinck with the necessity  of obtaining prior information w ith 
regard to the French movements. In h is opinion it was difficult
*Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Admiral Rainier, 23rd March, 1804. 
Beng. Sec. 6c Pol. Cons. 17th May, 1804, Vol. 136, N o .279.
2
Gov. Gen. in  Coun. to Gov. in Coun. Mad. 1st May, 1804. 
Beng. Sec & Pol. Cons. 17th May, 1804, Vol. 136, N o .280.
3
Gov. in  Coun. Mad. to Admiral Rainier, 4th Feb. 1804, Beng. 
Sec & Pol. Cons. 26th April 1804, ¥ol. 134, N o .275 B.
4
Bentinck's M inute, 22nd May, 1804, Beng. Sec. 6c Pol. Cons. 
14th June 1804, Vol. 140, No. 18.
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for the British authorities to know the intentions and move­
ments of the enemy "until they did something arrogant to the 
British trade or they were arrested in their progress by the skill 
and activity  of the naval commanders, To avert th is difficulty, 
he felt that the Dutch Settlement of Tranquebar w ithin the 
jurisd iction  of the Tanjore State could be used as a channel 
of information. He had a strong suspicion that this Dutch 
Settlement had links with the French as w ell as with the Raja 
of Tanjore. Though British relations with the Raja of Tanjore 
were otherwise normal Bentinck suspected the existence of a 
league between the Raja and the French. To find an answer to
both the problems Bentinck decided to appoint a British agent 
2at Tranquebar. Accordingly, in May 1804, C ol.C ullen was 
sent to Tranquebar as a Resident at the R aja 's court, with the 
instruction that his views should be directed to the intercourse 
subsisting between tesafr&ia&e Tranquebar and other foreign
3
settlem ents. The Supreme Government fully agreed to th is 
decision . ^
^Bentinck's M inute, 22nd May 1804, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons.
14th June 1804, V ol.140, N o .8,
^Ibid.
3Ch. Secy. Govt, of Mad. to Lt. Col. Cullen, 22nd May 1804, Beng. 
Sec. & Pol.C ons. 14th June 1804, Vol. 140 No. 19.
^V ellesley  to Bentinck, 18th June 1804, W .P .
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With regard to the French m enace, however, the Portuguese
colony at Goa attracted the most serious attention of Bentinck.
"It appears that a French force landed a t Goa", he observed,
"would be enabled to do us more serious Injury than they could
from any other spot within our territories on either side of the
Peninsula."* The greatest danger emerging from a possible
French landing at Goa would be an immediate contact of the
French with the M arathas." The Maratha ch ie fs ,"  he concluded,
2"would give them all the assis tan ce  which they might require." 
British authorities both in India and at home, unanimously ack­
nowledged the n ecessity  of preventing Goa from passing into the 
French hands. Lord Hobart, the Foreign Secretary of State to His 
M ajesty, foreshadowed a French attempt on the Indian se ttle ­
ment of Portugal. W ellesleyrs apprehension ran in  the same 
direction and in August 1803 he asked the British envoy a t Goa 
to negotiate for the admission of British troops to the garrison
3
of Goa. Subsequently, a strong British force was despatched
*Bentinck's M inute, 3rd Nov. 1805, Sec. Cons. B .P.
2Ibid.
3
Minute of Jonathan Duncan, Gov. of Bombay, 19th O ct. 1805. 
Beng.Sec. & Pol.C ons. 29rh N ov .1805, V ol.179, N o .85.
from Bombay for the defence of Goa and the safety  of which was 
thtis secured .
In 1805 the Government of Bombay received information
that a French contingent w as proceeding towards Goa and
W estern India. In face of such a direct danger the Bombay
Government doubted the capability of the Portuguese authorities
in  employing the British troops a t Goa against the French. If
they fa iled , the effect would endanger the British position in
Bombay, Gujrat and Surat. The Governor of Bombay, Jonathan
Duncan, was especially  concerned about the safe ty  of Bombay,
which would then be exposed "to the most eminent risk  of
passing into the hands of the F re n c h .^ In  October, 1805, he
decided therefore to bring back immediately the Bombay troops
stationed a t Goa for the security  of Bombay, Gujarat and Surat. *
Bentinck, who always considered Goa a s  the safe ty  valve
of Madras Presidency, w as vehemently opposed to th is  decision
of the Governor of Bombay and urged him to rea lise  the necessity
2
of the defence of Goa. The occupation of Goa, Bentinck asse rted ,
*Minute of the Governor of Bombay, 19th O ct. 1805, Beng. Sec.
& Pol. Cons. 29th Nov. 1805. Vol. 179, N o .85.
2
Bentinck to Duncan, 4th Nov. 1805, B.P.
would be the "greatest consequence for the security  of our
empire and more specially  for th is  particular Presidency (M adras)".
In Bentinck's opinion the danger would not be so serious if  the
French landed in any other part of the coast line. For in  that case ,
the British authority would remain in  between the M araihas and
the French and would prevent contact between them. But he w as
convinced that a French landing in Goa woiild foster a  Franco-M araiha
understanding and would be ruinous to the safe ty  of M adras.
The security of Goa appeared to him so important that in sp ite
of the  insufficient military strength of M adras, he decided to
replace the Bombay troops in the garrison of Goa, by a  Madras
force.* The Commander in  Chief, John Cradock, who succeeded
Stuart, could not approve of th is . He did not believe th a t the
Madras establishm ent had the means of sending "a sufficient
body of troops to occupy that post (Goa) and to  replace with
effect the garrison drawn from thence by the Governor of Bombay. "
He suggested making a forcible representation to the  Governor of
Bombay to suspend the evacuation of Bombay troops from Goa for 
2some tim e. But a mere representation did not seem sufficient
*Bentinck's M inute, 3rd Nov. 1805, Sec. C ons. B. P.
^Cradock's M inute, 3rd Nov. 1805, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons.
29th Nov. 1805. Vol. 179, N o .51.
to Bentinck and he remained firm in  h is own decision . In
November 1805, he directed the commanding officer of
M alabar to prepare His M ajesty 's  80th Regiment to s ta r t for
Goa. The Resident of Travancore was a lso  asked to keep
ready two Indian battalions for the same purpose. * Finally,
in 1806, after a futile attempt to re ta in  some of the Bombay
troops, the  Madras detachment consisting of His M ajesty 's
80th Regiment and two Indian battalions replaced the former,
2at Goa. Last of a ll, Bentinck made contact with Admiral
Edward Pellew of the British Naval Squadron and impressed
hpon him the necessity  of assuming a covering position in
3
Trincomally a t Ceylon.
The measures thus adopted by Bentinck as safeguard 
against the French were w ell considered and m ilitary sound.
The m easures were largely what W ellesley desired and he 
heartily  approved of them. Throughout h is stay  in India 
W ellesley was always anxious about the possible French
1 Chief Secy, of Mad. Govt, to  William Clerk, British Envoy at 
Goa, 3rd Nov. Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 29th Nov. 1805, V ol.179, 
N o .86.
2 Gov. in Coun. Mad. to  the  Sec. Comm. 12th Feb. 1806, See* 
Letters from Fort St George Vol. 2, 1804-9.
3Edward Pellew to Barlow, 1st May 1806, Beng. Sec. & Pol.
Cons. 29th May, 1806, Vol. 189, N o .15.
attack  on India. During the in itia l years of h is Governor
Generalship (1799-1803) he put too much emphasis on the
possib ility  of French reappearance. In 1804, however, he
recovered to a certain extent from his great concern and
expressed the view that a French offensive in  India might
not be very imminent. * But he always believed in the ability
of the French power to advance towards India. He w as s t i l l
cautious and w as "extremely anxious to provide the means of
vigorous defence or of ac tive  attack  against what remains of
2French or Dutch power in  th is  quarter of the globe. " W ellesley
attached so much importance to French danger that he
complained of the indifference of the home au thorities, as
they did not reciprocate his concern. "Indian politics are in
'tke,
such a sta te  at home”, he commented to Bentinck, "that^utmost
3
danger may be apprehended.Jl Bentinck shared W ellesley 's  
anxiety  for security  measures hut differed on the imminence of 
the French a ttack . He believed that France would prefer to 
launch a direct a ttack  on England rather than on her colonies.
^W ellesley to Bentinck, 20th July 1804, W. P. 
2Ibid.
Napoleon, in  his opinion, w as too much engrossed with
European affairs to undertake adventures in the East. But
as Bonaparte was not certain about England's m ilitary strength,
he could attempt a diversion of the regular English force by
fa lse  or real a ttack  on the colonies. Such a diversion would
remove a considerable part of the best defensive forces of
England. * Bentinck thus agreed w ith the prevalent English
opinion that England and not her colonies would be the real
target of the French. For th is  reason he did not accuse the
home authorities of their cold a ttitude . The military upbringing
of Bentinck taught him to take no chances with the enemy and
therefore, he promptly devoted him self to devising safe ty
m easures. His anxiety and exertions for ensuring protection
against the French menace were undoubtedly sincere. "We
have done a ll w ithin our power", he w rote, "all that our duty
2demands from u s .
During the la ter years of Bentinck's s tay  in  Madras the  
French menace was rapidly diminishing. It was not only because
* Bentinck's M inute, l&th O ct. 1804, See. Cons. B.P. 
2 Ibid.
Bentinck had completed h is preparations for the prevention of 
French a ttack , but a lso  for a change of situation  in th e  European 
po litics . In 1806 and 1807, Napoleon w as dominating the 
European politics and concentrating a ll his energies on the 
European questions. Thomas Grenville, a member of the  Board 
of Control, wrote to Bentinck in July 1806* "The European war 
does not appear in  its  continuance to be such as is  likely to 
affect the internal sta te  of India. Such was also  the feeling 
hi India. Governor General George Barlow, W ellesley ’s successo r, 
stated  that his Government "entertain no apprehension for the 
safety of any part of our territorial possessions or for the tran­
quility  of Ind ia . From the operations of the French squadron,
2supposed to have been originally destined to^East Ind ies. H 
The gradual disappearance of the French menace a t that point 
coincided with the end of the Anglo-Maratha conflict. The 
Supreme Government and the home authorities were in  favour 
of u tilising  th is  tranquility for an  improvement in the finances.
^Grenville to Bentinck, 2 9th July 1806, B.P.
2Gov. Gen. in  Coun. to Gov. in  Coun. Mad. 24th May 180.6.
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 29th May 1806, Vol. 189, No. 18.
They felt that the m ilitary expenses of Madras could be
reduced without much danger and the safety  of the Indian
seas could be entrusted to His M ajesty 's  fleet.'*'
In M adras, Bentinck too; was thinking in the direction
of economy rather than increasing the defence expenditure.
At the beginning of 1806, Bentinck suggested a considerable
reduction in the establishm ent of Madras army. The reduction
w as inspired not merely by the financial consideration but by
the hope that Madras was comparatively free from the fear of
an a ttack  of the Indian or European powers. To Castlereagh,
Bentinck wrote; "We are under no apprehension of any attack
2
from the French in India. " In Noveiaber 1806 Bentinck felt 
that the French danger w as alm ost over. "It is  only n e c e ssa ry / 
he w rote, "that we shall be prepared to cooperate in  such manner 
as future events may require for the safety of the passessions
3
under our au thority . "
*Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in  Coun. M ad. 7th Aug. 1806. 
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 7th Aug. 1806, Vol. 193, N o .63.
2Bentinck to C astlereagh, 11th May 1806, B.P.
3
Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in  Coun. 29th Nov. 1806f 
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 24th Dec. 1806, Vol. 198, N o .54*
During the Governorship of Bentinck, the apprehension 
of a French a ttack  coincided with the Maraiha wars -  and the  
two together formed an alarming situation for the British authority 
in India. The w arlike, powerful and audacious Maraiha chiefs 
constituted the mofet imminent threat to the security  of the British 
possessions in  India and a  greaterdanger than  the designs of the 
French. The Anglo-Maraiha conflict progressed in  the North , 
where General Lake w as entrusted by the Supreme Government 
with the task  of subduing the Marafha ch iefs. In the South,
Lord W ellesley  engagdd his brother Arthur W ellesley , the 
Commander in Chief of Mysore army, with unlimited m ilitary 
and political power to deal w ith the M arathas.  ^ Bentinck 
assumed the charge of Madras adm inistration a t that critical 
stage of the Anglo-Maraiha conflict. As the Governor of the 
Madras Presidency Bentinck had naturally to share the respon­
sib ility  of making arrangements for the supply of the  British 
forces against the ftlaraihas. But his most significant role w as 
to keep an alert eye on the progress of the conflict and to adopt
^Gleig, G.R. , History of the British Empire In India, Vol.II, 
p . 189.
specific  measures of defence for the Madras Presidency and 
the neighbouring British a llie s .
All over India, there were five principal Maratha houses 
engaged in a confederacy. The Peshwa at Poona was the titu lar 
head of the M arathas who controlled the W estern India. In 
Gujrat, the Gaekwar family had established itse lf  at Baroda.
The Bhonsle chiefs with their capital at Nagpur were sometimes 
called the Raja of Berar. The Scindhias of Gwalior and the 
Holkars of Indore were two other Maratha families of rather 
inferior rank than the former three, but they had gradually gained 
power and prestige. The confederacy of the Marathas was always 
loose and the chiefs were often engaged in conflict with esch 
other to acquire supremacy. Dowlut Rao Scindhia and Racjhujbu 
Bhonsle II, though nominally acknowledged the supremacy of 
the Peshwa, often raised in arms against him. Tacoji Holkar 
was also  trying hard to become the most powerful force among 
a ll other Maratha chifefs. However, their approach to the British 
was a ll the time hostile , though actual hostilities did not start 
with them until W ellesley 's arrival in India. From the beginning 
W ellesley 's  concern for the safety of British Indian possessions
prompted him to court a close connection with the Maralha 
powers. He made offers to induce them to enter into his 
sy sten /o f defensive a lliance and mutual guarantee" on several 
occasions. But his offers to the Peshwa in 1798, 1799 and 1800, 
and to jScindhla in  1801 proved to be of no av a il. * The power­
ful Maraiha chiefs were obviously unwilling to allow a foreign 
power to  interfere in  their domestic affa irs . "H itherto"f W eUesley 
commented in  1800, "either the capricious temper of Baji Rao pr 
some remains of the characteristic  Jealousy of the nation with
2
regard to foreign relations have frustrated my object and view s. " 
Considering the m ilitant French policy in  Europe and the possib­
ility  of a French attack  on India, W ellesley was eager to estab lish  
a complete internal security of the British authority in  India. The 
keynote of h is policy was thus "to avert war and to estab lish  tran­
quility" a ll over India through the establishm ent of subsidiary
3
a lliances with the Indian ru lers.
^Roberts, P .E. . India under W ellesley , p .186.
2
W ellesley to the Sec. Comm, of the Court of D irectors, 9th June, 
1800, W ellesley D espatches. Vol.H, p .272.
3
W ellesley 's  M inute, 12th August 1798, cited in Srinivaschari,
C .S . The Inwardness of the British Annexations in  India, p .m .
W ellesley could not allow the strongest of the native
powers in India -  the M araihas -  to remain outside British
influence. A sudden change in  the course of Maraiha affairs
afforded W ellesley an  opportunity to in tervene. Nana Fadnavis,
the shrewd, old Maraiha statesm an, who had so long success—
fully resis ted  a ll British interference in M araiha a ffa irs , and
who tiled  h is utmost to preserve the Maraiha confederacy, died
a t Poona on 13th March 1800. With h is death, the British
Resident a t Poona, Col. Palmer rightly rem arked, "has departed
1
all the wisdom and moderation of the  Maraiha Government. u
The death of Nana Fadnavis, in  fac t, removed the la s t check
on the disruptive tendencies of the Maraiha ch iefs. Scindhia
and Holkar entered into a fierce struggle for supremacy and
control over the Peshwa at Poona** Holkar won a decisive
victory over the main army of Peshwa and a portion of the forces
2of Scindhia in  1802. The Peshwa, who had so long refused to 
accept a  subsidiary a lliance  with the British, helptessly appealed 
to W ellesley for protection against h is y a ssa ls . On 31st December
*Duff, J .G . ,  History of the M ahrafcas, Vol.II, p .350.
2
Petrie's Minute, June, 1803, Sec. Cons. B.P.
1802, by signing the Treaty of Bassein with Peshwa, W ellesley 
succeeded in realising his object to estab lish  control over the 
M arathas. The effect of the Treaty of Bassein was undoubtedly 
very great. The submission of the head of the maratha powers 
to the British Government was bound to make the position of the 
subordinate Maratha chiefs quite vulnerable. The treaty of 
Bassein was bitterly resented by the Maratha Chiefs as  an absolute 
surrender of their national independence. For the time being 
their patriotism rose above their mutual jea lousies and they 
presented a united front against the British. Scindia and the 
Raja of Berar combined together and invited Holkar to join with 
them. Even Peshwa, who regretted the treaty  with the British, 
secretly  communicated h is support to the coalition. But the 
Maratha coalition could not function effectively; Scindhia and 
the Raja of Berar delayed in mobilising their troops and Holkar 
preferred to remain netnfcral. *
H ostilities started early in the month of August 1803 and 
it was on the side of the Deccan that the first blow was struck.
*Duff, J .G . , History of the M ahrattas, V ol.II, p p .383-5.
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On 12th August, Major General W ellesley captured Ahmednagar
on the Nizam 's frontier and advanced towards Aurangabad against
the Berar army. Bentlnck, who had recently arrived at M adras,
did not have much time to understand the gravity of the military
situation and his own responsib ilities . His military training
enabled him to a s se ss  the military tac tics  of the M arathas and
their strength. Bentlnck had confidence In the ability  of Major
General W ellesley and at the same time had no Illusion about
the strength of the Maratha arm ies. In his opinion, the Marathas
who had adopted the system of European warfare by leaving aside
their traditional tac tics  of sudden cavalry charge, would not be
able to  re s is t British attacks for long.* He believed that in
discipline and action the British army was infinitely  superior to
that of the M arathas. Such a superior British army, he held ,
"would overtake and overcome a bad infantry incumbered by
numerous artillery , to which their (the Marathas) irregular cavalry
2could be of no support." Thus, Bentlnck did not consider the 
anti-B ritish coalition of Scindhia and the Raja of Berar as formidable.
1Bentlnck to C astlereagh, 12th September, 1804, B.P. 
2Ibid.
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The joint Maratha armies gathered on the frontier of the Nizam's 
territory seemed really  alarming to  him. But what he w as most 
afraid of w as the possib ility  of a protracted war with the M araihas. 
He desired a quick end of the M araiha hostility . To C astlereagh 
he w rote; "It would have been desircc^ble that the Maratha war 
should have been terminated before the commencement of h o stilitie s  
in Europe.
Bentinck's confidence in  M ajor General W ellesley 's ability  
was soon strengthened by a complete victory of British arms over 
the combined forces of Scindhia and the Raja of Berar at Assey on 
23rd September 1803. H istorian Grant Duff described the battle  as
ir
a triumph "more splendid than any recorded in  t t e  Deccan history. " 
Following th is incident, Bentinck was jubilant when he heard about 
two successive  victories of the British forces at Argaon and 
Gawilgarh on 29th November and 15th December, 1803 respectively . 
While these  developments were taking place in the Deccan and the 
British troops from Bombay were overrunning Gujarat, General Lake 
was carrying on his operations with vigour and success against
3
Scindhia's possessions in North India. In course of a ll these
* Bentlnck to C astlereagh, 12th Sept. 1804, B.P.
^Duff, J h G .,  History of the MahraJbfeas. Vol.II, p .398.
3
Roberts, P.E. , India under W ellesley , p p .225-35.
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actions in  the South and in the North , the Madras Government
helped the British forces with men, money and supp lier. A
detachment of Madras troops under the command of Lt. Col.Harcourt
invaded Cuttack in  October, 1803. Bentlnck arranged a ll possible
ass is tan ce  to th is Madras detachm ent. He instructed the revenue
officers to keep the supply of money ready all the tim e. He even
permitted the collectors to obtain necessary amounts from the
general treasury of Madras and Masullpatam. *
VpUJatil now the British armies had defeated the M arathas
everywhere. The forces of Scindhia and Bhonsle were severely
defeated and compelled to conclude two separate  trea ties  with the
English. The la tter signed the trea ty  of Deogaon on 17th
December and the former concluded the treaty  of Surji Arjangaon
on 30th December, 1803. The perfortnance of the British army was
glorious and Bentlnck happily congratulated the Governor General
2"on the splendid and remarkable ach ievem en ts." F inally, on 
27th February, 1804, Scindhia entered into a subsidiary a lliance  
with the English, by which a British force of 6, 000 infantry was 
stationed near the frontiers of Scindhia. The M aratha chief was
^Chief Secy, of the M ad.G ovt, to Chief Secy, of the Beng. Govt.
5th Nov. 1803. Beng. Sec & Pol.C ons. 29th Dec. 1804, Vol. 121,
N o .262.
2
Gov. in Coun.M ad. to Gov. Gen. in  Coun. 29th Jan. 1804, Beng. 
Sec. & Pol.C ons. 26thA pril, 1804, Vol. 134, N o .262.
further prevented from having any connection with the French or
1
any other European power. Lord W ellesley  had every reason to
be sa tisfied  with the resu lts  of the M araiha w ars.
The M arathas could not swallow the disgrace silently*
However inim ical the M araiha chiefs might be to each other, the
leading principle of their politics had invariably been to exclude
the Europeans from every part of the ir empire. Holkar, who had so
long kept him self aloof from the w ar, suddenly took the field . In a
so le  effort he defeated the British forces under Col.M anson and
advanced as far as the plains of Rajputhna. With th is a ttack  in April
1804, the repose existing between the English and the M araihas was
IXidely disturbed. Bentinck in  Madras was immediately informed
about the actions of Holkar which were "manifestly hostile  to
(British)interests and the in te rests  of t'& U rallies, whose territories
were exposed to the plunder and violence of his (Holkar1 s) feudatory 
2troops. " Holkar in the meantime had entered the territories of the 
Raja of Jaipur, a British a lly . With such an  outbreak of ho stilitie s  
in Northern India, Bentinck turned h is attention towards the safety 
of the Deccan. In the Deccan, Holkar possessed  the fort of
^The copy of the Peace Treaty with Scindhia, 27th Feb. 1804,
Beng. Sec. & Pol.C ons. 7th June, 1804, V ol.138, N o.I.
2Extract of a le tte r of Capt. Sydenham to Bentinck, 12th May 1804, 
enclosed with Bentinck's le tte r  to W ellesley , 17th June 1804, W . P.
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Chandore situated in Bellary d is tric t, which was acknowledged 
to be a strong m ilitary post. B esides, Bentinck came to know by 
that tim e, that Haghujl Bhonsle had started intriguing with the 
Raja of Cuttack and was preparing for an attack  on the English 
possessions in O rissa. He a t  once instructed the Commanding 
Officer of the Northern Circars to co-operate with Col.Harcourt of 
the Madras establishm ent to frustrate the designs of Raghuji Bhonsle. 
Among a ll other ftfaraiha ch iefs, Bentinck was most apprehensive 
about Holkar whose bravery and ab ility  could create troubles of 
any dimension. "If he should continue to be su cc essfu l", Bentinck 
wrote to C astlereagh, "I fear the greater part of North India w ill be 
up in  arms, In view of th is  impending danger Bentinck resented
i
the failure of the British Residents a t the various Maraiha courts, 
in sending him information as to the actual Maraiha movements and 
ac tio n s  which might m aterially affect the security of the Madras 
Presidency, Many contradictory accounts of the hostile  d ispositions 
of the Maraiha chiefs came to him through different channels -  
from p laces like Nagpur, Gwalior and Hyderabad. Such scattered  
in telligences and rumours increased  h is anxiety for the safety  of 
his Presidency. Hyderabad seemed to him to be the first probable.
^Bentinck to C astlereagh, 18th O ct. 1804, B.P.
target of a  Maraiha aggression . In that case , he wrote, "If the
Nizam's house were eh fire , it would become necessary  for us to
take care of our own. Bentinck was eager to get from the
British agents in  the Maraiha cou rts , the earliest notice "of the
possible turn of affairs " so that he could be prepared "to meet
any exigency. "2
Meanwhile, in  Horth India, Holkar had joined hands with the
la t Raja of Bhara.trpur and continued defying the English. In
February, 1805, General Lake failed to capture the famous fort
3
of Bharatpur and suffered heavy casu a lties . Bentinck w as shocked
at th is  new s. He could not imagine "that Holkar would have caused
such resis tance  and ill- lu ck . " He commented th a t "there w as no
game subject to so much chance. A battle  is  never won or lo s t t i ll  
4
i t  is  over. " Almost at the same time in  April 1805, Bentinck came 
to know that Scindhia was carefully watching the eventful siege of 
Bharatpur and considering to regulate h is conduct according to the
^Bentinck to  Sydenham, 23rd Jan. 1805, B.P.
2Ibid.
2 Buff, J .G . History of the M ahrattas. V ol.II, pp. 441-4.
4
Bentinck to Sydenham, 29th March, 1805, B.P-
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result of that s iege . The news of Scindhia’s motive combined
with General Lake’s failure at Bharatpur led Bentlnck to Imagine
that British reverses In the North of India might be followed by a
large-scale  hostilities  in the south. "In the event of any reverse
which might be experienced by our army in the North . . . " ,  he
observed, "it would be difficult to say where the evil might not
extend."* He strongly fe lt, therefore, the necessity  of adopting
elaborate defence measures in his Presidency.
W ellesley was always conscious of the danger of the renewal
of hostilities in  South India. He suggested to Bentinck certain steps
for the security of the British territories and the territories of the
British a llies  -  such as Hyderabad, M ysore, Travancore and Tanjore
in South India. He advised Bentinck to create a reserve corps in  the
Deccan and to place i t  in an advanced position at Hyderabad. This
corps, the Governor General thought, would "afford protection to the
territories of our a llies  . . .  or may be employed in active operation
2or in  the protection of the convoys in  any d irection ."  Further he 
warned Bentinck of the possib ility  of intrigues of the Southern 
Jagirdars (the petty Maratha chiefs of south-India) with the important
* Bentinck's M inute, 21st April 1805, Sec. C ons. B. P.
2 G ov.G en.in Coun.to Gov. in Coun. Mad. 9th Jan. 1805,
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 20th June 1805, Vol. 165, N o .34.
Marafiia ch iefs. He advised Bentinck to keep some force ready 
to w atch and prevent the Jagirdars from uniting with Scindhia or 
any other British enemy.*
Bentinck promptly put into effect W ellesley’s suggestions.
On 21st April, he decided th a t'an  efficient corps of infantry, 
cavalry and artillery  both European and Native, should be immed­
ia te ly  assem bled in  some point of the Ceded d is t r ic ts , near to our
northern frontier and should be completely equipped for actual 
2serv ice. ,l Accordingly a fully equipped force of 4769 infantry,
1264 Cavalry and 150 artillery w as raised from the irregular Indian 
infantry and cavalry of Madras combined with some regular European 
and Indian forces of the Presidency. This troop was assem bled at
3
Bellary ready to march a t any tim e. The Commander in Chief of 
Madras him self took charge of the detachment and Bentinck hoped 
that the force a t Bellary would "check a ll adventures of whatever
4
description. " But Bentinck s till fe lt the need of procuring additional 
m ilitary strength and turned h is atten tion  towards the  s ta te  of Mysore
* W ellesley to Bentinck, 5th April, 1805, W .P.
2Bentinck’s M inute, 21st April, 1805, Sec. Cons. B.P.
3Gov. in  Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in Goun. 23rd April, 1805.
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 20th June, 1805, V ol.165, N o .368.
^Bentinck to W ilks, 23rd April, 1805, B.P =
for that purpose. An agreement w as made with the Mysore 
government in  May 1805, to the effect that a substan tial portion 
of the Mysore troops (500 Stable horse , 3500 Silladar horse, 4000 
Regular infantry, 2000 Peons and 8  field guns) together with several 
batallions of British soldiers should be placed to guard the-borders 
of M ysore. It was further agreed that the re s t of the Mysore troops 
would be kept ready to help the British detachment In  the Ceded 
D istricts at any time by the order of the Governor. * The arrange­
ment seemed satisfactory to  Bentinck and he wrote to  the British 
Resident in Mysore that the assem bly of a large body of troops 
“will^suffice to keep tranquility in the south. ” Next, Bentinck 
turned his attention towards the intrigues of the Southern Maraiha 
Jagirdars. To prevent any of the ir hostile  designs, he directed 
Major W ilks, the resident of Mysore and Capt. Sydenham, the 
resident of Poona on 23rd April, 1805, to keep watchful eyes on the 
movement of these petty chiefs. The Residents were also  instructed  
to keep a force ready to prevent those Jagirdars from making contacts
3
With Scindhia or Holkar. F inally, in July 1805, Bentinck placed a
strong detachment near Tungavactra under General Campbell in  order
4
to restra in  the Southern Jagirdars.
^Wilks to Bucha^L, chief Secy. M ad. Gov. 10th May 1805, Beng,Sec. 
& Pol.C ons. 20th June 1805, Vol. 165, N o .426.
^Bentinck to W ilks, 10th May 1805, B.P.
^Bentinck to W ilks, 23d April 1805, B.P.
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Petrie to the Chairman of the Court of D irectors, 3rd July 1805. 
Letters reed, from M ad. Pot. Deot. Vol.31.
W hile Bentinck w as strengthening the British position in
M adras, an important development took place in  North India.
General Lake's failure to capture the fort of Bharaipur came as
a terrib le blow to the British p restige, but the M araihas could not
make much use of i t .  The Raja of Bharatpur, after a successfu l
resis tance  saw the im possibility  of evading the ultim ate defeat,
and finally  made a treaty  with the British Government on 17th
April 1805. * The war in Northern India might have taken an adverse
turn for the M arathas a fte r th is  subm ission. But to their re lief
W ellesley suddenly resigned following a censure by the home
authorities in  July 1805, on the ground of their d isp leasure a t h is
2continued "w ar-loving*' policy in  India, W ellesley 's  departure
effected a  to ta l change in  the policy of the Company's Government
in India. His successo r, Cornwallis, was despatched to India to
put an end to W ellesley 's  policy of expansion and aggrandisem ent.
Shortly after W ellesley le f t  India, Jenkins, the Resident at Scindhia's
court, informed the Madras Government that Holkar had gained a
complete ascendancy over Scindhia and they both were preparking
3to undertake "a plunge" into south India. But Bentinck w as confident
^Aitchison, C .U ., T reaties. Engagements and Sam ds relating to India 
and neighbouring countries. Vol.HE, p p .390-3.
2Roberts, P.E. , India under W ellesley , p p .26
3
Petrie to the Court of D irectors, 3rd July, 1805, Letters Reed, 
from Mad. Pol. Dept. V ol.31.
63
at tha t tim e, as he believed that the British forces in  the Deccan 
were strong enough to repel any such aggression, "They (Scindhia 
and Holkar) know too w ell our superior strength ", he w rote, "and 
their entire annihilation would be hazarded by a new war.
Cornwallis, succeeding W elle s ley  on 3 0th July 1805, inaugu­
rated a  complete reversal of British attitude towards the M arathas. 
He came with explicit Instructions from C astlereagh, President of 
the Board of Control, to return to the pre-1798 position with regard 
to the M arathas. The home authorities were averse to sanctioning 
the mounting expenses of war and the cost of administering huge 
trac ts  of land. They w ere spec ia lly  reluctant to support W ellesley 's
policy in view of the categorical clauses of the Acts of 1784 and
21793 of Parliament^ prohibiting further aggrandisem ent in  India. 
Cornwallis him self was committed to these  ideas and he always 
believed in  a peaceful and non-interfering policy in  dealing with 
the Indian princes. W hatever might be the justification  for a rever­
sa l of policy, the Anglo-Maraiha war w as almost a t  its  la s t  phase. 
Holkar, though not to ta lly  crushed was struck severely. Scindhia, 
who w as always looking for an  opportunity to break the Subsidiary 
Alliance Treaty he had entered in  February 1804, w as s till  bound by
* Bentinck to C astlereagh, 29th April 1805, B.P.
2 Home. M isc. Series, Vol. 486, p p .6 - 8 .
i t .  And General Lake w as preparing for a final te s t  with the
1
confederate forces of Holkar and Scindhia. The situation on 
the whole appeared to be favourable to the British. But Cornwallis^ 
policy w as not to destroy the Maraiha ch iefs, but to le t them enjoy 
their previous positions. He condemned the prevailing attitude of 
ru th lessness to  Holkar and Scindhia. He deprecated Mthe effects 
o^alm ost universal frenzy^which has seized even some of the heads 
which I though:the soundest in the country, for conquest and victory. " 
Cornwallis, in  fact, decided to make peace with Scindhia and Holkar 
even conceding a ll the British advantages t>f victory. But before 
anything could effectively be done he died in October 180 5. Sir 
George Barlow, who succeeded him, however, faithfully se t out 
to implement C ornw allis's policy.
As regards the MaraHias, Bentinck was devoted to the policy 
of W ellesley . His idea about the Maraiha characters was som e- 
what prejudiced. "The M araihas are^faithless and perfidious 
people” he believed, "plunderers upon principle and by ptf&fession. " 
He had no doubt that the Maraiha threat should be crushed and 
crushed as promptly as possib le . He w as always against a prolonged
* Petrie to the Chairman of the Court of D irectors, 3rd and 31st July, 
1805, Letters Reed, from Mad. Vol.31.
2 !Cornwallis to Lt. Col. Malcolm, 14th Aug. 1805, Correspondence of 
C harles. First Marquis Cornw allis, Ross, C . , V ol.Ill, p .542,
3
Bentinck's Minute, 3rd Nov. 1805, Sec. Cons. B.P.
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war which would adversely affect the financial position of the 
British Government. He therefore could not approve of the directions 
of the home authorities and C ornw allis's policy. He w as against 
concluding peace with the M araihas a t the expense of a ll the 
advantages of a victory. This moderation, he thought, w as extreme 
w eakness and he recalled and deprecated such w eakness of Cornwallis 
in h is  past dealings w ith Tipu, of M ysore. "I only tru s t, " Bentinck 
wrote to C astlereagh, "that Cornwallis w ill make no appearance of 
moderation or concession, The Chieftains of India understand nqtsuch 
conduct. To Bentinck the Maraiha war w as justified  by expediency 
and he was unconcerned about atny parliamentary obligation of the 
Acts of 1784 and 1793. Though inconsisten t with the principle laid 
down by Parliament, the views of W ellesley and Bentinck were 
ju stified  from the point of yiew of security  of the British empire.
The Maraiha power, in  fac t, posed a serious th reat to the British 
authority in  India and a quick reversal of W ellesley 's  policy might 
have betrayed the British security  in  India to a certain extent. This 
practical consideration, however, weighed little  w ith Sir George 
Barlow and the preparations for peace w ith the M aralhas were 
hastily  made. The Peace Treaty w as first concluded with Scindhia • 
on 22nd November, 1805, which w as followed by another with 
Holkar on 24th December 1805. In both cases the terms were
1
Bentinck to Castlereagh, 17th Sept. 1805, B.P.
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favourable to the Maraiha chiefs and mofct of their lost territories
were restored to them. In return the British Government only
secured the pledge from the chiefs that they would renounce claims
on the neighbouring kingdom s. * As the head of a subordinate govBmr
ment Bentinck had to accept these  final arrangem ents. He w as,
however, relieved when he found that the terms of peace were not
2
altogether unsatisfactory .
Bentinck's alleg iance to W ellesley 's  policy w as further 
m anifested in  the former's d ea lings with the other Indian Princes. 
W ellesley on h is arrival in  Iiidia, found that the French m enace, 
the Maraiha threat and the ambition of Mysore created an atmos­
phere of utmost insecurity to the British in  India. He apprehended 
that the  Indian princes were in  a position to take advantage of th is 
situation  either by collaborating with the enemies of the British or 
by defying the British Government. With a view to counteracting 
such tendencies and to strengthening the hands of the British
3
authority, W ellesley resorted to the policy of subsidiary a llian ce .
*
In h is minute on M ysore, dated 12th August 1798, W ellesley wrote 
in  support of that policy: 'I t  is  our right and duty to restore the
^Aitchison, C .U ., T reaties, Engagements and Sam ds e tc . VoI.V, 
p p .400-403, Vol.IV, p p .26-8.
2Bentinck to Barlow, 26th December 1805, p .P ,
3
For subsidiary a lliances see  page 3 of th is  chapter.
vigour and efficiency of our defensive a lliances . . .  The
*
establishm ent of our subsidized forces at Poona and Hyderabad
w ill afford effectual means of guarding not only against any
such (foreign) intrusion but against the undue growth of any
native powers.
W ellesley 's policy of subsidiary alliance was obviously
very controversial in  h is  own tim e. It had its  advantage as,
W ellesley believed in exercising "a general control over the
re s tle ss  sp irit of ambition and violence which is  characteristic
2
of every A siatic Government. " But its  disadvantage was also  
conspicuous. It had the tendency of bringing every Indian s ta te  
under the exlusive control of the British Government -  the tendency 
whihch was neither liked by the Indian rulers nor approved by the 
home au thorities. Munro, an expert on South-Indian po litics, 
pointed out that the subsidiary a lliance brought security  to an 
allied  s ta te , purchased by the "sacrifice of independece, of 
national character and of w hatever renders a  people responsib le. ” 
Financially, too, it  could ruin a country. A subsid ised  British 
army w as always ready w ithin an Indian s ta te  to d ic ta te  to the 
ru ler and to reduce him to the s ta te  of a cypher. In effect the
"^Wellesley's M inute, 12th Aug. 1798, cited in  Srinivcuscchaii, C .S . ,  
The Tjawardness of British Annexations in India, p .H I.
2Lyall, Sir A ., British Dominion in India f p. 244.
subsidiary system could protect an incompetent ruler against any
/
internal opposition. Bentinck, however, upheld W ellesley 's policy 
of subsidiary allian ce and rendered earnest co-operation towards 
its  success. After his arrival at Madras the subsidiary alliance 
had been implemented in several cases in the Presidency. On his 
own part he helped its  extension to Travancore s ta te , a harm less, 
trusted ally of the British in South India.
The Hindu Kingdom of Travancore had connections with the 
English East India Company from as early as 1684. In 1783 , the 
Raja of Travancore alone of a ll the native princes of South India 
took sides with the British and resisted  Tipu Sultan, the powerful 
ruler of Mysore. His zealous co-operation entitled him to be 
ranked as an ally and led to the conclusion of a treaty  with the 
Company in 1784.^ Out of the fear of being attacked by Tipu, the 
Raja in Jnne 1788, applied to the Madras Government requesting 
them to send some British officers to train  six of h is own regiments. 
But instead of sending officers, the Madras Government offered him 
direct help of the Company's army. Consequently, the Raja agreed 
to maintain two batallions of British forces on the basis of monthly 
subsidy. ^
^Aitchison, C .U . , T reaties, Engagements and Saftands, e tc . , Vol.X, 
p. 115.
2 Shungoony Menon, P .,  History of Travancore, p .251.
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Following the treaty , Travancore was attacked by Tipu in  
1790 and was defended by the British troops stationed there . In 
1795, the Ha 1a of Travancore again  engaged him self to subsid ise  
three battalions of the Company's sepoys, a company of European 
artillery  and two companies of las cars. It was further stipulated 
that the commanding officer of the force should require ptior sanction 
of the Government of Madras to help the Raja to repel invasions.*
It should be npted here that in the trea ties  of both 1788 and 1795, 
arrangements were transacted on terms of equality and the stinging 
clauses of a typical subsidiary alliance were not thought to be 
necessary . The independent and assertive  tone of the Rala of 
Travdncore, even after these trea ties  were drawn, was clearly 
m anifested in 1804, during a controversy over levying du ties. The 
Dutch Settlement of Cochin was contiguous to the territories of 
Travancore and had had treaty relations with the Raja since 1753.
By taking advantage of the Raja's attention with regard to the  s ta te  
of M ysore, the Dutch officers of the Settlement of Cochin began an 
unauthorised collection of duties on trade w ithin the territories of 
Travancore. In 1804, the Dutch Settlement of Cochin w as annexed 
by the British and the unauthorised collection continued there by
*Petrie 's M inute, June, 1803. Sec. Cons, B.P.
I
j i
the British Revenue O fficers. The Raja vehemently protested
against such action of the British "us solely grounded upon ~tUU
unprincipled and unjustifiable u sage" and demanded an  outright 
1end of i t .  Bentinck, the then Governor of M adras, had to
acknowledge that the Dutch officers in the past had unduly usurped
the authority of the Raja and that the Company’s officers in Cochin
2
had "improperly continued that (usurpation of A u t h o r i t y H e  lost
no time in  sending orders to the British Officers in Cochin to stop
3
collecting duties in Travancore. H itherto, in  their relations with 
the Raja of Travancore the British Authorities had never shown any 
tendency to disregard the R aja 's power and position. Similarly, 
the Raja had always reciprocated by h is constant support to all 
British ac tions.
4
The situation was changed by a sudden mutiny of the Nair 
troops in December 1804. From the year 1802, the young Raja of
^Resident of Travancore to Ch. Secy. Mad. Govt. 3 ls t  Jan, Mad.
Pol. Proc. 31st March 1804, Ran. 317, Vol.I.
2Gov. in  Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen in Conn. 31st March 1804,
Mad. Pol. Proc. 31st March 1804, R a n .- 317, V ol.I.
^Bentlnck's M inute, 31st March 1804, Mad. PoU. Proc. 31st 
March 1804, R an .- 317, V ol.I.
4
The 'N airs ' are Malayi Hindus who were principally of the m ilitary 
c lass but held lands too . Nair troops were famous for th e ir courage 
and m ilitary performances.
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of Travancore was guided by h lsDewan Valu Thawiby, a ru th less 
and strong personality. The Dewan's rigorous m easures against 
corruption and his pro-British leanings had created tension  among 
the civil and military officials of Travancore. The m atter took a 
serious turn when in 1804 the Dewan decided to cut down the 
allowances of the Nair battalions in  order to meet some arrears 
of subsidy payable on acconnt of the British forces stationed in 
Travancore. The Nair battalions mutinied and proceeded towards 
Trivandrum, the capital of Travancore with the object of demanding 
the Raja to dism iss and execute the obnoxious Dewan and his 
a sso c ia te s . The Dewan was away from the capital in  Aleppy at 
that tim e. The young Raja w as panicky and there w as none beside 
him to cope firmly with the Situation. Meanwile in Aleppy too, 
the Nair battalions mutinied and the Dewan fled to Cochin accom­
panied by the British Resident. After a hurried consultation between 
the two, the British Resident ordered the British troops from 
Tinnevelly to march towards Trivandrum. It was further arranged 
that the subsidiary forces a t Quilon should a lso  march towards the 
cap ital. The movement of these  two forces subdued the uprising 
and the rebels were severely punished. ^
^Shungoony Jt^enon, P. History of Travancore, p p .307-9.
On hearing the news of insurrection ih Travancore 
Bentinck immediately instructed the Commanding Officer of 
M alabar to assem ble his troops in the field . This he thought 
w as necessary  to check sim ilar uprising in  the southern provinces. 
He further arranged to send reinforcements to Travancore if asked 
by the Resident. * W ellesley w as highly sa tisfied  with the. 
m easures of the Madras Government and desired to u tilise  th is 
golden opportunity by bringing the Raja explicitly  under the 
complete British control. "I consider this occurrence11, he wrote 
to Bentinck, "to afford a favourable opportunity for the modific-
2
ation of our subsidiary engagements with the Raja of Travancore. "
The affair of Travancore, W ellesley expressed, had not only
required but justified  a viigx>rous intervention of British force
"for the preservation of the British in terests  in that Quarter. "
He,thereforerwanted to modify the existing subsidiary treaty
on the line of installing a permanent subsidised British force in
3
the Raj a Vs dominion, solely regulated by the British . Bentinack
gave full support to the plan and remarked, "there can be-do doubt 
as to the great advantage of the proposed arrangement to  our
^Chief Secy, of the M ad. Govt.' to the Commanding Officer, 
M acdowall, 3rd Dec. 1804, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 24th 
Jan. 1805, V ol.150, H o .56.
^W ellesley to Bentinck, 17th Dec. 1804, W .P .
^Ibid.
general in terest. " JIe promptly transm itted a copy of
W ellesley 's  le tte r to the British Resident in Travancore, L t.C ol.
M acaulay. The Resident also  welcomed the proposal. In his
opinion it was "injudicious to make any delay in seizing the
favourable opportunity which seemed to present itse lf  for the
conclusion of an arrangement by which the rights and in terests of
the Company in Travancore might be fixed on a solid and secure 
2foundation. " The motive behind the eagerness of all in imposing 
a rigorous subsidiary treaty on Travancore was their suspicion about 
an increasing anti-British feeling among the civil and military ranks. 
As W ellesley wrote to Bentinck, "the avowed object of the insurr­
ection is the subversion of the British influence in the counsels of 
3
the Raja. " The Raja was a t first reluctant to modify the arrange­
ments with the British; but for the Dewan's unceasing endeavours 
and the pressure of the British Resident he had ultim ately to give 
way.
The propos ed treaty of "perpetual friendship and alliance " 
w as signed by the Raja on 12th January 1805. It was decided that
* Bentinck to W ellesley, 16th Jan. 1805, B.P.
2Resident of Travancore to Chief Secy, of Mad. Govt. 8 th Jan.
1805, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 16th May 1805, V ol.162, N o .284.
3
W ellesley to Bentinck, 17th Dec. 1804, B.P.
the Raja would financially  support an additional British regiment
to be stationed in  h is territory. The treaty  provided that in  case
of n ecessity , the Raja would concede to the British his power of
regulating the adm inistration of a ll the branches of public affairs
and would bring them under the direct management of the officers
of the Company. In such an eventuality , however, it was decided
that he would be given the guarantee that his personal income
would ho t^e? ieS h^hanrte6 :lakhs of rupees in  addition to one fifth
of the annual revenue. The Raja further bound him self to abide by
the British advice in the external affa irs . Finally, the treaty
provided that the Raja would make no communication with any
foreign s ta te , admit no European to his serv ice , and allow no
European to stay  w ithin h is territories without the permission of
1
the British Government.
Bentinck w as happy a t the way in which the new treaty  was 
concluded giving an  im pression tha t i t  was a voluntary ac t, performed 
by the Raja him self. This, he believed, would not ra ise  any objec­
tion from theCourt of D irectors, the majoirty of whom were not 
favourably disposed to the system of subsidiary aflLiances. He had 
no doubt about the in trinsic  m erits of the trea ty . "I t ru s t ,r, he wrote
i
to  Resident M acaulay, “that our in terests  in that country (Travancore)
^Aitchison, C.LL Treaties, Engagements and Sanads. e tc . Vol.X, 
pp. 135-8.
are now forever secured. " At heart, however, both Bentinck
and M acaulay were afraid of the adverse popular reaction to the
treaty in Travancore as w ell as in Mai abar. The Resident strongly
advised the Government that British troops should speedily enter
2Travancore in view of widespread disaffection. This appeared 
most expedient to Bentinck and he w ished no delay in  marching 
British troops to Trivandrum. But at the same time he felt that the 
people should not be given the impression that the treaty  was inten­
ded to make their Raja dependent on the British authority. To
W ellesley he wrote that "the point should be carried without giving
3
offence to the Raja or to h is sub jec ts . " Immediately after the
treaty  was signed, three battalions of British troops were despatched
towards Travancore and the British force in M alabar were kept alert
4for any disturbance. Fortunately, no further complications arose 
and the s ta te  of Travancore was safely brought down to the sta tus
1 ~
Bentinck to M acaulay, 20th June 1805, B.P.
2
Resident of Travancore to Chief Secy. Beng. Govt. 13th Jan. 1805, 
Beng. Sec. & Pol.C ons. 16th May 1805, Vol. 162, N o .286.
3
Bentinck to W ellesley , 16th Jan. 1805, B.P.
^Bentinck to  W ellesley, 26th Jan. 1805, W .P.
of a dependent and protected kingdom under the Biritiish authority.
The Travancore affair was a typical illustra tion  of how a 
subsidiary alliance was concluded with an Indian s ta te . The policy^, 
though devised as a means to safeguard the British possessions in 
India, was in effect a policy of aggrandisem ent. Bentinck, who was 
always concerned for the security  of British territories in  India 
supported th is policy. He seemed to believe in the notion that 
expansion was justified  as  a safety m easure. W hatever might be 
the practicability of the policy of countering hostilities  from Indian 
s ta te s , the treatment to a firm British ally like Travancore was fully 
unjust. One characteristic  feature of the expansive British policy 
a t th is phase w as, however, to m aintain the pretence that the 
Company had no intention of interfering with the sovereign sta tus 
of the Indian rulers and their internal government-. W ellesley solemnly 
alluded to th is  in his famous minute on Mysore by stating that he 
had no intention of "altering the condition or reduc.lng or raising 
the power of any established s ta te  In India. The pretension served 
a useful purpose by soothing the injured vanity of the Indian rulers 
by satisfying the sentim ents of the ir subjects and by arresting the 
tendencies towards intrigues. Bentinck had no doubt as to the
* W ellesley 's  M inute, 12th Aug. 1798, Srinivasachari, C . S. ,  The 
Inwardness of British Annexations in India, p . Ill
importance of such pretence. In the case  of Travancore he 
expressed h is  reluctance to offend the Raja and his sub jec ts .
The same consideration prompted him to deal carefully and 
cordially with the rulers of M ysoref the Carnatic and Tanjore.
The powerful kingdom of Mysore had been a constant source 
of danger to the British authority ever since Hyder A ll's accession  
to power. His able son, Tipu, inherited h is enmity towards the 
English and fought with them to h is la s t breath in 1799. Thereafter, 
the conquered territories of Tipu were divided into three parts. The 
d istric ts  on the sea coast of Mysore and the provinces adjoining the 
British territories in Malabar and the Carnatic were held by the 
British government. The territories contiguous to the Nizam's domin­
ion including the d istric ts of Goramconda and Guti were assigned to 
the Nizam of Hyderabad. Some d istric ts  in the North-W est of Mysore 
first offered to the M araihas were subsequently shared by the British 
(government and the Nizam, What remained of the Mysore kingdom 
was restored to Kilshnaraj Udaiyar, a child of about three years of 
the old Hindu dynatty  ousted by Hyder All. * During the minority of 
th is child, the adm inistration of the kingdom of Mysore was entrusted
Aitchison, C .U .,  T reatiesf Engagements and S a lad s, e tc . Vol.X, 
p .183.
to the able m inister of Tipu, Pumiah Dewan, a brahmin by birth .
A British Resident was appointed at the Raja's court and the Mysore
troops were placed under the Command of Sir Arthur ‘W ellesley. The
Governor General, Lord W ellesley , soon concluded a  subsidiary
alliance with the minor ruler on 8 th July 1799. The treaty  stipulated
for a  British force for the defence and security of Mysore and for th is
the Raja was to pay an annual subsidy of as much as the cost of the
force required to the British government. It forbade any direct
intercourse of the Raja with any other s ta te , native or foreign. It
provided that in case of financial confusion and misgovernment the
British Government would temporarily assume the administration of
the kingdom. It further required the Raja to pay h is "utmost
attention" to the advJrce of the British Government on a ll important
m atters.  ^ After the completion of the settlem ent of Mysore kingdom,
the Company's civil and military personnel in Mysore were placed
under the direct control of the Government of M adras. And it was
decided that on every important transaction  concerning M ysore, the
2final approbation of the Governor General was essen tia l.
^Aitchison, C .U ., T reaties, Engagements and Sa/iads e tc . Vol.X, 
p p .220-25.
2
W ellesley 's M inute, 14th Sept. 1799, referred in the le tte r of the 
Beng. Govt, to Mad. Govt. 5th O ct. 1804, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 
24th Jan. 1805, V ol.150, N o .2.
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Bentinck arrived in Madras after the settlem ent with Mysore 
was over and therefore found no difficulty in h is dealings with that 
kingdom. The Pgrnlah Dewan was a good adm inistrator and a favour­
ite  of W ellesley . During h is able Regency Mysore became prosperous 
which resulted  in  an increase of revenue ranging from 50 to 70 
per cent.  ^ The kingdom of Mysore offered help in men and money to 
the government of Madras during British campaigns against the 
M arajhas. Bentinck was always eager to maintain cordial re lations 
with the Dewan. When the British troops were withdrawn from Mysore 
during the Maratha w ars , Bentinck felt worried for the safety  of that 
kingdom. Then it  was due to Bentinck's endeavours that the damaged 
fort of Seringapatam was re instated  and the security of Mysore was 
ensured.^
In 1806, Anglo-Mysore cordiality was suddenly upset when the 
British commanding officer at Bangalore arbitrarily interfered in the 
internal affairs of Mysore s ta te . Theeincident occurred, subsequent 
to the mutiny of native sepoys a t Vellore, a place adjoining to the 
sta te  of M ysore. The Vellore mutiny in July 1806 had created extreme 
alarm among the British military c irc les in South India. Lt. Col. Ogg, 
the commanding officer of the British troops a t Bangalore, in  Mysore
^Petrie’s Minute, June 1803, Sec. Cons. B.P.
\ Afiiejfeffco W ilks, 16th Jan. 1806, B.P.
sta te  came across a rumour in October, 1806 about plans for a 
mutiny in h is own establishm ent. The fact was that Col. Ogg 
was informed that the Subadar of Bangalore Madhab Rao, a high 
official of Mysore s ta te  and a near re la tive of Pumiah Dewan, who 
had previous knowledge of the mutiny and m assacre of European 
officials at Vellore, had planned a sim ilar uprising among the 
British troops at Bangalore. The Resident, Major W ilks, was also  
informed of th is plot and he d iscussed  the charges against Madhab 
Rao with Pumiah Qewan. The Dewan agreed to appoint an impartial 
commission to enquire into the m atter. In course of th is  investig­
ation it was decided that Madhab Rao should be suspended from his 
duties for the time being.  ^ When the investigation was in progress 
Col. Ogg suspected that some people in Bangalore were in  possess­
ion of seditious documents connected with this plot. He immediately 
arrested these persons and made a vigorous search forjthe papers 
which could not be traced . This led Col. Ogg to believe that Madhab 
Rao had these  secret dociiments in h is  own custody in the Bangalore 
palace of the Raja of M ysore. On 9th November 1806, he ordered the 
seizure of Bangalore palace without consulting the Mysore <3pvem - 
ment or any of its  responsible officers. The palace was seized and
* Resident of Mysore to Gov. in Coun. Mad. 15th Nov. 1806, 
Beng. Sec, & Pol.C ons. 5th Feb. 1807, V ol.200, N o .8 .
searched thoroughly by the British troops but the seditious papers
' lwere not found.
Such an interference and coercion on the part of Col. Ogg
seriously disturbed the peace of Mysore s ta te . He superseded and
degraded the authority of the Mysore government and filled the minds
of the inhabitants with great apprehensions. The officers of Mysore
felt d istrusted , suspected and hum iliated. Major Wilks promptly
informed the Government of Madras of the situation  and sought the
Governor's direct intervention to restore the confidence of the Mysore
2government in British ju s tic e . Bentinck believed that Col. Ogg had 
acted precipitetel y out of the fear of the mutiny of Vellore and 
commented that his mode of action was obviously arbitrary and injud­
ic ious. He could not disregard the feeling in Mysore that the state
3
had been unjustly treated by a foreign power. He blamed Col. Ogg's
action as "imprudent, ill-judged , intemperate and im politic" and did
not h es ita te  to issu e  instructions for his outright removal from 
4
Bangalore. This was carried out without delay. Bentinck then
^Resident of Mysore to Gov. in  Cou^.Mad. 20th Nov. 1806, Beng* 
Sec. & Pol. Cons. 5th Feb. 1807, Vol.200, N o .9.
2Resident of Mysore to Gov. in  Coun. Mad. 20th Nov. 1806, Beng. 
Sec. & Pol. Cons. 5th Feb. 1807, Vol. 200, N o .9.
^Bentinck to W ilks, 25th Nov. 1806, B.P.
4
Bentinck's M inute, 11th Dec. 1806, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons.
5th Feb. 1807, V ol.200, N o .14.
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informed Pumiah Dewan to re in sta te  Madhab Rao to h is  former 
position. * '’In th is time of doubtful allegiance and affection, "
Bentinck wrote to Col. Ogg, ”it  is  a paramount duty to strengthen 
every bond of union^and more particularly in respect jtaa power
2from which we received such zealous and effectual co-operation. " 
Bentinck’s treatment of the case of Mysore^had however 
-manifested h is  w illingness to respect the jurisdiction of a subser­
vient a lly . The same attitude guided him to treat the powerless 
Nawab of Carnatic and the Raja of Tanjore with great consideration.
The first British subsidiary treaty  with the Nawab of Carnatic was
concluded in the year 1787, by which the Company’s government under-
the
took the responsibility  of defending^Carnatic for a subsidy of 15 
lakhs of pagodas. The treaty further provided that the British 
Government could assume even the internal government of the Nawab
3
if it w as necessary . However, the Company at that time showed no 
intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the Nawab. The 
imprudent and extravagant Nawabs of the Carnatic were habituated 
to borrow money from the Company's servants at exorbitant ra tes  of
■^Governor of Mad. to Pumiah Dewan, 24th Dec. 1806, Beng. Sec.
& Pol. Cons. 5th Feb. 1807, V ol.200, No, 15.
2
Bentinck to Ogg, 11th Dec. 1806, B.P.
3
Aitchison, C .U . , T reaties, Engagements and Sanads, e tc . Vol.X, 
p p .41-47.
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in te rest. Such improvident habits soon led the country to a
deplorable s ta te  of affairs. The loans were generally contracted
on the guarantee of lands and on the fanning of tax collection of
the state  to the creditors. Gradually the creditors of the Nawabs,
mostly European and Indian officials of the Company, began to
exercise a very demoralising influence on the management of the 
1
s ta te . The matter took a worse turn when the Nawabs having
failed to pay the subsidy to the Company augmented the debt s till
further. Several attempts on the part of tine Company to improve the
situation proved to be of no avail and the deplorable condition
continued when Lord W ellesley arrived in India. To th is  financial
difficulty were added the demerits of dual adm inistration. The
collection of revenue by the Company's servants and the internal
adm inistration at the Nawab's hands had led the country, as Sir
Arthur W ellesley observed, "not only to the oppression of the
inhabitants of the country, but to the impoverishment of the Nawab
2
and the destruction of the revenues of the Carnatic ". From the 
beginning, Governor General W ellesley was averse to the existence 
of such evils in the adm inistration of the Carnatic and wanted to draw
1 Srinivasachari, C .S .,  The Inwardness of British Annexations in India. 
, p .72. ...............
2 Owen, W ellington D espatches, cited in Roberts, P .E . , India under 
W ellesley , p .162.
the Nawab under the supreme control of the Company. In the
the
Carnatic and in Tanjore (a dependent s ta te  o^C am atic) W ellesley 
preferred, therefore, the establishm ent of the Company's sovereign 
control rather than imposition of subsidiary a lliance . In the 
m iserable financial situation of the Carnatic a subsidiary treaty  
would only help to ruin the  country by adding more financial burden 
to the Nawab without making any improvement in the adm inistration.
W ellesley soon found a suitable opportunity to implement his 
plan. After the fall of Seringapatam the British authority seized a 
secret communication between the Nawabs of the Carnatic and Tipu 
Sultan. W ellesley asse rted , that the correspondence of Muhammad
il& s
All and Omdut ul-Omrah, two successive Nawabs of^Camatic were 
treasonable and hostile  to the British in te rse ts . At th is point Omdut- 
ul-Omrah died in July 1801 and W ellesley refused the claim of Ali 
H ussain, the son of the deceased Nawab,to succedd and he opened 
negotiations with Azim-ud-Dowlah, h is  nephew. On 25th July 1801, 
a new treaty w as signed between the Company’s (government and 
Azim-ud-Dowlah and the  la tte r was recognised as the Nawab of the 
Carnatic by the British. According to the treaty  the Nawab renounced 
the civil and military government of the country to the Company in 
exchange for a guaranteed pension of one fifth of the revenues. ■
The treaty also  accepted the Nawab "In the sta te  and rank,with 
the dignities dependent thereon, of h is a n c e s to rs .. .  W ellesley 
was severely criticised for th is  act of annexation. At home Sheridan 
and Lord Moira even threatened to launch an attack on the Governor 
General in Parliament,
Bentinck entered the scene a t this stage and took much care to 
preserve the hereditary dignity of the Nawab. By the treaty  of July 
1801, the Nawab was granted exclusive jurisdiction over h is  follow­
ers and relations in the Chepuk palace and surrounding gardens adja­
cent to the city of M adras. Before Bentinck's arrival, a  conflict 
started between the Supreme Court and the Nawab,as the former 
challenged the limited sovereign rights of the la tte r. The newly 
established Supreme Court of Madras had a territorial Jurisdiction 
over the town of M adras. On the b as is  of th is  the ©ourt claimed 
that the Nawab and his men living in the Chepuk palace were 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. In fac t, on several 
occasions^the Supreme Court of Madras had failed to respect the
sovereign status of the Nawab and gave protection to some of the
2dissident members of the Nawab's fafnily. In th is conflict, the
^Aitchison, C .U ., T reatiesT Engagements and Sarvads. e tc . .  Vol.X,
2
Govt, of Mad. to the Court of D irectors, 23rd MarcfJ.804, Letters 
Reed, from Mad. Pol. Dept. Vol.29.
Government of Madras had to abide by the treaty  of July 1801.
Bentinck's predecessor, Lord C live, upheld the rights of the 
Nawab, much to the d issa tisfac tion  of the Supreme Court. JBentinck^ 
too, supported the Nawab's s ta tu s . He had no doubt that the Nawab 
"should enjoy all the rank, state ,and fee privileges of fee sovereignty, 
excepting th o se5which he has expressly  delegated. He not only 
kept the Supreme Court away from the controversy but a lso  recomm­
ended an amendment of the treaty  of July 1801, so as to give no 
further grounds for any future complication. He was in favour of 
granting the Nawab perpetual sovereignty within the limits of the 
Chepuk palace. Bentinck proposed to Wellefeley that the British 
Government should explicitly declare that they would not interfere 
in the palace and gardens of the Nawab, where his sovereignty over 
h is own men and relatives should be absolu te. In return he felt that 
the Nawab should engage him self to deliver to the British Government 
any subject of the Company who might temporarily reside w ithin his 
palace. Lord W ellesley , however, was reluctanfcto reopen the 
question of modification of the treaty , hence shelved Bentinck's
^Bentinck to W ellesley, 2nd May, 1804, W .P .
2
Additional Articles proposed by Bentinck, Enclosure to Bentinfck's 
Letter to W ellesley , 2nd May, 1804, W .P.
proposal. But the case was solved by the Supreme Government in 
favour of the Nawab. * The proposals made by Bentinck had proved 
h is unwillingness to degrade "the illustrious house of Arcot ” (the
2capital o^C arnatic). Bentinck's sym pathetic attitude towards the 
Nawab produced the fruitful resu lt. The Nawab was satisfied  and 
grateful for the British treatment and he had no hesita tion  in
expressing his gratitude for the support that he received from
, 3 Bentinck.
British relations with the state  of Tanjore resembled those with 
the Carnatic and there Bentinck was confronted with a sim ilar problem. 
In 1786/ a complication arose on the question of succession  following 
the death of Tulaji, the Raja of Tanjore. The Raja's half brother,
Amir Singh, and his adopted son, Surfogi, were the candidates for 
the throne. Amir Singh’s claim being proved stronger, he was 
enthroned by the British in sp ite  of h is corrupt and unbalanced 
d ispositions. However, his calamitous reign led the British author­
itie s  in Madras to reconsider the succession . In course of th is
* For the details  of the Carnatic ca se , see Chapter III, pp. 124”*$ 8  ■
2
Bentinck to the Nawab of Arcot, 22nd May 1804, B.P.
3
The Nawab of Arcot to the Court of D irectors, 16th O ct. 1807, B.P.
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reconsideration, Stlrfogi, a gifted and accomplished man, secured
unanimous approval by the authorities in India as w ell as in England.
But nothing definite was done w ith regard to Strrfogi's nomination to
the throne till W ellesley arrived in India. Very soon W ellesley found
in the unsettled  condition of Tanjore a rare opportunity "to sweep
away another Indian sta te . With the intention of drawing Tanjore
completely under the Company's authority, W ellesley commenced
negbtiations with Sarfogi and persuaded him to conclude a treaty  on
25th October 1799 in return for h is elevation to the Raj a ship by
deposing Amar Sing. By the trea ty , the whole civil and military
adm inistration of the kingdom was taken over by the Company in lieu
2of a pension of £40, 000 a year to the Raja. Raja Sttrfogi thus failed
to gain the actual power and prefetige of the Raj a ship and had to
surrender a ll h is adm inistrative jurisdictions to the British for an
empty ti t le , some privileges and a guaranteed pension. In 1803,
therefore, when Bentinck took charge of the administration of M adras,
Tanjore w as under absolute supremacy of the Company leaving to the
Raja the fortress of Tanjore, the palace of residence and a few
ganiens. 3_________________________________ _ _ _ _ _
^Roberts, P .E ., India under W ellesley , p. 112.
2
Aitchison, C .U . , Treaties. Engagements and Sanads. e tc . , Vol.X, 
p p .90-94.
3
Petrie's Minute, June 1803, Sec. Cons. B.P.
Bentinck's in itia l step with regard to Tanjore was an act of 
intervention into the restric ted  sphere of the Raja's jurisdiction.
0>~~ i i
The small fort of Tanjore situated on the coast line , belonged to 
the Raja. Influenced by the suspicion that thejtejci might be in 
secret link with the neighbouring Dutch settlem ent and thus implic­
ated with the French design, Bentinck decided to place the foil 
under the British control as a precautionary m easure.* Accordingly,
the fort w as garrisoned by the British with the prior consent of the 
2Raja. Bentinck, however, justified  his interference on the ground 
of the Raja's previous consent as w ell as on the ground of the emer­
gency situation . In case of an attack  by the French, he explained
to the Court of D irectors, the fort could effectively be u tilised  "for
*1kt,the purpose of intercepting the supplies and of interruptinc^intercourse
3of the invading enemy with the interior part of the country. " In any 
ca se , as the occupation of the fort w as not made on a permanent 
b a s is , it did not impede the understanding between the Raja and 
Bentinck.
*A reference to th is incident is made in connection with Bentinck’s 
measures to counter the French m enace. (See above, p. 351)
2Raja of Tanjore to Bentinck, 28th Sept. 1803, Beng. Sec. & Pol. 
Cons. 24th Jan. 1805, Vol. 150, No. 12.
3
Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Sec. Comm, of Court of D irectors, 13th 
Sept, 1803, Sec. Letters from Fort St. George, V ol.Ill, 1804-9.
By the 4th Article of the treaty  of 1799, provision was made 
for the creation of a court of Circuit to adm inister the civil and 
criminal ju stice  in Tanjore under the authority of the Government 
of M adras. The treaty clearly provided that such a court would not 
be "subject to the control, authority or interference of the said Raja' 
The court, when established in Tanjore in 1806,refused to give the 
Raja any specia l privilege as regards jurisd iction , without spec ia l 
instructions from the Madras government. On the occasion of mis­
deeds and law-breaking it indiscrim inately arrested the Raia's 
servants and compelled them to appear before the court for tria l.
The Raja, in  September 1806, strongly resented  the actions of the 
Company's court and contended that h is jurisdiction had been rtidbly 
violated. He protested bitterly to Bentinck. "In delivering to the 
Company's authority the judicial and revenue departments of the 
province, I divested myself of everything buydignity. I remain the
Raja of Tanjore, s t i l l?recognised as such and entitled  to a ll the
2honours and privileges of sovereign dignity . 11
Bentinck fe lt that it was necessary  to restore the confidence 
of the Raja in the British sen se  of ju stice  and he started  examining 
the relevant papers. He found that the treaty  of 1799 confined the
^Aitchison, C .U ., T reaties, Engagements and Sanrads relating to 
India and neighbouring countries. Vol.X. p .91.
2
Raja of Tanjore to Bentinck, 25th Sept. 1806, B.P.
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Raja's jurisdiction only to the fort and made no mention of the
palaces. Moreover the treaty in sis ted  on establishing an undivided
civil and military jurisdiction throughout Tanjore. But some later
documents of the Madras Government written immediately after the
treaty not only clarified but extended the jurisdiction of the Raja.
On the basis of these documents Bentinck decided the question.
A letter from the Governor of M adras, Lord C live, to the Resident
of Tanjore, dated 3rd October 1799, revealed that the Government
proposed to provide for the administration of justice  throughout
Tanjore “with the exception of the R aja 's fort and pa laces. A
subsequent le tte r from the Secretary of the Government of Madras
to the Raja, dated 5th July 1800, further revealed that "the pa laces,
gardens, e tc . belonging to the Raja, and the gardens and bazars
(markets) appropriated to the Houses of Charity of the Queens -
2shall be held under their respective au tho rities ."  Thus Bentinck 
had no doubt that the Madras Government intended to place "the 
palaces and gardens" exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Raja.
In December 1806 Bentinck, therefore, proposed a regulation 
defining specifically  the jurisdiction of the Company's court and of
* Quoted in Bentinck's le tte r to Blackbume, 23rd N ov .1806, B .P. 
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
the Raja. He asserted  that the Raj a should enjoy exclusive ju ris­
diction over h is relations and servants residing in the palaces and 
the fort. “This arrangement", he sta ted , "will be satisfactory  to 
the Raja^rasl w ill fac ilita te  the solution of any difficulty that may 
arise  in  de&iing more exactly His H ighness's ju risd ic tio n .. .
In 1807, such a regulation was put into effect. Blackbume, the
British Resident in Tanjore, expressed his satisfaction  at Bentinck's
2decision favouring the Raja. The R aja,of Tanjore, on h is part, was
completely won over. "This haVemade upon my mind", he wrote to
Blackbm m e, "an everlasting impression of h is Lordship's particular
3
desire to maintain my honour and dignity. "
Bentinck's attitude towards the French menace was not different 
from that of W ellesley . Like W ellesley he was deeply concerned for 
the safety of British possessions in  India and helieved in  the possib i­
lity of a French attack on the Indian c o a s ts . He thus agreed with 
W ellesley that the British policy in such an eventuality should be 
one of elaborate defence arrangem ents. In a situation tense  with the 
apprehension of French offensive, Bentinck felt that the Maratha 
1
Rentinck's M inute, II th P ec . 1806, Sec. Cons. B.P.
2Blackbume to Bentinck, 16th Dec. 1806, B.P.
3
Raja of Tanjore to Blackbume, 4th Oct. 1807, B.P.
power in India should be destroyed to ta lly . He was therefore not 
sa tisfied  when Barlow effected a settlem ent with the M arathas by 
giving them considerable concessions. Bentinck's dealings with 
the Indian sta tes like Travancore, Mysore ^ C arnatic  and Tanjore 
demonstrated a mixture of the British policy of intervention and of 
respect for the sovereignty of the Indian rulers. He always felt the 
n ecess ity  of respecting the jurisdictions and sentiments of the 
Indian princes so long as they did not clash  with the vital in terests 
of the British empire. His generous treatment of the Mysore s ta te  
w as an example of this policy. But his dealings with the sta te  of 
Travancore was altogether different. The existence of an an ti- 
British feeling among the m ilitary and official ranks in Travancore led 
him to impose a stringent subsidiary alliance on a hitherto faithful 
and dependant ally .
CHAPTER II 
ADMINISTRATION OF LAND
Land being the main source of income, the settlement 
of its revenue had always been the prime concern of the rulers 
in India, In South India, as in all other parts of the country, 
the prosperity of the populace and the benevolence of the rulers 
depended largely on the administration of land. Starting from 
tho days of early Hindu rulers down to the advent of the British 
the settlement of land revenue remained an object of great care 
and interest. However, the amount of land tax and its pressure 
on the cultivators varied from time to time* The Hindu rulers 
directly collected the land tax from the cultivators through their 
representatives in each village. Further, during the Hindus 
the land collection was generally moderate* The assessment of
revenue was not regulated merely by the extent of land the husbandmen
1cultivated but also by the quality of the produce* For example, 
in the district of ICanara, the Pandiya rulers realised one sixth of
the whole produce. In Malabar, prior to the invasion of Hyder All
*  2-  
in 1764, the land tax was least burdensome* Dr.Buchanan in his
^Briggs, John, Land Tax in India, pp,54-55, 
2Ibid,, f>. 59
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book, Toumev through M ysore, Canara and M alabar, wrbte that
Krishnadevaraya, the King of Vljayanagar (1509-29) took one fourth
of the gross produce of rice la n d s .*
The Mohammedan conquerors of South India continued the Hindu
method of direct revenue collection . But under them the state  demand
on lands in  southern territories rose appreciably. The Mysorean Revenue
Regulations on the government under Hyder and Tipu showed that half of
2the produce was retained as "the share of the sovereign". On account 
of heavy taxation by the Mohammedan rulers in  the 17th and 18th 
centuries many proprietors in  South India abandoned their lands.
Writing about Kanara in 1800, Munro, the Principal Collector, main­
tained , " . . .  for the amount of land left unoccupied, from the flight or 
death of its  cu ltivators, became at la s t so great, th a t i t  could not be 
discharged by the remaining part of the inhab itan ts, and the collections
3
. . .  fell short of the assessm ent from ten to  sixty per c e n t ." The cond­
ition of other South Indian territories did also  exemplify the higher 
rate of revenue assessm ent by the Mohammedan ru lers. In Malabar 
and Coimbatore the officials
* Buchanan, Dr. F . ,  Toumev from Madras through M ysore, Canara and 
M alabar, V ol.3, p p .171-2.
2
G reville, C .F . , British India A nalysed, The Provincial Revenue estab ­
lishments of Tippoo Sultan and of Mahomedan and British conquerors,
Reg.3 , p .3 .
3Munro's Report on Canara, 31st May 1800, Arbuthnot, A .J . , M ai.G eneral 
Sir Thomas Munro, V ol.I, p . 69.
of Mysore had taxed at rates which could be endured only by
fraudulent practice. At Chinglepet and Nellore, on the east
coast, benevolences and forced loans had been screwed out of
the cultivators in  addition to the land tax es . * The economic
condition of Tanjore was miserable due to inhuman exactions
under the Nawab of Arcot. Same was the picture of the Zamlndar
countries. In Vizagapatam, Godavari, Ganjamand Kristna the
rayats nominal share was half of the gross produce but in practice
additional taxes levied by the Zamindars reduced the ra y a ts ' share
2to merely one fifth or one six th .
Along with th is high rate of taxation the age long warfare 
and struggle for supremacy among different powers reduced the agri­
cultural c lass of Madras to m iserable poverty. On the  economic 
condition of the ray a ts , Munro commented in  1797, that "many of 
the iyots \ axe so poor that it \ as always doubtful whether next year 
they wi&il<’ be in the rank of cultivators or labourers". Only a few 
of them were able to stick  to the ir holdings in sp ite of one or two 
bad seasons. Heyne, a contemporary w riter, observed that the
^Dharma Kumar, Land and C aste in South-India. pp. 8-9 .
2
Raghavaiyanger, S .,  Memorandum on the progress of the Madras 
Presidency for the la s t forty y e a rs . p .12.
3
cultivators of Mysore were left with a mere trifle  when the 
expenses of the cultivation and dues of the village and sircar 
servants were deducted from their one half of the whole produce.'*’ 
The British settlem ent in South-India began in the first 
quarter of the 17th century although they started acquiring territ­
ories only in the middle of the 18th century. As a reward to the 
English for their help in h is war of succession  in the C arnatic, 
the Nawab Mahammad Ali Khan granted the East India Company a
part of his Taghire lands surrounding Madras in  1750 and finally
2the re s t in 1763. These Jaghlre lands were la ter on constituted 
into Chingleput d is tric t. Soon after in 1765 the Mughal Emperor of 
Delhi granted to the Company's Government the Northern Circars -  
comprising the distfcLcts of Ganjam, Vizagaphtam, Godavari and 
Kristna. At the conclusion of the first Mysore w ar with Tipu Sultan 
in  1792, Salem-Baramahal, Dindigul, Palni and M alabar were 
acquired by the English. Further acquisitions of Kanara, Coiiffratbre 
and the Hoisur Taluk were made after the second Mysore war in 1799. 
The same war resulted in  the transfer of some Mysore d istric ts to
^Heyne, B ., Tracts on Ind ia . p .85.
2Briggs, John, Land tax in Ind ia , p .237.
3
Baden Powell, Land Systems of British India, V ol.Ill, p p .7 -8 .
the Nizam. The Nizam being unable to cany  on the adm inistration 
of these  d is tr ic ts , handed them over to the Company in 1800. This 
tract of land was known as the Ceded D istricts -  comprising an area 
of approximately 27,000 square miles -  covering Bellary, Cuddapah, 
Kumool and Palnad.* In 1799 the Raja of Tanjore renounced h is 
sovereign rights over h is entire territory which w as brought directly 
under British management. The remaining d istric ts of Nellore, North 
Arcot, South Arcot, Madura, Trichlnopoly and Tinnevelly were orig­
inally held by the Nawab of Carnatic. But having been greatly 
indebted to the Company's servants he had to assign  to them the 
revenues of his various e sta tes  from time to time to pay off his
deb ts. In consequence, by 1801 almost the whole possession  of
2
the Nawab of Carnatic passed into the hands of the Company.
Thus at the beginning of the  19th century the Presidency of Madras 
under the Company's government comprised virtually the whole of 
South India.
In course of the acquisition of these  territo ries , the British 
authorities found the land system s prevailing in those areas 
confusing and varied. In the Northern C ircars they found the
1 _
Arbuthnot, A .J . , M aj. General Sir Thomas Munro, V ol.I, p .X £.
2 Baden Powell, Land Systems of British Ind ia , V ol.Ill, p .9.
existence of big proprietorship under which some local chieftains
owned the lands, held m agisterial authority and possessed
m ilitary power. They collected rent from the cultivators of their
land and paid only a portion of it to the Government. This pattern
of land tenure closely resembled the Zamindary system in  Bengal.
In the wider Tamil and Telegu speaking areas -  including Coinbatore,
N ellore, M adura, Kanara, Trichinopoly and Tinnevelly -  Amani
system (a sort of village communal system) prevailed. Under
th is system the villages were considered as corporate bodies and the
lands of the v illages belonged to the corporation. The Government
collected the land revenue cash or kind directly through its  village
o ffic ia ls , without any intervention of farmers or Zamindatrs.* A
sim ilar system prevailed in the Ceded ih s tr ic ts  under the name
Appanum. In course of time th is village communal system uunder-
went d rastic  modifications and it even allowed individual land
2holders or M lrasdar to se ttle  the revenue of h is  land directly with
3the Government. This system of direct settlem ent with the
^Iyengar, S .,  Sundararaja, Land tenures in the Madras Presidencyf 
p. 78.
2
The word M irasdar came from the Arabic word M iras. A Miras is  
literally  a hereditary right and its  holder i s  called a M lrasdar. 
Iyengar, S .,  Sundararaja, Land Tenure in  the Madras Presidency f
p. 20.
3
Dharma Kumar, Land and C aste in South India, p. 15.
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cultivator instead of through the village corporation w as la ter 
on called the M irasdari system . This M irasdari system  w as 
sim ilar to what the British officials finally  adopted as Rayatwari 
Settlement. Thus in M adras, the British found three types of 
land settlem ent -  Zamindary. Village Communal and Rayatwari -  
whereas in  Bengal they found only the Zamindary system .
The land settlem ent in  early British possessions like 
Jaghire lands and the Northern C ircars, did never pose any 
great problem to  the Company's Government. The Jaghire lands 
were farmed to th e  Nawab's agents ti l l  1780 when the Madras 
Government took the management directly into their own hands. 
They recovered the lands from the mismanagement of the  farmers 
and allowed the existing village communal system  to continue 
there up to 1798.^
In the Northern Circars the government permitted the local 
chiefs to retain  their position as land holders provided they paid 
to the government a  stipulated share of the revenue they collected 
from the cultivators. In order to  regularise the land tax , the 
government in  1789 arranged w ith the proprietors of the Northern 
Circars that they would pay one third of the ir rental to  the treasury .
^Report of L. Place, Collector of Jaghire Lands, 6th June 1799, 
Firminger, Fifth Report, V ol.Ill, pp. 163-7.
At th is point, in the yea r 1793, Cornwallis effected a perman­
ent settlem ent of land revenue with the Zamlndars of Bengal.
The anticipated advantages of the permanent Settlement and its  
successfu l application in  Bengil enthused the Supreme Govern­
ment to extend i ts  application  in South India too. During the
.i
Governorship of Clive (1798-1803), a ll  the Jaghire lands and the 
lands in  the Northern Circars were se ttled  in accordance with the 
Permanent Zamindary System of Lord Cornw allis.^
So far the Government of Madras did not face any overwhel­
ming problem. But when they started  considering land settlem ent 
in the territories occupied between 1792 to 1801, they were con­
fronted with a difficult situation . This vast trac t of newly acquired
lands "had been for upwards of two centuries a scene of successive
2invasions and a constant prey to internal confic t and m isrule. "
The long drawn out struggle for supremacy between the French and 
the English, fights for survival between the Mysore rulers and the 
British, the age long suspicion and stratagem among the Indian 
ru le rs , had virtually thrown the whole area into a sta te  of anarchy. 
There the existing land revenue system w as confused, uncertain and
*Dutta, R .C ., Economic History of Ind ia , p . l i d —. 12.?-.
2Arbuthnot, A .J . , Major General Sir Thomas Munro. V ol.I, p .x c .
irregular. Hence it had to be reorganised. But the Permanent 
Zamindary Settlement which the Supreme Government wanted to 
extend over the whole of British possessions in India, now seemed 
to be incompatible with th e  conditions prevailing in the newly 
acquired territo ries. The authorities in  Madras found it  difficult 
to  create Zainindars where they did not ex is t. A group of Madras 
revenue officers, therefore, attempted experimenting a new form 
of land settlem ent. *
Captain Alexander Read was the pioneer in  introducing the 
Rayatwari System (direct land settlem ent with th e  ray cits) in M adras. 
He was appointed in 1793 the Superintendant and Collector of the 
newly acquired Baramahal d is tric t. He selec ted  Captain Munro, 
Captain Graham and Captain Macleod from among the  military 
officers and George Hurdis of the civil serv ice , as h is  a ss is tan ts  
in Baramahal. Read believed in  the sovereign 's indisputable prop­
rietory rights in land. In h is scheme there were to fee no intermed­
ia rie s . The settlem ent w as to be made directly with the actual 
cultivators. The assessm ent of the revenue, preceded by an extensiv 
survey of the lands, was to be based on the average y ields of the
* Among these  officers the names of Capt. A. Read, Lt. Col. Th. 
Munro, W. Thackeray, M. W allace, G. Graham and G. H indisi 
should be mentioned.
£o4-
lands for the last ten years. In Baramahal Read successfully
1
applied his scheme of direct settlement on annual basis. The
success of Read's settlement at Baramahal impressed the Court
of Directors who, however* felt that "the system is perhaps better
adapted for ascertaining the resources of a new country than for
2continued practice. " The Board of Revenue in Madras* too* was 
highly satisfied with Read's successful experiment up to 1796 and 
expected that he would be able to make a permanent settlement at 
Baramahal. But the Board was totally disillusioned when on 10th 
December 1796* Read's Proclamation declated the Rayatwari.
Settlement at Baramahal as essentially annual* At that point the 
Supreme Government instructed the Government of Madras to extend 
and establish the Bengal system of revenue administration in the 
Madras Presidency. Inconsequence* shortly after Read's 
resignation in 1799, the system introduced by Read was ignored and the 
Permanent Zamindary Settlement was established at Baramhal,
^Read’s Proclamation, 10th Dec. 1796, cited in N.Mukherjee,
Ryotwarl System in Madras, p. 13,
2Briggs, John, Land Tax In India, p .262.
3 Mukherjee, N .. Ryotwarl System in Madras. pp.14*5.
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During his stay at Baramahal, Munro became a supporter 
of Read's Rayatwari Settlement. In September 1797, he wrote 
without hesitation that the system which would be equally bene­
ficial to the cultivators and the government was the Rayatwari. 
System.* This system not only recognised the Government as 
proprietor of the land but a lso  protected the In terests of the cu lti­
vators of the so il. From Baramahal Munro was transferred to 
South Kanara as  collector In 1799, and remained there for a year. 
Lamenting on the economic condition of Kanara, Munro wrote,
"Hyder ruined Canara . . .  he regarded It as a fund from which he
might draw, without lim it, . . .  The same demands and worse manage-
2ment, increased  them In the beginning of Tlpu's re ign ."  It was a t 
th is period that Munro felt more strongly that a proper assessm ent 
on land was the only solution to the sad plight of the Kanarese 
people. He was im pressed to find that the settlem ent of land In 
Kanara prior to Hyder's conquest was sim ilar to the Rayatwari sy s-
3
tern. In Kanara, therefore, he started with the preliminaries
*Mukherjee, N . , Rvotwari System in M adras, p . 13.
2Extract of Munrols Report on Canara, 31st May 1800, Firmlnger, 
Fifth Report, V ol.Ill, p .309.
3
Extract of Munro's Report on C anara, 9th Nov. 1800, Firmlnger, 
Fifth Report, Vol.HI, p p .447-48.
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of direct settlements with the revets. But his stay there was too
short to bring any substantial change In the situation. His removal
from Kanara, however* did not bring an end to the system he
started there. His successor, J# Ravenshaw carried on the
experimentation started by Munro and the Rayatwari Settlement
1was introduced in Kanara on annual basis.
In November 1800, Munro was put in charge of the civil
administration of the Ceded Districts, As the Principal Collector
of the Ceded Districts* Munro first got the opportunity to make a
full fledged experiment with the Rayatwari system as a land tenure
for Madras Presidency. When the Ceded Districts first came under
the British Government, they appeared to be a scene of turmoil and
depression. The frequent changes of masters, the ravages of the
2Mysore war, the unrest caused by the turbulent poligara and
^Report of Ravenshaw, Collector of Southern Canara, 30th April 1802,; 
Firmlnger, Fifth Report. Vol. HI, pp.452*4.
^Poligar'is a Telegu word meaning military chieftains • The poligars in 
Madms districts originally descended from the officers of police and 
revenue agents of the Hindu sovereigns. In power and position they 
were like local chiefs who possessed military forces and strongholds. 
In course of time, they became large proprietors of lands too. They 
gradually turned so powerful that the cultivators had to pay them 
protection money. During the acquisition and settlement of lands in 
the Madras Districts, the British government had to face the powerful 
resistance of the poligars who rose in revolts in defence of their 
arbitrary power and position. However, most of the poliqars were 
successfully subdued by the British Authority before Bentinck's arrival, 
Maclean, A.D. ,  Standing Information regarding the Official Admlnis* 
iretion of the Madras. Presidency,_pp .95*97. and 
Gleig, & K.,  Life of Sir Tfromas Munro. Vol.I, pp.337-45.
finally the abuses caused by the N izam 's misgpyernment pulled
the Ceded D istricts down to an utmost s ta te  of m isery,  ^ With
the purpose of improving the conditions there through safeguarding
the in terests of the  cultivators, Munro decided in  1802 on a detailed
Rayafcwari survey in  each d istric t and v illage of the Ceded D istric ts .
This survey continued up to 1806, and during that period the
Rayatrwari system w as practiced in the Ceded D istricts on an annual
b a s is . After the completion of h is survey, Munro w as so impressed
with the success of annual Rayatwari system , that he recommended
to the Board of Revenue to  make the system permanent for the Ceded 
2D istric ts . But the issu e  of permanent settlem ent in  Madras was 
yet undecided t and the Government of Madras was h es itan t to adopt 
Rayatrwari settlem ent as  an official policy.
Coimbatore was another d is ttic t where the Rayatwari 
settlem ent was introduced after its  acquisition  in  1799, by 
Col. Macleod and G. Hurdis, appointed as  the Collectors of North-^ 
Coimbatore and South Coimbatore respectively . Both the Collectors 
had worked as  a ss is ta n ts  of R^ad a t  Baramahal and believed in  the
1General Repott of the Board of Revenue, Cited in M ukherjee, N . , 
Ryptwari system  in M adras, p. 20.
^Munro to the Board of Revenue, 3 0th Nov^ 1806, Extract Proceedings 
of the Board of Rev. *Tth Jan. 1807, Firmlnger, Fifth Report. V ol.Ill, 
p p .204-208.
su ccess of the Rayatwari settlem ent. They both therefore started 
Rayatwari surveys in  their areas and introduced the system of direct 
annual collection from the rayats. Later on in  1805, the two 
divisions of the d istric t of Coimbatore were Consolidated and the 
Rayatwari system progressed satisfacto rily  under the collectorship 
of George Gaixow.
By 1803 , however, the number of se ttled  d istric ts  in  Madras
were le ss  than that of unsettled  provinces. The areas,which had
been settled  permanently were Guntur, Chingleput, Baramahal, the
whole of the Northern C ircars, Nellore, a  division of Ramnad and
Tinneveley, The rest of the M adias provinces were continuing under
1
annual settlem ent and were considered a s  unsettled  d is tric ts .
In the mean time in 1798, W ellesley succeeded Sir John 
Shore a s  the  Governor General of Bengal. It w as soon after h is  
arrival that the question of land settlem ent in the vast territories 
of the Madras Presidency became very important. W ellesley , a 
more assertive  personality than h is predecessor, in sis ted  that the 
Government of M adras should introduce the Bengal system  of 
Permanent Zamindary settlem ent in a ll the  unsettled  areas of Madras.
# ^Baliga, B.S. . Studies in Madras Administration, V ol.II, pp. 83-4.
The Court of Directors a lso  supported W ellesley and in  1801 
desired the Government of Madras to  comply with th e  ideas of 
W ellesley ,  ^ Thus in th e  commencing years of the 19th century 
two different system s of land adm inistration were found to he 
struggling for successfu l emergence in  M adras Presidency, One 
w es the Bengal system  of Permanent Zamindary Settlement sponsored 
by the Supreme Government and upheld by the  authorities a t home, 
and the other w as the newly evolved Rayatwari settlem ent initiated 
by Read and adopted by Munro, It was a t th is  Juncture that Bentinck 
reached M adras as the Governor of the Presidency. From the very 
beginning he w as confronted with the difficult ta sk  of choosing 
one or the other of the two Systems -  a decision on which depended 
the resources of th e  Government and the  happiness of the millions 
of people.
Sometime after h is  arrival in  early 1804, Bentinck made an 
acquaintance with Munro and h is  works in  th e  Ceded D is tric ts .
This associa tion  provided him with an in itia l knowledge of the land 
system s of Madras and its  characteristic  problems. In a le tte r to the 
Court of D irectors , Bentinck drew the atten tion  of the Court to the
1
Banerjea, P . , jndian Finance, p. 179.
settlem ent made by Munro of the revenues of the Ceded D istric ts .
"The basis of th is settlem ent", formed by Major Munro, "is a
defined and detailed  assessm ent apportioned on the lands, and
paid by the individuals who occupy them ."* Under the Munro system ,
as observed earlie r, the Government was considered as the sole
proprietor of the lands. While distributing the lands for cultivation
2
the Government would give the tille rs  Pettah or deed of le a s e , by
which the holders of land would be considered as i ts  proprietors.
This settlem ent in the Ceded D istiic ts  was thus described by Munro
as a system of ensuring peasant proprietorship. In th is system all
the lands were surveyed and then assessm ent made according to
their qualities (fertility and to tal production). In fixing the rate of
assessm en t, Munro relied on the accounts of the previous years.
The land tax , when fixed, was to  be paid by the cultivators directly
to the Government. Bentinck seemed to be highly im pressed with
th is system in the Ceded D istricts and referred to the Court of
Directors that under Munro's Settlement 208,819 independent fanners
had secured the profits of their industry . This, he hoped, would
*Rev.Letters from M a d ., 23rd March 1804, Vol.I, para. 119.
2 Pettah or Pattah is  a document given by the Collector to the Zamindar 
or by some other receiver of revenue specifying the condition on which 
the lands were held , Phillips, C .H . , Hand Book of Oriental H istory , 
p. 71.
revive the ruined resources of the Ceded D istricts and would yield 
a considerably increased revenue to the Government.* His s a tis ­
faction with the settlem ent of the Ceded D istricts turned him into 
an enthusiast of the Rayatwari system . He desired to make i t  
permanent, not only in the Ceded D istricts but in  other parts of 
Madras Presidency a lso . To Petrie, the senior member of the Council,
he wrote, "I confess myself that I should have liked better the 
2Kulwadv Settlement in permanency . . . »  This would have given the
animation of in terest to every individual in the country and the
future in te rests  of the Government would have kept pace with the gen-
3
eral prosperity of the country."
Though Bentinck believed in  the success of Munro's system , 
he s till could not decide whether i t  would be expedient for the 
Government to enforce Rayatwari Settlement in opposition to the 
favoured policy of the Supreme Government. The Governor G eneral's 
instruction about the establishm ent of Bengal system in Madras was 
s till operative and the influences against a Rayatwari experiment 
were widespread not only in Bengal but also  in  M adras. The works
* Rev. le tte rs from Mad. 23rd March 1804, Vol. I , para. 110.
2
Kulwady derived from Kulwaii a Persian word meaning a  settlem ent 
made by the Government directly with the individual ray at s .
^Bentinck to Petrie, 8th Nov. 1804, B.P.
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of Col* Read and h is  a ss is ta n ts  had already boon disregarded by 
C live’s government and the lands vrere directed to bei settled on 
Bamindary tenure. At tills  moment Bentinck strongjy felt the need 
of preventing the unwanted extension of the Bengal settlement in 
other Madras territo ries . For him the only way to  safeguard the 
nev; experim entation w as to  persuade the Supreme Government to 
assum e a flexible altitude with regard to land tenure in Madras 
Presidency. But it w as net an easy task  to induce Wellesley to 
change policy. However, the  relationship between Bentinck and 
W ellesley was very cordial a t th is  stage and the Governor General
I
seemed to ba sympathetic and helpful to him. Soon Bentinck made 
up h is mind and on 29th June 1805, he reached Calcutta with the purp­
ose of consulting the Governor General on the subject of land 
2settlement* No detail record is  available about the outcome of 
Beutinck’s v is it to  Y /eilesley . To Frederick North, the Governor of 
Ceylon, (1798-lo0r>),Bentinck w rote , "Lord W ellcsley  received ine 
w ith every possible d istinction  . . .  I w as not disappointed with any 
of the expectations which I have formed either of information or of
general curiosity and I am satisfied  that my journey has been of special
T~  ------------------------  ~ !
Boulger, t>. Loiu Will}arn Bentinck. p .20.
2Bentinck's M inute, 20th June, 1805, Mad. Rev. Cons. 9th Aug.
1805, Range, 270, V ol.I.
advantage to the public s e rv ic e . ,f* From the le tte r of W ellesley , 
which Bentinck forwarded to the Board of Reveiiue, after he 
returned from Bengal, it appears that W ellesley w as somewhat 
influenced by Bentinck on the question of the future land se ttle ­
ment in  M adras. The le tte r s ta ted  that the surveys and a s s e s s ­
ments which were being made in  Madras Should be completed and
the question of ultimate settlem ent of th e  re s t of the territories
2
should be left for further investigation . This undoubtedly indic­
ated a positive change in  the attitude of the Supreme Government 
w ith regard to Madras land settlem ent. Bentinck's in itia l success 
lay  in  checking the  extension of the permanent Zamindary settlement 
in Madras Presidency and in allowing Munro and others to carry on 
their experimentation w ith the  Rayafcwari system .
W ellesley ’s decision  to allow further investigations afforded 
Bentinck with the opportunity to  look deeper into the question  of land 
revenue. He was astounded to see the poverty of the rayats in a 
predominantly agricultural country like South Ind ia . According to 
him, the excessive assessm ent of the Indian rulers on land and the
^Bentinck to Frederick North, 5th July, 1805, B.P.
2W ellesley To Bentinck, 4th July, 1805, Mad. Ret/. Gons.
9th Aug. 1805, Range, 276, V ol.I.
continuation of the same policy by the British authority was the root 
cause of poverty. At theeid of 1804 he wrote, "I have paid a great 
deal of attention to the revenue management in th is country. Your 
Lordship will perceive, . . .  that the general tenor of my opinion i s ,  
that we have rode the country too hard and the consequence is  that 
i t  is  in a s ta te  of the most lamentable poverty. The high a s s e s s ­
ment on land and the rigorous collection of revenue, Bentinck 
observed, were detrimental not only to the peasantry but a lso  to 
the Company's power and prestige. As a devoted servant of the
Company he was against the adoption of any system which was
2harmful to the revenue and propserity of the country. To Bentinck
the introduction of a new system in  the Ceded D istric ts offered a
better prospect. He had in fact started  to believe tha t the direct
settlem ent with the ravats was the most workable way to ameliorate
3
the condition of the people.
Bentinck, however, had no inclination to reverse a ll that had 
already been done. He confirmed the permanently se ttled  areas of 
the Northern Circars where the big landholders were allowed to stay
* Bentinck to C astlereagh, 18 th O ct. 1804, B.P.
2
Rev. Letters from M adras, 16th O ct. V o l.l , p a ra s . 101-103.
3
Bentinck to Charles Grant, 8th Sept. 1805, B.P.
as  before. But he w as obviously reluctant to extend the Zamindary
system in other parts of the country, Bentinck critically  examined
the Zamindary system and discovered some grave defects in  it .
This system r he believed, was likely to deprive both the Qovem-
1
ment and the cultivators i$f the benefits of future prosperity. F irstly, 
the Zamindary system provided no incentive either to the Zamindetr 
or the cultivator to bring w astelands under cultivation. The Zamlndars 
who distributed the lands to the tille rs  for cultivation, were more 
concerned about the immediate revenue return than in the long term 
improvement of the lands. His d istance from the Soil made him 
ignorant of the nature of the soil and rendered him disin terested  
about the m easures which could be adopted for its  improvement.
The cultivators, on the other hand, being merely the tille rs  and not 
proprietors of the land, fe lt no incentive to labour hard for making 
w astelands cultivable. Thus the w asteland would;remain w aste for 
ever without any attempt being made by either party to make it fertile . 
Secondly, under the Zamindary system the Government would se ll 
the land to the highest bidder who would become the proprietor of 
the land. As a proprietor he would receive a certain percentage of
1
Bentinck to Charles Grant, 8th Sept. 1805, B.P.
revenue, which Bentinck calculated to be approximately fifteen 
per cent of the to ta l gross product of the land . This amount of the land 
revenue consumed by the highest bidder of the land appeared consid­
erably high to Bentinck. Further, th e ^ ^ o A e n t settlem ent gave no 
prospect to the Government to enhance the revenue in  accordance 
with any future rise  in the productivity or value of the land. Thirdly, 
under the Zamindars the Pettah Regulation was not specified. In 
that settlem ent it was the Zamindars and not the Government who gave 
the rayats the deed of lease , stating the  amount of the rent and the 
time it was to be paid. Each Zamindar, being an independent prop­
rieto r of land, was not bound by any fixed rules and regulations for the 
Pettah.  ^ In th is  situation the rayat had to depend entirely on the 
d iscretion  of the Zamindars .
As against the drawbacks of the Zamindary system , Bentinck 
pointed out the advantages of the direct settlem ents with the rayats,, ,
In the Ceded D istricts the Pettahs had been granted by the Collectors
Allinstead  of by the big landholders. There, a s  Bentinck observed, the 
land is  first surveyed and a s se s se d , the amount of the assessm en t is 
fixed with each individual, and a  Pettah specifying the amount and 
period of payment is  given to hlmP^ According to Bentinck, the large
^Bentinck to Charles Grant, 8th Sept. 1805, B.P.
2 ' ,Ibid.
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profit which the proprietors of land received under the Zamindary 
system  was sheer w astage. Instead of allowing th is  profit to the 
Zamindars, he preferred a 7 to 10 percent reduction in the a s s e s s ­
ment of the ray at s . The amount of revenue which could thus be 
saved by the exclusion of Zamindars should be used for better 
purposes, such a s / "the improvement of the country, the making of 
roads, bridge?, tanks and buildings.
In the Rayatwari System, under which the Government would 
be the sole proprietor of the lands, the problem of w asteland would 
be solved. Bentinck believed that under th is  system  the cultivators 
would grow prosperous and wealthy and they would like to bring 
additional lands under cultivation. At th is point the Government 
could allo t them the w aste lands, in addition to cultivable lands, 
without any assessm en t for the first year. In subsequent years the 
rervenue was to be a sse sse d  according to the produce in  w aste lands. 
The cultivator, having permanent in te rest in the land, would also  try 
h is best to improve his land and make it cultivable. So the w aste -
A
lands would not remain barren for ever. Thus, in the Rayatwari system , 
there seemed a possib ility  of obtaining additional revenue in  future and 
effecting gradual improvement of the w aste lands. As Bentinck
^Bentinck to Charles Grant, 8th Sept. 1805, B.P.
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commented: "By such a settlem ent . .  .the population would become 
rich and the in te rest and revenue of the Government would keep on 
equal pace with the prosperity of the people. In the existing cond­
ition of the Madras Presidency, Bentinck believed, that the Rayatwari
Settlement would be most suitable for the unsettled  d is tr ic ts , where
2
"it would appear dangerous to create powerful Zamindars. " But
before taking any final decision on the question, Bentinck thought i t
w ise to complete the survey and assessm ent of the country which
W ellesley had suggested to him in July 1805.
In May 1805, Bentinck had asked the Collectors of the various
d istric ts  to express their opinion on the is su e . "The proposed
settlem entK, he wrote to the C ollectors, "shortly i s  to confirm the
rayots in possession  of their lands in  perpetuity upon a fixed rent
without any agent between the Government and the ry o t ." With a
view to convincing the Collectors of the advantages of the abolition
of Intermediate agen ts, Bentinck pointed out the unnecessary loss
of a large portion of total revenue which the Zamindars appropriated.
3
This amount could be used for other beneficial w orks. Bentinck
* Bentinck to Charles Grant, 8th Sept. 1805, B.P.
2 Ibid.
3
Bentinck to the Collectors of different districts, 27th May 1805, B.P.
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believed that the C ollectors, who had direct re la tion  with the
peasantry , would be able to  provide him with betteer suggestions
on the mode of settlem ent in  their a reas . He first asked their
views a s  to the extent of re lie f which a cultivator Df the unsettled
d is tric ts  would require at the time of assessm ent to cover the loss
of bad years , to keep up h is stock and to d ispense with the future
advances of Tuccavi (agricultural loan to the  cultivators by the
government). Next, Bentinck desired the" Collectors bp s ta te , what
should be the ra te  of rent for the different kinds of w aste lands. On
th is  point he requested the Collectors to bear in mind that the rent
should be moderate to encourage every ravat t o bring new lands under
tillag e  without diminishing the existing cultivable lands. *
With a view to avoiding any such allegation that he intended
to influence the Collectors w ith his own id eas , Bentinck sent them a
second circular on 8th June, 1805. There he made it  very clear that
his w ish w as only to collect information through the Collectors and
2not to impose h is views on them. The C ollectors, however, could 
no t send any immediate reply to Bentinck*s queries, but they adequ­
ately  helped William Thackeray, Bentinck's representative, to gather
* Bentinck to the Collectors of different d is tr ic ts , 27th May, 1805, B.P. 
2Governor's Circular to the C ollectors, 8th June 1805, Pub. Dept. 
C ons. B.P.
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detailed information when he v is ited  M alaber, Kanara and the 
Ceded D istricts in  1806.* '
During the early years of his Governorship, Bentinck was thus 
engaged in twofold ac tiv ities; f irs t, he carefully watched the s ta te  
of affairs in the Presidency and tried to form an idea about the ex ist­
ing land system . Secondly, with his personal preference for a 
Rayatwari system Bentinck attempted to influence a change in the 
official land policy. But before arriving a t  any final decision 
Bentinck wished to  be equipped with a ll informations in support of 
the  proposed Rayatwari settlem ent. Much of h is time was thus 
occupied In pursuing the d iscussions of th e  re la tive merits and demerits 
of the Rayatwari and Zamindary system s. A controversy had already 
developed in the Madras Presidency over the land question . The 
arguments put forth by the opponents and supporters of the two land 
system s must have considerably influenced Beintinck's opinion.
The case for the introduction of Zamindary system throughout 
Madras Presidency w as voiced by some experience^revenue officials 
of the Government led . by John Hodgson. They attempted to demon­
strate  the advantages of a  Zamindary system  and wanted to expose
*Thackerayrs Report, 4th Aug. 1807, Firmlnger, Fifth Report. Vol.Ill 
pp. 4{5l£-££r.
I Z i
the w eaknesses of a  Rayatwari settlem ent. The other group of 
revenue officals led by Thomas Munro endeavoured to prove the 
superiority of a Rayatwari settlem ent over a Zamindary system .
The advocates of the Zamindary system pleaded that the 
Government of M adras should make permanent settlem ents with 
the Zamindars whore they already existed and should create them 
where they did not ex is t. They had no doubt that the Zamindary 
system would prove advantageous to the government and beneficial 
to the rayafs . It would save the government the enormous trouble 
of looking into the agricultural details  before a ssessin g  the land 
tax and also  the hazardous job of its  collection. The Zamindar 
w ith a profit incentive would be professionally most suitable to take 
care of these details.'*’ Free from the troubles of directly adm inister­
ing the land, the government would find their revenue more secure under 
the Zamindary system . A permanent settlem ent with the Zamindars 
would not necessarily  mean low revenue earnings, for the s ta te . Even 
allowing the Zamindars a reasonable profit from the land, the govern­
ment would s till be safe against any lo s s , because there would be
"^Hodgson's Memoir, 1806, Fifth Report of the Select Committee.
1812, V ol.7, p p .922-37.
competition among the Zamindars for securing a settlem ent from
the government. ■*■
B esides, Hodgson argued, settlem ents w ith the Zamindars
would lead to the  improvement in  agriculture. The proprietors of
big esta te s  would always have the means and the incentive to invest
in cultivation. The cultivators would likew ise be benefitted under
th is  system . The fear that the cultivator, if hard-pressed , might
abandon his holding, would restra in  the landlord from over-assessing
his ten an ts . The rayats t therefore, were likely  to have a g reater
certainty of holding his land a t a moderate rent under the Zamindars.
Hodgson even went so far as to suggest that under the Zamindary
system there would be a growth of mutual confidence between the
2landlord and the ten an ts . The cultivator under the Zamindary system./  *
the  Tanjore Committee commented, would be a t liberty to pay rent or
3
to divide the produce as se ttled  between him and the landlord.
R eport of the Tanjore Committee, 22nd Feb. 1807, Mad. Rev. Cons. 
10th April 1807, Range, 276, Vol. 13. The Tanjore Committee was 
appointed by Bentinck in April 1804 to investigate into the charges of 
corruptionjagainst the  Tanjore Revenue O fficials. The Committee 
consisted of Hodgson, W allace and Blackbume.
2Hodgson's Memoir, 1806, Fifth Report of the Select Committee, 1812, 
V ol.7, p p .922-37.
3
Report of the Tanjore Committee, 22nd Feb. 1807, Mad. Rev. Cons. 
10th April 1807, Range, 276, Vol. 13.
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Moreover, the Zamindars . being aware of the nature of the soil 
and the circumstances of the ra y a ts , would regulate their demands 
fairly "so as  to enable the better sort of rayats to thrive^ and the 
poorer sort to avoid the d istres
The advocates of the Zamindary system  then went on under­
lining the defects and inconveniences of the direct settlem ent. The 
system  would leave the ultim ate responsib ility  of fixing s ta te  demand 
in  the hands of the revenue o ffic ia ls . This, in consequence, would 
lead to the oveijkssesSment of land. Unlike the Zamindar, the 
Collector would have no in terest in  lands and would pay no heed to 
the d ifficulties of the cultivators. Under the Rayatwari system the 
cultivator would not be able to evade over^issessment as he could under
the Zamindars, by leaving one proprietor for the other. A revenue
2officer could alw aya follow a fugitive rayat and a s se s s  him. Even
Thackeray, an exponent of Rayatwari settlem ent,had to admit that an
indolent, corrupt and incapable revenue officer could oppress the 
3
ra y a ts . It w as further argued tha t the investm ent in land would be 
poDr under Rayatwari system and agriculture would consequently suffer.
^fiodgson's Memoir, 1806, Fifth Report of the Select Committee.
1812, V ol.7, p .927.
2Ih id ., p .9 J3 .
3
Memoir of Thackery, 29th April 1806, Mad. Rev. Cons. Range 276, Vol. 
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sepnd fa ilu res.
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Hodgson, the then Collector of Coimbatore, hn h is report dated
10th September 1807, held Rayatwari system responsible for the
depressed condition of South Coimbatore* * Men like Hodgson were
convinced that under a Zamindary system the people would be
relieved from the constant and vexatious interference of the revenue
officials In  a ll their transactions t and consequently the government
2would save a greater part of expense in  maintaining them*
The advocates of the Rayatwari settlem ent in Madras refuted 
a ll the arguments raised  against a d irect arrangement between the 
government and the ray a t . Further, they sharply pointed out the 
main defects of the Zamindary system . Their arguments were stren­
gthened by Munro's experience, who, a s  the Principal Collector 
of the Ceded D istric ts , had completed surveying the whole area by
3
1806. Munro always believed tha t the Rayatwari settlem ent, being 
the original land revenue system  of South India, should be retained, 
and that its  abandonment woidd lead to injurious consequenees.
Thus the chief argument in favour of the Rayatwari settlem ent was
1 ~
Hodgson's Report on Cotmbafore D istric t, 10th Sept. 1807, Mad.
Rev. Cons. 16th Aug. 1808, Range, 276, Vol. 21.
2 Hodgson's Memoir, 1806, Fifth Report of the Select Committee, 1812, 
V ol.7/ p p .922-3^*
3Arbuthnot, A .J . , M ajor General Sir Thomas Munro, V ol.I, p .xcv .
that i t  w as the indigenous- system of South India and was 
naturally  su ited  to the conditions and customs of the people. ^
A system which had long been practiced in a  country and which 
the people understood^could not be in tricate  and hazardous in 
execution. Besides, mOdiJjof the details  of the Rayatwari se ttle ­
ment would be "done away with once the survey was completed
2and a full picture of agricultrual conditions gained. " After the 
fixation of rent following a thorough survey in a  d istric t no further 
official interference would be necessary . The deficiencies fo rbad  
years could always be adjusted against the increased produce of 
the good years. According to Munro, oyeijkssessment under the 
Rayatwari T 'system  could be obviated with the  help of the ra y a ts .
The cultivators were generally well-informed about the actual con­
dition of crops of the neighbouring lands. Their advice to the
revenue officers at the time of assessm ent would be invaluable
3
to avoid high assessm en t. Thus a  proper assessm ent of revenue 
would turn the ra y a t's lands into saleable  properties and he would 
enjoy the right to dispose of a part of h is land or to buy an additional
* Munro's Report, 30th Nov. 1806, Fifth Report of the Select Committee. 
1812, Vol. 7, pp. 745-8.
2Munro's Answer to Questions regarding Rayatwari Settlement, 26th 
June, 1806, cited in Shastri, V. Munro System of British Statesman­
ship in Ind ia . pp. 22-46.
3
Munro's Report, 30th Nov. 1806, Fifth Report of the Select Committee. 
1812, V ol.7, p p .745-8.
plot according to his varying needs . The g ist of the argument was
that the Rayatwari settlem ent would not only ensure a fa ir and
reasonable assessm ent of lands, but would also  provide proper
incentives to the cultivators to improve and expand their individual
holdings by bringing w astelands under cultivation. *
The advocates of the Rayatwari system then pinpointed the
various drawbacks of the Zamindary system . Thackeray criticised
the settlem ent with the Zamindars as a bargain. "Under the
2Mootadary System ” he wrote, "the rem ission w ill perhaps filter
through mootadars. renters and sub-renters; and a little  of it  may 
3
reach the ryots " The gravest w eakness of the Permanent Settle­
ment was the creation of a c lass  which would obtain profit from the 
government as  w ell as from the rayat. Any remission of rent during 
the lean year would go to the Zamindars instead of to the ry a ts .
Further, by creating Zamindars the government would become a 
substantial lo ser. The Zamindary settlem ent involved a loss of the 
w aste lands, a  lo ss  of revenue and an increasing ignorance about
^Memoir of Thackeray, 29th April, 1806, Mad. Rev. Cons. 29 April, 
1806, Range, 276, V ol.6.
2 w ?The word Mootadar came hem  the Tamil word M otai, meaning a person
on whom the Zamindary rights of a Moota (or a  Farm o f several villages) 
were confirmed by the government in a perpetual settlem ent.
3Thackeray's Report, 4th Aug. 1807, Firminger, Fifth Report. V ol.Ill, 
p .584.
the country.'*' The adherents of the Ravatwaii settlem ent appre­
hended that with a  view  to keeping a ll the advantages, the Zamindars 
would give the ravats only short le a se s  of land, compelling them to 
pay increased  ren t. Moreover, in  the conditions of Madras d is tric ts , 
where there were no Zamindars, the ravats would dislike to be put 
under a big landholder. Politically , too, the creation of a  c lass  of
powerful Zamindars with armed retainers would be dangerous for the 
2government. To M acleod, the Collector of North Coimbatore and
H urdis, the Collector of South Coimbatore, the Ravatwaii settlem ent,
seemed to be the only light system which should be adopted through-
3
out the Madras Presidency. It would give the cultivator a defined 
proprietory right in  his holdings received d irectly  from the govern­
ment. It should, however, be remembered that the whole contro­
versy over the mode of revenue settlem ent in  Madras was largely 
conjectural. The year 1806 was in fact too early to judge the metLtls 
and demerits of the Permanent Settlement which had been operating 
only for a decade or so .
^Memoir of Thackeray, 29th April 1806, M ad .R ev .C ons., 29th April 
1806, Range, 276, V ol.6.
2
Munro's Report, 15th Aug. 1807, Mad. Rev. cons .Range, 2 76, V ol.6
3
M ukherjee, N .,  The Ryotwaii System in M adras, p p .42-43.
Bentinck announced h is decision  in  favour of the Rayatwari 
system  in January 1806. 'Tt^always appeared to me that the exact 
plan of the Pem anent Settlement of the revenues adopted in Bengal 5
*i
w as not applicable to these  territories . " (Madras Presidency). He 
firmly maintained that the creation of Zamindars where none existed 
before wasjiieither calculated to improve the condition of the lower 
orders of the people, nor politically  w ise . He emphasised the 
advantages of the Rayatwari settlem ent and thought it best to make 
the system permanent in  M adras.^ In collaboration with the collec­
tors Bentinck already started his enquiry in  th is  direction. But 
without a thorough field investigation it  was found im possible to 
obtain a ll the accurate information. A personal v is it to  each co ll- 
ectorship would haye been fruitful. But Bentinck could not afford 
it for want of time and lack of h is knowledge in  the native languages.
He therefore selected  William Thackeray, an  experienced civil servant, 
and a good linguist, to do th is  job. Thackeray yras given six  months 
leave from October 1805 to March 1806 from his Masulipatam c o lle c -
torship to v is it the  various d is tric ts  of the Presidency and to investigate
2
into the revenue records. At the completion of h is investigation in
1 2§th April 1806
Bentinck*s M inute, 22nd Jan. 1806. Mad. Rev. Cons JR ange, z 76.
Vol.4 . /X
^Ibid., A9th April 1806, Range "0276, V ol.4.
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the Ceded D istiic ts and in  the Northern Circars , Thackeray sub­
mitted a report on 29th April 1806. In th is  report he sharply 
criticised  the Zamindary settlem ent and argued in favour of making 
the Rayatwari system pem anent in  the unsettled  d is tric ts  of M adras.1
Backed by Thackeray's report, Bentinck put h is views before 
the Board of Revenue in  favour of the Ravatwari settlem ent: "The 
more I consider th is important question , the stronger my conviction 
is^that the present system^ (Zamindary system) is  not the best which 
might be adopted. ]jam satisfied  th a t the creation of 3SSh Zamindars
is  a measure^incompatible with the true in terests  of the government,
2
and of the community a t large. " The Board of Revenue, however, 
decided not to take any hasty  decision on the is su e , especially  when 
a t th is  moment another revenue expert, John Hodgson, had made a 
strong case in  favour of the pem anent Zamindary settlem ent in  M adras.
Bentinck in fact had no objection to the operation of pem anent 
Zamindary system s in  the presidency of Bengal. The existing circum­
stances in Bengal, according to  him , were su itable for a Zamindary
^Thackeray's Memoir, 29th April 1806, M ad. Rey. Cons. 29th April, 
1806, Range, 276, Vol. 6.
2
Beijtinck's M inute, 29th April 1806, Mad. Rey. Cons. 29th April, 
1806, Range, 276, V ol.6.
3Hodgson's Memoir, 1806, Fifth Report of the  Select Committee.
1812, V ol.7, p p .922-937.
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settlem ent; but in Madras "the same circum stances do not 
ex ist. The more he examined deeply the land question of 
Madras the more he became convinced about the inapplicability  
of the Bengal system there . To Charles Grant, the Chairman 
of the Court of D irectors, he conveyed h is  firm conviction that
sooner or la ter the Rayatwari System would be established in
2
Madras as a natural phenomena. But Bentinck apprehended
that a quick solution of the land problem of Madras would not
be easy at th is stage . The final adoption of the Rayatwari system
was destined to be opposed not only by the advocates of the
Bengal system , in M adras, but also  by the Supreme Government
in Bengal. The Government of Bengal, Bentinck commented,
were "partial to their own system and never reached the knowledge
of revenue d e ta il, upon which the Rayatwari settlem ent has been
3
estab lished  with such extraordinary su cc ess . " Bentinck's 
apprehension about the opposition of the Government of Bengal was 
quite reasonable. W ellesley , w ith whom he had reached an under­
standing on the necessity  of a change in  Madras land policy, had 
left India in July 1805. Both of his successo rs , Cornwallis and then 
Barlow, strongly favoured the extension of the Zamindary settlem ent
^Bentinck's M inute, 29th April 1806, Mad. Rev. Cons. 29th April, 
1806, Range, 276, V ol.6.
2 Bentinck to Grant, 11th May 1806, B.P.
3Ibid.
to the re s t of the English possessions In India. Bentinck was 
hesitan t to oppose men who were a t the helm of the affairs in  
Ind ia . He therefore deliberately avoided committing h is Govern­
ment quickly to the adoption of a system in M adras. But the 
Rayatwari system w as in effect operating in some of the Madras 
d istric ts  and investigations were being made in some other 
collectorates with a view to its  extension in  those a reas . At th is 
point, Bentinck expressed his opinion about Rayatwari system 
more clearly . In a minute in November 1806, he declared that the 
Rayatwari settlement^cons ls ted  in the equal distribution and the 
defined amount of the land tax , and upon the security afforded 
to the poor against ex tra-assessm ents from head-inhabitants. 
Everyman knew h is exact obligations to the S irca r, and was 
assured of the quiet enjoyment of the surplus produce of his labour. " 
Bentinck was impressed by the improved conditions of the 
rayats in  the Ceded D istricts where land settlem ent at th is point 
was made only annually. He had no doubt that if th is settlem ent 
be made permanent the ratio of benefit would increase to a greater 
extent. But Bentinck's endeavours to se ttle  the land tenure of 
Madras Presidency suddenly received a check by an unexpected 
uprising a t Vellore. After having w ritten his la s t minixte in November
^Bentinck's M inute, 25th Nov. 1806, M ad. Rev. Cons. 28th Nov.
1806, Range, 276, V ol.10.
1806, on the land revenue question , Bentinck became increasingly 
involved in  the matters arising out of the Vellore mutiny.
Though the outbreak of the mutiny a t Vellore on 10th July 
1806 w as promptly suppressed, it  left behind a  tense atmosphere 
in the Presidency. Even after the mutiny, Bentinck persevered in 
his effort to resolve the land question. But the post mutiny prob­
lems increasingly absorbed h is attention and in November 1806, 
he had to admit that "the s ta te  of public affairs w ill necessarily  
oblige me to relinquish the intention of visiting some of the d istant 
provinces. I regret th is n ecessity , both as it  prevents me from bene­
fiting by that best of information, which is  obtained by personal 
communication with the local authorities. As he could not 
investigate further into the land question personally, Bentinck 
decided to gather the required information through other efficient
channels. Once again he deputed William Thackeray to make 
«
eTNpiJiries in  Kanara, M alabar and the Ceded D istric ts , a t the 
completion of which he decided to give h is final opinion as to 
the suitab ility  of adopting Rayatwari Settlement in  the Madras 
D istric ts . He had several reasons for Selecting these  three a reas .
^Bentinck's M inute, 25th Nov. 1806, Mad. Rev. Cons. 28th Nov. 
1806, Range, 276, Vol. 10.
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Kanara, from Its  first transfer to  the British authority, had enjoyed 
undisturbed tranquility and grew prosperous . The system  of land 
tenure in Kanara, Bentinck argued, was responsible for i ts  su ccess .*  
He was happy to find a close resem blance between the actual land 
system in Kanara and the proposed Rayatwari settlem ent. This simi­
larity led Bentinck to believe that the tenure found in Kanara origin-
2ally  existed throughout the peninsula in  some form or other. It was
from Kanara that Bentinck hoped to trace “those principles and
regulations which might be applicable to the unsettled  d is tric ts
3
where permanent tenures are to be introduced." He also  expected 
to find there the cultivators' hereditary right to the property.
Besides Kanara, Bentinck was in te rested  in  making enquiries 
in M alabar, where the proprietors possessed  hereditary rights in 
the land from ancient time and paid a land tax  which was almost 
negligible. In fac t, the British Government had to ra ise  the a s s e s s ­
ment of M alabar when their firs t revenue collection in  1793 fe ll 
short of twenty five per cen t. This increase had led to  the rebellions
* Bentinck's M inute, 25th Nov. 1806, M ad. Rev. C ons. 28 th Nov.
1806, Range, 276, V ol.10.
2Revenue Letters Reed, from M adras, 6th March 1807, V ol.2, p a ra .2.
3
Bentinck's M inute, 25th Nov. 1806, M ad.R ev.C ons. 28th Nov. 1806, 
Range, 276, Vol .10 .
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of the Malabar! people and the British government hdd to struggle
hard to suppress them. *
The Ceded D istricts were to provide the models for future
settlem ents, as it was there that Munro had introduced the
Rayatwari system . Bentinck thought it  indispensible to know a ll
the deta ils  of Munro's works in  the Ceded D istric ts . Bentinck
instructed Thackeray first to find out a ll the sources of the
government's income in these  areas including the land revenue.
Then he wanted him to ascerta in  the rules of assessm ent and the
mode of collection that prevailed; next to gather information on
the conditions of the rayats there and their opinions on the land
question; and finally to find out the changes effected there by the
2British adm inistrators.
In March 1807 Thackeray started h is tour in  Kanara, M alabar
and the Ceded D istric ts . In the course of his enquiries, Thackeray
received ample co-operation and a ss is tan ce  from the C ollectors,
the M agistrates and the members of the Board of Revenue. After
the completion of h is  tour, he submitted his report on the 4th August 
31807. Thackeray's report endorsed the prosperity and w ell-being
^Briggs, John ., Land Tax in Ind ia, p p .277-8.
2
Bentinck*s M inute, 25th Nov. 1806, Mad. Rev. Cons. 28th Nov. 
1806, Range, 276, V ol.10.
3
Thackeray's Report, 4th Aug. 1807, Firminger, Fifth Report. Vol.Ill 
p p .562-95.
of the cultivators in the three areas which had been attained in 
greater measure through the introduction of Rayatwari system 
there . He was highly im pressed with the adm inistrative success 
of M alabar, Kanara and the Ceded D istric ts . According to 
Thackeray, if  the new settlem ent was completed and allowed to 
continue, the d istric ts would be up in such position "which the 
soundest authors, the g reatest po litical economists^ and w isest;; 
statesm en have etefetfr thought best suited to produce general
7
happiness^and the g reatest agricultural improvement. In 
conclusion, he asserted  that the establishm ent of a strong govern­
ment and the security of the person and property could only be 
guaranteed through a direct settlem ent between the rayats and the 
Government. He was of firm conviction that the cultivators were 
fully capable of acting as  small proprietors. The rayats of the Madras 
Presidency, according to Thackeray, were laborious and in  some 
respects parsim onious. Their characteristic  qualities and exped­
ient nature made them elig ible to estab lish  direct relationship  with 
the government.
Thackeray's findings supported Bentinck’s views on the land 
question. The scheme of a thorough investigation into the condition
^Thackeray's Report, 4th Aug. 1807, Firminger, Fifth Report, 
V o l.Ill, p. 567.
of the Rayatwari settled  d istric ts  w as Bentinck's own plan.
He had suggested the a reas into which the enquiry was to  be 
held and also  the methods and scope of investigations. The 
conclusion drawn by Thackeray on the su itab ility  of Raaatwari 
settlem ent in the Madras Presidency was that Bentinck believed 
in . At that point, Bentinck was further strengthened in his stand 
by Munro. On 15th August 1807, Munro submitted a report to 
the Government of M adras on the grand success of direct land 
settlem ent in the Ceded Districts.'*' Munro concluded asking 
Bentinck's Government to confirm the Rayatwari revenue se ttle ­
ment in the Ceded D istricts as  a permanent m easure. ’ In favour 
of the Rayatwari sy stem ' , he remarked, "it may be observed that 
it  is the system which has always prevailed in India, that no
other can be permanent, and that however different^one may be^it
2must t'Ssolve itse lf  into i t . "
r
However, the reports of these  two revenue experts upholding 
Bentinck’s v iew s, came only too la te  to allow him an opportunity 
to press forward his ideas. On the question of the  Vellore mutinyt 
the home authorities had already decided in April 1807 to remove
1
Munro1 s Report, 15th Aug. 1807, Mad. Rev. Cons. 4th May 1808, 
Range, 276, Vol.20.
2Ibid.
Bentinck from the Governorship of M adras. With Bentinck ’s 
d ism issal in  September 1807, the question of land settlem ent 
in  Madras fell into abeyance. It appears from an analysis of the 
circum stances, that if Bentinck had been allowed to stay  a t Fort 
St. George, as he had always hoped, he certainly would have 
tried to clinch the land question in favour of the Rayatwari system . 
On Bentinck's sudden departure the land adm inistration of Madras 
was left to continue in its  diverse and unsystem atic forms. It 
was not before 1820, when Munro came back to Madras as the 
Governor, that the question of permanent Rayatwari settlem ent 
was taken up.
In his endeavours to find out a  suitable land system for the 
Madras Presidency, Bentinck did not overlook the necessity  of 
examining the system of land adm inistration on which depended 
the success of any laad system . In the adm inistrative structure 
of land revenue the Governor in  Council, as the head of the 
executive, possessed  the final power to determine the land policy 
for the whole of the Presidency. Then the Board of Revenue, 
consisting of four members, was responsible for the general revenue 
adm inistration. The President of the Board was a member of the 
Council. The general duties of the Board were to supervise the
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revenue department and to advise the Government in revenue
m atters. The Board used to lay before the government an annual
report. The co llectors, who served under the Board of Revenue,
were solely entrusted with the revenue administration of the
d is tr ic ts . They, in their turn, controlled a ll the subordinate
revenue officers of the d istric ts  . The Indian revenue a ss is tan ts
like Serist^adar, the village head man, KumUm or village accountant,
were all responsible to the collector. * In addition to the revenue
collection, the collector a lso  enjoyed m agisterial and judicial
powers in the d is tric t. Thus he was almost an absolute authority
in the territories under his charge. The collectors w ere, in fact,
so powerful that the Board of Revenue could only exercise limitdd
control over them. Board could check their account but could not
2restrain  them from bbusing their powers. Bentinck lamented that 
the collectors were often "accustomed to arbitrary government and
3
to the exercise of uncontrolled power. "
_ _ _ _ _ _    ~
The Code of Regulations for the internal government of the Madras 
Territories, 1802-29, Compiled by A .D .Cam pbell, V ol.I, p p .294-306 
2
Bentinck's M inute, 15th June 1805, Mad. Rev. Cons. 18th June 1805 
Range, 276, V ol.I.
^Ibid.
The collectors were thus the main agencies in the 
administration of land and consequently the quality of the district 
admiristmticn largely depended upon their character and ability*
An impetuous and inefficient collector could give a bad name to 
the British administration in the district and arouse the antipathy 
of the people* Bentinck was aware of thi s from the very beginning*
He realised that there were some collectors like Munro, Macleod,
<
Ravenshaw, who were 1 sufficiently virtuous* not to abuse their 
pov/era 7* but the incompetent collectors formed the majority.
Bentinck believed that two factors were mainly responsible for the 
recruitment of incompetent collectors in the district administration* 
First was the pressing need for collectors resulting from the 
sudden creation of many collectorships in the recently acquired 
territories* Secondly* the non-existence of an official system for their 
selection* Unworthy collectors, Bentinck reckoned, were not only 
detrimental to the good administration but also a financial liability.
The sum spent in their salaries and commissions actually amounted 
to 5 per cent of the total government revenue* * As a solution to 
this problem, Bentinck first contemplated reducing the number of 
existing collector&tes by amalgamating them into a few large 
collectorates* Next, he wanted to make a definite improvement
^Bentinck to Castiereagh,18th Oct. 180®, B.F.
2 ^  June ^805, Mad* Rev# Cons. 18th June 1806#
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in the system of recruitment. This plan was la ter abandoned in favour
of depriving the collectors of their judicial powers and removing those
2who were inefficient and corrupt, from their office. Bentinck was 
always ready to intervene in the cases of gross incom petence and 
corruption. This point could be clearly illustrated by referring to 
Bentinck's handling of the collectors of Tanjore and Arcot.
The territories of Tanjore came under British suzerainty in the 
year 1799. After its  acquisition, Madras Government appointed 
J .H arris, an experienced civil servant, as its  collector. During 
the early years of his service, Harris appeared to be a successfu l 
adm inistrator, but at the end of 1803 his administration ran into 
d ifficu lties. The Government of Madras in their despatch of March 
1804, complained that the Tanjore revenue accounts were not in 
order. The accounts showed a to tal deficit in the collection of rev­
enues which the collector failed to explain. Doubts arose regarding
i
the character of Harris. His attitude towards the Indians was also  
questionable. Bentinck commented, Harris "p#o|esse<3 an a b h o rre n c e ^
1
Bentinck to James W alker, 8th O ct. 1804, B.P.
2In 1806 Bentinck's Government passed Regulations restricting  the 
C ollector's power only to revenue collection. The judicial powers 
of the collector were divested and given to the Courts of Justice 
established in 1806 in the d is tric ts . See Chapter III, p. d.
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native character and his intercourse both with the Europeans
and the natives hasjfclwaysj/been unwilling. His adm inistration
of ju stice  has been marked with severity . He was even more
strongly criticised  for h is bad temper and blind confidence in the
subordinate officers whom he himself had employed. These gross
defects in H arris 's personality affected the administration of
Tanjore. Thee;subordinate officers of the d istric t adm inistration,
namely, the local tax collectors and principal land holders (who
were Indians) had joined together in oppressing their people through
undue exactions. They also  defrauded the Company by misapprop-
2riating the portion of a revenue for them selves. Harris had failed
to detect th is corruption among his officers. Not only th is , when
afterwards an Indian, Trivangadatayenger, put forth the charges of
corruption against the government servants and failed to substantiate
them by evidence (as the w itnesses seemed to have been coerced
not to  give evidence) Harris ordered a public flogging and then
3
banished the man from Tanjore for making a false charge.
This episode immediately attracted the attention of Capt. .
William Blackburn^, the Resident of Tanjore, who intervened
* Bentinck's M inute, 21st Sept. 1804, Mad. Rev. Cons. Range 275, 
Vol. 74.
^Ibid.
 ^Ib id .
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into the m atter and wrote privately to Bentinck on th is . He 
testified  to the fact that the government officers in Tanjore were 
corrupt and oppressive and the complaints of Trlvangadatayenger 
were not ill-founded . Bentinck a t once formed a committee for 
investigating into the alleged frauds. It had been found that in 
two years and a half, the Company suffered a substan tial loss of 
revenue amounting to 310,000 pagodas, believed to have been7
2m isappropriated by the government servants. Such a loss was 
serious enough, but far more serious in  Bentinck's view was the 
loss of the good name of the British adm inistartion. The people 
of Tanjore, Bentinck regretted, sustained the same lack of con­
fidence in  the British adm inistration as they  had in the preceding 
Indian rule •
This lack of vigilance^ "errors and gross misamangement ofv  
the part of the  Collector" were considered by Bentinck as serious
3
breaches of duty. Without any hesita tion , therefore, he proposed 
removing Harris and a ll h is a ss is tan ts  from their positions. "The 
profound silence under which the confederacy had been conducted",
^Blsckbume to Bentinck, 14th March 1804, Mad. Rev. Cons.
Range 275, Vol. 74.
2




Bentinck wrote to the C ourt", w as more and no re ascribed to
the fear of revealing injuries and of seeking redress under the
known severity , which had been exercised by the collectors 
1 1authority, Harris was further censored for his cruel treatment
of Trivangadatayenger, which had not only terrified the people
into submission to the power and influence of the collector's
servants, but also  made the revenue officers the virtual governors
of the d is tric t, Harris had in fact turned him self into "an uncon—
2scious instrument of a ll  the ir villainy and oppression. "
Without any further delay Bentinck wanted to put an end to 
th is  abuse. The people, he believed, should have confidence in 
the sense of ju stice  and protective power of their Governor. He, 
therefore, promptly discharged Harris and a ll h is a ss is tan ts  from 
their o ffices. Explaining the object of h is  m easures, he wrote to 
Petrie, the senior member of the Council, ‘1 shall remove him upon 
what I assume to be the foundation stone of a ll good government; 
the responsibility  of the individual who undertakes any charge, 
whether great or sm all, in the adm inistration of i t .  In th is  Mr Harris 
has most unfortunately failed and he ought to suffer for the good
3
of In d ia .11 To provide Tanjore with a  be tter adm inistration, Bentinck
*Kev. Letters JRecd. from Mad. 16th O ct. 1804, V o l.l, p a ra .128,
2Bentinck's M inute, 21st Sept. 1804, Mad. Rev. Cons. Range 275,
Vol. 74.
3
Bentinck to Petrie, 11th Sept. 1804, B.P.
planned to divide the province into two collectorates. John 
W allace, the Collector of Trichinopoly w as placed in charge 
of Tanjore for the intervening period un til the arrangement for 
d ivision became effective. He was instructed to find out w ith­
out delay the  amount of embezzlement of the land revenue made 
by the government servants during H arris 's collectors hi p.
Finally, Bentinck set up a Zillah Court in Tanjore which could 
efejejjuire into the charges of corruption and oppression.  ^ The 
Court of Directors were satisfied  with Bentinck's handling of the 
Tanjore case and readily approved a ll the measures adopted by
him. They also  agreed to Bentinck's plan for the better adm inis-
2tration of Tanjore.
The second case of m al-adm inistration occurred in South 
Arcot. South Arcot consisted of the whole southern half of the 
C arnatic. In the year 1801, the Company's (government took over 
the adm inistration of the C arnatic. For more than thirty years 
the Carnatic had been scandalously misgoverned by a system of 
double government. The Nawab of Carnatic retained the power to 
control the internal adm inistration of h is territory As he was not
*Rev. Letters Reed, from Mad. 16th O ct. 1804, V ol.I, p a ra .222-30.
2Court of D irectors, to Mad. Govt. 6th Nov. 1805. Letters to 
M adras V ol.I, p a ra .69.70
strong enough the Company provided him with military force to 
m aintain peace. The cost of a huge British subsidiary army within 
the Carnatic deteriorated the Nawab's financial position to a great 
extent. The Nawab was thus forced to borrow money from the 
Company's servants stban exorbitant ra te  of in te rest. In conse­
quence of h is  failure to pay back the loan the Nawab handed over 
to the Company 's  servants the revenues of h is various e sta tes  from 
time to tim e. Thus a system of double rule developed in  the C arnatic. 
This, however, was ended with the acquisition of the territory by 
the Company's (government who in  1801 appointed Captain Graham 
as the Collector of South Arcot. He was superseded in  October 1802 
by George Garrow, the secretary of the Board of Revenue. *
Nearly a year after Garrow's appointment, Bentinck took 
charge of the Madras Presidency. Soon after h is arrival, he came 
across a report sent by some principal land holders of South Arcot, 
complaining against Garrow's m isrule. The report stated that 
Garrow, knowing fuU w ell about the deplorable economic condition 
of Arcot, had forced the people to pay the maximum land tax . The 
amount he ..extracted from the cultivators had never been realised
* Bentinck's M inute, 2nd Dec. 1803, M ad. Rev. Cons. 16th Oct. 
1804, Range. 275, Vol. 68.
by any ru le r so far. The sufferings of the pe^ople, therefore, 
reached its  finality . The information was testified  to by both 
the Europearjand the Indian so u rces. * The news disturbed Bentinck 
greatly a s  he a lso  came to know that Garrow had a  notorious prev­
ious record. When employed in  Ceylon, Garrow had been removed 
from h is  office mainly for "an arbitrary and violent use of authority 
which . . .  broke out in  ac ts  of unwarrantable oppression to the people 
In sp ite  of th is , Garrow had managed to  get the Collectorship o f
South Arcot through the influence of some of h is powerful friends
%
in the Board of Revenue.^ Bentinck, however, was not ready to let 
Garrow carry on h is oppressive administaation any longer. He at 
once admitted that the assessm ent in  South Arcot w as too high and 
torture w as practiced in the collection of revenue and th is should 
be stopped. Bentinck even dispensed w ith the formality of holding 
a public enquiry into the adm inistration of Garrow and removed him 
immediately from the Collectorship of South Arfcot. M ajor Macleod 
an experienced military officer, replaced him in  January 1804.
The removal of an important officer w ithout first making - 1
^Bentinck's M inute, 14th O ct. 1804, M ad. Rev. Cons. 16th O ct. 
1804, Range. 275, V ol.75.
2Gov. of Ceylon to Gov. in  Co^o. Mad. 17th Sept. 1799. M ad. Rev. 
Cons. 16th O ct. 1804, Range. 275, V ol.75.
3
Rev. Letters Reed, from Mad. 16th Oct. 1804, Vol.I, para.224-5.
an enquiry into the charges against him w as, indeed, a
questionable m easure. It was not surprising therefore that
"clamour prevailed in the settlem ent against the supposed
in justice of h is  action. Garrow, who was in England at the
time of h is  removal^returned to  Madras and became loud in his
complaints against the Governor's action . H e wrote to Bentinck
that the stigma attached to h is character by the existing order
of the Governor was highly injurious. He urged Bentinck to allow
2him the privilege of self defence.
Instead of granting Garrow any such privilege Bentinck in 
reply strongly criticised  h is revenue adm inistration. "Too much 
s tre ss  seems to be laid upon the realisa tion  of revenue and too 
little  importance attached to a consideration of the rights of the 
people. Withjhe removal of Garrow, Bentinck believed that 
the evil had come to an end and a public enquiry, hereafter, would 
only help the recollection  of British mismanagement. Bentinck 
was thus so convinced about the propriety of h is action that he 
did not consider i t  necessary  to a sk  for the  opinions, of the Board 
of Revenuef who had in itia lly  supported Garrow's appointment
* Bentinck's M inute, 14th Oct. 1804, Mad. Rev. Cons. 16th Oct. 
1804. Range. 275, V ol.75.
2 Garrow to Bentinck, 21st Sept. 1804, Mad. Rey. Cons. 16th Oct. 
1804. Range, 275, V ol.75.
3
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to the post. The Board now stood in  favour of Garrow. They not 
only praised h is  zealous services in Arcot, but also  tried to justify  
h is high assessm ent there . * Upon th is  Bentinck simply commented, 
Mlet the C ollector be also  asked if trac ts of country have not been 
abandoned and if tonfcure has not been exercised upon the inhabit­
an ts . " He firmly asserted  that m alpractices caused in the sphere 
of land adm inistration and the man responsible for th is must pay the 
price. ^
The Court of Directors strongly criticised  Bentinck for adopting
such an extreme measure without a thorough enquiry. They suspected
the reliab ility  of the testimony on which Garrow was removed. The
native inhabitants, the Court w rote, often complained against the
revenue collectors and Garrow might have become a victim of such
complaint without any real ground. The Court further pointed out
that Bentinck should have allowed Garrow the privilege of a public
3
tria l to clarify  and defend him self.
But Bentinck, who strongly believed in the propriety of h is 
m easures against Garrow, did not pursue the m atter any futther.
*Rev. Letters Reed, from Mad. 16th O ct. 1804, V ol.I, p a ra .224.
2Bentinck’s M inute, 14th O ct. 1804, M ad. Rev. Cons, 16th Oct. 
1804, R ange.275, V ol.75.
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Court of Directors to the Gov. in Coun. Rev. Letters to Mad.
V ol.I, paras 49-54.
He remained firm in h is decision  and Garrow hdd to go back 
home, a frustrated and b itte r man. ^
In his dealings with the  cases  of Harris and Garrow and 
in  h is endeavours to introduce a permanent Rayatwari system  
in  the Presidency of M adras, Bentinck's main consideration was 
the  w ell-being of the people. An efficient and ju st administration 
together with an equitable revenue settlem ent would foster the 
prosperity cf the people and consequently arouse the ir faith  in 
and strengthen the ir tie s  with the British Raj. In his scheme the 
security of the empire w as to rest on good government.
^Court of D irectors to the Gov. in  Goun. Rev. Letters to Mad 
Vol.I, p a ra s .49-54.
CHAPTER III 
ADMINISTRATION OF TUSTICE
Bentinck's governorship in Madras commenced when the 
judicial adm inistration of the Presidency was in flux. On 26th 
December 1800, the Supreme Court had replaced the old Recorder's 
Court in M adras. In January 1802, a new system of the adminis­
tration of ju stice  was introduced in the Presidency bearing close
Iresemblance to Lord C ornw allis's Bengal system of 1793.
Bentinck was an ardent supporter of the judicial system "formed
2by the  illustrious founder" Governor General Lord Cornwallis.
He desired an extension of the Bengal judicial system throughout 
the Madras Presidency. He was convinced that the basic  principle 
of Cornw allis's system , namely, the separation of the judiciary 
from the revenue functions of the Collectors was sound and would 
be useful for the Madras territo ries. Bentinck's judicial plans 
and reforms in Madras w ere, therefore, modelled on the Bengal 
system . In addition to th is , his governorship from 1803 to 1807 
was characterised by a conflict between the government and the 
newly established Supreme Court of M adras.
* Regulations for establishing and defining the jurisdiction of the 
courts of Adalat or <3ourts of judicature, 1st Jan. 1802, Mad. Jud. 
Cons. 1st Jan. 1802, Ran -  321, V ol.92.
^Bentinck to Grant, 11th May 1806, B.P.
The system of introducing new laws and the method of 
the ir adm inistration developed sim ultaneously w ith the  exten-. 
sion of British suzerainty in India. The first charter of King 
Charles n  in 1661 empowered the Company only to make laws 
and impose punishment on their own servants. Thus in Madras
i
as  w ell as in other places in India the Company's agents had
no rights to adm inister ju stice  over the Indians unless derived
from the local ru lers. With the extension of British power and
influence in  India the Court of Directors felt the need of an
extensive judicial authority and petitioned the King of England
in  1726 to introduce a speedy and effectual adm inistration of
1ju s tic e  in  British India. In response to th is , the Charter of King
George I in  1726 introduced a M ayor's Court in  each of the three
Presidency towns to adm inister civil ju s tic e . The M ayor's Court
2was thus a crown court and it  applied the English civil law s.
This new se t up brought forward the question whether the civil 
laws of England were to be applied in  cases where a party was 
an Indian. In 1746 the French occupied Madras and the Mayor’s 
Gouft there was dissolved for sometime. With its  restoration in
Outlines of Indian Constitutional History
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1749 a new Charter was granted In 1753 by George II for 
improvement of the judicial se t up in  British India. This Charter 
explicitly  provided that the Mayor1 s Courts were not to  try 
actions between the Indians un less  they them selves willingly 
submitted the case  for determination.
This early British hesitation  to introduce their own laws and 
customs over the Indian people soon gave way to new developments. 
In 1786 by an Act of Parliament an extensive civil and criminal 
jurisdiction was conferred on the Governor in Council and on the 
M aypr's Court a t M adras. It was decided that a ll the British 
subjects “residing in the territories of the East India Company on 
the Coast of Coromandel, or in any other part of the C arnatic, or 
the Northern C ircars , or within the territories of the Soubah of the 
D eccan, the Nawab of Arcot or the Raja of Tanjore" would be under 
the jurisdiction of the Governor in  Council and of the M ayor's court. *
The M ayor's Court of Madras was replaced by a  Recorder's 
Court in  1798, consisting of the Mayor, nine Aldermen and a 
Recorder. There was little  difference between the.old Mayor's 
Court and the new Recorder's Court except for the addition of a
* Cowell, H . ,  The History and constitution of the Courts and 
Legislative Authorities in  In d ia , p .91.
Recorder d irectly  appointed by the Crown. The jurisdifction
of th is  newly established body w as extended to C ivil, Criminal
1
E cclesiastica l and Admiralty c a se s . Thus in power and auth­
ority the Recorder's Court was sim ilar to that of the Supreme Court 
of Calcutta* Its jurisdiction covered not only the British subjects 
w ithin the British territories of Madras Presidency, but a lso  the
Indian subjects w ithin the territories of the native princes in
2alliance with the Madras Government. The new court did not la s t 
long due to mutual jealousies and accusations between the Mayor 
Abbott and the Recorder Sir Thomas Strange. Consequently, the 
Recorder's Court was superseded by a Supreme Court in 1800 
composed of a Chief Justice and two puisne judges. The powers 
of the Recorder's Court were transferred to the new Supreme Court 
of M adras and it was placed upon an  equal footing with the Supreme 
Court In C alcutta. On 26th December 1800, the Charter of George 
III empowered the Supreme Court of Madras to enforce its  ju risd ic­
tion  over a ll the British sub jects in M adras, but its  territorial
ju risd iction  was confined to the town of Madras and i ts  adjacent 
3a re a s •
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The Charters of the High Court and of the Courts which preceded it
from 1687 -  1865. edited by John Shaw, pp. 52-84.
^M orley, W .A .^ Administration of Tustice in British Ind ia , pp. 12-14. 
^The Charters of the High Court and e tc . ed. John Shaw, p p .85-116.
Along with the King's Court in  Madras town there was also
a Choultry court from the beginning to try civil cases  valued up to
50 paqadas and petty criminal offences. This court consisted of
three Company's officers — mint p iaster, pay m aster and customs
master* * The system of ju s tice  in other parts of M adras territory
under the Company's possession  w as not organised up to 1802. The
C ollector's Court or Cut cherry was the main adm inistrative body in
a ll the p laces. This court consisted  of an English Collector and his
Indian a ss is tan ts  like Dewan, Seristadar. G um astas, Kumams and
the Record keeper. With the help of these  officers, the Collector
carried on the d istric t adm inistration 6f a ll the branches of revenue,
2
executive and judiciary. Thus the Collector possessed  enormous 
jud icial power to try a ll the civil and criminal cases w ithin his 
jurisd iction . From the C ollector's court appeal la i^  to the Governor 
in  Council. In Zamlndary areas the Zamindar also  could exercise 
civil and criminal jurisdiction on h is sub jec ts . In capital cases he 
could consult the MQhammedan Kazis or could refer the case to the 
C ollector's Court.
*Jain, M .F . , Outlines of Indian Legal H istory , p. 16.
2 Ruthnaswamy, M ., Some influences that made the British adminis­
trative system in India, p p .33 0-333.
Considerable changes were effected in  th is jud icia l system 
in  1802* By the end of the 18th century the Company's p o ssess­
ions in  Madras Presidency had largely extended through annexations. 
The Government of Madras felt the necessity  of creating a w e ll-  
defined code of regulations for the whole of the Madras territo ries. 
Accordingly, on 1st January 1802, a Code of Regulations was passed 
by the Governor in Council of Madras with the purpose of organising 
and improving the jud icial adm inistration of the Presidency. The 
new regulations were based upon the principles of C ornw allis's 
Bengal system made in May 1793, By C ornw allis's Code, the 
collectors of Bengal were divested of their jud icial powers (Reg. 2, 
1793). Thdir powers were restric ted  exclusively to the adm inistration 
of revenue. The Revenue Court was consequently abolished and the
1
revenue department was separated from the adm inistration of ju s tice .
The Madras Regulations of January 1802 clearly sta ted  that 
the offices of the judges, the m agistrates and the  collectors of 
revenue were to be held by three d istinc t persons. It was further 
declared that ju s tice  should be adm inistered in accordance w ith the 
established regulations and the laws of the country. By Regulation 
II of 1802, Zillah (District) Court of Dlwani Adalat w as introduced
Jain , M .P .,  O utlines of Indian Legal H istory , pp. 161-66.
in every d is tiic t for trying civil and revenue c a se s . The Zillah 
court was to be presided over by an European judge a ss is ted  by 
the Indian law officers. The Zillah Court would have cognizance 
in a ll su its  but its  decision  was to be final in cases up to 1000 
arcot rupees. Above that amount an appeal would lie to the 
Provincial Courts of Appeal.
Four Provincial Courts of Appeal (each consisting of three 
judges) were established  in the towns of C hicacole, Nellore, 
Kistnagherry and Dindigul -  to hear appeals from the Zillah Courts. 
Their decisions were to be final in  a ll the cases up to 5000 arcot 
rupees (Reg. IV, 1802). Above that amount a further appeal layjto 
the Sadar Diwani Adalat.
The Sadar Diwani Adalat was created by Reg.V, 1802, consisting 
of the Governor and the members of the Council as judges. The 
Court was to have power to determine a ll cases appealable from the 
Provincial Courts. An appeal from th is court could be made to the 
Governor General in Council of Bengal for the cases exceeding the 
amount of rupees 444,000.
Besides that Reg. XVI created a Court of Commission in  each 
d is tric t, held by an Indian Commissioner. These Courts were 
empowered to try suits not exceeding rupees 80. Above th is amount
su its lay in  the Zillah Courts. The Code of Regulations of 1802 
further laid down that a ll the Indians and other persons excluding 
the British subjects would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
Adalat courts. However,by Reg.II some categories of British 
civ ilians like the 'Collectors, customs officers, commercial resid en ts , 
sa lt agen ts, mint and assey  m asters and the ir British a ss is tan ts  were 
declared amenable to the Zillah and Provincial Courts for ac ts  done 
in their official capacity . The proceedings of the Zillah and 
Provincial courts were to be carried on in native languages.
The plan introduced for the adm inistration of criminal ju stice  
in Madras was a lso  sim ilar to that of Bengal. In each d istric t the 
M agistrate was appointed to m aintain peace and arrest those charged 
with crim es. They had the power to inflict punishment in cases of 
abuse, a ssau lt and petty theft by imprisonment, corporal punish­
ment or fine up to 200 rupees.
Four Courts of Circuit were to be held tw ice in every year 
for the tria l of persons charged with crimes and misdemeanours.
The judges of the Provincial Courts of Appeal were to be the judges 
of the Courts of C ircuit. These courts were entitled to pass, every 
sentence excepting capital sen tences for which they had to get 
confirmation of the Nizaiwat Adalat.
To keep uniformity in  the decisions of the Court of Circuit 
a superior criminal court known a s  the Sadar Nizamat Adalat w as 
created in M adras. This court consisted of the Governor and the 
members of the Council. It w as empowered to take cognizance of 
a ll m atters relating to the adm inistration of ju stice  in criminal 
c a se s , and police of the country. It was to have the power of 
passing final sentences in capital c a se s . Both the Sadar Diwani 
Adalat a nd the Sadar Nlzamat Adalat were thus respectively created 
into Civil and Criminal Courts of Appeal. They were also  entitled 
to issu e  orders and instructions to the lower judicial organs for 
effectual adm inistration of Justice. The sentences of the criminal 
courts were to be in accordance with the Mohammedan law modified 
by the regulations. The civil courts were to apply Hindu law or 
Mohammedan law according to the religious persuasion of the parties 
before them. In other cases they were to ac t in accordance with 
ju s tic e , equity and good conscience."1.
The Board of Revenue hitherto had exercised jud icia l authority 
and determined certain  civ il appeals from the C ollector's Court. A
^Regulations for establishing and defining the jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Adalat or Courts of judicature. 1st Jan. 1802, Mad.Jtad. 
Cons. 1st Jan. 1802, Range, 321, V ol.93.
regulation, therefore, was passed in January 1803 divesting the 
Board of Revenue of the Judicial duties which were hereafter trans­
ferred to the Zillah Courts (Reg*I). ^
C live, the then Governor of M adras, supported th is new
system of judicature based  on the principle of separation of judicial
2power from the revenue functions. Petrie, another adherent of the 
system and a member of the Council, went even further and strongly 
opposed a proposal in 1803 of appointing the collectors as the judges 
of Rajatnundry and Vizagapatam. He championed the principle of 
C ornw allis's system by pointing out tha t, "No Company's servant 
should be appointed a judge in those d istric ts  where he has immed-
3
la te ly  before acted as a collector. "
At th is Juncture Bentinck reached M adias and gave his full 
Support to C ornw allis's principle in the Judicial adm inistration and 
expressed his sa tisfac tion  a t its  extension to the Madras territo ries. 
But soon he found that under the prevailing condition of the Presidency 
the new system of judicature was operating only in those d istric ts
4
where land revenue had been se ttled  permanently. In the major
*A New Edition of the Code of Regulations for the Internal Govt, 
of the Madras Territories, edited by A.D. Campbell, V ol.I, 
pp. 294-5. 1$30 ,
2
C live 's  M inute, 10th April 1802, Mad ,«Iud. C ons. 1st Jan. 1802, 
Range, 321, V ol.93.
3
P etrie ’s M inute, 20th May 1803, Letters Reed, from Mad. Vol.29, p a ra .12.
^ For the se ttled  d is tr ic ts , see Chapter II, p. 1 0 8 •
part of the Madras Presidency the ju s tice  was s till  administered 
by the C ollectors. Benlinck felt utterly  d issa tisfied  with th is  
situation  in which two system s operated in the same place. He 
wanted to solve the problem by extending the Courts of judicature 
estab lished  in 1802, in the unsettled  d istric ts  as  w ell. He also  
desired to introduce futther reforms in the existing system of ju s tice . 
Apart from th is , Bentinck found that even in the areas where courts 
of ju s tices  had been established two different laws and systems 
were operating -  dne under the Adalat Courts and the other under 
the Supreme Court. Such a diverse system of judicature in Madras 
was contrary to Bentinck's basic idea that in the adm inistration of 
Justice ,lthere ought to be no d istinction . From the beginning, 
therefore, he became very critical of the Supreme Court and the 
English law it exercised.
The establishm ent of the Supreme Court, a s  mentioned before, 
had explicitly  excluded the Governor in  Council from exercising any 
legal jurisdiction over the Presidency town of M adras. Thus a ll the 
British bom subjects of the Presidency and the inhabitants of 
Madras town, both Indian and European, became amenable to the
^Bentinck to Strange, 7th March 1805, B.P.
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Supreme Court and were subjected to English law. The Governor 
in  Council, in their turn, were entitled to exercise jurisdiction 
over a ll the Madras territories except the town of Madras . They 
were authorised to pass regulations and bye-laws in  conformity 
with the established laws of the country. There had thus emerged 
a dual legal system in the Presidency. The Supreme Court, on the 
one hand, exercised pure English law and worked as the King's 
Court deriving authority from Parliament. The Company's courts, 
on the other hand, administered Indian law and were controlled by 
the Governor in Council.
Bentinck considered th is dual method as an  anomaly in the 
legal system of M adras. "The people of the Jaghire and of the 
town of Madras are the sam e”, but subjected to different laws 
and courts.  ^ The partial introduction of English law , Bentinck 
believed, was a factor obstructing the growth of a  uniform legal 
system . Bentinck had strong objection to the application of 
English law in the Madras Presidency. English law s, which 
guarantee both civ il and political liberties to the people, were 
not considered suitable to the conditions of Madras Presidency. 
He argued that the English laws were "suited to the circumstances
1
Bentinck to Strange, 7th March 1805, B.P.
of a great and enlightened nation". But the s ta te  of society  
in India w as different and the Indians were used to  despotic 
rule for centuries. For the people of India therefore, the require­
ment was not the liberty , but security of persons and property and 
an upright adm inistration of ju s tic e . The growth of a strong 
British empire was needed to fulfil these  requirem ents. The 
sp irit of liberty in English laws would only "incite the people 
in India against foreign yoke” which consequently would endangeri
2the British power in India. For the safety  of British in terest as
w ell as for the happiness of the Indian people, Bentinck preferred
good adm inistration of laws rather than good law s.
Bentinck's next argument against the English laws in India
w as based on the necessity  for introducing a uniform system of
ju s tic e  for a ll the people irrespective of ra ce , religion and s ta tu s .
In principle Bentinck believed that the Europeans coming to India
3
should be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Company's courts. 
English law s, according to him, had crept into India on the plea 
of the "birth right" of the Englishmen living there to be governed
^Bentinck’s M inute, 28th Feb. 1807, Incomplete File on Madras 
police and judiciary, 1806-7, B.P.
2Ibid.
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TSy their own law s. The British bom subjects were always
exempted from the jurisd iction  of the Company's courts. But
the nature of British settlem ent in Ind ia , Bentinck believed,
had been completely changed with the establishm ent of British
rule there . India was not a mere colony of the Europeans. lfWe
are now the governors and the guardians of a great empire. We
1must trea t the people as our sub jec ts , as our brothers. " In th is
circumstance he thought it quite unwise to make d istinction  between
the Indians and Europeans by establishing separate Courts of Justice.
He believed it more convenient to estab lish  an uniform legal system
by subjecting the European society  in Madras (consisting of a small 
the
number of C om pany's servants^ and m erchants and 'mostly of the 
worse men of a ll nations') to the Company's courts, than to bring 
the entire Indian society  (composed of different religions and races) 
under the English law. On the same consideration of uniform ju stice  
Bentinck advocated that the Governor in  Council should have the full 
power to make laws for the whole Presidency including the town of 
M adras. Why should the Governor in Council who Is  adjudged by 
the Parliament of Great Britain^to be competent to the formation of
^Bentinck to Strange, 7th March 1805, B.P.
us
0 1laws be restric ted  in the single case of the town of M ad ra s :11 
The Governor in  Council being the authority on the spot, Bentinck 
believed, would understand the local circum stances and tta s  were 
more efficient to make and a lte r laws for the Presidency. He 
further argued that in a place like M adras, consisted of various 
ra ce s  and thus needed frequent legal changes, the power of making 
laws to the Governor w as essen tia l for quick rem edies. On the 
other hand, if the Supreme Court was allowed to exercise English 
law in the Madras town the delay in providing legal remedies would 
continue. The Supreme Court would have to seek Parliamentary 
leg islation  each time a new circum stance arose demanding a new 
law or an alteration in the old. The ignorance of Parliament about 
the social condition of M adras and the considerable amount of time
involved in seeking a Parliamentary redress would only extend the
2sufferings of the people.
As the substitu te for English law s, Bentinck preferred to 
introduce the golden rule of "the law  of the Defendant", either of the 
European or Hindu or Muslim in  the civil s u its . In the criminal 
cases he favoured the introduction of some principles of English
* Bentinck to Stiange, 7th March 1805, B.P.
2 Ibid.
Criminal Code to modify the existing Mohammedan criminal 
law s. He justified  th is by pointing out that the Mohammedan 
government in South India, in the C arnatic, in the Ceded D is ttlc ts , 
and in the Northern Circars were so corrupt that law s were virtually 
not in  ex istence . ^
Bentinck was not sa tisfied  with the system of law making 
in  the Madras Presidency. Under the prevailing practice the 
Governor in Council in itiated  and framed laws necessary  for the 
whole of the Madras Presidency excluding the town of Madras . 
Usually laws were made or amended on account of some local 
n ecess itie s  or general causes existing w ithin the d is tric t. The 
C ollectors, the M agistrates and the Zillah judges,being the local 
adm inistrators, would know more than any other agency about the 
kind of laws required in  the local circum stances. Thus, according 
to Bentinck, the Collectors or the M agistrates should be the in it­
iators of legal remedies in  the d istric t level. But in  initiating a 
law they should consult the Zillah judges about the problem. The 
solution suggested by them should then be jdaced in  the Sadar Adalat 
through the Provincial Court. The resu lt of the suggestion should
^Bentinck to Strange, 7th March, 1805, B. P.
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hereafter be submitted to  the Governor in Council who alone had 
the power to  pass la w s .*
Bentinck next turned h is  a tten tion  towards the erdsting Judicial 
framework of the Presidency and suggested extensive reforms in  i t ,
The reforms were calculated not only to  provide th e  people with an  
efficient and equal system of ju s tic e , but a lso  to render the ex ist­
ence of the Supreme Court quite  unnecessary . The Sadar Adalat. the 
highest jud icial body of the Presidency w as up to th is  time composed 
of the three members of the Governor in  Council, of whom only two 
were really  effective. The President of the  Court (the Governor) being 
encumbered with executive functions could not attend the court 
regularly except when a casting  vote w as required, Bentinck objected 
to  th is  method and wanted th e  President of the Sadar Adalat to be most 
effective in  the  adm inistration of ju s tic e . According to  him, the Fr&sidem 
of the Court should be a  judge appointed by the King of England, His 
salary  should be equal to  th a t o f the Councillors and h is  pension after 
ten  years of service should equal that of the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of C alcu tta , By th is  change, he wanted to bring the 
King's supervision in  the  most v ita l Judicial organ of the Presidency
1 ..........
The Act c f Parliament 1797, gave separate powers to  the  Governor in  
Council to  pass regulations for their own territo ries, Bentinck to  
Strange, 7th K arch 1805, B ,P,
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and to make it efficient and "Supreme tribunal of the EmpireM. ^
Next to Sadar Adalat there were four Provincial Courts of 
Circuit consisting of three non-professional judges appointed by 
- the Governor in Council. It w as in th is  court that Bentinck desired 
"to extend the superintendence of the King through the person of 
h is judgesyithe whole judicature of the country". He thus 
suggested a thorough reform in the composition of the Provincial 
C ourts. In this court two more junior judges should be appointed 
with the existing three members to speed up the adm inistration of 
ju s tic e . The President of th is Court should be appointed by the 
King of England. He should be a barrister of five years experience 
and would retire a fte r ten  years of serv ice. He should enjoy the 
same salary and pension a s  that of the judges of the Supreme Court. 
The President of the Provincial Court with his professional knowl­
edge and in tegrity , Bentinck believed s"would be highly conducive 
to w ise and correct leg isla tion".
Under the Provincial Courts existed the Zillah Courts in each 
settled  d istric ts  of M adras, w ith one non-professional European 
judge, a ss is te d  by Indian law officers. W hile contemplating reforms
^Bentinck to Strange, 7th March 1805, B.P.
2Ibid.
and changes in the Judicial system of M adras, Bentinck paid
h is  first attention to the Zillah courts. By the Regulation of
1802V Zillah courts were estab lished  only in  some of the Madras
d is tric ts . But th is  court/ Bentinck believed, was the most useful
organ of the judicial adm inistrative body. The extension of Zillah
%
courts appeared to him the g reatest improvement that "we have to
make in the civil government".* As he wrote to Charles Grant,
the member of the Court of D irectors, "where the Zillah courts have
2not been established neither person nor property Is  secured".
Among a ll other jud icial reforms, the establishm ent of Zillah courts
in a ll the Madras d is tr ic ts , either settled  or unsettled^was Bentinck's
3
primary consideration. The judges of the Zillah courts, he desired ,
should be experienced law yers. They should also  have sufficient
acquaintance with the Indian customs and enough knowledge of the
native languages. Bach Zillah judge should receive 10,000 pagadas
annually a s  h is  salary  and should retire  a fte r ten  years of service
with a pension of £1,000 per annum.
At the bottom of the jud ic ia l framework was the C ollector's
* Bentinck to Grant, 11th M ay 1806, B.P.
2Ibid.
3
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Cut cherry in the unsettled  d istric ts  of the Presidency. The 
Collector of revenue also  acted as  the m agistrate and judge 
with his Indian a s s is ta n ts . Bentinck, who was always against 
the co llector's judicial power, entertained a poor opinion about 
the co llecto r's  Cut cherry. He regretted the existence of such a 
court even after the introduction of C ornw allis's system in Bengal 
and its  subsequent extension to M adras. The collectors w ere not 
usually  trained for judicial services and Bentinck was astonished 
to find such "great tru st"  placed on very "improper persons".^
He wanted to abolish the collector's Cut cherry as soon a s  possib le.
The whole scheme of judicial reorganisation was planned by 
Bentinck in such a manner as to make the existence of the Supreme 
Court quite superfluous. If the King's judges be appointed in the 
Company's courts and justice  be administered according to the laws 
of the defendants, the Supreme Court would become perfunctory. 
Bentinck, in fact, had no objection to the abblitron of the Supreme 
Court. He even suggested the division of the town of Madras
t
into two Zillahs and to substitute the Supreme Court by two Zillah court!
T m
*Bentinck to Strage, 7th March 1805, B.P.
^Ibid.
The piincipiJ' object of Bentinck's plan w as to introduce an 
efficient and equitable legal system . With th is end in  view 
and also  to ensure that the judiciary w as reasonably independent 
he planned to employ professional men on the bench. The appoint­
ment of a King's judge to the Sadar Adalat w as a lso  suggested by 
him for the complete separation of the Judiciary from the executive. 
This, Bentinck always believed, was essen tia l for the proper 
adm inistration of ju stice .
It may be observed that th is elaborate scheme of judicial 
reorganisation was not placed by Bentinck before the Court of 
Directors; but written in  a le tte r to h is friend, Sir Thomas Strange, 
who was then the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of M adras. * 
Probably h e  was not certain that the home authorities would like 
h is  plan which was principally calculated to render the Supreme 
Court u s e le s s . Strange, however, was profoundly im pressed with 
his plan supposed to provide "the best practical system  for the 
administration of Justice". He praised Bentinck fo r devising a plan
*Sir Thomas Andrew Lumisden Strange was bom on 30th Aug. 1756. 
Educated in  Oxford and called to the bar from Lincoln's Inn in  1785, 
Chief Justice of Nova Scotia in 1789: Recorder of M adras 1798 and 
President of the M ayor's Court and Alderman. Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Madras 1800. Returned to England 1817; died 
July 1841.
which m aterially differed from "any at present in  force in any
part of th is country. n* Strange w as in  favour of implementing
Bentinck's plan for better adm inistration of ju stice  and recomm-
2ended it to C astlereagh, the President of the Board of Control.
As the abolition of the Supreme Court was not an acceptable
proposition to the home au thorities the scheme was not pursued
at a l l .  In sp ite  of th is  Bentinck was successfu l in putting some
of h is ideas into practice during the years 1806-07.
Soon after his arrival Bentinck made his attempt to divest
executive officers of the jud icial functions. The C ollector's
jud icial power in the unsettled  d istric ts  drew h is first attention .
He desired to erect "independent tribunals " in those d istric ts
3
where lands had not been se ttled . He wanted to appoint Registers 
as a ss is tan ts  to the Collectors in  revenue matters but exclusively 
in charge of the judicial b usiness. The Registers would thus take 
away the Judicial functions of the Collectors and bring propriety 
to the adm inisttation of ju s tic e . In  implementing th is  plan Bentinck 
w as opposed by Col. Munro, the Principal Collector of the Ceded
^Strange to C astelreagh, 17th O ct. 1805, Home M isc. Ser. Vol.
43 0, p p .285-88.
2m d .
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Bentinck to his father, 7th March 1807, B.P.
D istric ts . Munro, who was deeply in terested  in  settling the 
lands of the newly acquired territories on Rayatwarl pattern, did 
not agree with Bentinck's proposition of curtailing the judicial 
powers of the C ollectors. He was of the opinion that the se ttle ­
ment of the land revenue was of far greater importance to the country 
than the introduction of the principle of the separation of powers.
A judicial system which curtailed the powers of the C ollectors, he 
feared, would seriously interfere with the settlem ent of land. He 
further argued that such a judicial reorganisation would not be 
effective in  d is tric ts  where Zamindara and Poligars were too power­
ful . A collector with Judicial and executive powers alone could 
control these local ch iefs. Further, the separation of civil and 
Judicial powers, Munro argued, was not an indigenous system
and "whatever excellence such a syfctem may p o sse ss" , i t  would
2appear strange and unsatisfactory to the peop le". Thus Munro 
advocated a system of omnipotent collectorship  not only on the 
grounds of expediency, but a lso  because i t  was consisten t with 
the oriental tradition of despotism .
* Munro *s comment on W ellesley 's le tter to Bentinck, (Add. Ms s . 
13679, W .P .) cited in Beaglehote, T .H . Sir Thomas Munro, p . 75.
2Ibid.
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Bentinck rejected  th is  line of argument. "It i^ fa sh io n
here , I find", he wrote to Governor General W ellesley , "to
believe that the courts w ill impede the collection o^revenueS.
The courts, he a sse rted , would certainly Interfere in  the arbitrary
and unjustifiable ac ts  of the inferior revenue officers. But the
collectors would be benefitted w ith the operation of such a check
on the arbitrary powers of their subordinates. "There can be no
collision  of authority. The collector must find re lief and aissist*-
ance from the court in the ju s t discharge of h is duty.
However, he found it difficult to oppose Munro on th is issu e  while
the la tte r  was supporting him on the question of land se ttlem en t.
Bentinck thus explored other means for establish ing  separate
courts of ju stice  in  the unsettled  a reas . He urged W ellesley to
permit the general introduction of the Zillah courts in a ll the
2
d istric ts  of M adras, settled  or unsettled .
The controversy between Bentinck and Munro illum inates 
the ideas Bentinck had in mind. On the question of land settlem ent 
in  M adras, he opposed the introduction of C ornw allis's Permanent 
Zamindary Settlement and supported Munro in  effecting a direct
^Behtinck to W ellesley, 9th Sept. 1804, W .P.
2Bentinck to Castlereagh, 16th Oct. 1804, B.P.
settlem ent with the ra y a ts . But in  the m atter of judicial 
adm in istra tion  he was upholding the principle of Cornw allis's 
jud ic ia l reforms and opposing a ll the pleas of Munro in  favour 
of retaining the extensive powers of the C ollectors. Though 
apparently inconsisten t in  h is  v iew s, Bentinck in both cases was 
guided so lely  by the motive of improving the lot of the Indian 
people.
W ellesley , however, was sim ilarly en thusiastic  about the 
separation of leg isla tive , executive and Judicial powers of the 
s ta te . Such a distribution of powers, he wrote in a despatch to 
M adras, would fulfil twcjprincipal objects — firs t, the estab lish ­
ment of an  impartial administration of ju stice  according to the 
existing laws; and secondly, the gradual improvement of the law s.
He was eager to see  these  two objects pursued in  the Madras 
territo ries. He further believed that the full-fledged implementation 
of the Regulations of 1802 would lighten the  burden of the C ollectors. * 
W ellesley*s policy thus echoed Bentinck's own id eas . Enthusiastically  
he wrote to the Governor General; ’'The flagrant abuse of authority 
in  the southern division of Arcot and in  Tanjore made me anxious for
^Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in  Coun, M ad. 19th July 1804,
India Office T racts, V ol.465.
the establishm ent of Zillah. courts in every part of the countiy.
“ It is  im possible not to concur in  every part of that excellent
le tte r in the Judicial Department containing your Lordhhip's
orders for the introduction of the jud icial system .
Accordingly it w as announced on 14th February 1806 that
for the due adm inistration of ju s tic e  "Zillah courts should be
established in a ll the territories under Fort St. George . . .  where
land revenue has not been permanently se ttled  . . .  in  the same
manner a s  in  the districts where the revenue has been permanently 
2se ttled . " The collector and the Board of Revenue were divested 
of their jud icia l and m agisterial functions which were vested in 
the civil Judge. Up till  then the Governor in  Council was entrusted 
with the judicial authorities of both the Sadar Adalat and the 
Nizam at Adalat. But for more "speedy and effectual adm inistration 
of ju s tic e "  Bentinck felt an  urgent need to a lte r the system . He 
wanted to make the principle of the Bengal jud icial system a rule 
for Madras a lso . Since 1793 in  Bengal, the Sadar Adalat consisted 
of three members, only one of whom w as a member of the Council and
* Bentinck to W ellesley, 9th Sept, 1804, W .P.
2 Regulations for Madras 14th Feb. 1806, Enclosed in  Fort St.
George le tte r, 15th Feb. 1806, Beng. Ind. Cons, (c vil)
3rd April 1806, Range, 148, Vol. 26.
the court w as separated from the government. On 14th Majrch 
1806 it was laid down by Regulation IV? M. . .  i t  is  essen tia lly  
necessary  to the im partial, prompt?and efficient adm inistration 
of Justice -  civil and criminal -  that the exercise of th is import- 
ant function be separated from the  leg isla tive  and executive auth­
orities^ and vested  in  two Judges^ not being members of the govern­
ment r whose time and attention may be exclusively devoted to the 
punctual discharge of the ir jud icial du ties , under the o c c a s io n a l 
superintendence of the Governor as President of the/dburts/'*
Thus, among the three judges two would be appointed from the 
civil servants of the Company and the Governor would ac t as  the 
chief judge.
Bentinck w as not fully sa tisfied  with th is half m easure. He
strongly felt that i t  was difficult for the Governor to  carry on the
responsib ility  of the chief judge of the Sadar court.'W ith the various
important and laborious du ties  . . .  of the Government % he found it
difficult to "discharge the extensive and arduous duties of the Chief
2
Justice of the said  court11. Thus he advocated a  to ta l separation 
of the judiicial authority from the executive in  a ll the ir respective
^Regulations for the Internal Government of the Madras territories 
1802-29 . Compiled by A .D . Campbell, Reg.II, 1806, pp. 186-87.
2
Bentinck's M inute, 20th June 1806, Mad. Jud. Proc. 19th June 
1806, Range 322, Vol. 24.
branches. He argued "if relieved of the labour of reading the 
criminal tr ia ls , the Governor could easily  give a general atten­
tion to the proceedings of the Court and to the conduct of the 
judges and m ag istra tes11.^ Bentinck as the Governor of the 
Presidency, therefore desired to withdraw him self from the office 
of Chief Justice of the Sadar Adalat. It was thus announced in 
June 1806 that "the Chief Judge of the said Court should be 
selected,by the Governor in Council^ from among the civil coven­
anted servants of the Company, not being members of the 
2council. " But th is resolution failed to receive the assen t of
the Supreme Government. The Governor General in Council
suggested that the Chief Judge of the Sadar and Nizattaat Adalat
should be a member of the Council though he might not be the
3
Governor him self or the Commander in Chief. By Regulation III
1807 therefore, the constitutions of the Sadar and Nizayyiat Adalat
were modified on the line suggested by the Supreme Government.
^Bentinck's M inute, 4th March 1806, Beng. Jud. Proc. 10th April 
1806, Range 148, V ol.26, N o .24.
2 Bentinck's Minute, 20th June 1806, Mad. Jud. Proc. 19th June 
1806, Range 322, V ol.24.
3
Jain, M.P.  , Outlines of Indian Legal H istory, p p .284-5.
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It was settled  that the posts of the chief judges were to be held 
by some other members of the Council. The number of the puisne 
judges were increased from two to three and they were to be 
selected  from among the covenanted servants of the Company.'*’
TheSa were thus the significant Judicial reforms introduced 
by Bentinck's in itia tive . Two of his fundamental ideas were 
realised  during h is  stay  -  firstythe separation of judiciary from 
the executive and feecondythe Introduction of regular courts of 
Justice in a ll the d istric ts  of Madras Presidency. But Bentinck 
was involved not only w ith the general problems of the judicial 
adm inistration, but a lso  in conflicts with the Supreme Court of 
M adras. Hence, the account of his ac tiv ities  in the field of the 
adm inistration of Justice would not be complete without an enquiry 
into his relationship w ith the King's court.
The Supreme Court in  Madras was created in like manner 
as that of Bengal with the object of protecting the Indians from 
the oppressions of the Company's servants. The establishm ent 
of a Supreme Court, therefore, first in  Bengal and then in  Madras 
and la te r on in  Bombay was characterieed by an outbreak of conflicts
* Regulations for the Internal Government of the Madras Territories.
compiled by A. D. Campbell, Reg.Ill, 1807, p. 188
between the Supreme Court and the Government of the Presidency.
In Bengal, the quarrel between the Court and the Council 
started on the issu e  whether the Supreme Court was to  serve 
under the supervision of the Council or it was to function indepen­
dent^. The judges gonceived th a t the Supreme Court in  Bengal was 
established by the King of England to se t as a check tbe on the 
arbitrary powers of the Company's o ffic ia ls . They thought i t  their duty 
to scrutinize sternly any severity or a c t of corruption committed by 
the  Company's servan ts t either privately or publicly. The Councillors 
of Bengal on the other hand believed that their main function was to 
manage the governmental work and to collect the revenue and not to 
adm inister ju s tic e . They,therefore,did not like the idea of extending
r
the British ju stice  into the provinces outside the town of C alcutta.
They further believed that for a ll the ir ac tiv ities they were respon­
sible to  the Court of Directors only and the Supreme Court had no 
power to interfere in  their executive functions. These diam etrically 
opposite standpoints of the Court and the Council in Bengal created 
great t troubles in  the civil and jud icial adm inistration of the 
Presidency leading to a series of quarrels.  ^ At la s t to se t things 
right, Parliament had to intervene. The Act of 1781 restric ted  the
^Pandey, B .N ., The Introduction of English Law into India^ 
1774-83, p p .131-33.
jurisd iction  of the Supreme Court to the lim its of the  city of
C alcutta. It further laid down that the Supreme Court should
have no legal authority in  m atters of revenue. The Governor in
Council was empowered to  determine the civil su its  from the
country courts and to decide the offences committed in the collection
1
of revenue and to frame regulations for the Provincial Courts. Thus 
the Act of 1781 decided the Issu e , by limiting the Supreme Court's 
legal authority stric tly  in the town of C alcutta. The decision was 
however not final and many difficulties remained until 1832, when
Parliament by an Act invested  the Governor General w ith powers to
1 2 limit the Supreme Courts ju risd iction .
1
Jain, M .P ., Outlines of Indian Legal H istory, pp. 113-7.
2After the Supreme Court w as estab lished  in Bombay in  1823 , 
a sim ilar conflict followed there. In Bombay, the conflict 
arose in  1828 on the question of the Supreme Court issuing 
certain w rits of Habeas Corpus to some persons living outside 
the Bombay town. The Governor in  Council of Bombay forbade 
to make return to any of the w rits issued  by the Supreme Court.
In consequence, the Supreme Court stopped functioning and 
petitioned the King of England against th is intrusion of the 
Government in Supreme Court's jurisd iction . However, the 
verdict of the Privy Council categorically went against the 
Supreme Court and the conflict between the Court and the 
Council in  Bombay was solved clearly in favour of the Govern­
m ent. Jain, M .P . Outlines of Indian legal History, pp. 125-8.
It may be mentioned that during the  conflict in  Bombay, Bentinck 
w as the Governor General and favoured the curtailment of the 
powers of the Supreme Court in  Bombay.
In Madras too, quarrels of sim ilar nature started  soon
after the establishm ent of the Supreme Court in  December 1800.
The conflict between the Court and the Council over the question
of jurisd iction  commenced during the Governorship of Lord Clive
and became serious during Bentinck's office /W hen I first came
to India*1 Bentinck wrote to h is  father, "I found that t3fle most
unpleasant difference had existed between my predecessor and
the Supreme Court. The clashes between the Court and the
Council in Madras were further complicated by a conflict of personal
nature between Bentinck and Sir Henry Gwillim, one of the puisne
2
judges of the Supreme Court. Curiously enough, the Chief ju s t ic e ,  
Sir Thomas Strange, who should have been the mouthpiece of the 
Court against the Council, was an  intimate friend to Bentinck and 
as such he carefully avoided getting deeply Involved in the conflict. 
Consequently Sir Henry Gwillim assumed the key role in the 
whole conflict.
The judges differed in  their charactejsand a ttitu d es. Sir 
Thomas Strange, the Chief Justice , w as a learned and distinguished
7  ~ '
Bentinck to his father, 7th March, 1807, B.P.
2 Sir Henry Gwillim, appointed puisne judge of the Madras Supreme 
Court on 26th December 1800. Resigned the post being recalled  
by the Court of Directors on 28th October 1807 and died on 12th 
September 1837.
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man but nervous, sensitive  and suffering from ill-h ea lth . Of
him, Bentinck remarked * ,fIf there is  a cautious, moderate, and
cwL 1
I might almost add, ^  timid man in  the world, it  was Sir Thomas, "
Sir Heniy Gwillim, the second in order, was different. His great
energy and legal ta len t were strangely overshadowed by his
almost insane vanity and aggressiveness. As Bentinck commented,
"Sir Henry has something of the constitutional agitation of Holkar
(Maratha Chief). He likes to make w ar upon h is neighbours not for
the purpose of stealing their purse but without an equally innocent
2intention against their good name. K He was very ill-tempered
and w as on bad terms w ith both the Governor and the Chief Justice.
Sir Thomas paid a courtesy v is it to Sir Henry on the  very day of h is
return to  Madras from England where he had been on a long leave .
Sir Henry refused to return the v is it on the ground that the Chief
Justice had slighted him by not letting him know prior to h is depar*-
3
ture the purpose of h is v is it to England. Thus, Sir Henry always 
suffered from a persecution complex. The third member of the Court 
was the old Sir Benjamin Sulivan, who, like Sir Thomas, suffered
^Bentinck to his father, 7th March 1807, B.P.
2
Bentinck to Strange, 13th Oct. 1806, B.P.
3Gwillim to Strange, 29th June 1806, B.P.
from ill health . However, in  many controversies that arose 
between Bentinck and Sir Henry, Benjamin was generally on the 
la tte r 's  side . Bentinck believed "that he permitted him self to be 
made the tool of that violent man (Henry Gwillim)!
The root of conflicts between the Court and the Council 
lay deeper in their mutual assertion  of superiority against each 
other. To go back to the beginning of the conflicts the friction 
between C live 's Government and the newly established Supreme 
Court of Madras arose on the question of the jurisdiction of the 
Court over the Nawab of^Camatic. The Government of Madras had 
made a treaty  with the Nawab in 1799 and acknowledged him as the 
titu lar ru ler of the C arnatic. By th is  treaty  the Company's Govern­
ment guaranteed him "the rank and stateywith the dignities depen­
dent there^on'1, enjoyed by his ancesto rs. It was further stipulated 
that he was to be treated with the attention and respect "due to an
3
ally  of the British Government. " The Nawab's sea t of authority and 
residence w as on the Che^puk palace and gardjans, s ituated  in  the
*Sir Benjamin Sulivan was appointed puisne judge of the Madras 
Supreme Court on 26th Dec. 1800, Resigned the post on 7th May 
and died in Nav. 1810.
2
Bentinck to Petrie, January 1807, B.P.
a
The Nawab of Carnatic to Bentinck, 12th Jan. 1804, l^P \
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town of Madras over which the Supreme Court exercised its  
territorial Jurisdiction. However, C live 's government made
it abundantly clear that the Nawab w as considered by the British
l(to
authorities in Indiaj^'be an  independent prince permitted to reside,
ik t, i
and^administer h is executive government, within^British territo ries . " 
Soon after the treaty a few members of the Nawab's family, who 
were hostile  to his succession,began plotting against his author­
ity . This w as brought to the notice of the British Government 
and Clive on several occasions directed, without much su ccess ,
these  h ostile  members to submit to the authority of the Nawab.
,r
Finally, these  m iscreants /^assiduously prompted by certain attorneys"
of the Supreme Court of Madras started  bringing fa lse  charges against
2the Nawab before the Supreme Court. This they did on the plea 
that the Nawab, being a resident in M adras town, was subject to 
the jurisd iction  of the Supreme Court. But the Nawab, who was 
declared by the treaty a s  a sovereign ruler w ithin h is own area, 
challenged the Supreme Court's right to deal with the charges against 
him. In th is he w as supported by C live. The Government of Madras
^Extract of le tte r by the late Govt, of Mad. to the Supreme Court.
3rd /Sept. 1801, Enclosed with Bentinck’s le tte r to W ellesley ,
2n d May 1804, W.P*
2
The Nawab of Carnatic to Bentinck, 12th Jan 1804, 1W. P.
held , In view of the independent position of the Nawab, his
palace and the w alled gardens, of Cheepuk in Madras town as
outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, They requested
the judges of the Supreme Court to agree "jmthe expediency of
that exception on the principles of national faith and generosity”. *
The Supreme Court^being overconscious of its  ju risd iction ,
declined to concede th is exemption and asserted  that the Nawab
of Carnatic "is not distinguishable by the law  ^from any other
2individual residing w ithin the limits of the ©ourt. " The Court 
also  started dealing with the proceedings brought against the 
Nawab. Thus the relationship  between C live 's Government and the 
Supreme Court became strained from^the beginning.
The Nawab was then requested by the Government to remove 
h is  residence beyond the lim its of the Supreme Court's ju risd ic tion . 
But the Nawab rejected the proposition and expressed his determin­
ation  never to leave the traditional sea t of his ancesto rs . Neither . 
Clive nor Bentiiick la te r on could make the Nawab comprehend "the 
possib ility  of the existence of an  authority, independent of the
7
Government and apparently cotityWtng its  a c ts . " Besides th is ,
^Extract of Letter by the  la te  Govt, of Mad. to the  Supreme Court, 
3rd Sept. 1801. Enclosed with Bentinck's le tte r to W ellesley,
2nd May 1804, .W .P .
2
Bentinck to W ellesley, 2nd May 1804, W .P.
^Ibid.
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the non-cooperation of the Supreme Court Irritated Clive so much 
that he urged the Court of D irectors to  seek Parliamentary interven­
tion in  the m atter. It was at th is point, Bentinck assumed the Govern­
orship of M adras. Considering the whole proceeding of the Supreme 
Court he commented: "It has been im possible to prevent that part of 
the family (Jhe N aw ab's), hostile  to the succession  from many oppor­
tun ities which the law  affords of bringing action against the Nawab, 
especially  degrading to his public rank and d istressing  to his personal 
fee lings."*  From the beginning Bentinck supported the actions of 
C live 's  Government and assen ted  to the Nawab's claim as an indepen­
dent Mohammedan prince. The Nawab contended, "I am bound by no 
particular laws but those of the Islam . My political relation to the 
British empire in India does not render me in  any shape or degree,
amenable to the Municipal laws of England, from which my family,
2
household and my dependents must be equally f r e e ."
Bentinck was eager to find out an easy  so lu tion . He knew i t  was
difficult to move Parliament promptly for fresh leg islation  on the is s u e .
Instead , he  decided to  appeal to the Governor G eneral, who only was
competent to grant to the Nawab "in perpetual sovereignty the territory
3within the w alls of Cfepata#. " The Government of Bengal urged the 
Supreme Court to admit the fact that a ll the sovereign rulers of India
* Bentinck to W ellesley , 2nd May 1804, W .P.
2 The Nawab of Carnatic to Bentinck, 12th Jan. 1804, W .P .
3 Bentinck to W ellesley , 2nd May 1804, W .P.
were accepted to be the subjects to their own laws only.
Thus the Supreme Government settled  the case of the Nawab
7k£
of^Camatic in favour of the Nawab. The Supreme Court had to 
accept the decision, but felt irritated and remained on the look 
out for a new opportunity to a sse rt its  power against the Madras 
Government.
The first direct break between Bentinck and one of the 
judges of the Supreme Court c^ccurred in November 1805, on a 
rather trifling matter as the application of a church fund for charit­
able purposes. A rich Indian donated a considerable sum to a church 
society for the use of public benefits. Reverend Dr Kerr, the Chap­
lain  of the settlem ent, wrote to Bentinck on the subject and proposed 
that the money should be put under the care of a responsible trustee 
selected by the Government. Bentinck thought of the judges of the 
Supreme Court but the Chief Justice being absent on a v is it to 
England a t that time, he sent a le tte r to Sir Henry Gwillim enclosing 
the C haplain 's le tter and asking for his opinion on the m atter.
"I conceive", Bentinck w rote, "that some security more than we 
have a t present would be advisable in order to prevent the possible 
m isapplication of property to a large amount bequeathed or given
QiJA. j
for the best of^purpoees^ for those charity. 1 To secure th is ,
Bentinck suggested that the Church fund be put under the direction 
of the Supreme Court and Sir Henry to be appointed as  one of its  
tru s tees . The le tte r was polite in  tone, but Sir Henry saw in it 
an  affront to him self and to the Court. He considered the proposal 
a  product of impudence and ignorance on Bentinck's part and 
remarked that he could not feel highly flattered at h is  appointment 
as  a trustee of the fund; "Your Lordship seemsto te a e  misunder­
stand the constitution of a  British court of ju stice; the puisrie 
judges are not appointed^like young lords of certain boards, 
merely to write their names, oCkcIreg ister the orders of their President; 
nor was I sent here, my Lord, nor w ill I ever condescend to ac t as
an underpart of the Supreme Court11. He thereafter returned a ll the
2papers sen t to him by the Governor.
W hatever grounds Gwillim might have had for h is annoyance, 
it  was too much for Bentinck to to lerate such a  "haughty and 
d isrespec tfu l" reply. He did not like to answer it  a i a l l . Instead 
he wrote to Anstruther, the Advocate General, enclosing Gwillim's 
le tte r , which in h is opinion was ”not w ritten with that temper or in 
that s ty le  of respect usually  observed between gentlemen living
^Bentinck to Gwillim, 11th Nov. 1805, B.P.
^Gwillim to Bentinck, 12th Nov. 1805, B.P.
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$n tenns of good understanding. " He further remarked that though
he was always anxious to pay everii respect to the judges of the
Supreme Court in their private and public capacity , under the
present circum stances he fe lt justified  in his determination to cease
all communications with Sir Henry un less he addressed him in the
language of "polished intercourse" rather than that of "judicial
rebuke". * This did not upset Sir Henry who accepted Anstruther
a s  a "channel cf communicationM with Bentinck. For a year after
th is episode, there was no direct correspondence between Bentinck 
2and Sir Henry.
Meanwhile in 1806, there took place two incidents which 
further aggravated the controversy and turned it into an open 
quarrel between the Court and the Government. The firs t incident 
occurred with regard to the appointment of the Indian law ass is tan ts  
Pundits a nd M aulavis in the Supreme Court. And the second incid­
en t, a little  more serious than the firs t, re lated  to the estab lish  
ment of the police force in  the town of Madras and the appointment 
of one Captain James Grant a s  the police Superintendent.
^Bentinck to Anstruther, 14th Nov. 1805, B.P.
2 Bentinck to Strange, 25th Jan. 1807, B.P.
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The Supreme Court in  1806 wanted to appoint native law 
a s s is ta n ts , Pundits and M aula v i s . to interpret Indian law s and 
custom s. During the absence of the Chief Justice the puisne 
judges them selves had decided upon the appointm ents. Accord­
ing to the charter it was settled  th a t, "If a new office be wanted the 
Court must look to the Government for the necessary  salary . The 
Supreme Court therefore applied to the Council to sanction  the 
expenditure needed for the new posts . The application was signed 
only by the two puisne judges, but not by the Chief Justice , who 
in  the meantime, had returned from England. In the Charter, how­
ever, it w as clearly stated  that if  the Chief Justice be p resent, 
h is signature and sea l would be essen tia l in  every transaction  of
the Supreme Court. The Governor in  Council^therefore^sent the app-
*
lication  back to the Court requesting them to authenticate it by the 
signature of the Chief Justice . As a reason for withholding the 
sanction of money the Governor in Council stated  that they had done 
it  for "preserving what appeared to be the rule of established custom". 
But both the puisne judges fe lt insulted a t th is . This incident not
^Strange to Tierney, 5th March 1807, B.P.
2 Gov. in  Coun. to the Court of D irectors, 6th March 1807, Letters 
Reed, from M adras, V ol.28, para. 28.
ohly delayed the appointment of the native a s s is ta n ts , but 
a lso  strained the intercourse between the Court and the Govern­
m ent. Sir Benjamin, who had not so  far taken s id e s , now joined 
hands with Sir Henry against the Council. This development made 
Bentinck a little  tac tfu l. To win over Benjamin on h is s ide , Bentinck 
wrote a personal le tte r to him explaining the reason for returning 
the application to the Supreme Court. ,nThe Government, " Beiitinck 
w orte, "could not receive a communication from two of the judges 
without the signature of the Chief Justice or an explanation of the 
reason of that signature not appearing". He.further Stated that he 
had no desire to disreppect the authority of the judges and reques­
ted Benjamin to forget the breach and renew the usual mode of offic­
ia l  intercourse.'*' This communication produced the desired effect.
Sir Benjamin was highly gratified and considered the explanation 
given by the Governor very satisfactory .
The m ost serious conflict between the Supreme Court and the 
Council arose over the establishm ent of a new police force in the 
town of M adras. The outbreak of the Vellore mutiny in  July 1806, 
led  the Government to consider the necessity  of creating a regular
^Bentinck to Sulivan, 22nd Jan. 1807, B.P.
police force in the Madras town, under the control of one Mr
W alter Grant, an able m agistrate. Sir Henry held that in
establishing th is new police force the Government had crossed
the lim its of its  ju risd iction . He contended that the Government
had no light to create a police force in the town of Madras without
haying first obtained the sanction of the Supreme Court. B esides,
Sir Henry considered the institu tion  of police force by the executive
as unknown to the laws of England and feared that it might lead to
a m ilitary despo tism .1 The Council^on the other hand, pointed out
that it was Within its  executive authority to create and employ an
organised police force "not only to m aintain law and order in the
country, but a lso  to suppress every possible seed of insurrection
2within the territory. ” The creation of the police force, it  was 
argued, w as nothing but an executive m easure. For a fuller under­
standing of the controversy that grew on th is question, it  is  necessary
Sir Henry Gwillim's Charge to the Grand Jury, 21st Jan. 1807,
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 431.
In England there w as no police force under the Government 
before 1829 when it was created by Robert Peel. Public opinion in 
England w as suspicious tha t a strong police force in  the hands of 
the executive might be used to subvert liberty . The du ties of the 
police were performed by u n p a id  constables in the country and hired 
watchmen in  the town. They were appoitited by the Justices of Peace * 
Sir L. Woodward, The Age of Reform, 1825-70. Oxford History of 
England, p p .465.
2
Gov. in  Coun. to the Court of D irectors, 6th M arch 1807,
Letters Re cd . frogi Madras / Vol.3 3 .
tp  give an account of the circum stances which led finally  to 
the creation of the policy.
There was no organised s tab le  police force in Madras
*
Presidency up to the year 1806. The Indian police system that
had functioned in  the days of the Muslim rulers continued to work
in the early years of the British rule in M adras. Under the Indian
system  there was no regular police. The local chiefs like zamin-
dars or poligars maintained band of w atchers and peons known as
D undasses, Barkees, Naick W adies, Mahatuds and ffa lllaries.
These watchmen were fully under the control of their local m asters
and could be used by them against any outside authority, even the
Government.* But the establishm ent of the Company's Government
and especia lly  the introduction of the Courts of Justice in  1802
had inaugurated a new epoch in the adm inistration of M adias. It
w as expected that hereafter the police would work as  an organ for
maintaining peace and order and thus would become a  part of the
jud icial establishm ent. In 1793, Lord Cornwallis in Bengal had passed
regulations for taking over the control of police from the Zamindars
and setting up a new Superintendent of Police w ith a body of European
1 —
Report of the Committee of General Police, 24th Dec. 1806, Mad.
Ind . Proc. 2nd Jan. 1807, Range. 322, V ol.18.
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constables. But in Madras nothing had been done on th is line .
By Regulation 35 of 1802, the head inhabitants of each village 
were entrusted with the charge of looking after the peace and 
order of their v illages. They had to inform the Zamindar of any 
suspicious parson or incident that was brought to h is notice. The 
Zamindars were thus allowed to re ta in  the power of controlling the 
police. The m agistrate of the division was to help the Zaminder 
if  the la tte r asked for h is help. * This regulation did very little  to 
improve the existing system of po lice . When Bentinck came to 
Madras he found that not only on the outskirts but in the town of 
Madras also  the police were sadly deficient. For the whole of 
Madras town, with its  vast mixed population, there existed only
2 European constab les, a ss is ted  by 24 Talllaries (watchers) and for
the neighbouring-areas a few more peons and na icks. For the Indian
population the organisation of police consisted of a Poligar and 33
2
peons who were nominally under the Government control* This 
force, if  i t  really  ex isted , Bentinck believed, was hopelessly
3
inefficient and "protected criminals rather than prosecuted them ".
*
Regulations for establishing and difining the jurisdiction of the courts 
of Adalat or courts of judicature. Reg. 35, 1st Jan 1802, Mad. Jud. 
Gons. Range 321, Vol.93.
2 Report of the Committee of Investigation, O ct. 1805 Police and Judicia. 
Papers, B.P.
3
Bentinck to Strange, April 1805, B.P.
The m agistrates, therefore, could only rely on the two 
European constables and th e ir  Indian a ss is ta n ts  who were 
in fact nothing more than m essengers. They kept no watch 
and had no authority to ac t in  any circumstance without the 
positive order of the m agistrate. Such a police organisation 
Bentinck regretted was Hdefective and insufficient even against 
common offenders Soon after h is arrival, Bentinck wanted 
to improve the situation . It w as only a t h is in sistance  that 
a Committee was appointed in 1804 to investigate into the
existing establishm ent of police and "with a view of placing
2 of Police
it  on a connected and defined footing, " The Committ^eywas
empowered to call upon any organisation or individual to give 
3
information. The Committee carried on investigation for over 
a year and prepared a report a t the end of 1805 on the existing 
condition of the police force in Madras Presidency. But it did 
not make any satisfactory  recommendation for the improvement 
of the system .
^Bentinck to M lnto, 20thOct 1806, B.P.
^Bentinck's M inute, 21st Dec. 1804, Mad. Jud. Proc.
21st Dec. 1804, Range 322, Vol.3 .
3
Chief Secy, of Mad. Govt, to the Committee of Police,
22nd Dec. 1804, Mad. Jud. Proc. 21st Dec. 1804, Range 
322, Vol.3.
W ithin a few months after th is  the mutiny of Vellore 
took place in  July 18 06, The muting em phasised the urgent 
need for an organised police force in  M adras, The Vellore 
outbreak had created considerable tension in the political 
situation  of the Presidency. Intrigues and discontent among 
the sepoys andTlpu's inheritors s till persisted . Bentinck 
in sis ted  that "no delay should take place in the establishm ent 
of the best system of po lice".^  He had expected at th is point 
that the Committee of Police established in 1804 would suggest
•A
the means of enlarging the establishm ent^ "such an extent as
may be necessary  to provide in  the best practicable manner
2for the public safety and tranquility”. The’Committee, however, 
failed to do so . Bentinck further found that the situation of 
crimes and corruptions in  Madras was deteriorating day by day. 
He felt that no time should be lo st to save the people and the 
Government from the inefficacy _ of the law and order as it stood 
a t that time.
Bentinck, therefore, decided to reorganise the Committee
and requested Sir Thomas Strange to help him in  th is m atter.
Accordingly, a new Committee of Police was formed in November
^Bentinck's Minute, 10th Oct. 1806, Pol. & Sec. Cons. B.P.
2Gov. in  Coun. to Gov. Gen. in Coun. 21st Oct. 1806, Letters 
Reed, from M ad. Vol.32.
1806. This new Committee was composed of professional
law yers, m agistrates, the Mayor and some important citizens
in  M adras. It was entrusted with the task  of making two-fold
investigations into^( crime and the police. On the former i t
w as asked to suggest m easures for the prevention of crimes,
for preservation of peace and order, and for security from the
danger of intrigue and insurrection. As for the la tte r, it was asked
to enquire into the nominal and actual efficiency of the existing
police establishment? to consider and s ta te  their ideas apon the
augmentation of the establishm ent; and lastly  to report what might
be the most efficacious means of security . * After a thorough
investigation , the Committeee submitted its  report to the Govem-
2ment of Madras on 24th December 1806. Bentinck was highly 
impressed with the Committee's primary contention that the power 
of training regulations for the police establishm ent should be vested 
in the  Governor in Council. This, Bentinck insisted  would secure
3
to the people the benefit of b es t law and order.
^"Chief.Secy of Mad. Govt, to the Committee, 11th O ct. 1806, 
Police & Jud. papers, B.P.
2Report of the Committee of General Police, 24th Dec. 1806,
M ad. Jud. Cons. 2nd Jan. 1807, Range 322, V ol.18.
^Bentinck to Minto, 20th O ct. 1806, -B.P.
The Committee observed that law lessness and corruption 
had considerably increased in the Madras territo ries. The 
insufficient and disorganised police system was held responsible 
for such degeneration. As for its  solution, the Committee recom­
mended the establishm ent of a strong and organised police system 
for the whole of the Presidency. The Committee believed that the 
duties of police should be discharged by the people them selves.
Thus the head inhabitant of the village should be the primary 
organ to detect crime and to look after the peace and order in 
the v illage. He should be a ss is ted  in his duties by other village 
servants like Karnnm. Talliary and so on. Above the head inhab­
itan t, there should be one Daroga in each sub-division of a 
d is tric t. The M agistrates should supervise the duties of the 
Daroga. The Committee further suggested that the Collectors 
should be vested with the overall superintendance of the police.
In the Zamindary settled  a reas , however, the Committee wanted 
the Zamindar to retain  superior charge of the police. The people 
were so attached to their Zamindars, the Committee contended, 
that "to include the Zamindars in the system of police is  in another 
way to include every inhabitant's a ss is tan ce  towards the suppression
Zoo
of crimes* " The revenue officers of the Zamindar could
strengthen the police ac tiv ities  by helping the Daroga in
discharge of his du ties. The Zamindar should seek  the
m agistrate 's help if it be felt necessary  by him. Finally the
judges of the Zillah court should have the sole authority for
tria l and punishment of the; offences.
In accordance with the recommendation of the Committee
of General police, the Government of Madras passed  Regulations
on 2nd January 1807 for the establishm ent of uniform police
2
system in Madras Presidency. By Reg. Ill, the village headmen 
were charged with the duties of police officers in the v illages.
A Daroga was posted in  each sub-d iv ision  to deal with the cases 
brought by village headmen. The Daroga was to attend to the 
details  of police, but was given no authority to punish the offender. 
He was to hand over the suspected persons to the Zamindar (in 
Zamindary area). The duties of the Zamindars were to be sim ilar 
to those of the village headmen. They were not given such power 
as to punish the offender either corporally or by fine or imprisonment .
^Report of the Committee of General Police, 24th Dec. 1806, Mad. 
Jud. Cons. 2nd Jan. 1807, Range.322, V ol.18, para. 27.
2Regulations were passed  by the Gov. in Coun, for establishing 
an uniform system of police, 2nd Jan. 1807, Mad. Juc. Proc.
2nd Jan. 1807, Range 322, Vol. 18.
The M agistrate w as given the power to define the duties of 
the Zainindars and the village headmen. He was also  to 
supervise the Daroga. (Reg. DC). The M agistrate was thus 
put in  charge of supervising the duties of the police o fficers, 
but not to perform any police duty him self.
By Reg. XV, the Collector w as. designated as the 
Superintendent of police. He was empowered to "examine, 
commit or r e le a s e 1 the accused  a t h is own discretion . He w as to 
decide whether an offender w as liab le  for tria l in the Zillah Court 
or was to be re leased . The collectors like the M agistrates were 
a lso  given the power to supervise the duties of the subordinate 
police officers. But they were not empowered to in flic t punish­
ment for any offence, (Reg. XVIII). Inwall the d is tric ts  of Madras 
the sole authority of final tria l and punishment w as vested in the 
Zillah ju d g e s .*
The police force in  the town of Madras w as also  increasedi
and strengthened. The number of European constables was incre­
ased  to 10. Over 400 revenue and customs peons and some writers
* Regulations were passed by the Gov. in Coun, for establishing an 
uniform system of police, 2nd Jan. 1807, Mad. Jud. Proc. 2nd Ian. 
1807, Range 322, Vol.18.
were engaged in the Madras town to perform the police duties 
efficiently . A horse patrol was a lso  created from the Governor's 
own body'guards.
Thus in  January 1807 the police system in  Madras was se t 
up on a new model. W alter Grant, an able M agistrate, was 
appointed the Superintendent of the new police in  the Madras 
town. Bentinck had very high opinion about him. "Walter Grant 
i s ,  I thinkywithout exception, the most eligibleiperson as Director 
of Police.
Bentinck thus deserves the credit of providing the d istric ts  
and the town of Madras far the firs t time with a w ell-organised 
police force. Politically too, in  view of the tense  situation of 
Madras following the mutiny, the measure was quite ju stified . It 
is  possible that behind a ll his good intentions of providing peace 
and security  to the country, he nurtured a desire to acquire some 
authority over the town of M adras, on behalf of the Council. He 
seems to have been aware that the measure might ra ise  the question 
of jurisdiction between the Court and the Council. He requested 
Sir Thomas Strange to support h is action . "As the concurrence of 
the Supreme Court is  indispensable to the su ccess  of any system of
* Bentinck to Petrie, Oct. 1806, Letter Box. B.P.
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police which may be estab lished , I have endeavoured to
1
make Sir Thomas Strange as  much a party to it  a s  possib le . "
But Bentinck did not consult the two puisne judges of the
Supreme Court -  Henry Gwillim and Benjamin Sulivan. This
enraijiged Sir Henry, who pointed out that it w as "the majority
of the judges and not the Chief Justice constitu tes the court. "
Very soon he created considerable trouble for the Goyerhment
of Madras over the question.
As stated  earlier, the direct correspondence* between
Bentinck and Sir Henry had already stopped. The creation of
the  new police force worsened their re lations irritated
Gwillim lodged two charges against Bentinck's m easures. F irst,
he felt^the creation of police without consulting him and Sir
Benjamin was a direct Insult to them. Secondly the m easure,
according to him, was an  unjust encroachment upon the sphere of
the Supreme Court's ju risd ic tion . Hey therefore, ivas determined to
oppose the police force in  a ll their ac tiv ities  in  the town of M adras.
He argued that the new police would be nothing more than a machine
3of official oppression. Some incidents occurred soon to supply
* Bentinck to Petrie, O ct. 1806, Letter Box. B.P.
2
Memorials of the Court of Directors to the Privy Council, 1807,
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 431, p p .356,
3Anstruther, Advocate General to G@v . in Coun. 18th Feb. 1897, B.P.
Sir Henry with pretexts to assum e a dangerously aggressive
attitude against the Govemnnant and particularly against Bentinck.
In November and December of IB06 there occurred in the
Madras Presidency a great scarc ity  of grain owing to the failure
of crops by draught. This scarcity  resulted  in serious tumult
among the native inhab itan tsand  several food riots broke out in
the grain market. The store houses and the market were plundered.
Police Superintendent, W alter Grant, found i t  necessary to suppress
the rio ts with the help of a m ilitary force. He also  stationed some
sentinels in different store houses to protect the grain and the 
1
grain dea lers. Sir Henry violently attacked the action of police * 
arrested few policemen and compelled W alter Grant to withdraw 
the military sentinels from the m arket. The Police Superintendent 
stood help less and hum iliated. On many other occasions, too,
Sir Henry opposed the Police Superintendent in the execution of 
h is  du ties, either by apprehending the subordinate police officers 
or by encouraging complaints brought against them in  the Supreme 
Court. Because of such hostile  opposition of the Court, Grant 
resigned the post of the Police Superintendent on 14th January 1807.
^Memorial of the Court of Directors to the Privy Council^ 8 07,
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 431, p p .337^373.
2Ibid.
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Bentinck then recommended and appointed Captain James Grant, 
Commanding Officer of his own bodyguards, to ac t as  the head 
of the police. Sir Henry w as further irritated at the appointment 
of a  military officer to a civil post. This he argued gave the 
police completely a different character: MIt is  headed and directed 
by a militaryman, and it  re ta ins in its  service a military force.
Under the system  in Its present s ta te , your laws and your liberties 
seem to be laid at the feet of a  military despot* u* Branding the 
police force as|a military regime Gwillim started championing the 
cause of ju stice  and civil liberty . He held the Government re s­
ponsible for th is measure and launched tirade against the Governor 
in Council, This time GMllim seem s to have shifted  h is  ground 
of a ttack . His objection to the police force now rested  on the fact 
that i t  w as headed by a  militaryman. As noticed earlier, he had in  
the beginning challenged the competence of the Government to create 
a police force in  Madras town.
On January 21st 1807, the storm broke out when the Supreme
Court assem bled for the opening of the sess io n  of Over and Terminer.
*SJLr Henry Gwillim 's charge to the Grand Jury, 21st Jan. 1807,
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 431, p p .3 07-17.
2This phrase is  derived from the Anglo—French phrase Oyer -  et -  
Terminer, It means the sess io n  of the court held for the tria l of
criminal offences.
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It was actually  Sir Benjamin's turn to attend the session ; but 
because of h is  illn ess  Henry Gwillim came to replace him*
Gwillim at once took up the opportunity and a ttacked  the Govern­
ment for establishing an oppressive police force within the town 
of M adras, In an open and crowded court he declared, "that^the 
Government had conducted itse lf  in  so arbitrary manner that it 
would be dastardly for him and a want of a tten tion  to the dignity 
of the Court, not to take further notice to i t .  He then mentioned 
the affronts which he believed tha t he and Sir Benjamin had 
suffered at the hands of the Government and especially  of "the 
very ill-ad v ised  young gentleman a t the head of i t .  " The Govern­
ment, he further s ta ted , had not only violated the  pledge given by 
them selves of supplying the  Indian a ss is ta n ts  (Pundits and 
M aulavis) to the Court, but eyen when the court had addressed a
le tte r to the Government claiming performance o^this promise "this
2ill-ad v ised  young Lcrd had evaded it by insulting the Court. H 
He then attacked "with peculiar asperity  " the system of 
police. Another no le s s  gross in su lt, he complained, had subsequent! 
been offered to the judges of the Supreme Court by establishing a new
*Sir Henry Gwillhn's charge to the Grand Jury, 21st Jan. 1807,
Home M isc. Ser.°431, p p .307-17.
2 ^Ibid*
police force without any previous communication with them.
He considered the numerous officers of the police to be a 
"body most dangerous to the community, " and that they 
resembled more the bands of "the Inquisition*4 than the regular 
officers of ju s tice . He further sta ted  that he came across the 
information that the Government of Madras w as contemplating 
to propose to the home authority a m aterial change in the admin­
istra tion  of ju s tice , It had also  suggested the estab lish­
ment of a local leg isla tive  authority. This proposal, he imagined, 
was made in order to extend the interference of the Council in the 
jurisdiction of the Court.
On the specific case of scarcity  of grain and rio ts in Madras 
town, he commented that undoubtedly some commotion arose from 
the public d is tress; but that misfortune might only be traced to 
the "misconduct of the Government in not providing a sufficient 
supply of food for its  sub jec ts . " However, when the riotous 
incidents occurred, Sir Henry believed i t  was only the Court and 
hot the pqlice appointed by the Government, who had the right to
lpunish the delinquents.
T
Sir Henry Gwillim*s charge to the Grand Jury, 21st Jan. 1807, 
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.431, p p .307-17.
It is  clear that Gwillim en thuskstically  fashioned him self
a s  the champion of the prestige of the Supreme Court, He
always imagined that the Supreme Court was subject to constant
hum iliation and interference by the Council. It was difficult for
Bentinck to  stand it . In h is opinion the Judge w as endeavouring
"deliberately and publicly to degrade and debase the Government
in  the eyes of the people".^  His immediate reaction  to "this
indecency and folly ,lwas expressed in h is remark to Petrie; "It is
2
im possible to submit to i t .  " Promptly but coolly he took meausre 
to counteract the aggression  of Sir Henry, First of a ll he wanted 
to stop him from functioning a s  a judge for that sessio n . He wrote 
to Sir Thomas that "in the present s ta te  of th is  country the promul­
gation of such opinions (as Sir Henry expressed) from the authority
3of the Bench w ill be highly dangerous to the public safety. "
He therefore requested Sir Thomas Strange to take h is place upon 
the Bench for the remainder of the se ss io n . Next he tried to iso la te  
Sir Henry from the other two judges of the Supreme Court, particularly
1 '  ' ............................................1 t  t - -  :
Bentinck to his father, 2nd Feb. 1807, B.P.
^Bentinck to Petrie, 22nd Jan, 1807, B.P.
3Bentinck to Strange, 22nd Jan. 1807, B.P.
from Benjamin, for Bentinck w as already on friendly terms 
with the Chief Justice* As Benjamin had on previous occasions 
supported Henry against the Government, Bentinck wanted to 
know whether a t th is  point he^ too, had joined hands with Sir 
Henry ta h u r l  abuse a t the Government. Sir Benjamin, who had 
no personal disliking for Bentinck, now felt that it was not prudent 
to attack  the Government in  a manner as se t by h is colleague.
He Immediately replied expressing h is disagreement with Sir 
Henry's d isrespectful conduct.^- After completing a ll these  pre­
lim inaries, Bentinck consulted the Advocate General, Anstruther; 
who in  fact was working as  a via-m edia between the judge and 
the Governor. He was also  present in  the Court and w itnessed 
Sir Henry's charge before the Grand Jury. At h is suggestion,
Bentinck strongly recommended to the Council two immediate 
actions to be taken against Sir Henry, First to  apply to the Supreme 
Government in Calcutta for the suspension of the judge and secondly, 
to make an appeal to the Privy Council in  England for the removal of 
the judge from the Bench. The memhers of the Council,though at f irs t 
anxious to "avert any procedure which may involve us in  controversy
^Benjamin to Bentinck, 25th Jan.1807, B.P.
and contest with the judges of the King's C ourt”, a t la s t  
unanimously agreed to both the proposals.*
W hile Bentinck was busy taking various measures against 
Sir Hemy, another incident occurred offering once again to Sir 
Henry an  opportunity to abuse the Governor in  a most foul 
language. In February 1807 the Governor in Council w&s informed 
by the Resident of M ^ o re , that an Indian, named CoplObraminy, 
a  dangerous man of suspicious and intriguing character, had 
come from Mysore to M adras. The Government, thereupon, ordered 
the Police Superintendent, Captain Grant, to apprehend the man 
and send him back to  M ysore. This was obeyed without any delay. 
Sir Henry, in  the name of public liberty , took up the case of 
Coolobraminy. On 17th February, the Supreme Court issued  a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus to re lease  Coolobraminy. But in  the mean­
time he was sent back to Mysore by the police. Sir Henry was Infur*- 
iated  and took it as an in su lt to the King's Court Inflicted by the 
Company's m ilitary servant. And on 18th February, in  the same 
sess io n  of the Court^he publicly launched a second attack  on the
* P etrie 's M inute, 22 nd Jan, 1807. Police & Judicial papers, B.P.
Government and the Governor which w as even more vicious 
than the first one. "Unexampled . . .  and d isgusting" as  
Bentinck mentioned of the language used by Sir Henry "in the 
hiStOjy of British court of ju s tic e . Again the judge criticised  
the system of police and governmental actions with the Utmost 
severity . But what was most noteworthy was the unrestrained 
and improper language in  which he launched an outrageous per­
sonal a ttack  on Bentinck. He exclaimed J'T cannot suppress my 
indignation. Good God! and these  outrages against the liberty of 
the subjects to be sanctioned by a Bentinck! By one of the 
family so illustrious in the cause of liberty! It is  im possible, 
none of the, ' noble blood of the Cavendishes can flow in  the 
veins of that man. He must be some spurious changeling that 
had been palmed upon that noble family and contaminates it; 
no one of that race would dishonour it by such illeg a l m easures. " 
He condemned the measure of the Government which had deprived 
the people of their liberty by placing a 'so ld ier ' at the head of 
the police. As a representative of the Supreme Court, Sir Henry 
could not allow th is  sort of In ju stice . "I s it here, " h e  declared ,
1
Bentinck to Grenville, 10th March, 1807, B.P.
"to protect the liberty  of my fellow su b jec ts" . He then threatened 
the Council that he would bring thewhole matter to the notice of 
His M ajesty 's Government. He would inform them of the heinous 
motive that the Government of Madras had, in  establishing a new 
police force. ^
All these allegations of Sir Henry against the Governor in
public, whether based on truth or not, obviously undermined the
prestige of Bentinck's Government in  M adras. Bentinck felt that
such misguided assertions on the part of a responsible member of
2
the Supreme Court were bound to affect the minds of the people.
Especially in  view of the political situation  after the mutiny in
Vellore, such actions would clearly impair the British authority in
India. "The duty of British Government in  India", he w rote, "was
only to save  the possessions of the mother country, not to preach
3
the Rights of Man. " In addition to  their former decision  to apply 
to the Supreme Government and to the Privy Council, Bentinck's 
Government now resolved to address to the Court of Directors to
^Memorials of the Court of Director to the Privy Council, 1807, 
Home M isc. Ser* V ol.431, p p .337-73.
2 Bentinck to Grenville, 10th March 1807, B.P.
^BentinckiM inute, 21st July 1807, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 691. 
p p .153-62.
take an extreme m easure, nam ely, the removal of S ir Henry
from Madras Immediately. In u tte r exasperation he wrote J
"If no superior authority were a t hand to whom we could apply
for instrutrtions for our guidance, I should deem it my duty to
propose even on my own responsib ility  to order the immediate
arrest of Sir Henry Gwillim for the purpose of sending him for
tria l to England. In a lfetter to the Court of Directors Bentinck
stated  that the dignity and decorum of the British Court had
always earned national importance and enjoyed great respect
2
from the Indian people. Such dignity the British Court should 
m aintain in  India in the in terest of the British ru le . But unfortun­
ate ly , Sir Henry always wanted to place the question of the ju ris­
diction of the Supreme Court ahead of the actual In terests  of the 
British Government.
Apart from the political consideration, Bentinck argued, even 
legally  the Supreme Court could not oppose the executive authority 
and hum iliate i t  in  public esteem . When the Supreme Court was 
established  by His M ajesty, Bentinck asserted,*#Vit could never
*Gov. in Coun. to Court of D irectors, 6th March 1807, Letter 
Reed, from Mad. Vol.33, para 86.
2
Gov. in Coun. to Court of D irectors, 23rd July 1807, Letter 
Reed, from Mad. Vol.33, p a ra .24.
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have been intended to give to the judges the power of becoming
the public censors of the ac ts  of the Government, or of defaming o^ d
its  authority in the eyes of the public. So Sir Henry, even if
he was determined to hamper the progress of the police ac tions,
had no right to abuse the Government, especially  the Governor.
In March 1807 Bentinck's Government directed the Advocate-
General to frame charges aga in st Sir Henry to submit to the
home authorities for his immediate recall from M adras. The
authorities in England were requested to consider w hether a
respectab le office holder of His M ajesty had any right to make
a violent and abusive a ttack  "upon an independent authority
2
forming the government of the country". The Governor in  Council
further decided to inform Sir Henry formally of the charges made
against him and to enable him to explain him self before the home
authorities. The Supreme Government in C alcutta, too , held that
3the recall of Sir Henry would be both "beneficial and d e s ira b le .11 
Hereafter, Bentinck w as eagerly waiting for the decision from the 
authorities of England, which he believed should come at its
^Bentinck to Grenville, 1st Feb. 1807, B.P.
2 Bentinck to h is Father, 1st Feb. 1807, B.P.
3Gov. in  Coun. to the Court of D irectors, 6th M arch 1807,
Letters Reed, from M ad. Vol.33, para. 25.
earliest "for the safe ty  of the place and for the protection 
of those public in s titu tio n s". *
Suddenly in  Madras a dramatic change in  s ituation  took 
place and a t the very height of the whole conflict Bentinck had 
to leave M adras. The mutiny of the Indian troops a t Vbllore 
created great tension  in England. The prevailing opinion there 
held  Bentinck responsible for the outbreak. Consequently, on 
the gronnd of m iscalculation and misamangement of affa irs, 
Bentinck was called back by the home au thorities, before any 
final decision on the question of Sir Henry's removal w as reached.
However, Bentinck's reca ll was soon followed by a verdict 
on Sir Henry. The Court of Directors unanimously considered the 
conduct of Sir Henry as a "violation of the law ". They clearly 
apprehended that such a controversy -  as existed between the 
Supreme Court and he Government of Madras -  would not only 
disturb "the peace and tranquility of the British possessions in  the 
East Indies" but perhaps the very existence of the British .dominion 
in  that country. The British power in India, they bell eve d^was 
dependent on the authority of the executive government, and not
*Gov. in Coun. to Court of D irectors. 21st O ct. 1807. Letters 
Reed, from Mad. Vol.34, para. 15.
on the judiciary. They concluded, therefore, that the 
continuance of the service of a person like "Sir Henry Gwillim 
in  a high public situation , uncontrollable by the  Government 
may induce the most d isastrous c o n s e q u e n c e s .A c c o rd in g ly , 
with unaMmous decision  of the Court of Directors in  November 
1807, two months after the reca ll of Bentinck, Sir Henry was 
called back to England to explain h is  conduct.
As in Bengal (from 1774 to 1783) so in Madras the conflict 
between the Company's Government and the King's Court involved 
both the institu tional and personal factors. The Supreme Court 
created by and owing allegiance to King and Parliament claimed 
an independent and superior sta tus to the Presidency Government 
on which,some of the judges thought,the Court was established to 
act a s  a check. Constituted differently, owing allegiance to 
different superior authorities and with th e ir jurisdactions and power 
in  relation to each other vaguely defined, the two bodies could 
easily  c lash . Even w ithin th is  explosive institu tional framework 
a  conflict in  Madras might have been averted had there not arisen
■^Memorials of the Court of D irectors to the Privy Council, 1807, 
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.431, pp. 370-73.
a clash of personalities between the tlyoung Lord" and the 
impetuous judge. The is s u e s  which caused the friction -  
the church fund question, appointment of Indian law a ss is tan ts  
and the creation of police force in  Madras town -  w ere not so 
v ital that the Court o r the Council could make no compromise.
But they were inflated beyond proportion by mutual suspicion 
and rivalry that persisted between Bentinck and Sir Henry. The 
Judge acted impudently. But in  proposing to arrest a King's 
judge, if h is  call for help was not responded, Bentinck was ready 
to  go further, perhaps unw isely, than  Hastings or Philip Francis 
did in  their opposition to Impey and the Supreme Court in  Bengal.
CHAPTER IV 
SOME ASPECTS OF FINANCES
During Lord W ellesley 's adm inistration the financial
condition of the British Government in  India saw  a steady
deterioration. Following a policy of w ise economy, Cornwallis
(1786-93) had left an aggregate surplus of over 10 million pound
sterling . His successor Shore (1793-98) had a lso  followed a
pacific policy and practised rigid economy. From 1792-93 to
1796-97 Shore had managed to accummulate an aggregate surplus
of £5,637, 588 in  sp ite of the increase of expenses resulting from
1
C ornw allis's Judicial and adm inistrative reforms.
Beneath the to ta l surpluses left by Shore there was an indic­
ation of concern. W ellesley , succeeding Shore in  1798, sent 
home a minute explaining the financial sta te  of the country. In 
that minute he .apprehended that the year 1798-99 wotild be one 
of deficit in  a ll the three Presidencies. Explaining the deficiency 
he stated  that the allocation of a large amount (^4 , 96, 15, 165) 
for the investment and commercial charges of the Company during 
the years 1796-97 and 1797-98 would adversely affect the finances 
of the Government. "This annual demand, W ellesley wrote, "for 
the purpose of Investment (and commercial charges) upon a scale  
^Banerjea, P .,  Indian Finance in the days of the Company, p. 87.
z~zo
so far exceeding the annual means of the three Presidencies was 
the principal cause of the deficiency. W ellesley ’s  policy of 
expansion added to the discomfiture already created by the 
Company's enormous investm ents. W ellesley ’s enthusiasm 
for aggrandisement led to the increase of the Civil and M ilitary 
establishm ents of the P residencies. He was deeply concerned 
w ith the security  of the British empire and the expansion of British 
territories regardless of the stab ility  of the Government treasury . 
Thus the series of war and conquest which followed W ellesley ’S 
assum ption of office resulted in  reguhr annual deficiet -  the
2
to ta l of the five years ending in  1801-2 amounting to £2 ,743 ,952 . 
The deficit was hardly neutralised but increased stead ily  up till 
1806-7.
However, the most depressing point in  the whole financial 
situation of British India was the precarious finances of the Madras 
Presidency. Ever since  the commencement of war with Mysore in 
South India, the Madras treasury continually showed an  annual 
defic it. By terminating the war with Mysore Cornwallis once 
brought a hope of improvement. But as soon a s  the Anglo-French
^W ellesley 's M inute, 12th June 1798, P P. V ol.16, 1806, p. 510.
2Banerjea, P. Indian F inance. p. 88.
hostilities  broke out In 1793, M adras returned to pecuniary
embarrassment.* Even during Shore's adm inistration Madras
had a considerable amount of deficiency. In 1798, W ellesley
w as d istressed  to notice "the pressure of the Government (of
2Madras) to be so severe. w The condition showed no further 
sign of improvement and the annual deficit from 1793 onwards 
became a regular feature. In the year 1803, Bentinck inherited 
the liab ility  of a crippled finance of Madras Presidency with a
3
deficit of 51*52,115 ahead. The precarious condition of Madras 
finances prompted W ellesley to formulate certain m easures for 
"speedy re lief" . With the purpose of drawing into the treasury 
of Madras Government the amount of the balance of trade (estim-. 
a ted  at 10 to 12 lacs of pagodas) between Madras and Bengal, 
W ellesley allowed the Government of Madras "to draw upon 
Bengal a t certain ra tes of exchange". Secondly, he directed 
the Madras Government to open a public loan and lastly  he 
permitted the Government of Madras to use specie  - allotted for
^Petrie 's Minute on "Finances of Government", June 1803, Public 
Dept. B.P. \
^W ellesley 's Minute, 12 June 1798, P .P . Vol. 16, 1806, p. 514.
3Petrie 's  Minute on "Finances of Government", June, 1803, Public 
Dept. Cons. B.P.
Bengal, if the ships from Europe on their way to Bengal, (carrying 
those specie) touched the port of M adras. Madras Government was 
scep tic  in  its  reception of W ellesley 's proposals -  and the propo­
sa ls  in effect produced little  immediate relief.^1 The situation soon 
worsened with the beginning of Anglo-Maraiha wars and in August 
1803, W ellesley directed the whole of the Madras army to march 
towards the Maraiha frontiers.
Soon after his arrival in  Madras Bentinck felt the inadequacy 
of W ellesley 's proposals to deal w ith the financial difficulties of
M adras. The situation of Madras necessita ted  more d rastic  m easures
2than what W ellesley contemplated. Bentinck realised  that a reduc­
tion in  the army was the foremost requirement for tackling the problem 
But the outbreak of Anglo-Maraiha war made an augmentation in  the 
m ilitary force of Madras indispensable. Madras treasury had to 
spend eleven lacs of pagodas on the detachment led by Major 
General W ellesley. In addition to th is Madras Government was 
burdened with an extraordinary disbursem ent, when W ellesley
requested them to assem ble troops for the internal security of
3
British territories from Maraiha invasions. At the beginning of
^Petrie 's Minute on "Finances of Government", June 1803,
Public Dept. B.P.
2 Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in  Coun. 8th Sept. 1803,
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 29th March 1804, V ol.131. N o.I,
^Ibid.
1804, Bentinck was deeply concerned at the gravity of the 
financial condition of his government. The budget showed 
a deficit of 39 lacs of pagodas. An additional military expen­
diture of 7 lacs of pagodas and the payment for a 10 per cent 
Decennial Bond loan, matured a t that tim e. The to ta l deficit 
of the year reached to 51 lacs of pagodas. * The measures 
directed by the Governor General could provide only 24j lacs of 
pagodas leaving a deficit of 2 6 | la c s . To overcome th is diffi­
culty Bentinck decided to take quick m easures a t h is own 
in itia tive .
He promptly made an arrangement w ith the Madras Bank to 
supply 5 lacs of pagodas to the Madras Government for Bills 
drawn on Bengal. He did not w ait for prior sanction of the
2
Governor General for increasing the amount of the drafts on Bengal. 
W ith the purpose of m eeting the deficiency of specie he further 
recommended to issu e  Treasury Bills (a sort of paper money) bearing 
an  in terest of 8 per cent to pay the demands where specie was not
^Bentinck to W ellesley , 6th Jan. 1804, W .P.
2
Madras Bank to the Chief Secy. Govt, of Mad. 31st Dec. 1803, 
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 29th March 1804, Vol. 131, N o .20.
absolutely required. Both these  m easures of Bentinck
exceeded the limit allowed by the directives of the Governor
General and were liab le to provoke indignation of the Supreme 
2Government. On the anticipation that the Supreme Gpvem- ‘
ment might oppose the issu e  of Treasury Bills as a mode of
temporary re lief, Bentinck justified  his action on the ground
of emergency and wrote ”. . .  the disposable balances in the
subordinate treasuries (of Madras) having been reduced to the
low est sca le , we are at the commencement of the present month
without resources and without any means of meeting the d iffic-
3
u lties of an accumulated pressure. "
Bentinck's measures were not readily acceptedd by W ellesley .; 
In fact the m easures adopted by Bentinck had brought him almost 
to a breaking point w ith the Governor General. Ih/Wfthtmost serious 
regret and apprehension, " W ellesley wrote to Bentinck; “The 
embarrassment (of the financial situation of Madras) representedto 
your Lordship^appears to me^and to every person conversant with the
^Bentinck to W ellesley,26th Jan. 1804, W .P .
2
Bentinck's Minute, 13th Jan. 1804, Public Dept. B.P.
3
Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. im Coun. 8th Jan. 1804.
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 29th March 1804, Vol. 131, N o .2.
subject^to have been greatly ex a g g e ra ted ^  not altogether 
f ic t i t io u s ,,r He was convinced that the presence of a spirit 
of faction within the Madras Government was responsible for 
th is  m isrepresentation of the s ta te  of finances of M adras, *
According to W ellesley the situation  of Madras w as not so bad 
as  to warrant the m easures Bentinck had undertaken. He claimed 
that Bentinck became panicky at the estim ates of the Madras 
Government of May 1803. But the la te s t estim ate prepared in 
August, 1803 showed a deficit of only 23,16,433 pagodas for 
the year which was ending on 3 0th April 1804. The supplies from 
Bengal being 11,97,712 pagodas the deficiency would then be red­
uced to the sum of 11,18,721 pagodas. This deficiency, W ellesley
believed would be possible to  meet by raising loans as he suggested,
2and through the supply of bullions and specie from Europe.
W ellesley , however, did not force Bentinck to retrace h is actions
and approved his measures including the issu e  of Treasury Bills.
But a t the same time he cautioned Bentinck in  c lear terais: 'T sincerely
hope that in all future operations of finance your Lordship w ill rely 
•
^W ellesley to Bentinck, 1st Feb. 1804, W .P.
2
Gov. Gen. in Coun, to Gov. in  Coun. Mad, 9th Feb. 1804, Beng. 
Sec. & Cons. 29th M arch 1804, V ol.131, N o.3.
confidently on the zeal and prudence of th is Government (the
Supreme Government) . . .  Further, he wanted Bentinck to
furnish the Supreme Government w ith the estim ate of Madras
for the year 1804-5,
Bentinck's reaction to W ellesley 's attitude was one of
disappointm ent, "Your Lordship's le tte r was w ritten, " he wrote
to W ellesley, "in a tone of which gave me very
2 *  • -considerable pain". He?however?lost no time in  furnishing the 
Supreme Government with the estim ate of 1804-5, The estim ate 
showed a deficit of 25,65,967 pagodas of which an amount of 
1400, 000 pagodas (100, 000 for Bills on England and 40, 000 for 
Bills on Bengal) being deducted — an amount of 11,65,967 pagodas 
s till remained to be supplied. The money expected from the 
successfu l implementation of Bentinckrs measures would cover 
only a part of th is huge defic it, leaving at leas t 3 00,000 pagodas 
to be ra ised . To meet th is , Bentinck requested the Supreme 
Government to allow the Government of Madras to open a loan 
on their Promissory Notes of 8 per cent in te rest. He further wanted
^W ellesley to Bentinck, 2nd March 1804, W .P .
o
Bentinck to W ellesley, t s & y s k j -1 1804, W .P.
to introduce D ecennial Loan C ertificates bearing an in terest
of 10 per cent.*  The estim ate of the Madras Government for
1804-5 did not appear unsatisfactory  bo W ellesley, who thought
that the remaining deficit of 300^000 pagodas w as not alarming.
H e,therefore,discarded Bentinck's proposal for introducing 10 per
cent Decennial Loan C ertificates but allowed the Government of
M adras to receive loan in  exchange of their Promissory Notes
2at an in terest of 8 per cent per annum. The difference that arose 
between Bentinck and W ellesley was with regard to the in tensity  
of the financial c risis  of M adras. W ellelsley was not a s  alarmed 
as  Bentinck w as. The Presidency Governor had to give way grace­
fully to the w ishes of the superior authority. Bentinck wrote to 
C astlereagh, "I am happy to  say  that a ll misunderstanding has been
3
completely done away r. ivi . . . "  Bentinck even declared not to
adopt any measure howsoever proper it  might be for the Madras
Government, which the Governor General did not consider compatible
. 4
with h is general policy. W ellesley , in h is turn, approved Bentinck'
*Gov. in  Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in Coyn. 9th March 1805,
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 29th March 1804, Bol.131, N o.4.
2Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in  Coun. Mad. 29th March 1804,
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 29th March 1804, V ol.131. N o .7.
3
Bentinck to C astlereagh, 18th O ct. 1804, B.P.
4 'Gov. in  Coun. Mad, to Gov. Gen. in  Coun. 26th April 1804,
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 26th April 1804, Vol. 134, N o .58.
recent management o f the finances of Madras and hoped that
the new 8 per cent loan opened by Bentinck would receive good
1public subscriptions* D ifferences were thus patched up,
but Bentinck did not entirely give up his own point of view.
His anxiety over the sta te  of Madras finances was not dimirished.
"The defic it is  very g rea t" , he wrote to C astlereagh, "and I have
no idea as to the mode of supply which Lord W ellesley may intend 
„2to propose. "
The year 1805 was financially the most critical year for 
Madras adm inistration. Failure of rain further in tensified  the 




The estim ate showed a defic it of 84,70,119 pagodas. Besides an
additional cost of 97,97,283 pagodas was estim ated on the m ilitary
3
charges on account of expected French invasion and Maraiha war. 
Under th is pressure Bentinck endeavoured to ra ise  money from
*A note transm itted to Bentinck by W ellesley , 20th July 1804,
W .P .
2 Bentinck to C astlereagh, 18th October, 1804, B.P.
3
Gov. in  Coun. M ad. to Gov. Gen. in  Coun. 16th March 1805, 
Enclosure to Mad. Pub. Letters 2nd April 1805, Vol.lA , 1803-9.
various sources, such as drawing Bills on Bengal and England, 
receiving treasure (bullion and specie) from England and issuing 
Company's Public Securities. A further problem arose in  connec­
tion w ith the Treasury B ills. The Madras Government was comp­
elled to issu e  a large number of Treasury Bills (exceeding ten lacs 
of pagodas) to overcome the difficulty of the scarcity  of specie .
Now they were faced with the problem of supporting the credibility 
of the B ills. To maintain the currency of the Treasury Bills at the ir 
face full value, the Madras Government proposed a reduction of 
their circulation. This could be done, they believed^"by opening a 
general loan on favourable terms to the public". In the operation of 
th is  loan Treasury Bills should be received a s  cash-m oney. Thus a 
large part of Treasury notes in circulation would be withdrawn and 
then the Madras Government would issu e  a sim ilar description of 
paper to  a moderate extent.*  The Supreme Government accepted the 
proposal. ^
M eanwhile, with the sanction of the Governor General in 
Council, Bentinck decided to adopt further measures for curtailing
*Gov. in  Coun. Mad. to  Gov. Gen. in Coun. 16th March 1805, 
Enclosure to Mad. Pub. Letters 2nd April 1805, Vol. 1A, 1803-9.
2 Gov. Gen. in Coun. to the Court of D irectors, 4th July 1805, 
Letters Reed, from Beng. Pub. Dept. Vol. 118.
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the heads of expenditure. First of a ll he reduced the allowance
of the Nizam supplied from the treasury of M adras. Next he
%t,
postponed the payments to the creditors of the Nabab of .Carnatic.
A
Lastly  he withheld the payment of 250, 000 pagodas to the Raja 
of M ysore, This amount was due to the Raja who had supplied 
S illadar horses to the British army in  the la s t year. *
When Bentinck w as thus struggling w ith the financial diffi­
culties Cornwallis relieved W ellesley at the centre. The state 
of finances in India attracted C ornw allis's first attention and he 
wrote to the Court of Directors that it would be exceedingly diffi­
cult to meet the expenses of the renewed war with the confederated
Maralha force "unless some very speedy measures are taken to
2
reduce our expenses. " Cornwallis started trying h is best to end 
the Maraiha wars as soon as possib le. At the same time he urged 
the Government of Madras to  cut expenditure on the charge of 
Maraiha wars and to consign to Bengal £50, 000 of the specie allo tted
3
them from the treasure that had arrived from Europe. At the end of 
1805jhowever^the financial position of Madras showed marks of
^Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Court of Dir. 4th July 1805, Letters Seed, 
from Bengal. Pub. Dept. Vol. 48. "" . ■
2
Cornwallis to the Court of D irectors, 9th Aug. 1805, C. Ross, 
Marquis of Cornwallis D espatches, p. E2&*
3
Z3i
improvement and Bentinck seemed to be satisfied  with the
resu lts  of his m easures. With the establishm ent of peace
with the M aralhas Bentinck v isualised  the reduction of
military expenditure and hoped that hereafter h is Government
1would breathe more freely in financial m atters.
Though the treasury situation  showed possib ilities of 
improvement, the Government of M adras was s till unable to 
discharge a ll the floating debts. In the estim ate of 1806/7,
2Bentinck again observed a probable deficit of 28,54,336 pagodas.
The Supreme Government once more advised the Madras Government
to open an 8 per~cent Government loan on the line adopted in
Bengal. But Bentinck favoured a loan on a higher rate of 10
peSTcent. In his opinion a lower rate of in terest than 10 p e rcen t
would neither withdraw from circulation the great amount of
Treasury B ills, nor ra ise  enough supplies to provide sufficient
re lie f to the Government. So, Bentinck proposed a  loan bearing
310 per cent in terest with the  principal payable in two years . The
Supreme Government gave way to the w ishes of the Government of
M adras.^ To Bentinck, now, the overall picture of 1806/7 seemed
^Bentinck to C astlereagh, 7 Sept. 1805, B.P.
2 Gov. in Coun. Mad. to the Vice President in  Coun. Beng. 19 Feb. 
1806, Beng. Pub. Cons. 20th March 1806, Range 6, V ol.24, N o .4.
^Bentinck’s M inute, 4th Jan. 1806, Beng. Pub. Cons. 30th Jan. 1806, 
Ran. 6, Vol. 23, N o.I,
,4
Gov. Gen in Coun. to Gpv. in  Coun. Mad. 20th March 1806, Beng, 
Pub. Cons. 20th M arcn l8 0 6 , Rancre 6. Vol.2 4 , No, I.
2 3 2 -
more or le ss  satisfactory . He wrote to C a s t l e r e a g h ^ ^  ike,
exception of the Treasury Bills and 8 per cent Bonds . . .  the 
receip ts and disbursements of 1806/7 w ill nearly balance each 
other. u He was convinced tha t in the near future, "our own 
separate resources w ill afford a surplus and enable us without 
any foreign ass is tan ce  to provide^considerable investm ent.
At th is point Bentinck's optimism was strengthened by the estab ­
lishment of a Government Bank in M adras, which according to h is 
expectation would secure 4 lacs of pagodas on credit. He further 
hoped for a fa ir season  which would increase the revenue in 
addition to the Salt tax (approximately 3 lacs of pagodas). More­
over, with the establishm ent of peace with the M arathas, he 
expected to save more than 20 lacs of pagodas on the military 
charges.
Bentinck's exertions to reach a balance between receipts and 
disbursements of Madras Government was on the whole appreciated 
by the Court of D irectors. At the same time the Court was very 
critical about some additional costs Incurred by Bentinck in  the 
adm inistration of M adras. During 1804 and 1805 Bentinck proposed anc
* Bentinck to Castlereagh, 20th Feb. 1806, B.P,
carried out the increment in  the salary of different Govern­
ment officials including the Council members, the Commander 
in  Chief, the Revenue officials and the Mint m aster. The 
Court severely censured Bentinck and pointed out that "the 
situation of our finances in India requires,an earnest and 
unremitting regard to economy and to the retrenchment of a ll
7
unnecessary and superfluous expenses. Several times up to
1807, the Court reproached Bentinck for such unnecessary
increase in  the expenditure. In April 1807, again the Court
rudely disallowed Bentinckfs proposal to increase the sa laries
o^some Indian officials at the Provincial Court of M asulipatam . ^
Bentinck thought that the attitude of the Court was unjust and 
3narrow.
When the financial prospect of the Government of Madras 
had improved a little  a t the end of 1805, Bentinck adopted a number 
of w ell-devised  measures for a permanent improvement of the 
finances of the Preside! cy. He started  w ith a  reform in  the se t 
up of the Financial Department. Until then th is  department was
^Madras D espatches, 9th April 1806, Vol.37.
2M adras D espatches, 8thApiiol 1807, Vol.39.
3Bentinck to Castlereagh, 20th Feb. 1806, B.P.
under the sole authority of the Governor him self. Ail the 
m atters of finances were decided through separate communications 
between the Governor and the Board of Trade and the Board of 
Revenue. In consequence, the financial arrangements and detailed 
distribution of public resources were never included in  the 
Governmental records and were left to the personal care of the 
Governor. With the rapid growth of the financial business in  
Madras Presidency, the Court of Directors appointed in 1802 r an  
Accountant General and entrusted him with the executive duties of 
regulating the receipts and disbursem ents of the revenue aLnd 
commercial treasu ries , sub ject to the confirmation of the Governor.* 
Still then , the financial ^ Department remained beyond the scope of 
general governmental control. In reality , however, the Accountant 
General became all powerful in the financial arrangements and the 
Governor paled into a nominal authority. Bentinck and his Council 
did not approve of th is  situation . Bentinck thought tha t the financial 
transactions should be brought under the full control of the govern­
ment. "It is  my entire be lief" , he sta ted , "that the  more our 
financial transactions are brought under public inspection , the 
more beneficial w ill the  re su lt be in ordinary cases of the public
* Bentinck's Minute, 5th Sept. 1805, B.P.
in te re s ts , " Further, h e  wanted to define the position and
powers of the Accountant General. W ith the approval of the
Supreme Government, therefore, Bentinck introduced changes
in the financia l adm inistration of the Presidency In  September
1805. Hereafter the Accountant General was placed a t the
head of the Financial Department, "managing the du ties  and
deta ils  of i t  in a ll re sp ec ts , as those of revenue and commerce
2are by the Boards of Kevenue and Trade. " He was to correspond 
on every financial m atter w ith the Boards , not d irectly , but 
through the Chief Secretary. Thus a ll transfers and is su e s  of 
money were at first to be recommended by the Accountant General, 
then approved by the Governor in  Council, and finally to be 
carried into effect by the Chief Secretary of the Government. The 
m easure, therefore, restric ted  the power of the Accountant General 
to recommendations only and strengthened the hands of the Chief 
Secretary of the Government. Finally , the Governor in  Council and 
not the Governor him self was charged with the general supervision 
of the f in a n c e s  of the Presidency.
Bentinck's boldest financial m easures were^however, the 
establishm ent of a Government Bank in Madras and the reform
^Bentinck's Minute, 5th Sept. 1805, B.P.
2Ibid.
of the currency system of the Presidency. He had to undertake
both the reforms simultaneously as the questions of banking and
currency were inter-connected. Due to constant deficiency of
bullion in the Madras treasury, the Company always faced the
problem of inadequate specie or circulating medium in Madras.
In course of time financial dealings of the Presidency increased
with the augmentation of lands and commerce. But the depressed
situation of the Madras finances did not allow the Government to
1make a required enhancement in the circulating medium. The 
problem attracted Bentinck's attention and he decided to cope with it by 
establishing a‘government Bank, which he believed would be the 
best, dependable machinery to deal with the problem. In dealing 
with the scarcity of specie and circulating medium Bentinck was 
confronted with anotherproblem of debased and multifarious coins 
which were in circulation in the Presidency for a long time.
Prior to the Company's rule there was no uniform currency 
in India. In the early years of thair rule the Company's Govern* 
ment found 994 different kinds of gold and silver coins current in
India with different weights and fineness. They were constantly varied
V   .................~  1 1  1 1 1  - - - - - - - - - ...................................................................................  ,
Petrie's Minute on General Finance, June I8C3, Public Dept. B.P.
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in their value from day to day. With the commencement of
British rule in Bengal, however, the coinage was confined to
the mint established at C alcutta, issuing the most important
silver coin, the sicca rupee. In 1792-93 sicca rupee was dec-
2lared as the legal tender in Bengal, In the case of M adras, 
the currency problem was even much wider and varied than that 
of Bengal. Before the establishment of the Company's rule there 
were many independent private mints in Madras apart from the 
official mints of the Muslim or the Maratha Governments. The 
Muslim and the Mara/tha Governments licensed the private indi­
viduals -  like the big merchants, bankers and etc . to set up 
private mints in lieu of an annual fee. Coins issued from these 
mints circulated freely along with those of the official m ints. In 
consequence, there was hardly any uniformity in s ize , weight, fine­
ness and value of the coins in circulation. The currency in Madras 
was mainly based on gold and silver; but gold standard was
3
maintained and the principal coin was denominated as star pagoda.
^Macleod, H .D ., Indian Currency, pp. 12-13.
2Banerjee, P ., Indian Finance, pp. 60-61.
3ThurSo&fcn, E ., History of the Coinage of the Territories of the East India 
Company in the Indian Peninsula, pp. 11-13 and Coins of India by South 
Indian Teachers Union, pp. 18-21. The nomenclature "pagoda " was 
derived from "Varahans" the gold coins of Chafcflukytis. The Portuguese 
merchants called "Varahans" as "Bhagavadas " which la ter on became 
corrupted into 'pagodas'. Coins of Ind ia , S .I .T .U .,  p p .22-23.
The Company’s first mint in Madras Presidency was built
w ithin the w alls of Fort St. George in  1723. But the factory
established a t Madras must have exercised  the right of coining
at a much earlier period. The old Star pagoda of Madras which
was a lso  called Company’s Varaha was struck in the early days
of the Company and no exact date was found to indicate the
earliest Circulation.^ The Company's pagodas contained the
same weight, some goodness and passed for the same value
with those of the Nawabs and Rajas. This s ta te  continued in
Madras up to the beginning of the 19th 'Century. Even when
silver coin sicca rupee w as declared legal tender in Bengal .in
1792-3, Madras carried on with the same system and maintained
gold standard. The coins in circulation in Madras in the early
days of the 19th century were mainly s ta r pagodas, Madras pagodas,
Madras gold mohurs, arcot gold mohurs a ll in gold; Madras rupees
and arcot rupees in silver and fanams in  copper. The gold pagoda
2equalled to three and a half silver rupee.
*The Madras Public records stated  that bullions despatched to 
Fort St. George on the appointment of Sir George W alter as 
Governor in 1661 were coined into pagodas in  the Madras mint. 
ThurcfcGn, E ., History of the coinage , pp. 13-14.
^Banerjee, P . ,  Indian Finance, p .63.
The problem of diverse currency and debased coins drew 
the attention of the Madras Government even before Bentinck's 
arrival. During Lord O live 's adm inistration a Committee of 
Finance was appointed to investigate  the p lausibility  i>f intro­
ducing the Bengal currency of silver standard throughout the 
Madras Presidency. The Court of Directors welcomed th is  sugg­
estion  and in December 1799 the Committee of Finance recomm­
ended for Bengal silver standard. In December 1801, the Board 
of Revenue accepted the recommendation of the Finance Committee, 
but a t the same time pointed out the inconveniences which might 
a rise  due to the differences in  the relative ra tes of gold and silver 
coins in  Madras and in  B engal.* C live 's  Government then 
referred the subject to the  Assay M aster of Madras B. Roebuck, 
a num ism atist, for h is opinion. Roebuck undertook the investig­
ation in  the in trinsic value o f the gold and silver coins of M adras. 
In h is report of April 1802, he pointed out that the principal 
currency sta r pagoda was exactly equal to  3\  arcot rupees. The 
actual proportion of gold and silver in  the coins of Madras 
according to him,was 1 ounce of gold to 13f  or JL4 ounces, of
■^Minute of Buchan, Chief Secy, of Mad. Govt. 28th Sept. 1805, 
Board's Collection, Vol. 188.
silver in  bullion. The rate of exchange between pagodas
and arcot rupees would therefore be 100 pagodas to 359 Arcot
rqpees. Roebuck further stated  that the intH nsic value of
17gold coins and silver coins in  Bengal was 1 to 14“  ounces.
Thus there remained a disparity in the relative value of the
i
precious m etals of the two Presidencies. On th is ground of
disparity  Roebuck stood against the recommendations of the
Committee of Finance and the Board of Revenue. *
Until Bentinck's arrival in 1803, no action was actually
taken to system atise the currency system of M adras. Bentinck
took up the matter in earnest and in June 1805, appointed a new
Committee of Finance to re-exam ine the question. The Committee
consisted  of Thomas O akes, W illiam Harrington, C ecil Smith,
2George Buchan and James Taylor. For several months the 
Committee considered the question of uniform coinage and 
improved mintage system . >On the v ita l point of introducing 
the Bengal currency in Madras the Committee members could not 
come to a unanimous decision  and stated their views separately .
1Minute of ... Buchan, Chief Secy, of Mad. Govt. 28th Sept. 
1805, Board's Coll. Vol. 188.
2 Extract from the Minutes of the Gov. in  Coun. 18th June 1805, 
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 6 th March 1806, Vol. 186, N o .96.
$The majority of therm>however,discarded Roebuck's opltnlon
that Bengal coins should not be introduced in  M adras without
making an alteration in  the in trinsic  value between the gold
and silver coins there. The majority held that the relative
value of gold mohur and sicca  rupees was not absolutely fixed
and even varied in Bengal from place to p lace. The disparity
of the precious m etals in  the  two Presidencies was such a trifle
that it should not be considered an obstacle to the adoption of
a uniform coinage for the whole of British India. They thought
it advisable to adopt Bengal currency than to expose M adras to
the inconvenience and loss by sh ro ffag^nd  varying exchange.
They further maintained that the benefit of the  introduction of a
new coinage could only be experienced by gradual progress.*
Smith strongly urged the introduction of a general currency through-
2out British India. T*o accomplish th is ob ject, Taylor recommended
3
that "Bengal coins should become the currency of British India. n
O akes merely advocated immediate throwing out of circulation the
4diverse coins and fixing the relative value of the  re s t. Buchan
*Report of the Comm, of Finance, 12th O ct. 1805, Board's Coll.Vol. ll 
2
Minute of Smith, 28th Sept. 1805, Board's Coll. V ol.188.
3Minute of Taylor, 28th Sept. 1805, Board's jCoil. Vol. 188.
^Minute of Oakes, 28th Sept. 1805, Board's Coll. Vol. 188.
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however, strongly clung to the views of the Assey M aster and 
favoured the retention of star pagodas and arcot rupees in Madras 
than introducing solely the Bengal currency of gold mohur and 
sicca rupees. In his opinion, "when it shall have been found 
practicable to narrow the currency of the two Presidencies to those 
four coinSj(gold mohur, sicca rupee, s ta r pagoda and arcot rupee) 
the distinction which will then remain w ill ex ist more in idea 
than on any real ground. As regards the mintage system the 
majority of the Committee held that in future all the bullion should 
be coined in England, before sent to India. The minority, on the 
other hand, believed that the government should apply to the Court 
of Directors for a complete set of coinage machinery and for two 
experts to come to India for instructing the natives here in the 
process of m intage.^
Bentinck considered it necessary  to consult Roebuck further 
on the whole issu e . This time Roebuck amended his previous 
opinion of April 1802 regarding the in trinsic value between the 
gold and silver coins in M adras. As opposed to his former s ta te ­
ment that 100 star pagodas should be equal to 359 arcot rupees,
"^Minute of Buchan, 28th Sept. 1805, Board's Coll. Vol. 188.
2 Report of the Committee of Finance, 12th O ct. 1805, Board's
Coll. Vol. 188.
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h e  now stated that the existing rate of 1 0 0  s ta r pagodas to
350 arcot ru p e e s^ 3much nearer to true standard. But he stood
finn on his former position as regards the introduction of Bengal
currency in  M adras. The re la tive proportion of gold and silver
in Bengal, according to him, was not suitable for the Madras
Presidency. A general currency for the whole of British India was
an "utopian idea" to Roebuck.* He w as a lso  against the opinion
of the majority in  the Committee that a ll the bullion should be
coined in England. Such a scheme in  his opinion would be
expensive. If the Madras Government was furnished with proper
apparatus "the cheapness of the labour and^some of the m aterials
for refinage w ill render coinage much le s s  expensive in India 
2than at home. "
After a thorough examination of a ll the v iew s, Bentinck arrived 
a t h is own decision on the currency reforms in M adras. His conclu­
sion w as that the idea of having one currency for the  whole of
3
British India , though very a ttrac tiv e , w as im practicable. The 
greatest evil in  the Madras currency system , Bentinck observed,
*Roebuck to Bentinck, 23rd O ct. 1805, Board’s Coll. Vol. 188.
2 Ibid.
Bentinck’s Minute, 3rd Feb. 1806, Board's Coll. Vol. 188.
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w as the multitude of various coins with undefined positive
value. He found that the value of Madras coins varied
according to the caprice of the shroffs. This evil was damaging
no doubt; but the Introduction of Bengal currency in M adras, he
apprehended, would possibly  be more detrimental to the public
and private in terests  in the Presidency. Bentinck thought that
the majority of the Committee of Finance had no ideaefoout the
adverse consequences which might ensue as a resu lt , of the
introduction of the Bengal currency. He pointed out that in
M adras the relative value of gold and silver w as 1 to 14 ounces
17whereas in Bengal it was 1 to 1 4 ~  ounces. The Bengal value of 
precious m etals, if introduced in  M adras, would disturb the 
exchange rate of gold and s ilv er co ins. One hundred pagodas would 
then be equivalent to approximately 370 arcot rupees instead of 350 
and walld occasion a loss of nearly 7 per cent. Such loss in 
Bentinck's opinion was greater than the lo sses  susstained  on 
account of the circulation of multifarious and undefined coins in 
M adras. The problem of the base coins according to Bentinck 
could be remedied by their reca ll from circulation, by the  substi­
tution of Madras standard coins such a s  s ta r pagodas and arcot
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rupees and by enforcing a fixed rate of exchange jyy government 
regulations. As to the regulated ra te  of exchange, Bentinck 
upheld Roebuck's finding that 100 gold coins would equal 
350 silver coins, and ^ w a s  found to be seldom varying in differ­
ent parts of Madras . Any change in  th is  ra te , he believed, would 
create general confusion and great inconvenience. "It i s  imposs­
ib le to sa y ”, he cautioned in  case of any change, "what injury 
might not be done to individuals and what deception might not be 
practised upon the ignorant. "* Thus he refused to disturb the 
in trinsic  value between gold and silver in Madras and did not 
favour the idea of having one currency system for the whole of 
India. In his, opinion i t  w as immaterial whether one , six  or 
twelve system s prevailed, provided that a ll the silver coins bear the 
same re la tive value in proportion to the gold ones, "If the sicca  
rupees have the same proportion to the gold mohur, a s  the arcot 
bears to the s ta r  pagoda, the four coins might be made in  the same 
mint and issued  indiscrim inately both in  Bengal and in  Madras s .  " 
The gold mohur not being the  standard coin of Bengal coiild be 
altered with le ss  inconvenience in future. Thus, without changing
*Bentinck‘s Minute, 3rd Feb. 1806, Board's Coll. Vol. 188.
the standard coins either in Madras or in Bengal, Bentinck 
believed "the desirable circumstance of a general currency 
would be effected. As regards mintage Bentinck discarded 
the majority opinion of. the Committee of Finance of estab lish ­
ing mints in  England and upheld Roebuck's views in  favour of 
mintage in India. His susggestion was to estab lish  mint a t 
every Presidency in India under the superintendence of able 
Company’s servants.
Bentinck p r o m p t ly  appealed to the Supreme Government to 
allow h is  Government to continue with the Star pagoda and Arcot 
rupees as the currency of Madras Presidency without effecting 
any change in  their in trinsic value and inscrip tion. He further 
desired to add some new coins to the prevailing currency by
issuing double pagodas, half rupees and quarter rupees in similar
2forms a s  that of the Bengal coins. Without waiting for the sanc­
tion of the Supreme Government, Bentinck proceeded with h is
currency reforms. Soon he ordered the gradual withdrawal of the
3
multitudes of debased coins from circulation. Subsequently, a
^Bentinck's M inute, 3rd Feb. 1806, Board's Coll. V ol.188.
2 Ibid.
3
RentLnck's Minute, 18th March 1806, Sec. Cons. B.P.
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building was erected to be used a s  the new mint house.'*
Lastly, he appointed Roebuck the superintendent of the new 
mint, ^
The Supreme Government In  fact had no objection to the
plan suggested by Bentinck or to the m easures that he already
had adopted in th is direction. But they fe lt a little  uneasy as
the Court of Directors had advised them to work for the intro-
3
duction of general coinage for the whole of India. The only
Instruction that Bentinck received from Governor General Barlow
w as that the new coins in Madras "should be struck in  the name
4of the King of Delhi as here to fo re .. .  "
The Court of D irectors, who firmly believed in the efficacy 
of a general currency, reluntantly sanctioned Bentinck's currency 
m easures in  February 1807. They conceded to Bentinck's argu­
ment that "the benefits expected to be derived from a general 
currency would hardly counter-balance the great loss^we must 
suffer^in raising the standard of the current coins of other parts
■*BentLnck's M inute, 17th O ct. 1806, Extract from Fort St. George 
Cons. 17th March 1807, Board's Coll. V ol.274.
2
Extract of Pub. Letter from Fort St. George, 21st O ct. 1807,
Board's Coll, V ol.274.
3
Court of Directors to Mad. Govt. 25th April 1806, Mad. Desp. Vol.3'
4
Chief Secy.Bengal Govt, to Chief Secy. Mad* Govt. 10th Dec. 1806, 
Beng. Pub. Cons. 11th Dec. 1806, JRange 6 , V ol.36, N o .2.
of our p o s s e s s io n s ^  that of the Calcutta m int". They further 
agreed with Roebuck that the value of the coins should approach 
as  near as possible to the usual average value of the bullion 
from which they were made. But they could not support Bentinck's 
views a s  to the disadvantages of introducing one general currency 
a ll over India and advocated the future adoption of such a m easure. *
Bentinck's currency reforms, though not d rastic  in  nature, 
placed the debased, complicated currency system  of Madras on 
a new footing. But these  m easures hardly touched the import­
ant problem of the scarfcity of circulating medium in  M adras. In 
th is  respect therefore, Bentinck's endeavours to reorganise the 
banking system of Madras and the issu e  of paper currency deserve 
spec ia l attention.
India 's indigenous banking system may be traced to a remote 
past when the bankers were very influential as a c lass  and were 
generally connected w ith the imperial powers and local governments. 
The bankers of Madras^ however^ in  abm pari son with their counter­
part in  Bengal, were^ always le s s  influential and le s s  w ealthy.
The British, though they estab lished  their power in  South India,
1
Madras Despatches, 10th Feb. 1807, Vol.39.
failed to estab lish  peace there up to the end of the 18th century.
The Anglo-French h o s ti l i t ie s , the Mysore Wars, and the Maratha
conflicts during the la s t quarter of the 18th century and the
beginning of the 19th century compelled the British authorities in
Madras to borrow extensively from the private bankers and the
Agency Houses at an  exorbitant ra te of in te rests .*  To remedy
th is  situation , Bentinck planned to estab lish  a Government Bank
in  M adras. Such a bank, he believed, would not only increase
the dLraulating medium but would also  lend money to the Government
at minimum rate of in te rest.
The banks^ad  existed in  Madras before Bentinck's arrival
were the Carnatic Bank, established in  1798 and the Madras Bank
created in  1795. Both these banks used to issue  bankno tes
acceptable to the Government treasury . But the credit of these
two banks were generally insufficient and the government derived
2very meagre benefit out of them. The pecuniary d ifficulties led 
C live 's Government to appoint the Committee of Finance in  1798, 
to enquire into the currency system . At the completion of their
*■ "Laissez faire in Madras ", S. Ambhirajan, Indian Economic and 
Social History Review. Tuly 1965, V ol.II, N o.3, 238-9.
2 Report of the Comm, of Finance, 26th Oct. 1805, Beng. Sec. & Pol. 
Cons. 6 th March 1806, Vol. 186, N o .98.
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enquiry, the Committee recommended the issu e  of a paper
currency t>n the basis  of "sound principles of po litical economy"
as  a great solution to  the scarcity  of the circulating medium. *
But at tha t time, the Madras Council was not unanimous on th is
point. Two members, Petrie and Smith, opposed the introduction
2of paper currency. And the other two, Cockbum and Kindersley,
supported the recommendation by concluding that "nothing has
more tended to Improve and augment the industry, trade and w ealth
of the countries of Europe than the establishm ent of w ell-regulated
3
banks and the consequent introduction of paper currency. "
Nothing really came out of these d iscussions. The question 
of banking attracted Bentlnck's atten tion  in 1804 when the A siatic 
Bank was established in M adras. The new bank represented to the Go  ^
-  em or that they had ra ised  a considerable amount as capital 
(250,000 pagodas) and that the ir no tes should have the credit
4
of acceptance of the Government treasury like the other two banks.
* "Laissez faire in  M adras",S . Amihirajan, Indian Economic and Social 
History Review, July 1965, V ol.II, N o .3 , p p .238-44.
^Petrie 's M inute, 27th Nov, 1799, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.456.
3
Joint Minute of Cockbum and Kindersley, 1st March 1799, Home 
M isc. Ser. Vol.456.
4
A siatic Bank to Gov. in  Coun. Mad. 20th Sept. 1804, Mad. Pub. 
Cons. 16th O ct. 1804, V ol.6 8 .
Though the Madras Councillors were favourable to the petition
of the new bank, Bentinck decided to re ject i t .  He w as, at th is
point, thinking in  terms of establishing a Government Bank.
Bentinck's decision w as upheld by the Supreme Government who
werejaot in favour of the Madras Government accepting the notes
of other two. banks of M adras.  ^ The Court of Directors were
sim ilarly  against encouraging the Government to accept bank 
2
notes. Thus Bentinck's action  with regard to the A siatic Bank 
was fully in  conformity with the policy of the higher au thorities. 
Bentinck meanwhile was thinking in  terms of reorganising the 
banking system of Madras under government control. This seemed 
to him a reasonable solution of the problem. In June 1805,
Bentinck asked the Committee of Finance to investigate the plausi­
bility  of establishing a Government Bank in  M adras. After prolonged 
deliberation, the Committee submitted their report in  October 1805, 
The Committee observed that the scarcity  of specie had become 
more serious than before. They admitted that the existing banks
*Gov* Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in  Coun. Mad. 9th Nov. 1804,
Mad. Pub. Cons. 16th O ct. 1804, Vol. 6 8 .
2
Extract of Pub. Letters to  Fort St George, 23rd Oct. 1805, Board's 
Coll. Vol. 197.
were insufficient to redress the scarcity  and that the estab­
lishment of an efficient banking system was necessary . The 
Committee believed that, the foundation of a new bank would 
increase the circulation of paper currency which would ultim ately 
solve the difficulty of circulating medium. "The establishm ent 
of a general bank a t th is  p lace , " they concluded/w ould be of 
great public and private b e n e f i tT h e y  further sta ted  that such 
a new bank was essen tia l Mto the prosperity of th is s e t t l e m e n t *
The circulation of the paper currency, the Committee recommended, 
should be the first function of the general bank.
W hile unanimously advocating the formation of a general bank, 
the Committee distinctly  opposed the idea of a Government Bank.
They preferred a w ell-organised private bank under the  general 
control rather than under the direct management of the Government. 
"Any pecuniary benefit" , the Committee observed, "which the 
Company could derive from holding an immediate share in  the 
proposed bank, could not compensate the inconvenient effects 9
which might be expected to follow from an extensive government
2engagement in  detailed concerns of that nature. " Quoting Montesquieu!
* Report of the Committee of Finance, 26th O ct. 1805, Beng. Sec. & 
Pol. Cons. 6 th March 1806, V ol.186, N o .98.
2 Ibid.
■ Spirit of Laws. the Committee concluded that commerce 
should be run by the people and not by the Government. The 
East India Company, being a sovereign power in  India, should 
not undertake such ac tiv itie s .
Bentinck's views on the establishm ent of a Government Bank, 
therefore, were not corroborated by the Committee On 6th  Decem­
ber, 1805, Bentinck produced h is  elaborate scheme for a bank 
controlled and operated by the Government. Apart from financial 
considerations, from the m ilitary point of view , too, Bentinck 
thought the establishm ent of a new bank as a m atter of urgency.
At that point the apprehension of the French re-appearance on the 
Madras coasts w as a live in  Bentintifs mind and he favoured the 
adoption of some m easures against i t .  But due to the poor s ta te  
of the M adias finances, the Court of Directors directed the Govern­
ment of Madras to stop spending money on defence charges. This, 
Bentinck believed, was dangerous for the safety of M adras. The 
territories of Madras Presidency were large and the m ilitary forces 
scattered . Bentinck w as apprehensive about the difficulties of 
encountering an emergency. In case of sudden French a ttack , 
Bentinck argued, it would require much time and money to collect 
artd despatch forces to the w ar front. B1antinck^thereforeywanted
to m aintain a considerable financial reserve for defence purposes 
by means of the is su e  of paper currency payable on demand. Sim­
ultaneously , with the is su e  of paper currency, Bentinck wrote, "the 
circulating medium would be increased  without any addition to 
the actual amount of sp ec ie  in  circulation. Bentinck did not 
agree to the Committee's suggestion for the establishm ent of a private 
hank under Government supervision. He reasoned tha t the credit of 
a government was superior to that of a private banker. With such 
advantage a government Bank would be ab le  to issue  greater quantity 
of notes quite safely* As regards the ratio of notes to be issued  
against the specie reserved in  the bank, Bentinck suggested, “three 
of paper to one of spec ie" . This would give an  in tiia l advantage 
of an increase of four lacs of circulated currency with the possiblity  
of getting ten lacs at the .end.
A Government Bankjas Bentinck say> would have other advantages. 
He was extremely critical about the financial transactions of the 
bankers of Madras Presidency. Unlike the English bankers the 
Madras bankers "act a s  m erchants engaged in  deep speculations 
w ith money not their own but belonging to their constituen ts. M The
I
Bentinck's M inute, 6th Dec. 1805, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons.
6 th M ar. 1806, Bol.186, N o .99.
Madras bankers, Bentinck noticed, were owners of Agency Houses, 
who by means of monopolistic practices were trying to ra ise  the 
rates of in te rest. He was convinced that "no measure will tend 
so effectually to destroy that agency as that of a Government Bank. 
Bentinck did not accept the prevalent views of M ontesquieu on 
commerce. He thought that "commerce should be carried on with 
perfect freedom, that the industry of a ll should have equal encour­
agement and that no privileges of exemption of dutxetf e tc . as has 
been given in  th is and in all other countries where trade has not 
been w ell understood, should be granted to individuals to the
m anifest disadvantage of the community, en^aa^iferfin the same 
2pursuit. " The Government: Bank, Bentinck argued, would protect 
the community against individuals and would introduce state  
control over the commerce and economy in  Madras to the benefit 
of the people. The establishm ent of the Government Bank would 
enable the Government to earn the confidence and allegiance of the 
people. "I should be happy also  to see  that the notes of the 
Government Bank in general circulation in the interior (of Madras)
^Bentinck's M inute, 6th D ec. 1805, Beng. Sec. ^Pol« Cons.
6 th  March 1806, Vol.186, N o .99.
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as  the notes of the bank of England are generally current In 
Britain. As for the benefit of getting loan from the bank a t 
low in te rest, Bentinck thought tha t “the in terest ori money w ill 
alm ost immediately fa ll"  with the Inauguration of the Government 
Bank. ^
Bentinck's scheme for the immediate institu tion  of the
Government Bank was opposed inside h is Council. Petrie, the senior
member of the Council, who had in 1799 favoured a Government
3
controlled bank, now opposed the measure on the ground that
4banking system should remain free from the government interference.
Petrie and the Commander in  Chief, Cradock, were against the
adoption of an important m easure like th is without the prior
sanction of the higher au thorities. Only James Strange, the
third member of the Council,supported Bentinck on the ground of
an  imminent danger of French invasion and the consequent necessity
45of having sufficient financial reserve. W ith such divided opinion
^Bentinck's M inute, §th Dec. 1805, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons.
6 th March 1806, Vol. 186, N o .99.
^Bentinck to C astlereagh, 20th Feb. 1806, B.P.
3During the d iscussions in  1799, Petrie gave a  qualified support to 
a government controlled bank. Petrie 's  minute,, 27th Nov. 1799, 
Home M is. Ser. v o l.456.
4Petrie 's  M inute, 7th Dec. 1805, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 6 th  
M arch, 1806, V0 I . I 8 G No. 100.
5
Extract of Pub. Letters from Fort St. George 12th Feb. 1806,
Board's Coll. Vol. 197.
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among his colleagues, Bentinck had hardly any hope of getting
th e  approval of the Supreme Government and the Court of
D irectors, At the sam e time he w as greatly concerned at the
acute shortage of the circulating medium and w as against any
further delay in effecting a change. The plan of a Government
Bank seemed to him to be" very urgent". He argued with the
dissenting members of h is Council that the delay in  obtaining
sanction from the superior authorities would "defeat the aid and
2
benefits of which we are  so much in  n e e d .,r He,,however, assured
the Councillors that he would close the working of the proposed
bank if  higher authorities refused to sanction the m easure. "If it
sJucoUL fail. ", he observed, "nothing w ill be lo s t. If it succedf , the
recourse will be immense. It must produce in  any case a result 
2of advantage. "
Thus it w as on the sole in itia tive of Bentinck that the 
Government resolution for the establishm ent of the bank was 
p assed  on 4th January 1806, "Considering the great advantage 
to the public for the receipt and deposit of specie and for the 
issu e  of Promissory notes payable on demand, the Governor in
^Bentinck's M inute, 13th D ec. 1805, Extract of Pub. Cons.
Fort St. George, Board's C oll. Vol. 197.
^Ibid.
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in Council has been resolved to open a hank on 1st February
to be denominated the Government Bank. 11 The Governor himself
became the Director and General Superintendent of the bank. A
Sub-director, a Treasurer, a Sub-treasurer and a Secretary were
appointed to manage the detailed business of the  bank with the
a ss is tan ce  of a Cashier and a Deputy C ashier. * On 10th January
2Bentinck drafted the Regulations of the bank. The bank started 
functioning on 1st February 1806 and on the 16th February, its  
Regulations were finally passed by the Board of Revenue. It was 
se ttled , that the Governor in  Council should possess an  overall 
control over the bank. He should go through the quarterly s ta te ­
ment of the receip ts, disbursem ents and profits of the bank. Further, 
he should be well-informed about the extent of i ts  capital and should 
decide the proportion of notes to be issued by the bank. The issu e  
of notes should never exceed the amount of specie in  the bank to a 
g reater extent than in the proportion of 3 to 1 (1 lad of s ta r  pagodas 
in  specie = 3 lacs of currency in  the Bank Notes). The present capital 
of the bank was fixed at 8 lacs  of pagodas, which could be augmented
*Govt. Advertisement for the establishm ent of a Govt. Bank,
4th Jan. 1806, Extradt of Pub. Cons. Fort St. George, Board's 
Coll. Vol. 197.
2
Bentinck's Minute, 10th Jan. Board's Coll, Vol. 197.
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by the consent and approval of the Governor in Council* For
competent management of the bank, the Director was empowered
to make by e-law s or rules not contradictory with the principles
of the bank* The amount of loans made to the Government would
entirely depend upon the recommendation of the Director. *
When informed about these  developments in M adras, the
Supreme Government became sceptic* They had "great doubts
whether the bank established a t Fort St. George can be productive of
public benefit in any degree which w ill compensate the heavy
expense of its  establishm ent. " They were afraid of the risk  of a
commercial nature and thought it  be tter to leave such undertain
enterprise in  the hands of private m erchants. They also  predicted
that the bank would not ra ise  the public confidence, an essen tia l
requisite of its  su ccess . However, a s  the bank had already been
estab lished , the Supreme Government reluctantly  allowed i t  to 
2continue. Thus Bentinck won h is ground. He w as a lso  fortunate 
in  other way. The specific  orders from the Court of Directors 
forbidding him such a  venture came very la te . In a despatch of
1
Regulations for the Madras Bank, Bentinck to  the  Board of Rey.
16th Feb. 1806, Board's C oll. Vol. 197.
^Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in  Com. Mad. 28th April 1806,
Ben§. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 1st May, 1806, V ol.188, N o.36.
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23rd October, 1805, th e  Court of Directors spec ia lly  objected 
to the issu e  of paper currency under the present condition of 
India and wholly disapproved o f the idea of a  Government Bank.
They were convinced tha t the management of such a  bank would be 
“attended with various d ifficu lties and hazards Over and above, 
the Court fe lt that the Government as tho manager of the bank 
would be tempted to extend the issue of paper "to answer s ta te  
n ecessities  " and even if they did net,they would be suspected of 
doing so . They even ordered the Madras Government not to issue  
too many Treasury Bills "to form an instrument of banking operations" 
Bentinck, however, v/as fully satisfied  with the progress of the 
bank. At the end of the first quarter he submitted to the Council 
an estim ate of the receip ts and disbursements o f the Government
Bank. The estim ate showed a  clear profit of 14224 pagodas for
2 ; the first quarter. Emboldened by this intia^i success Bentinck
decided to reason with h is  superior authorities a s  to the  Justifia­
b ility  of h is  measure. He desired  to stand "at the bar of the Court 
of D irectors" to defend himself* Pointing a t  th e  preliminary su ccess
^M adias D espatches, 23rd O ct. 1805, Vol.36.
2
Bentinck's Minute, 6 th May 18 05, Board's C oll. Vol. 197.
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of the bank he waived the apprehension of the Supreme
Government that the public would lack confidence in  the bank.
He had no doubt that "every merchant of Madras is  directly
in terested  in  maintaining the credit of the bank and in  preventing
the embarrassment of the circulating medium. " Bentinck also
pointed out the best mode in  which the profits of the bank could
be u tilised . The profit would be accummulated in the  bank and
on the basis of it the Company's paper could be employed for
public serv ices. By th is  means the bank would become so
powerful a s  to pay off the national debt. * On the  financial
grounds Bentinck imf&red the Court to allow the functioning of
the bank. He assured them (the Court of Directors) that the bank
notes would not only ac t a s  good supplement to the sho rtage  of
circulating medium, but would meet the deficiency in the Madras
2
finances in the subsequent y e a rs . He a lso  lured the Court with
the future profit of the bank. "The experiment wiU cest the Company
nothing " he wrote to Bosanquet, a member of the Court of D irectors,
3"and it may, I maintain w ill, give them lacs of pagodas. **
^Bentinck's M inute, 27th May 1806, Board's Coll. Vol. 197.
2 Ibid.
3
Bentinck to Bosanquet, 24th Feb. 1806, B.P.
Bentinck's financial expectations were based on good
grounds. The report he submitted before the Government at
th^completion of one year w as quite satisfactory . This financial
success of the bank, according to Bentinck,further proved that
the apprehension of the Supreme Government as  to the want of
public confidence in  the bank notes w as utterly  unfounded. *
He,claimed that the working of the bank resulted in  a considerable
2increase in  the circulating medium of the Presidency. But 
Bentinck's exertions to convince the Court of Directors of the 
uprightness of his banking measure were of no ava il. The 
Court, when it learnt a ll about the establishm ent of the Madras 
Bank, sent specific direction to the Government "to wind up and 
term inate the concerns of the bank with a ll convenient expedition
^Bentinckfs  M inute, 6 th May 1806, Board's Coll. V ol.l97 .
2According to th e estim ate of the bank, 57*6.6^02 bank notes 
were issued  against 26p2732 spec ie . From the  point of view 
of the Government the rea l disbursem ent of specie  by the 
bank was only 14^35^634, a s  the amount of 11^ 67^ 098 specie, 
came back tothe Government treasu ries  from the bank in  
different forms, e .g .  sp ec ie  paid to the provincial treasuries 
for the cheques' on the bank e tc . Thus in  reality  5^66^902 
bank notes were issued  aga inst only 143 5^ 634 specie in  the 
bank for circulation.
Bentinck's Minute, 3rd March 1807, Board's Coll. Vol. 198.
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and to put an end to that in stitu tion  with no other delay that 
may be necessary  to prevent too sudden a shock to the circul­
ation and business of the Presidency. Nothing in fac t was 
done to close the bank as long as  Bentinck stayed in M adras.
But in  1809, the displeasure of the Court of Directors reached 
such an  extent on the whole issu e  that the Madras Government 
had to curtail the functions of the bank d rastica lly . The bank, 
however, existed up to 1843.
The inauguration of a Government Bank and the issu e  of 
system atic  paper currency were pioneer measures in the admin­
is tra tio n  of Madras finances. Bentinck, the founder of the 
Government Bank in  M adras, had hardly any background of a 
good financier. Neither he possessed  any practical experience 
in  the m atter of finances nor was he w ell versed in the theory of 
public finance and banking. But h is  practical nature coupled with
a clear understanding of the financial situation of M adras, enabled
2
him to adopt measures “apparently true and incontrovertible. “
He reso lu tely  dealt with the opposition in  the Council aind 
objections raised by the Supreme Government. It w as & pity
1
Madras Despatches, 6th Nov. 1807, Vol.40.
2
Bentinck to Charles Grant, 11th May 1806, B.P.
that the Court of Directors stubbornly in s is ted  on the nullific­
ation of the measure regardless of a ll its  beneficial re su lts .
The establishm ent of the bank w as undoubtedly an achievement 
of Bentinck in  M adras.
Bentinck w as fully  in  favour of the sta te  control over the 
banking business in Madras if  it could afford re lief to the 
financial difficulties of the Government. He was guided by the 
same consideration on the question of the sa lt monopoly of the 
Government. In Madras the sa lt trade w as carried on by the 
private Indian manufacturers. A revenue from the monopoly of 
the sa lt trade w as a lucrative opening to the Company's Govern­
ment in  M adras. The Government of Bengal w as already enjoying 
a monopoly over the s a l t  trade. For Madras the question was 
firs t ra ised  by the Supreme Government in 1799. They desired 
the Nawab of Arcot to relinquish to the British Government his 
right to manufacture s a lt  in  lieu  of the  payment of h is debts to the 
Government. * But th is  was not pursued by the Government at 
that tim e. Again, in 1802, the Government of M adras contemplated 
acquiring the right of manufacturing and selling sa lt in  the Madras
^Extract of le tte r from Bengal, 2-lst Dec. 1799, Board's Coll.
Vol. 240..
Presidency. The Special Commission appointed in  1802 to
investigate  into the m atter w as of the opinion that if  the
Company could possess the control of the manufacture o f sa lt,
hem  Ganjam to Camorine, it would be "practicable to estab lish
a revenue therefrom without oppression to the people. The
Commission calculated a  net increase of revenue of 29,440
pagodas per annum from th is  source. No further progress in  th is
m atter w as made ti l l  1805, when Bentinck took up the issu e  in
right earnest. With the purpose of increasing the revenue,
Bentinck's Government decided to monopolise the trade and
manufacture of sa lt in  a ll the d is tric ts  of the Madras Presidency,
temporarily excluding M alabar and Kanara. Accordingly, on 13th
Septanber 1805, a Regulation was passed prohibiting the Indian
sa lt manufacturers to manufacture, s e ll ,  tran sit, export or import
sa lt without the permission of the Government. It w as further
stipulated that the manufacture and sa le  of sa lt shall be conducted
by the Collectors in associa tion  with the General Salt Agent, under
2the orders of the Board of Revenue. A mew sa lt department of the
^Epctract of the Proceedings of the Special Commission of Fort 
£t George, 16th O ct. 1802, Board's Coll. Vol.240.
2 “Regulations and Acts in  force in  the Madras Presidency relating 
to Revenue matters from 1802 to 1882, Compiled by F .J.D aw es,
pp.37-45
Government was created under a General Salt Agent and the 
selling price of the sa lt w as fixed a t 2  0 pagodas per garce 
(4500 m aunds).* Bentinck's Government was sa tisfied  w ith 
the  inauguration of sa lt monopoly. "A continuance of vigilance 
and Judgment in the management of that branch of revenue", 
they  believed, ’Vould render a valuable and improving part 
of the public resources of th is  governm ent.,r
In early 1806 the General Salt Agent of the Government,
R. Fullerton, advocated an extension of the sa lt monopoly in 
M alabar and Kanara. He further expressed the view that the 
Government should not intervene in  the hereditary rights of the 
private m anufacturers. In the manufacture of sa lt the manufac­
turers should act entirely upon their d iscretion and the Govern­
ment should fix up a fair price of the produce. The Board of 
Revenue accepted the proposals of the Salt Agent and recommended 
that a s  a preliminary to the introduction of sa lt monopoly, in  
M alabar and Kanara, the Government should allow the sa lt Agent to bu;
from the private manufacturers a s  much sa lt as  possib le . The
     «
“^Extract of the Report of Board of Rev. Fort St. George 5th Oct. 1806, 
Board's Coll. Vol.240.
2
Extract of Letters from the Board of Rev. 18th June, 1806,
Board's C oll. Vol.240.
3Report of the Board of Rev. 5th Oct. 1806, Board's Coll. Vol.240.
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principal collectors of M alabar and Kanara supported th is
recommendation of the Board of Revenue* They further
suggested a change in  the prevailing system of sa lt manufacture
(the building for sa lt manufacture w as usually  constructed in
the v ic in ity  of the residence of pro pd.e to rs), by establishing
commodious and large warehouses near the sa lt pans. Further,
to  cover the expense of monopolising the s a lt  in M alabar and
Kanara, the Board of Revenue suggested an increase in the price
of sa lt from 20 pagodas to  22 pagodas per g a rc e .  ^ All these
recommendations were placed before the Government of Bentinck
who accepted  them without reserve. At the completion of these
arrangem ents, the Board of Revenue estim ated an increase of
242 ,32 ,11  pagodas as revenue to  the Government. Finally, on 
10th July 1807, the Government completed the monopoly of sa lt ,
3
trade in  M adras, by extending it  to M alabar and Kanara. Bentinck 
was happy to note that ,ra considerable augmentation of revenue 
has been secured to the Government and no new burdens were 
1 Report of the Board of Rev. 5th O ct. 1806, Board's C o ll. ,
Vol. 240.
2 Extract of Rev. Letter from Fort. S t. Geor. 21st Oct. 1806,
Board's Coll. V ol.240.
3
Regulations & Acts in  force in  the Mad. Pre. relating to Revenue 
m atters from 1802 -  1882, Compiled by F. J. Daw s, p. 46.
imposed on the inhabitants. Thus, Bentinck put into
effect a proposition on which h is predecessors Merely
contemplated. The Supreme Government and the Court of
Directors were sa tisfied  with Bentinck's measure when they
found that the sa lt monopoly yielded substan tia l revenue to the
2treasury of M adras.
Though he favoured Government supervision in banking and sa lt
business Bentinck did not like Government interference in trade
and commerce. He believed in  the advantages of the development
of free commerce in M adras. And it was out of th is consideration
that he turned h is attention towards the widely prevalent town duty
In M adras. The town duty was an indirect tax  imposed on goods
coming into or going out of the town market. Though the merchants
paid the tax  in itia lly  to the Government, it ultim ately came upon
the consumers. The town duty or Octroi (as i t  w as generally called)
was an old levy current in a ll Indian tow ns. However, i t  was
always unsystem atically collected and its  collection often inter­
* Extract of Letter from Mad. Govt, to the Board of Rev. 28th Oct. 180 
Board's Coll. Vol.240.
2
Net Rev. in 1805 = 156,545 pags. 24 fanam s, 78 cash.
Net Rev. in  1806 = 175,798 pags. 5 fanams, 28 cash .
Total Increase = 19,252 pags, 22 fan an s , 3 0 ufcash.
Extract of Report of the Board of Rev. Mad. 25th Feb. 1807,
Board's Coll. V ol.240.
fered with the nonnal flow of trade and commerce. Bentinck was
d issa tisfied  with the outcome of th is  tax  in the towns of Madras
Presidency. In h is Opinion It was injurious to the commerce and
unsatisfactory  from the point of view of its  yeild . He thought
that town duty should be replaced by a d irect house tax imposed
on the householders In  tow ns. A direct tax seemed to  him more
advantageous and Just than an indirect one. Such replacem ent,
according to him, "would be le ss  oppressive and vexatious ". *
He had no doubt that the house tax would yield more revenue to the
Government than the town duty.
The imposition of the house tax  was neither approved by the
members of the Board of Revenue cor by the home au thorities.
The objections to Bentinck's proposal were immediately raised from
different quarters. The house tax being iden tical with a ground rent^
2house rent and 'quit ren t) i t  was apprehended that the introduttion; 
of such a new tax in the unsettled  d istric ts  would appear to be an 
addition to the land rent already paid by the proprietors. This in  
consequence would be injurious to the improvement of the country.
•k
Bentinck's M inute, 8 th March, 1805, Pub. Dept. Cons. B.P.
2I t i s  a rent reserved in  grants of land, by payment of which tenant 
w as quitted from a ll other serv ices.
Though the Government had the right to levy an additional impost, 
the Board of Revenue thought it w ise to refrain from "adopting a 
measure which would be received as an infringement to the tenure".^- 
Bentinck invited the opinion of the collectors of different d istric ts 
on the subject. The majority of the collectors admitted that some 
sort of house tax in some form existed in their respective d is tric ts . 
In the Ceded D istricts almost all the people excepting few commun­
ities  like the Brahmins, Mohammadans and Rajputs, had to pay a 
certain amount on their residential property. In M alabar, Kanara and 
the Carnatic the house tax was imposed only on the m erchants,
manufacturers and craftsmen. Tanjore alone of all the unsettled
2
d istric ts was exempted from its operation. Thus Bentinck's 
proposal of a house tax -  as it turned out -  was not altogether a 
new imposition but modification and extension of one that already 
existed . The collectors, however, sharply differed in their opinion 
as to the wisdom of introducing a general house tax . The collectors 
of Tanjore, Malabar and Kanara spoke in favour of introducing house
tax , while the collectors of the Ceded D istric ts , Coim^tore and the
X
^Board of Rev. to the Gov. in Coun. Mad. 18th Oct. 1805, Extract 
from Board of Rev. Cons. 27th Jnne 1806, Board's Coll. Vol.240 .
^Ibid.
Carnatic opposed i t .  W allace, the Collector of ore
advocated house tax and denounced the town duty. "The
abolition of the town duties H he concluded “would be a re lief
to commerce and thereby ultim ately conduce to the general good.
Munro, the Principal Collector of the Ceded D istric ts , on the
other hand, argued, that a house tax  would not be fair* MA tax*
to  be properly a house tax*should be composed of the rent of the
ground occupied by the house and of a tax  on the ren t}for which
the house can be le t. " Munro refused to believe that houses in
the in terior, excepting some big tow ns, yield any real profit to
their owners. According to him, the town duties could force only
rich merchants and manufacturers to contribute while a  house tax
2would fall on everybody, rich or poor. M unro's arguments were
forceful. But he overlooked the ultim ate effect of town duty on
the consumers. In th is  respect the Board of Revenue understood
Bentinck's proposal b e tte r . They sympathised with Bentinck's
desire of relieving inland commerce from the pressure of town duty.
But a t the same time the Board stood firm in their decision that the
3
proposed house tax  would he "inexpedient". Similar w as the
 ^Board of Rev. to the Gov. in Coun. 18th O ct. 1805, Extract 
from Board of Rev. Cons. 27th June 1806, Board's C all, Vol. 240.
2Ihid.
reaction  of the Court of Directors who also  objected to
Bentinck's proposal. In the opinion of the Court a  tax levied
on artic les  of general consumption would be le ss  objectionable
than any direct taxation on ind iv idual’s personal property. ’I ts
operation and e ffec t11, the Court apprehended, "will be more
injurious because they w ill be more generally and immediately
the 1
fe lt by a ll c lasses  of^community. " The Court of Directors and
the Board of Revenue accepted Bentinck's comments on th e  abuses
of town duty. They were thus w illing to accept the abolition of
town duties in the Madras Presidency but not ready to introduce
2house tax in its  p lace . It was exceedingly difficult for Bentinck
to  move any further w ith h is  proposal of a house tax  against the
strong opposition. He therefore gave up h is  idea of introducing
house tax , but a t the same time went ahead in  abolishing the
existing Octroi duty* "No new tax is  required", he announced,
"to keep up our receipts to the ir former sca le  and the general
poverty of the country pleads strongly in favour of every possible
3
rem ission of burdens* " The deficit resulting from the abolition
^M adras D espatches, 23rd July 1806, Vol.37.
2 Ibid.
3
Bentinck's Minute, 2 0th Aug. 1806, Board1 s Coll. Vol. 24 0.
of town duties did not bother him much. He was pleased with 
the financial success of the sa lt monopoly. B esides, he felt 
-that an  increase  in export and impott duties would amply counter­
balance the lo ss  of town du ties. In October 1806, therefore, 
Bentinck's Government directed the Board of Revenue to stop 
collection of the town duties without delay and to ra ise  the 
export and import duties to l \  per cent. *
The abolition of the town duties,though beneficial to the 
internal trade,did not improve the fisca l position of the Govern­
ment of:that moment. But the reductions in  military establishm ents 
a s  proposed by Bentinck in  1806 relieved the Government treasury 
to a considerable Extent. F inancially,the reduction of m ilitary 
establishm ent was an important measure and Bentinck proceeded 
on the subject with the backing of the Supreme Government and 
the Court of D irectors. In the days of rapid expansion of British 
authority in  India, the military expenditure was the primary source 
o f  GovernmentsfiLnancial stringency. Even W ellesley admitted th is
fact and in  1804 urged Bentinck to look out for the possib ilities of 
2army reduction. Bentinck personally w as also  eager to carry out
^Extract of Revenue le tte r  from Fort St. George, 21st Oct. 1806, 
Board's Coll. Vol.240.
^W ellesley to Bentinck, 29th May 1804, W .F .
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reductions in view of the depressing position of Madras 
treasury . But the tense  po litical situation of the country, 
the apprehension of a French offensive and the  pressure of 
the M a rath a wars refrained him from making any d rastic  cut 
With the termination of the Marafha w ars, the political situ ­
ation of Madras showed signs of improvement. In January,
1806, Bentinck finally  stated that the British territory in India
1
w as secured against internal or external a ttack s . Hereafter,
Bentinck w as encouraged to pay more attention to the problems
of internal reorganisation. The curtailment of expenditure through
army reduction became a m atter of great importance to him.
"Although it is  true that the g reater our army the greater our
safety  " he w rote, ’Yet our finances and common prudence forbid
our m aintaining a  greater number of troops than are considered
2absolutely  necessary . "
In January 1806, Bentinck proposed a reduction in  three 
regiments of Native Infantry. He further decided upon the 
complete disbandment of two more regiments of Native Infantry,
^Bentinck's Minute, 2nd Jan. 1806, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons.
3rd July 1806, Vol.191, N o .78.
^Ibid.
but to be effective only after peace w as concluded between
England and France, Another proposal of curtailing the
subsidiary  forces of Madras at Hyderabad and Trayancore
w as put forward by him *  ^ The Commander in  Chief considered
2
the m easure as unw ise. Petrie argued that the secu rity  from 
foreign a ttack  was not sufficient "to warrant the measure of
3
diminishing the strength of our m ilitary establishm ent.
Bentinck was surprised to find that the Commander in Chief
and Petrie had failed to see the real im plication of h is propos- 
4
ition . However, he w as determined to adopt a ll practicable 
means "to limit the military disbursem ent of the Presidency to
5
a low est sca le . ” On 20th February 1806, Bentinck wrote to 
C astlereagh that the termination of the Maralha war would reduce 
the m ilitary charges of the Government of Fort St. George and
0
save 20 lacs of pagodas. Bentinck w as firmly expecting that
BBntLnck's M inute, 2nd Jan. 1806, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons.
3rd July 1806, Vol. 191, N o .78.
2Crad .ock^'s M inute, 28th Jan 1806, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 
3rd July 1806, Vol. 191, No. 83.
3
P etrie 's  M inute, 30th Jan. 1806, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons,
3rd July 1806, Vol.191, N o .83.
4
Bentinck’s M inute, 9th Feb. 1806, Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons.
3rd July, 1806, Vol. 191, N o .83.
Gov. in  Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in  Coun, 16th Ian. 1806 
eng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. J8tf\ Feb. 1806, V ol.85. N o .21.
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the Supreme Government would approve h is reduction proposal.
The Court of Directors at that point upheld Bentinck's view 
and described the general reduction of civil and m ilitary expen­
ses a s  “an object of the first importance. The Supreme Govern­
ment, too, appreciated Bentinck's zeal to tack le  the financial 
problem through the reduction of military expenditure and promptly 
sanctioned the decrease of the subsidiary forces in  Hyderabad and 
Travancore. From the reduction of Hyderabad fvyceB Bentinck 
estim ated a saving of 419,316 pagodas per annum and from the
TraveUicore forces he anticipated another 25,053 pagodas every 
2year. In August 1806 the Supreme Government further agreed to 
the disbandment of the three Native Infantry Regiments a s  Bentinck 
had proposed. The net saving from th is  measure was calculated
3
to  be 377,184 pagodas.
Bentinck had to abandon the plan of reducing the European 
establishm ent of Madras army for the time being. When in July
^"Madras D espatches, 30th July 1806, Pub. Letters, V ol.38.
2 Gov* Gen. in  Coun to Gov. in  Coun. Mad. 21st Feb. 1806, 
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 3 xd July 1806, Vol. 191, N o .77.
Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in Coun. Mad. 7th Aug. 1806,
Beng. Sec. 6c Pol. Cons. 7th Aug. 1806, Vol. 193, N o .63.
1806, a violent mutiny of the Indian sepoys broke out a t 
Vellore, the British d istrust of the sepoys increased and led 
the government to rely  wholly on the European sec tion  of the 
army. The question of general British safety  appeared to 
Bentinck more important than the consideration for economy. *
The Supreme Government also  advised him to  make no further
2m aterial change in the army establishm ent of Madras Presidency. 
The Vellore mutiny thus put an  end to Bentinck's efforts to further 
reduction in  the military expenses. But the partial su ccess  he 
achieved in th is direction w as a great re lief to the Madrasa 
treasury .
All of Bentinck's financial m easures -  the introduction of 
several Government loans, th e  reforms of coinage and issue  of 
paper currency, the establishm ent of Government Bank, the 
acquisition  of Government monopoly of sa lt and the reduction of 
m ilitary expenses were caluelated to meet the deficit of Madras 
treasury . Bentinck him self was sa tisfied  with the outcome of his
^Bentinck's M inute, 6th Nov. 180£, Beng. SeC. & Pol. Cons.
24th P ec 'j. 1806, Y ol.l98 , N o .54.
2Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in Coun. Mad. 7th Aug. 1806,
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 7jthAug. 1806. Vol. 193, N o .63.
m easures. As regards the estim ate of the Madras Government
for 1806/7, he wrote to C astlereagh, , our pecuniary
embarrassments are at an end and the estim ate of th is year
w ill present a picture^more pleasing than those which your
Lordship has been accustomed to  read . B esides, in June 1806,
the Supreme Government allowed the Government of Madras to
open a new 10 per cent loan which Bentinck had persistently
2
advocated for long. From th is loan Bentinck happily anticipated 
a contribution, not only to meet any probable deficiet of the 
treasury for the year 1806/7, but a lso  to increase the invest­
ment and to diminish the drafts on Bengal. He further expected 
to pay off the old 10 per cent decennial loan falling due in  May,
3
1807, “without creating any additional debt. J‘
But Bentinck's expectations did not fully m aterialise due to a 
calamitous season. A serious draught a t the close of 1806 resulted 
in  a complete failure of crops and threatened the treasury w ith a
4
deficit of 92,98,715 pagodas for the year 1807/8, To Grenville,
* Bentinck to  C astlereagh, 31st May 1806, B.P.
2Gov. Gen. in  Coun. to  the Court of Dir. 7th June 1806,
Pub. Letters reed, from Beng. v o l.49.
3
Bentinck's M inute, 15th Nov. 1806, Beng. Pub. Cons. 5th Feb. 
1807, Range 6, Vol.39, N o.2c.
4Gov. L^n Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in  Coun. 21st Feb. 1807 
Beng. Pub. Cons. 2nd April 1807, Rang. 6. V ol.41, No. 4.
the member of the Board of Control, Bentinck wrote; "We have a 
melancholy season before us and the loss of revenue (due to crop 
failure) which I estim ated at 800,000 sterling i s  the lea s t part of 
the c a l a m i t y * He, however, faced the situation bravely. The 
Government of Madras requested the Supreme Government to allow 
them to extend th e ir drafts on Bengal up to s ix  lacs of pagodas more. 
In th is adverse situation Bentinck relied heavily on the credit of the 
paper circulation which, according to him “has constituted and will 
constitu te a very great resource" . Further, he calculated a consid­
erable yield from the subscription of the 10 per cent loan. With th is  
amount a t hand he proposed to open another 8 per cent loan in  the 
Presidency. Taking a ll these in to  account, Bentinck hoped to keep 
down the defic it within 26 ,25 ,309  pagodas for the ensuing year.
To meet th is ultim ate deficit he decided to draw more Bills on England 
and Bengal.^
The m easures were proved to  be beneficial. In a minute of
26th August 1807, Bentinck expressed his satisfac tion  with the
_
Bentinck to G renville, 11th Jan. 1807, B.P.
2 Bentinck's M inute, 20th Feb. 1807, B.P. and G ov.in Coun. M ad. to 
Gov.Gen. in Coun. 21st Feb. 1807, Beng.Pub.Cons. 2nd April 1807, 
Range 6, V ol.41, N o .4.
present condition of the  public treasury  of M adras. His
Government even read ily  agreed to the request of the Supreme
Government to provide them with treasures from the Madras 
2treasury . The improvement of the finances of Madras was 
a lso  corroborated by the report of the Governor General. In 
July 1807 the Governor General wrote to the Court of D irectors, 
that "the  balance in  t h e o f  Madrafffin c^sh and bank notes 
amounted on the 1st June to pagodas 16 ,94 ,000 , to arcot rupees 
56 ,46 , 000 and the balance on the 1st July, is  expected to 
increase .
*
^Bentinck's M inute, 26th Aug. 1807 ,^ Beng. pub. cons. 
11 Sept. 1807, Range 6, Vol.50, N o .11.
2Bentinck to M into, 2nd Aug. 1807, B.P.
^Gov. Gen. in  Coun. to  the Court of Dir. 4th July 1807 




The mutiny of the Indian sepoys a t Vellore in July 1806 
was a significant event in Bentinck's career a t M adras, It led to 
h is abrupt removal from the Governorship of the Presidency in 
September 1807. It was the first major uprising of the Indian sepoy's 
against the British. The episode, though short lived, was remarkably 
organised and raised various questions regarding the general British 
adm inistration in the Southern Peninsula, the British attitude 
towards the Indian people and the organisation of the British forces.
The existing accounts of the mutiny’*’ are mostly partial, often based 
on the narratives of the European survivors of the d isaste r and on 
scanty official documents. Consequently, these  accounts are 
incomplete, and sometimes, unreliab le. In th is and the following 
chapter an attempt is made first to trace the circumstances leading 
to  the mutiny, then to ascerta in  its  causes and nature and finally 
to a s se ss  as to who were and in what extent responsible for the 
uprising,,
^The important among the accounts a re :-
L t.C ol. W .J.W ilson , History of the Madras Army . Vol. IV, Chapter XVIII: 
Kaye and M alleson, History of theIkA w vM utiny . 1857-58, V o l.l,
Book II, Chapter 1; JcuSvMill, History of British India Edited by W ilson, 
Vol. VII, Chapter 2; H .M .V ibart, The M ilitary History of^Madras Engineer 
and Pioneers, V o l.l, Chapter XV; Arthur Stanley. G illespie of Vellore,
Army Quarterly. Vol. 22, April -  July, 1931.
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The mutineers of Vellore were the Indian sepoys and 
their Indian O fficers. The sepoys had a long associa tion  with 
the East India Company beginning in the middle of the 18th 
century. The British‘'Military Activities in Madras assumed 
importance with the commencement of the Anglo-French hostilities  
in Europe in 1744^ The rivalry with the French, made the English 
to rea lise  the great necessity  of having a considerable supply of 
man power in India. The limited number of the Company's troops 
in India was not found sufficient to fight the Company's wars in 
Madras and in Bengal. A further supply of English soldiers was 
difficult to obtain from home a t th is  time when England was 
engaged in the war of Austrian Succession (1740-48). Besides, 
the Company was unwilling to hazard the unprofitable venture of 
importing and maintaining a huge number of expensive English 
so ld iers. Among the peoples of India, therefore, the Company 
looked for fighting m aterials -  cheap but dependable.
In the perspective of the Anglo-French conflict, the irregular 
Peons of Fort St. David (12 miles north of Pondicherry) had been 
first armed by the British in 1744 to protect the territory around 
the Fort. These sepoys commenced their active service in 1746
1Vibart, M aj.H .M .The Military History Madras Engineers and
Pioneers. Vol. 1, pfy 5 - 6 .  ^
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and took part in the defence of Fort St. David against a
French a t ta c k .1 Then in 1748, the Company, following the
example of the French, raised a small body of regular sepoy
2troops at M adras. For the next ten  years the number of sepoys 
was small and they were not trained on European lin es . The 
clash between the Nswahs of Bengal, Sirajuddaulah, and the 
English in Bengal led in 1756 to the sudden capture of Calcutta 
by the Nawafa,. In such a crisis the Madras forces of the 
Company was called to Bengal to recover C alcutta. With the 
departure of a large force from M adras, the Presidency became 
unsafe and exposed to the danger of a French invasion. In th is 
critical situation , the authorities of Fort St. George became 
conscious of the advantages of giving the sepoys better training 
and of increasing their numbers. In August 1758 the sepoys were 
formed into regular companies each of 100 men. Several low ranking 
Indian officers like Subadar, H avildar, Tamadar and Naiks were
~  U. Mx ~f~he. vj
It should be noted here that the sepoy corps in Bengal were 
raised la ter than that of M adras. In Bengal the sepoy recruitment 
first started before the battle of P lassey . (Kaye and M alleson. 
History of Indian V o l .l , p p .148-49). However, under the
adm inistration of Clive, the Bengal sepoys soon developed into an 
admirable fighting force.
2Chesney. Sir T. Indian Polity, p. 205
appointed under one European officer a t the top in  each Company.
Some regulations were also  passed in respect of their pay and
promotion.1 In January 1766, these  regulations were formed into
a code and were published for the information and guidance of the
2European officers. The number of the sepoys in the Company's 
service steadily  increased making a to ta l of six teen battalions 
in 1767. M eanwhile, the sepoys, together with the English so ld iers, 
had taken part in two of the Company's significant campaigns -  
the battle of P lassey in 1757 and the battle of Wandiwash in 1760.
It may be pointed out, however, that the battle  of Plassey was a 
poor military action and that the sepoys played only an insign ifican t 
role in the British success of W andiwash. Yet the sepoys * 
performances commanded respect and appreciation among the 
English and by 1767 it was believed that "jthe Madras Native Infantry! ' 
had been transformed from a rabble of peons^to a disciplined body
3
worthy to stand in line with the British troops. " By 1770 the sepoy 
element of the Madras army was further enlarged. The Madras 
military establishm ent in 1772 contained about 3 000 European Infantry
1W ilson W .J. History of the Madras Army V o l.l . p .ID .
2 "Orders, Rules and Regulations to be observed respecting the troops on 
the Coast of Coromandel in 1766. Published in Madras by the Govenor 
and the Commander in Chief in 1766.
3
Wilson W .J. History of the Madras Army. Vol. 1, p. 13.
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and 16OCX) sepoys with a body of more than 600 officers. The
sepoys contributed immensely to the success of the British power
in the Southern part of India throughout the la s t quarter of the 18th
century. From 1765 onwards hostilities  broke out between the
British and the powerful kingdom of Mysore -  under Hyder, followed
by the British conflicts with the M aratha Chiefs in 1778. Apart from
these actual m ilitary involvements there continued the apprehension
of a French invasion on the Madras settlem ent. The South Indian
wars reached a climax when Tipu, the arch enemy of the English,
succeeded Hyder in 1782 as the ruler of M ysore. By that time the
sepoys formed the majority of the Company's forces in the Southern
Peninsula, consisting of nearly three battalions of European troops
2
and twenty-one sepoy infantry batta lions. Thus during the la s t
r
quarter of the 18th century the British authorities employed the 
sepoys as their principal combative force in  a ll their v ital military 
operations. The sepoys on their part bore the brunt of warfare and 
earned reputation for their courage, bravery and faithfulness to the 
Company. They endured a ll the hardships and priviation of the
^Chesney Sir G. Indian Polity , p. 208 and Singh, Brig. RajendroL 
History of the Indian Army, p. 72.
2
Rivett Carnae, C ol.S . The Presidential Armies of British India p .306
28
battle  field without a murmur. But the conditions of the sepoys
m aterially remained unchanged. They were poorly paid and they
did not enjoy any dignity. A sepoy 's sta tus was generally much
inferior to h is counterpart in the English forces of the Company.
The qualified sepoys and Indian Officers were always placed under
the command of a Britisher, even if he was incompetent.'*'
Such was the organisation of the sepoy force in Madras when
Bentinck reached in August 1803. Though the Mysore wars were
over the conflict with the Marathas were renewed in August 1803
and the apprehension of a French attack  on the Madras coasts s till
loomed large. In view of the state  of belligerency Bentinck felt
the necessity  of increasing the numerical strength of the Madras
army. To W ellesley he wrote that- the defence of Madras "would be
2a subject of much anxiety and consideration". On the 10th April 
1804, the Government of Madras issued  an order to ra ise  additional 
infantrymen for the Presidency. It was resolved that a native corps 
of 750 rank and file with a due proportion of native commissioned and non-
3
commissioned officers be raised and maintained by the Government-.
^Kaye and M alleson, History of the Indian M utiny V o l.l. pp 160-61 
2 Bentinck to W ellesley, 30th September 1803. B.P.
3W ilson, W .J. History of the Madras Army, Vol 111, p. 164
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The Governor himself took the command of the new corps.
In addition to this expansion of sepoy corps Bentinck arranged 
for some additional financial help to the sepoys and their fam ilies. 
Subsequent to the conclusion of peace with the M arathas, his 
Government granted to the nearest heir of every native officer 
and soldier who had died or was injured in the battlefields -  the 
half pay of his rank.'*' This measure, though w ell intentioned, was 
not adequate. The sepoy army in 1804-5 virtually formed the bulk 
of the Company's forces in Madras , comprising 23 infantry regi­
ments of 2,000 each, 8 cavalry regiments of 400 each and over 
a thousand European officers. But financially such a huge force 
remained sadly neglected. A sepoy, after serving the Company 
successfully all through his life, could not rise higher than the 
rank of Subadar. Degradation of native officers from their ranks 
on the slightest pretext was very common. While a sepoy 
should always help an English officer by carrying his arms, an 
English soldier could pass an Indian officer of the highest rank 
without showing respect. "Mott European officers in native regi­
ments ", Cradock wrote, " . . .  looked on the native officers with 
contempt -  the native officers were aggrieved and possibly were
^Wilson, W .I ., History of the Madras Army. V ol.Ill, p.IBS'.
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the first to become corrupted in conspiracy. Moreover the
pay scale  of the sepoys was very low and they often complained
that "the sipahis of the Nizam and the Maratha chiefs are better
2off than our Subadars and Jam adars. " In comparison with the 
low ranking English officers like Leiutenant and Ensign who 
received 45 and 32 pagodas per month, the monthly pay of 
Indian officers like Subadar and Tamadar was only 12 and 7 pagodas. 
While an English soldier received 12 pagodas in a month a sepoy
3
used to get only 2 pagodas. Even th is meagre amount was not
regularly paid. In Bentinck's own w ords, "the sepoys have ivow-
fought with us for and under every hardship and in
4arrears for many months. " But the sepoys were never loud in 
protest against the insufficient pay and British ill-treatm ent. Their 
devotion to their m asters remained unwavered as long as their bare 
subsistence was maintained and religions sentim ents were respected .
But the situation altered considerably in 1805.
^Crad ock 's M inute, 2nd O ct. 1806. Home M isc .S er. Vol. 10.
2 .................Kaye and Malle son. History of the Indian M utiny.Vol. L. p. 161.
3
The new arrangement with respect to the rank and promotions of the 
army in the East Indies , Resolved by Board of Control, p .3 8 . 1796. 
and W ilson, W .J. History of the Madras Army. V ol.Ill, p. 93.
4Bentinck to Minto, 1st Oct. 1806, B.P.
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In February 1805, Sir John Cradock succeeded Major General 
D.Campbell as the Commander in Chief of the Madras Army. Soon 
after the assumption of office, Cradock found that there was no 
well defined code of military regulations in the Madras estab lish ­
ment. He immediately planned to draw the numerous scattered 
regulations of the army in Madras into a system atic code. The 
Deputy Adjutant General, Major Pierce, an officer of considerable 
experience in India, was entrusted with the task©.! drafting' the 
code. Following on 14th November 1805, the Commander in Chief 
issued an order for the use of a new turban in place of the old 
head dress of the sepoys in infantry and artillery . The traditional 
turban of the sepoys was considered clumsy and old fashioned.
The new turban devised by the Madras military authorities was 
made with the same materials like the old one, from a broad cloth 
and in iron frame, with the exception of a cotton taft "made to 
resemble a feather and a leather cockade. The new turban was
believed to fee "lighter, less expensive, fitting firmly on the
2
head" and its appearance was recommended as "military". Cradock 
further ordered the sepoys of Madras to w ear, as a rule, black 
stockings and white jacke ts. Perhaps these changes in the dress
^Report of the Enquiry Commission appointed by the Govt, at Vellore. 
9th Aug. 1806, P .P. Vol.42, 1861, p p .689-93.
2Adj. Gen. P.A.Agnew to Commander in Chief, 18th July 1806, Home 
M isc. Ser. Vol.507.
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were intended to bring semblance between the sepoys and
the English so ld iers. In January 1806 the draft M ilitary Code
of Regulations/ including the introduction of a new turban, was
submitted for the Government's approval. The 10th paragraph of
the XI section of the Code effected a further innovation and
forbade the sepoys to wear their caste  marks or religious signs.
"It is  ordered by the Regulations that a native soldier shall not
mark his face or denote his caste or w ear earrings when dressed
in uniform. It is  further directed that a t a ll parades and duties 
shall
every so ld ie^be clean shaved on the c h in .. .  and uniformity 
should be preserved in regard to the quantity and shape of the 
hair upon the upper lip .*  On 13th March 1806, the Code of 
M ilitary Regulations of Madras establishm ent was duly sanctioned 
by the Governor in Council.
The new turbans were sent to each regiment at different 
stations in the following months of A pril, May and June of 1806, 
with the directives to the Commanding Officer to issue them to 
the sepoys. But the sepoys sternly resisted  to accept the new 
turban. The first act of defiance on the turban issu e  took place 
a t Vellore. On 6th May 1806, Lt. Col. J. Darley, the Commanding 
Officer of the 2nd battalion of 4th regiment at Vellore, ordered 29
* Extract from the Code of Regulations, standing orders, 13th March
1806. Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
sepoys of h is battalion to wear the new turban. The
sepoys openly refused to carry out the order even though
they were threatened with imprisonment. Consequently, some
were arrested . On the 7th May, when the sepoys were asked
to put on the new turban during their morning parade, they
disobeyed the command by putting handkerchiefs on their bare
heads and abusively calling the English officers as "dogs".
During the evening parade on the same day the sepoys refused
to carry their side arms in protest against the introduction of
the new turban and the imprisonment of some of their comrades.
The new turban, they declared, had an offensive resemblance
to the hat or cap worn by the Firingees (meaning the men of
European origin) and it was also  objectionable to their caste 
1and religion. Col. Fancourt, the officer commanding at
Vellore, was infuriated at the behaviour of the sepoys and
suggested that rigorous steps should be taken against the
offenders. He promptly reported the incident to Cradock, the
Commander in  Chief, adding that the objection to the new turban
2
was based solely on the "lively prejudice" of the sepoys.
* Re port of the Court of Enquiry at Vellore 7th May 1806, Home 
M isc.Ser. Vol. 507.
2Fancourt to Cradock, 7th May 1806, Home M isc. Ser.Vol.507.
Cradock supported Fancourt's views and directed him to confine 
the agitators in the 2nd battalion of the 4th regiment and to send 
them to Madras to face tria l before a court-m artial.* The court- 
m artial took place on 9th June 1806. The military court received 
evidence from two authentic representatives -  one each from 
caste  Hindus and M uslims. They confirmed Col. Fancourt's
opinion that the new turban was not .offensive to the religions
2 ' of the sepoys. The court-martial inflicted severe punishment on
the defiant persons. Two H avildars. one Muslim and the other
Hindu, who s till refused to w ear the new turban, were sentenced
to receive 900 lashes each and to be discharged from the service.
The remaining men were all sentenced to 500 lashes each. Those
who regretted their defiance and promised good conduct in future
3
were spared d ism issal from the army.
A month after the incident of Vellore, information reached 
Cradock in the middle of June about an agitation among the sepoys 
stationed a t W allajabad in  North Arcot. When the Grenadier
*Agnew to Fancourt, 7th May 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
2Evidence before the N ative CourtrM artial, Bentinck's 
Memorial, p. 56.
3
Court-Martial Verdict, 11th June 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
Company of the 2nd battalion , 14th regiment wore the new turban
on 1 Oth June, the public taunted them for accepting the European
fashioned “Topis” (hats). C onsequently, the sepoys a t W allajabad
grew exc ited , threw away the new turbans and abused those who
still wanted to wear them. * Subadar Venkata N air, formerly in
2the service of Tipu, was suspected as the instiga to r. The Subadar 
was promptly araested and the situation was brought under control 
soon after he was despatched to Madras for tr ia l. The incidents 
at Vellore and W allajabad led Cradock to suspect for the first time the 
growth of some “universal objection" among the sepoysaagainst the 
new turban. At that point he was further informed by Lt. Col. James 
Brunton, the M ilitary Auditor G eneral, and another military officer of 
SerLngapatam that the new turban had caused widespread resentment
3
among a ll the sepoys. Brunton even attempted to im press upon 
Cradock of the necessity  of rescinding the new  turban order.
Cradock, being considerably concerned a t the developm ents, 
decided to  seek the government's advice on the m atter. From the
*C ol.G . Harcourt, Commanding Officer at W allajabad, to Agnew,
13th June 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.507.
2Bose, Commanding Officer, 2nd b a tt .l4 th  reg . to Harcourt, 10th 
June 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.507.
3
Com. in Chief to the Gov. in Coun. 29 June, 1806. Home M isc.
Ser. v o l .507.
point of military discipline he felt that the new turban order, 
once is  sudd on the advice of the Adjutant General and the 
Deputy Adjutant General, should not be withdrawn* But at the 
same time he found tha t the order had stirred the superstition 
of the sepoys as w ell as the rumour that they would soon be 
forced to become Christians* Under these  circumstances he 
was hesitaftt in enforcing the order. On 29th June he informed 
Bentinck a ll about the turban affair and sent him the le tter of 
Lt. Col. Brunton.^ Bentinck and h is Council paid more attention 
to upholding the authority than making a  proper estim ate of the 
situation . They were convinced that the findings of the court- 
m artial and the opinion of the Hindu and Muslim religious author­
itie s  had proved that the new turhan could not offend the religious 
sentiments of the sepoys. In the eyes of the government the sepoy
agitation  w a s , therefore, based solely  on superstition without any
2religious foundation. Bentinck did not think it proper to change
/
^Commander in Chief to Gov. in Coun. 29th June 1806, Home 
M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
2It should be noted here that Bentinck and the Councillors who 
had already passed the Code of Regulations, hardly examined 
the code in  deta il. Consequently, they were aware only of the 
is su e  of new turban and ignorant of any other dress regulations 
like banning the caste  m arks, w hiskers, e tc .
the resolution of the Government, To QradocJc he wrote,
. that if marks of discontentm ent , . .  should s ti l l  continue
no time should be lost in  interposing the authority of the 
2Governm ent." But Bentinck had no w ish either to be misunder*- 
stood or to appear to hurt the feelings of the sepoys. A General 
Order was written on 4th July 1806 by his Government to pledge 
to the sepoys explicitly that the former had neither the desire 
"to interfere in the religious faith of the sepoys nor any intention
3
to force them to accept C hristianity". Bentinck instructed 
Cradock to endorse and circulate the General Order a s  soon as 
practicable. Cradock was obviously relieved w ith the Govern­
ment support and resolved to stand firm on the turban issu e . 
Meanwhile he came to know that perfect discipline prevailed
among the sepoys at Vellore and they had started wearing the
4 , , r , thoughtnew turban. Cradock felt so composed tha t he ^  it unnecessary
to  circulate the General Order. ^
*Gov. In Coun. to Comm, in  Chief, 4th July 1806, Home M isc.
Ser. Vol. 507.
2
Bentinck to Cradock, 4th July 1806, B.P.
3
Draft of the General Order of the Govt, of Mad. 4th July 1806, 
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.507.
4
Commanding Officer, Darley to Adj. General, 3rd July 1806,
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.507.
5
Bentinck's Memorial, p. 4.
In their own way Bentinck and his colleagues were 
justified  in enforcing the military d iscip line and strengthening 
the hands of the Commander in  Chief. But the Government of 
M adras did make no attem pt to enquire into the origins and depth 
of the sepoy discontent. The unprecedented ac t of defiance by 
the sepoys w as thus treated rather casually  by the Government,
A thorough enquiry was not made into the turban affair and the 
la s t opportunity of averting a tragedy was lo s t. As it  w as proved 
la ter on, the agitation of the sepoys was quietened only super­
ficially  but it  never actually  subsided. Soon it received additional 
stimulus and even a political objective. At th is  juncture the 
descendants of Tipu entered into a combination with the sepoys.
After the fall of Seringapatam in  1799, the large family of 
Tipu consisting of twelve sons, (six of whom were minors), six  
daughters and several hundreds of their relations and followers 
were kept in captivity in  the former palace of the Nawab of C arnatic, 
inside the Vellore fort. They were granted handsome allow ances 
to live pompously in the palace. They were even permitted to 
draw around them selves ”a swarm of needy adventurers and vagrant 
m endicahts. Most of these people belonged to the frustrated
* M ill's  History of British Ind ia , edited by H .H . W ilson, Vol. VII, p. 116.
298
Muslim nohillty  who had lost their prosperity and strength with 
the fall of Mysore and the liquidation of the C arnatic. L t.C ol. 
Marriott was entrusted with the charge of supervision of the 
princes and the payment of their pensions. He a lso  discharged 
a ll the civil and political duties of the fort and the adjoining town 
of Vellore.* The outer gates of the palace were guarded by the 
Indian sepoys only. Generally, no European officer could enter 
the palace without the prior permission of the princes. Thus the 
Mysore princes were allowed by the English authority to live under 
a relaxed vigiM iice.
Bentinck, however, had very little  to do with these
arrangem ents. Vellore was selected  as the place of residence
for the princes before Bentinck's arrival in  Madras and their
allowance and security  deta ils were determined during the
regime of Bentinck's predecessor, C live. Personally, Bentinck
was satisfied  with these arrangements and found nothing object-
2ionable in  them. W hatever might be Bentinckrs views about 
the Vellore fort arrangem ents, the political situation in  South 
India a t th is point remained unstable for the British authority.
* Bentinck's Memorial to the Court of D irectors, p. 15. 
^ Ih id ., p . 16.
Only six  years had passed  since the downfall of Tipu and the 
British Raj in  South India was s till young* The loyalty of the 
people towards the Raj was uncertain . The d ispossessed  nobles 
and the disinherited princes were decidedly resentful to the 
Company's Government. In the event of any outbreak of rebellion 
against the British the sons of Tipu could naturally become the 
rallying point for the re b e ls . A stric te r control over them , there­
fore was desirab le .
At a la te r da te , Bentinck him self came to know about the 
existence of a disgruntled section of the native population. He 
wrote to M aitland: "From the overthrow of the Governments of both 
Mysore and of the Carnatic i t  must be evident that the country will 
abound in hostile  (to the English) people . . .  ready to join any standard. 
Such standard could most profitably be ho isted , if  a t a ll ,  by the sons 
of Tipu provided they got an opportunity. M ost of Tipufe sons were 
either minors or im beciles. The o ldest son, Futtah Hyder, was 
cruel, haughty, superstitious and sensual. Abdul Khalik -  the 
second son- was m ean-m inded,m iserly and weak. Both, in 
f a c t , were thoroughly incapable of becoming popular leaders of
* Bentinck to M aitland, 3rd August 1806, B .P .
men. But such was not the case with the third and the fourth 
sons of Tipu. Mohiuddin, the third son was am iable, gentle 
and judicious -  JLthe best specimen of Tipu's descendants 
The fourth son, Muizuddin, resem bled Tipu very much. He was 
a man of fury and passion , as easily  calmed as inflamed. He 
was an extrovert, good natured, lively , affable and generous.* 
Thus a t leas t two of Tipu's sons were capable of raising the 
standard of their father. The English in Madras did not seriously 
consider th is  eventuality. They failed to conceive a liaison 
between the princes and the sepoys.
The sepoys, who alone guarded the princes, had an easy 
access  to the palace. In the circum stances a secret contract 
between the sepoys and the princes was most likely to develqp.
As the la ter events showed, the princes ~ specially  Mohiuddin and 
Muizuddin -  were aware of the sentim ents of the sepoys on the 
turban issue  and other dress regulations. The princes exploited 
the revolting spirit of the sepoys through their numerous palace 
a ttendan ts. The palace attendants turned the sepoy 's concern for 
the sanc tity  of h is religion into a feeling of rebellion and thus
Character sketch  of the Mysore princes by Lt. Col. M arriott, 
April 1804, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508.
3oi.
laid the foundation of a  secret but w ell-la id  plot. It was 
believed that Alauddin, a foster brother of prince Muizuddin, 
acted as a link between the sepoys and the palace, Alauddin's 
endeavours resulted  in  frequent secre t mefetings a t the sepoy 
barracks attended by the Indian officers, sepoys and the agents 
from the palace. The sporadic agitation of the sepoys w as thus 
given a political purpose, namely, the extermination of the Euro­
peans and the restoration  of the rule of Tipu's family in M ysore. 
The sepoys were led to believe that if  they could destroy the 
English at Vellore and se t the princes free, a yictory over the 
English would be certain. Prince Muizuddin would thereafter 
lead the rebellion with the support and reinforcements arriving 
from different quarters of South India. In fact, Muizuddin had 
asked for a ss is tan ce  from the poligars of Venkatagheny and 
Kalastree. It was further believed that numerous soldiers serving 
Mysore s ta te  under Purniah were s till  faithful to the family of Tipu 
and willing to serve under them. The sepoys were also assured by 
the prince that if  they could occupy and keep the Vellore fort only 
for eight days, 10, 000 men from Gorramcondah would certainly 
reach to join them by that tim e. * Besides, the princes and their
Confession of SK. Gassim , a  leader of the mutiny a t Vellore, 
to Col. Forbes, 31st July 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508.
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men believed that once the fort was freed from the English, 
people from a ll over the south would turn up to help. them.
Subadar Sheikh Adam and Tamadar Sheikh H ussain soon 
assum ed the leadership of the sepoys respectively  as  the first 
and the second in  command. The sepoys were in itiated  into the 
plot through an  oath taking ceremony . Each w as required to 
drink milk and to sw ear by h is sword and the Koran to m aintain 
absolute secrecy about the plot of destroying a ll the Europeans 
a t Vellore and of re-estab lish ing  the Government of Tipu's 
descendants in  Mysore. * As the Europeans a t that time generally 
constituted the artillery  of the Company's army, the sepoys 
lacked sufficient knowledge about the use of the guns. To over­
come th is  difficulty the organisers secretly  contacted the gun 
la scars (Indian naval artillery) in the Vellore town who had 
considerable knowledge about the use of the guns. Absolute 
secrecy w as maintained about the whole plot and the scene was 
a ll se t for a surprise a ttack . It was first resolved by the mutin­
eers that their action would take place on 17th June 1806. But the 
date of commencement was postponed when the leaders of the mutiny
^Evidence of Sk.Ahmed, a sepoy, 21st July 1806, Proc. of the Court 
of Enquiry at Vellore. Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
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learnt that Mustafa Beg, a sep6y of the 1st battalion, 1st
regiment had divulged some of the plans of the mutiny to Lt.
C ol.Forbes, the Commanding Officer of the 1st battalion,
2
1st regiment. But Forbes had so great a reliance on the fidelity 
of the sepoys that instead of making a secret enquiry into 
M ustafa 's allegations, he sent for the Indian officers to comment 
on the information. Ml the Indian officers solemnly affirmed their 
innocence of any secret design against the British. They further 
convinced the Colonel that M ustafa was an odd, eccentric man in 
the habit of inventing fumours. They, therefore,advised Forbes to 
punish him for spreading such a damaging and confounddd alleg­
ation against other sepoys. Forbes believed,them so much that he
3
lost no time in sending M ustafa to confinement under chains.
One Mrs Burke, a widow of an European official, also  volunteered 
to give the Commanding O fficer, Col. F^ncourt some secret information
^Mustafa Beg was a destitu te boygi^ven refuge by European army officei 
and la ter on recruited as a sepoy. For h is attempt to give the British 
prior intelligence about the plot of Vellore Bentinck's Government 
rewarded him 2000 pags. cash and a life pension of a Subadar after 
the mutiny. General order by the Govt. 7th Aug. 1806, Home M isc. 
Ser. Vol. 508.
2
Evidence of Lt. (2>1. Forbes, 22nd July 1806, Proc. of the Enquiry 
Commission. Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
3
Evidence by Lt. Col. Forbes, 24th July 1806, Proc. of the Enquiry
Commission, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
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regarding the sepoys. But being known as a disreputable woman,
she did not receive a serious hearing.  ^ Thus the las t chance of
discovering the sepoy conspiracy was callously overlooked.
After deceiving Forbes, the leaders of the mutiny further
delayed their action to enable the sepoys to receive their payment
of the month. Finally, Sheikh H ussain , the second in command of
the m utineers, fixed the early hours of 10th July as the time to 
2
start v iolence. On the night of the mutiny the garrisson in the 
Vellore fort consisted of four companies of His M ajesty 's 69th regi­
ment, six companies of the 1st battalion , 1st regiment and the whole 
of the 2nd battalion, 23rd regiment. The la tter force had recently 
been recruited from the followers of the deposed poligars of Tinnevelly
3
and Pundalum. The to tal number of the sepoys a t Vellore fort
was approximately 1800 and the Englishmen were nearly 400 in 
4
number. The situation at the fort seemed so normal that on the
^Evidence by Mrs Burke, 23rd July 1806, Proc.of the Enquiry 
Commission, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508,
2 Confession of Sk.Cassim  to Lt. Col. Forbes, 31st July 1806, Home 
M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
3
Evidence of Lt. Col. Coombe of 2nd batt. 23rd reg . 26th July 1806, 
Proc. of the Enquiry Commission, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
4
G illespie of Vellore, A .Stanley, The Army Q uarterly. Vol.22, p .338.
3 o r
night of 9th July the European officers did not even w ish to go 
out on their routine round. Instead they requested some Indian 
officer to do the job. Sheikh Cassim at once volunteered to 
carry out the duty of night inspection on their behalf. * In the 
palace, Prince Muizuddin on 8th and 9th July requested the 
permission of Col. Marriott to allow him to spend the nights in 
h is public room and to retain  his servants there . He further 
requested Col. Marriott to permit his cousin, Hyder Has sain Khan, 
to stay during the night with him. All these requests were 
granted. Besides, Muizuddin, ju s t before the mutiny, wanted to 
purchase an attractive horse. M arriott, however, did not approve 
of th is but allowed the prince to keep the horse for a couple of days.
As midnight struck, the moon rose above the ramparts and the 
whole barracks seemed to be fast as leep . At 2 .00 a .m . of 10th 
July, the mutineers started the ir action. A secret m essage passed 
throughout the sepoy barracks that the time had come to exterminate 
the Europeans. The sepoys came out of their barracks, broke the
3
arsenal and armed them selves with swords and guns. As it was
^Evidence of Ramoo Sepoy, 19th July 1806, Proc. of the Committee 
of Enquiry, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
E v id en ce  of Col. M arriott, 25th July 1806, Proc. of the Enquiry 
Commission, Hom e,M isc. Serv. Vol. 508.
3
For a de ta il position of the fortress of Vellore see the map of 
Fort. Appendix. 3 .
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planned, their next move w as to k ill the English sentinels of 
the main gateway and to  take possession  of the m agazine.
Between 2 and 3 a ,m . the sepoys surrounded the European 
quarters and made a co-ordinate attack  on the European main 
guards and on the European barracks. They kept up a steady 
fire on the quarters of the European officers to prevent them from 
Joining the English soldiers in the barracks. Then "volleys of 
musketry were poured in through every opening and guns brought
1
up from the magazine were turned against the barrackyof the 69th. "
The quiet peaceful night was thus pierced by gunfire and shrieks.
The unprepared Europeans, men and officers, became completely
bewildered and started running for shelter in panic. They were
chased and mowed by the shots of the sepoys. Once let loose
the horrors of m assacre knew no bounds. More than half of the
men of the 69th regiment were either killed or wounded in the first'
onslaught. The quarters of the English officers were ransacked and
men m assacred. It is  important to note here that the sepoys
2generally spared the women and the children from m assacre.
1 G illespie of Vellore, A .Stanley, The Army Q uarterly, V ol.22, p.33&(
2
In a ll the official and non-official accounts there was no mention of a 
single death of an European woman or child. There is a very pathetic 
account of the two w ives of European officers describing how their 
husbands were m assacred and how their and their children 's lives wen 
spared. Possibly to the Indian sepoy it was s till very unchivalrous to 
kill women and children. Report of the Committee of Enquiry, July 180 
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
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Col. Fancourt, the Commanding officer at the Vellore Garrison
w as shot dead at the point blank range. The Commanding Officer
of the 23rd regiment, Lt. Col. Kerras was also  killed when he
was rushing towards the parade ground. Some officers, however,
managed, w ith the a ss is tan ce  of their Indian servants, to hide
them selves. At the dawn they made the ir way to the devastated
European barracks, creeping under the shadows jbf the w alls .
There they rallied  the survivors and forced a passage through the
mutineers to the ram parts. Then they took a cover under the main
gateway of tie  fort and stuck to their shelter under the incessan t
fire of the sepoys. In spite of injury and death they successfu lly
held their position until help came. *
So far the sepoys were successfu l in carrying out their
programme with the exception of letting some Europeans to survive
on the ram parts. The fort was captured and a large body of English
were k illed . During the whole operation the palace attendants
joined the sepoys and the servants of the princes were distributing
sherbut (drinks) and sweetmeats to the Hindu and Muslim sepoys for 
2refreshm ent. Following the preliminary success a group of sepp^tf
detailed account of the mutiny, especially  from the point of view 
of its  victims and survivors, can be traced in W ilson 's History of the 
Madras Army. Vol.IV, Chapter XVIII? and M ill's  History of British 
Ind ia , Vol.VII, Chapter II.
2
Evidence of Mo*ty Sepoy, 13th July 1806, Proc. i>f the Committee of
Enquiry, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.507.
met Prince Muizuddin in the palace, informed him of the m assacre 
of the Europeans and requested him to assume the leadership of
1
the sepoys at th is point. The prince readily agreed to th is  proposal.
It w as rumoured that the prince promised the sepoys to double their
2monthly salary  if  the mutiny became successfu l. Muiziiddin also
handled over the flag of Tipu Sultan (the flag decorated with a sun
in  the centre with tiger stripes on a red and green background) which
3
the sepoys promptly hoisted on the fortress of Vellore. Up ti l l  now, 
the progress of the mutiny had been steady. But once the m assacre 
ended and the fort occupied the sepoys began plundering the 
scattered  possessions of the Europeans. In the course of ransacking 
the quarters of the European officers and the paym aster's office, 
the sepoys found treasures and other valuables. Their greed for 
w ealth overshadowed the object of the mutiny and^started a scramble
4
for the booty. Their leaders at th is point could hardly exercise 
any control and implored Prince Muizuddin to take charge of the 
d istracted  sepoys.
^Evidence of Sk.Imam, 9th Aug. 1806, Proc. of the Enquiry Commission 
Home. M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
2Evidence by Sk.N utter, 9th Aug. 1806, Proc. of the Enquiry 
Commission. Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508.
^Report of the Enquiry Commission, 9th Aug. 1806, P«Pl861,
V ol.42, p p .689-95.
4
C onfession of Sk.Cassim  to C ol.Forbes, 31st July 1806, Home 
M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
One English officer, Major C oates, lived in  a quarter 
outside the Vellore fo rtress. When he sensed  an  outbreak inside 
the fort he decided to convey at once the awful news to the 
nearest British m ilitary station  at Arcot. Robert Rollo G illesp ie, 
a very successfu l and gallant British officer, w as at the command 
of a regiment of British Dragoon at Arcot, 14 m iles away from 
Vellore. * At about 6 o 'c lock  in  the morning of 10th July, Major 
Coates reached Arcot and informed G illespie of the outbreak a t 
Vellore. W ithin a short time G illespie s e t out on his way to 
Vellore with a squadron of 19th Dragoons under Captain Young and 
a strong force of seven cavalry under Lt. Woodhouse. Soon he 
w as followed by Col. Kennedy with further reinforcements from Arcot.
W hile G illespie was approaching the Vfellore fort, confusion 
among the insurgents persisted  inside. The sepoys were s till 
occupied in plundering and sharing the pillage and their leaders 
stood h e lp le ss . A large number of sepoys had started running away 
from the fort with as much spoils a s  they could carry. The mutiny
of Vellore thus began to collapse before the British started restoring.
him self 2
At la s t Muizuddin^rdecided to rally  round ' the dispersing sepoys.
^G illespie of Vellore, A.Stanley, The Army Q uarterly . V ol.22, p .33?~ £ . 
2
Evidence by Sk.Imam,9th Aug. 1806, Proc. of the Enquiry Commission 
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
But it was too late and soon Gillespie's forces arrived on the 
scene at 9.00 a.m. In the morning* Gillespie found the three 
outer gates of the fort opened and he had no difficulty in getting 
into the fort. But the fourth or the last inner gateway was 
completely under the command of the sepoys. Gillespie at first 
wanted to wait for the ariival of guns with the reinforcement from 
Arcot. Considering the urgent necessity of help to the Europeans 
who were still resisting under the cover on the other side of the 
gateway, Gillespie however decided to get through at once. He 
alone swarmed up a rope to the top of the gate and reached the other side 
to the survivors. Hurriedly rallying the men he found there, Gillespie 
led them in his final bid to capture the canons, so long held by the 
sepoys inside the fort. After a pitched battle with the insurgents 
the guns were seized and instantly turned agMnst them. The 
mutineers stood firmly against this set back and fought until their 
supply of ammunition was exhausted.* At that moment reinforcement 
from Arcot under Col.Kennedy arrived with gallpper guns. The 
gateway was burst open by the first shot but the steady fire of 
the sepoys made entrance dangerous. To clear the way, Gillespie
G illespie to Bentinck, 11th July 1806. Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
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at the head of the remaining soldiers of the 69th regiment, 
charged through it* Many of them fell from the shots of the 
sepoys but the battle was won. Firing suddenly ceased and 
the panic-stricken sepoys started running in every direction* 
the recovery of the fort was soon followed by horrible retri­
bution. "Hundreds fell beneath the sabres of the Dragoons . . .
Hundreds escaped over the walls of the fort,or threw down their 
aims and cried for mercy* But mercy was certainly a forgotten 
word at the moment* Some of Gillespie's men ran to take reprisals 
on Tipu’s sons in the palace* It was Col.Marriott who saved the 
princes by appealing earnestly to Gillespie to spare them*
In the course of the mutiny and its suppression 14 European
officers and approximately 100 European soldiers were killed by 
2
the sepoys. According to Gillespie's official estimate, the 
number of casualties following the suppression of the mutiny was
314 European officers, 9 Indian officers and 168 European soldiers,
besides about 76 Europeans were seriously injured during the
mutiny. On the number of casualties among the sepoys, no official
*Kaye & Malleson, History of the Mutiny. 1857-58, Vol.I, p. 168.
2Ibld.
3
Wilson in his book "History of the Madras Army Vol.III. p*187, gave the 
following number as dead; -  9 officers, 90 men of the 69th regiment 
and 15 soldiers -  who died subsequently due to their wounds*
Gillespie to Bontinek, 11th July 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507*
account is  available and other sources are hardly unanimous*
According to one account not le ss  than 350 sepoys died in the
Vellore outbreak** Another account stated that: “Bight hundred
bodies were carried out of the fort, besides those who were
2killed outside." The whole affair lasted approximately eight 
hours, starting at 2.00 o'clock in the morning and ending at
10.00 o ’clock during the day* The recovery of the fort was as 
fast as its fall in the hands of the mutineers. Gillespie arrived at 
the gate of Vellore fort at 9.00 o ’clock in the morning and by
10.00  o clock he was ain full possession of the fort and of the
3
family of the race of Tipoo. "
Gillespie was highly praised for his prompt action. Hls
swift move and quick decision were characterised by the Commander -
in Chief as militpywonder* Bent in ck also considered it as a
salutary example. *T cannot let a second day pass, * he wrote to
Gillespie, "without offering to you my thanks for your most prompt
end gallant conduct and for the great service which you have performed
4to this government. * At first Bentinck was upset at the news of the
*Wilson, W.J## History of the Madras Anny. Vol.IH, p.!8iT,
2Vibart, H.M.,  The Military History of/Madias Engineers & Pioneers, 
Vol.I, p. 409. *
3Gillespie’s private letter preserved in the war office records. Quoted 
Gillespie of Vellore. A,Stanley, The Army Quarterly. Vol.22, p .339,
^Bentinck to Gillespie, 12th July 1806, B.P.
mutiny at Vellore, but soon he restrained him self and decided
to  act coolly. He refused to make any comment on the incident
and appointed a Special Commission of Enquiry on 12th July 1806,
to investigate into the mutiny. * In the meantime on 11th July,
G illespie had institu ted  a M ilitary Committee of Enquiry t composed
of the European officers then present a t Vellore. From some of the
evidence given before th is  committee, G illespie concluded that
Tipu’s sons had a clear hand in the outbreak. He asked Col.
Harcourt, who succeeded the la te  Col.Fancourt as the Commanding
Officer of Vellore, to take prompt and severe m easures against 
2the princes. Bentinok, however, w as reluctant to take hasty
m easures against the princes until the Enquiry Commission completed
its  report. To C ol.M arriott, Bentihck clearly expressed his
unwillingness 4o changeMthe arrangement for the  safe custody
4
of the princes. '*
*The Commission consisted of M aj. G en.Pater, L td.C ol. Dodsworth, 
N .W ebb, J.D .O gilv ie and M aj.D ow se. G ov.in Coun. to Secret 
Committee, 3 0th Sept. 1806, Sec.Letters from Mad. V ol.2, 2nd 
S eries.
2 Col.H arcourt to Chief Secy. Govt, of Mad. 12th July 1806, Home 
M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
3
Chief Secy. Mad, Govt, to  C o l.H artourt, 14th July 1806, Home 
M isc. Ser. V ol.507.
^Bentinck to M arriott, 17th July 1806, B.P.
3 LA-
However, Bentinck was willing to deal with the turban
question promptly. In course of reconsidering the turban affair,
he was astonished to  discover for the first time in the M ilitary
Code of Regulations the section prohibiting the caste  marks,
w hiskers and earrings. Bentinck's Government sanctioned the
Code as a whole without scrutinizing it in detail and were
unaware of the existence of this section .*  This discovery
gave the government a new perspective into the sepoy grievances.
The apprehension of the sepoys that the English first took away
their caste  marks and w hiskers, then introduced a turban
resembling the hats ontly to make them Christians -  did not
seem to Bentinck altogether illog ica l. He wrote to Cradock,
"I confess that combining a ll these  circum stances together, I am
not surprised by the general apprehension of the sepoys that their
religious customs are no longer to be respected. Under thfcsecir-
cum stances the clause (regarding dress and turban) becomes a
bad one and true policy and wisdom appear to require that it
2
should be immediately abandoned. " On 17th July 1806, the 
government of Madras declared that a ll the orders which were
* Bentinck's Memorial, p.-9.
2
Bentinck to Cradock, 14th July 1806, B.P.
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contrary to the usages of the Indian troops should be
rescinded. In accordance with it a General Order was duly
passed on 26th August by which the new turban was withdrawn
and the sepoys were given permission to w ear the caste  marks
a t a ll times and in any manner they thought proper. The same
liberality  was accorded to keeping whiskers and wearing ornaments.^
The revocation of the dress regulations soon after the
mutiny clearly expressed the revised view of the Government,
that the sepoy agitation resulted from some unwise military
orders. If the Government knew a ll about the military code
they might not have sanctioned the dress regulations. The
military authorities, however, did not accept th is view. The
Commander in Chief asserted  that the mutiny was not as simpt$
as a mere case of insubordination, on the contrary, it was due
to a w ell-la id  out plot to reinstate  the overthrown ruling family
of Mysore. He demanded the immediate removal of the princes 
2from Vellore. This was followed by a collective petition of the 
high military officials (Col.Harcourt, C ol.G illesp ie , L t.C ol.
Kennedy and M aj.Gen.M unro) to the Governor urging him to take 
1 ..................
Publication of the General Order by the Government, 26th Aug. 1806 
Home M is. Ser. V ol.509.
2
Cradock to Bentinck, 15th July 1806, B. P.
MG
strong steps against the princes. ' Bentinck in his turn
expressed his lack of confidence in the findings of the
M ilitary Committee of Enquiry and insisted  on the propriety
of dealing carefully with the prisoners and on the expediency
2of restraining passion against the princes. His council offered
3
him full support. Thus in course of a week following the mutiny 
the relations between the civil and the military authorities became 
strained .
Bentinck promptly sent a full report of the Vellore mutiny
to the Supreme Government, together with an explanation of the
4m easures■: adopted by the Government of M adras. The Bengal 
Government appreciated Bentinck's views and approved his 
m easures. Regarding the Mysore princes, however, the Governor 
General thought that they were involved in the outbreak of Vellore.  ^
In view of recovering the cordial relationship with the sepoys, so
1A petition from the military officers to the Governor, 15th July 
1806, B.P.
2
Bentinck's M inute, 17th July 1806, See & Pol. Cons. B.P.
3
Petrie 's Minute, 17th July 1806, Sec & Pol.C ons. P.B.
4Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in Coun. 18th July 1806,
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
5Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in Coun. Mad. 1st Aug . 1806,
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508.
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essen tia l for the in terest of British empire in India, Bentinck 
decided to trea t the insurgents len iently . He was even willing 
to grant full pardon to the men of the 2nd battalion of 4th regi­
ment who had confessed their crime,  ^ "Too many unfortunate, 
brave so ld iers, both European and native", he wrote, "have lost 
the ir lives and I w ish that a ll those who have not been actually
tr
guilty of murder should be forgiven and a ll past transactions^be 
2forgotten, " He was eager to restore mutual reliance and good 
faith between the sepoys and the British Government, It was 
mainly at Bentinck's in itiative that the Government of Madras 
passed a General Order on 24th July clarifying the Government's 
opinion about the mutiny. It stated that the mutiny took place 
only a t Vellore and only the sepoys of the 2nd battalion, 23rd regi­
ment participated in It. Hence the Government had no reason to
3
doubt the fidelity and attachment of the sepoys in general.
At the end of July 1806, fresh developments created a 
situation in which Bentinck's policy of moderation became difficult 
to be m aintained. Suddenly the extent of sepoy unrest appeared .
^"Bentinck's M inute, 20th July 1806, B.P.
2
Bentinck to C ol.D aily , Commanding Officer, 2nd batt* , 4th reg. 
21st July 1806, B.P.
3General Order published by the Govt, of Mad. 24th July 1806,
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
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to him very w ide. Further sepoy agitation occurred at
Hyderabad and at W allajabad. The British subsidiary force
stationed at Hyderabad contained approximately 10, 000 men.^
The sepoys of Hyderabad, like the Vellore sepoys, a lso  became
strongly suspicious a t the new turban and the abolition of the
caste«-marks e tc . Consequently, a spirit of d issa tisfac tion
grew among them. Immediately after the Vellore mutiny on
11th July 1806, Col. M ontressor, the Commanding Officer of
Hyderabad, was informed of a growing resentment among the
sepoys of the 11th regiment. It was further stated that the
taunting remarks of the neighbouring people regarding the new
2turba<n made the sepoys more agitated . On 12th July the sepoys 
of the 11th regiment created great tumult over the new turban.
A riotous situation prevailed in the camp for the next few days 
and the sepoys categorically refused to comply with the dress 
regulations. The 2nd battalion of the 15th regiment refused  to 
wear the new turbans and abused their officers. The Indian 
cavalrymen announced that the spirit of unrest among the sepoys 
was so general that they would not take up arms to suppress the
^ / %c 3 ,
2 Sydenham to Gov.Gen.in Coun. 23rd July 1806, Home M isc.
Ser. Vol. 509.
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infantrymen, if the la tter rose into rebellion. At th is
situation , some Indian officers advised C ol.M ontressor
not to enforce the new turban. After consulting Sydenham,
the British Resident in Hyderabad, M ontressor considered it
expedient to suspend the dress regulations. Without wasting
time in obtaining the prior sanction of the higher authorities in
M adras, M ontressor on his own responsibility  issued an order
on 23rd July suspending the dress regulations at the Hyderabad 
2station . The decision brought admirable result and tranquility
3
soon restored in the camp. The ring-leaders of the agitation 
in Hyderabad were spotted out and kept under close w atch.
When Bentinck was informed of a ll these  proceedings on 23rd 
July, he readily approved the independent and w ise decision of
4M ontressor and Sydenham and called for an immediate enquiry.
An enquiry was accordingly carried out by M ontressor and 
Sydenham them s el ve s . Tog ether with the new turban a nd . dre s s
^"Montressor to Sydenham, 21st July 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 509. 
2M ontressor to Sydenham, 23rd July 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 509.
3Sydenham to G ov.G en.in  Coun. 23rd July 1806, Home M isc. Ser. 
Vol. 509.
4Chief Secy. Mad. Govt, to Sydenham, 31st July 1806, Home M isc.
Ser. Vol. 509.
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regulations, Sydenham strongly suspected the existence of
interested political parties behind the incident. After an
enquiry he became convinced that certain prominent members
of the Nizam's Court were involved in inciting the sepoys.
These nobles wanted to use the d issa tisfied  sepoys to serve
their own purpose of dethroning the Nizam, an English protege^,
and then to set up a rival prince of the family (Faridun Jah) in
his p lace. The sepoys, Sydenham believed, held regular meetings
in the camp and had regular communications with the insurgents of
Vellore.'*' M ontressor, too, thought that the unrest of Vellore w^$
^S® sHindustriously spread here".^  But Sydenham and M ontressor
could not substantiate their findings with reliable evidences.
However, on 14th August, the three ring-leaders of the sepoys
of Hyderabad were sent to prison and the rest were subsequently 
3
pardoned.. Thus, like Vellore, in Hyderabad a lso , the new turban 
and the dress regulations were the direct issu es  of the sepoy 
agitation.
1 r 1 r ’
Sydenham to Bentinck, 14th Aug. 1806, Home M isc. Ser.
Vol. : 509.
2M ontressor to Chief Secy. Mad. Govt. 17th Aug. 1806, Home 
M isc. Ser. Vol.509.
3
Sydenham to Bentinck, 14th Aug. 1806, Home M isc. Ser.
Vol. 5 09.
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The unrest a t Hyderabad was soon followed by a serious
commotion among the sepoys stationed a t W allajabad. In the
la s t week of July 1806, the sepoys a t W allajabad assumed a
mutinous attitude and threatened to kill their European officers.
This time they especially  complained the poor pay, the
excessive physical labour and the rigorous discipline they were
subjected to . Their objection to the long hours of d rill, parade
and cleaning their weapons was first manifested on 24th July,
The sepoys protested angrily when they were ordered to clean
their arms in the evening after a hard day 's labour. In u tter
desperation, some of them declared that they would k ill their
oppressive officers rather than submit to this inhuman labour.^
The matter took a worse turn on the following day. The sepoys
of the 1st battalion, 23rd regiment, abused their European officers
and praised the act of violence of the Vellore sepoys. They
openly said that they should do what the sepoys had done at
2Vellore and put every European to death . One Mrs Revier, the 
wife of an European officer, said that she had overheard the sepoys 
expressing strong displeasure at their meagre pay. and were talking ,
*Adj. G en's Report, 27th July 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
2
Evidence of a maid-servant of an European officer to Cradock,
28th July 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.507,
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of throwing away the few coins of their pay-packet in  the
1
face of their O fficers. At th is outburst of sepoy d iscontentm ent 
the Commanding Officer, Col.Lang, became extremely panicky 
and called for immediate help from G illespie at Arcot. Simultan­
eously he despatched a detail report of the situation to the
2Commander in Chief. Col. G illespie hurriedly came to W allajabad 
with his troops but did not find any visib le signs of mutiny. As a 
precautionary measure he, however, disarmed the sepoy battalion
3
and arrested the Indian officers and men of the suspected regiment.
The Commander in Chief also  personally proceeded to undertake an 
investigation on the spot. After a short enquiry Cradock found that 
the apprehension of violence a t  W allajabad was imagined by the 
panic-stricken European officers. He could not find the existence 
of any serious disaffection among the sepoys and therefore recomm­
ended no severe punishment for the sepoys or for their native officers. 
The Government of Madras was relieved with the report of the,
* Evidence of Mrs Revier, to Cradock, 28th July 1806, Home M isc.
Ser. V ol.507.
2 Col.Lang to Comm, in Chief, 25th and 26th July 1806, Home M isc. 
Ser. Vol. 507.
3Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Sec. Committee, 3 0th Sept. 1806,
(Wallajabad incident) See. Letters from Mad. V ol.2, 2nd Series.
4Comm, in Chief to the Gov. in Coun. Mad. 31st July 1806, Home
M isc. Ser. V ol.507.
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Commander in Chief and agreed with him that the sepoys at 
W allajabad should be spared of harsh tre&iment. * Petrie, 
the senior member of the Government, criticised Col. Lang 
and h is subordinate European officers for their injudicious 
behaviour in subjecting the sepoys to unnecessary labour and 
hardship* ^
Soon after the news of the disturbances of Hyderabad and
W allajabad reached M adras, Bentinck received the information
that Sheikh Cassim , one of the important leaders of the Vellore
outbreak, had made a voluntary confession to Col.Forbes, the
Commanding Officer of his battalion , This confession revealed
for the first time to the Government that there lay an extensive
preparation behind the Vellore mutiny and that it had a political 
3
object. Hereafter, the realisa tion  that the sepoy unrest was 
not confined to Vellore only and that the Vellore mutiny was a 
w ell-planned operation guided by the Mysore princes, alarmed 
Bentinck. He believed now that the possiblity of the exstence
 ^Chief Secy. Mad. Govt, to Chief Secy. Beng. Govt. 1st August, 
1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.507.
2 Petrie 's M inute, 29th July 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol.507.
3
Confession of Sk.Cassim to Col.Forbes, 31st July 1806,
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508.
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of a confederacy against the v ita l in terests of the British
1Government in South India should be taken seriously. The
confession of a Subadar in the Ceded D istricts further revealed
that the native cavalry of whom the Government had no suspicion
so long, was no less  affected by the mutinous spirit than the 
2
infantry. Bentinck's unprejudiced disposition thus gave way to 
extreme fear and this was reflected in much of what he said and 
did until he regained his judgment. To Minto, Bentinck confessed 
la ter on; "For many nights together after the mutiny at Vellore,
1 and every individual went to bed in the uncertainty of rising
3
alive. " Suddenly he felt that the situation was very critical
and wrote that "no dependence can be placed upon any of our 
4native .ftoops. " He dropped his previous non-comm ittallattitdde 
as regards the involvement of the Mysore princes into the mutiny. 
He warned Col.Munro that "the adherents of Tipu's family have 
been most active below and above the Ghauts (the Carnatic area). "
*Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in Coun. 3rd Aug. 1806,
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508.
2
Statement of a Subadar of the Native Cavalry to Munro, 1st Aug. 
1806, SeCfLetters from Mad. 30th Sept. 1806, V ol.2, 2nd se rie s .
3Bentinck to Minto, 20th O ct. 1806, B.P.
4Bentinck to Maitland, 3rd Aug. 1806, B.P.
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He was amazed at the extent of the conspiracy and stated:
" . . .  the conspiracy has extended beyond a ll belief and has
reached the most remote partsof our a rm i^ '. Bentinck's fear
was clearly manifested in the measures he pursued at the
beginning of August 1806. On 3rd August he implored the
Governor General to send immediate reinforcements to Madras
Presidency and proposed to detain the 19th and 94th European
2regim ents, scheduled for embarkation for Europe. Next, he 
sought help from M aj.G en. M aitland t the Governor of Ceylon.
After giving an account of the acute shortage of European troops 
in M adras, Bentinck observed to M aitland' ,rYou w ill perceive 
. . .  that we possess the most feeble means of suppressing any 
insurrection which might a rise . " The immediate transportation 
of European troops from Ceylon, he believed, would safeguard
3
the British possessions in Madras Presidency. He cautioned 
a ll the important officials of the Presidency against the eventuality 
of a widespread upsurge. He asked the R esident of Mysore to
^Bentinck to Munro, 2nd Aug. 1806, B.P.
2
Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Gov. Gen. in Coun. 3rd Aug. 1806,
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508.
3
Bentinck to Maitland, 3rd Aug. 1806, B.P.
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keep vigilant eyes on any sort of connection between Prince
1
Muizuddin and the inhabitants of M ysore. As a precaution
against further troubles in the C arnatic, Bentinck's Government
2decided to remove Tipu's sons to Bengal. Accordingly on 
20th August the princes were brought to Madras and were trans­
ferred to Bengal after ten days under Col. M arriott's supervision. 
Prince Mohiuddin and Muizuddin, who were directly implicated 
with the mutiny, seemed to be relieved by such moderate punish-
3
ment. The princes safely reached Bengal and were accommod­
ated near Calcutta on the premises of former Persian Ambassador. 
The M agistrate of the 24 Pargonas was instructed to keep strict 
vigilance on the princes.^
The terror which overtook Bentinck was shortlived and soon 
he recovered his confidence. He thought it necessary to restore 
the mutual trust of the sepoys and the Government. He rea lised  
that it was not the sepoys enmity but their prejudices which made 
them hostile  towards the British,authority. With the abrogation of
 ^Chief Secy. Mad. Govt, to W ilks, 3rd Aug. 1806, Home M isc. 
Ser. Vol. 508.
2
Chief Secy. Mad. Govt, to Harcourt, 3rd Aug. 1806, Home M isc. 
Ser. V ol.508.
3Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Sec. Committee, 30th Sept. 1806,
Sec Letters from Mad. Vol. 2, 2nd se rie s .
4
Gov.Gen's Minute, 14th Aug. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.509.
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"the obnoxious orders", therefore, he anticipated the restore 
ation of the sepoy 's loyalty."^ If the Government could once 
induce the sepoys to believe in their policy of religious non­
interference there would not be any further difficulty. "I am 
convinced", Bentinck wrote to Grenville, "that with time and 
common good management the (of the sepoys) w ill subside
and the sepoys will look back tfriftshame and horror upon their 
2conduct. " To Minto he revealed that his confidence in the
3
sepoys was "as strong as  ever" even after the mutiny at Vellore.
Some factors at th is point helped Bentinck to recover from 
his fright and sense of insecurity . The first was possibly 
Bentinck's realisation  that the incidents of Hyderabad and 
W allajabad, however distrubing in them selves, were not intimately 
connected with the Vellore mutiny. These incidents might have 
been inspired by the example of Vellore but not engineered by the 
Vellore m tuineers. In his minute of 23rd September, Bentinck 
clearly expressed his belief that the insubordinate sepoys of
4Hyderabad had no direct connection with the.m utineers of Vellore.
^Bentinck's Minute, 3rd Sept. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol.509.
2Bentinck to Grenville, 1st Dec. 1806, B.P.
3
Bentinck to Minto, 11th O ct. 1806, B.P.
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Similar was his conclusion about the case of W allajabad.
Secondly, he felt confident with the report of the Commission
of Enquiry, submitted on 9th August 1806. The Commission
stated that the dress regulations, the introduction of the new
turban and the prohibition of caste marks and earrings, seriously 
ok
impteged^the religious prejudices of the sepoys and constituted
the primary cause of the mutiny of Vellore. As a secondary
cause, the Commission pointed out that the discontent of the
Sepoys was "caught up and incited by some interested persons
like Tipu's sons, who were looking for an opportunity to regain
2
their power and prestige. " These findings fully confirmed Bentinck'i
views as to the primary cause of the mutiny and obviously satisfied
him. He commented that the report of the Eaquiry Commission "has
3
the entire concurrence of my opinion. " But the Council members
were not happy with the findings of the Commission and both the
4
Commander in Chief and the senior member of the Government, Petri<
 ^Chief Secy. Mad. Govt, to Chief Secy. Beng. Govt. 1st Aug. 1806, 
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
2
Report of the Enquiry Commission, 9th Aug. 1806, P .P . V ol.42, 
1861, p p .689-93.
3
Bentinck's M inute, 15th Aug. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508.
4Cradock's Minute, 21st Aug. 1806, Home M is. Ser. V ol.508*
 ^Petrie 's M inute, 21st Aug. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
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disapproved the report as an outcome of inadequate investi­
gation, Finally, Bentinck was encouraged by the views of 
Governor General,Barlow. The Supreme Government readily 
conceded Bentinck's proposal to remove the Mysore princes 
from Vellore to Bengal. But they firmly turned down Bentinck's 
request for the despatch of European troops from Bengal to 
M adras.^- I t  would be a m anifest indication, : Barlow cautioned 
Bentinck's Government, ihat-the Government (of Madras) had lost 
its confidence in the native troops and that the European troops 
are introduced to coerce or overawe them. Such an indication 
on the part of the Madras Government, Barlow believed, would only
help to grow adverse feelings between the European and the native
2
troops, which would be harmful for future pacification. Barlow's 
views prompted Bentinck to shake off the sense of insecurity and to 
rely on a judicious appraisal of the situation and a policy of 
moderation. From September 1806, Bentinck followed a policy 
of moderation on a ll issu es  connected with the Vellore mutiny.
1
Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in Coun. Mad. 11th Aug. 1806,
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 509.
^Ibid.
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Though the agitations of Vellore, Hyderabad and W allajabad
quietened, the British official c irc les in Madras Presidency was
s till suffering from severe psychological strain . Apparently there
was little  ground for apprehension. The insurgents had been taken
prisoners, absolute tranquility prevailed among the sepoys of the
Presidency and the dress regulations including the new turban had
been rescinded. There was no evidence that in terested  parties were
any longer plotting against the British authority and the Government
measures seemed to have produced desired effects on the sepoys.
Yet rumours among the British officials were rampant and the fclarm
of a new outbreak was haunting a ll the British military estab lishm ents.
In his memorial to the Court of D irectors, Bentinck recalled that even
after six months of the mutiny: "The officers were tortured by the
conviction of a general plot. In December 1806, Bentinck
described this situation as "frenzied". He further reported to
Grenville that the European Community were convinced of the fear
2of another sepoy outbreak without any ground w hatsoever. Such 
unusual apprehension often led to m easures bearing serious conse­
quences and one such incident developed a t Nandidroog.
* Bentinck’s Memorial, p. 35.
2
Bentinck to Grenville, 1st Dec. 1806, B.P.
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The fortress of Nandidroog was situated in the heart of
the Mysore territory where four companies of Indian sepoys were
stationed. In the middle of October, a rumour spread that the
Nandidroog garrison made a plan to repeat the m assacre Vellore
and that the Hindu and Muslim sepoys had sworn to act jointly
against the British on 18th October. The rumour alarmed the
Commanding Officer there to such an extent that he lost no time in
calling for immediate reinforcements from Bangalore. On the night
of 18th October the English, in fact, awaited an attack of the sepoys
in a barricaded enclosere with arms and ammunition. Nothing
however happened and on the following day the 22nd Dragoon
reached Nandidroog from Bangalore under C ol.D avies to find
1undistrubed peace in the area.
Following the case of Nandidroog, Col.Ogg, the Commanding
Officer of Bangalore, came across a rumour that the sepoys of the
2nd batalion of 1st regiment under him were involved in a plan of
insurrection. The Subadar of Bangalore, a relation to Purneah Dewan
2was suspected to be the leader of th is plot. The Subadar,was t
^Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Sec. Committee, 2nd Dec. 1806, Letters 
Reed, from Mad. Vol.3 , 2nd se rie s .
2
Resident of Mysore to  Gov. in Coun. Mad. 15th Nov. 1806,
Beng. Sec. & Pol. Cons. 5th Feb. 1807, V ol.200 ,N o .8.
promptly arrested and suspended from his du ties. An enquiry
following the arrest of the Subadar soon revealed that there
w as neither substantial evidence against the Subadar nor any
existence of disaffection among the sepoys. Bentinck at once
ordered the reinstatem ent of the Subadar and punished the British
officer by removing him from the Command of Bangalore.*
The development that took place at Palamcottah in
Tinnevelly d istric t in November was even more serious. In the
middle of November 1806 the Commanding officer at Palamcottah,
Major W elsh, had sensed the existence of a mutinous spirit
among the Muslim sepoys under his command. Being terrorised,
he did not bother to w aste time by verifying the grounds of his
suspicion. On 19th November, he decided to disarm the Muslim
sepoys by separating them from the Hindus and then expelled
them from the fort. Even after th is  he did not consider himself safe ,
and promptly despatched the news to the Commanding Officer of
the British subsidiary force a t Travancore and to the Governor of
2
Ceylon seeking a ss is tan ce . In h is le tte r to M aitland, the 
Governor of Ceylon, W elsh stated that he had detected a widespread
* Bentinck's Memorial, pp. 3 6-7 .
2
Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Sec. Committee, 2nd Dec. 1806, and 
1st Jan. 1807, Sec. Letters from Mad. V ol.3, 2nd series .
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conspiracy among the Sepoys all along the coastline and
that the security of the Company's possessions would be
in jeopardy without immediate arrival of European troops from
Ceylon. M aitland, in  his turn, arranged for the despatch of
troops and forwarded the in telligence to the authorities in England
instead  of breaking the news to Bentinck. * In his le tte r to Col.
Grant, the Commanding Officer of Travancore, W elsh cautioned
him against the dangerous disposition of the sepoys serving the
subsidiary force. Col. Grant a t once followed the example of
Welsh and disarmed the sepoys of his own establishm ent. While
effecting th is  he confessed that he h im self did not find any cause
2to suspect the fidelity of his sepoys. When Bentinck's Govern­
ment came to  know about a ll these inexpedient proceedings of 
the British officers, they promptly asked the Commanding Officer 
of Tinnevelly, C ol.D yce, to v is it Palameottah and to investigate 
into the whole ; Situation. To his u tter surprise Col.Dyce 
discovered that there was no cause of apprehension whatsoever, 
and that W elsh 's actions were rash , erratic  and extreme. Dyce 
at once decided to restore arms to the disarmed sepoys -  a decision
* Bentinck's Memorial, p. 38.
2
Gov.in Coun. to Sec. Committee, 1st Jan. 1807. See.Letters 
from M adras, v o l .3, 2nd Series.
which was immediately confirmed by Bentinck him self.
The bewildered sepoys resumed their du ties.*
The attitude of Bentinck's Government to a ll these  incid­
ents was one of restraint and moderation. Possibly they real­
ised  that it  was dangerous and unreasonable to alienate the best 
part of the Company's army, who had so long fought with the 
British with unexampled loyalty. Thus the policy of the^ Madras 
Government subsequent to the mutiny of Vellore was to regain the 
confidence of their fighting machine and not to break it up through 
groundless suspicions and rumours. About the then prevailing 
apprehension and suspicion among the British, Bentinck remarked:
"As long as th is feeling continues it w ill be fatal to the great
2
object of reconciliation. " Obviously Bentinck not only disapp­
roved but also  censured the inexpedient actions of the military 
o ffic ia ls . The case of Nandidroog was a clear example of such 
disapproval. However, the Madras Government could not take 
any step against the Commanding Officer there, as the Commander
*Gov. in Coun. Mad. to Sec. Committee, 1st Jan. 1807, 
Sec.Letters from Mad. Vol.3, 2nd se rie s .
2 Bentinck to Grenville, 1st Dec. 1806, B.P.
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in Chief defended him and the Supreme Government supported 
the Commander in Chief in the case.'*' But in Palamcottah, 
Travancore and Bangalore, Bentinck had no hesitation in punish­
ing the officers in command for their irresponsible behaviour.
If the incidents of Palamcottah, Travancore, Bangalore and 
Nandidroog illustrated Bentinck's forbearance, the reorganisation 
of the rebellions battalions by the Government showed his 
liberality . The Commander in Chief, Cradock, who was in 
favour of punishing the mutineers most severely, proposed before
the Madras Council on 2nd September 1806, of a to tal erasure of
2
the guilty regiments from the army l is t .  The proposal received the
3
approbation of the majority of Bentinck's Council. But Bentinck
him self was wholly against such a drastic  measure. He argued that
a to tal extinction of the regiments would only keep alive the
recollections "which i t  was our wisdom to extinguish as soon 
4as possib le . " He refused to believe that such extreme measures
1
Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in Coun. M ad ., 4th Dec. 1806, 
Bentinck's Memorial, pp. 120-22.
2 Cradock's M inute, 2nd Sept. 1806, Bentinck's Memorial, p p .31-2
3Petrie 's Minute, 12th Sept. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.509.
4
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would set a desirable example before the Indians. A large 
number of Indian commissioned and non-commissioned officers 
and sepoys of both the mutinous battalions (1st and 23rd) were 
arrested following the outbreak. In view of th is Bentinck pro­
posed to amalgamate the 1st and the 23rd battalions of the 1st 
regiment into the 1st battalion only. He further suggested that 
those Indian officers who actually  participated in the mutiny, 
should under no circumstances be allowed to resume their 
serv ice. But those officers, who merely had a knowledge about
the d isaffection, should be permitted to take up their military 
2du ties. This arrangement was fully accepted by the Madras
government and Bentinck reported that "the ju stice  of our opinion
(as opposed to the Commander in Chief's) had received the
3confirmation of the Supreme Government. "
Bentinck's liberality and moderation were glaring in his
treatment of the prisoners of the mutiny. The Commander in Chief
from the beginning insisted  on inflicting the severe punishment of
4general exile on a ll the prisoners irrespective of their gu ilt. He
^Cradock's Minute, 6th Sept. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.509.
2
Bentinck's M inute, 23rd Sept. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol.509.
3
Bentinck to Bosanquet, 2nd Oct. 1806, B.P.
4
Commander in Chief's Minute, 14th Sept. 1806, Home Misc.
Ser. Vol. 509.
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considered any pretence of justice  in th is  respect quite
superfluous. Bentinck was always against such a measure.
He preferred to appoint a Special Commission to classify
the imprisoned sepoys, "some of whom were leaders, some
participants^and some ignorant of what was happening", and
then to bring them before a native court-m artial. * Bentinck
pointed out that a great number of unarmed Vellore sepoys were
arrested after the mutiny in the outlying v illages. There was
thus a positive necessity  to specify their gu itt. The Council
supported him and resolved that a ll the sepoys arrested after the
Vellore mutiny should appear before a court-martial and Ije given
2an opportunity to prove their innocence. Bentinck had no doubt 
that only a proper tria l of the prisoners would conform to the prin­
ciples of ju s tice .
But before the tria l by native court-martial held. Col. 
Coombs and Lt. Col. Forbes were asked to investigate Into the 
guilt of the prisoners and to classify  them according to their 
m isdeeds. The report of these two officers was discouraging as 
they concluded that a ll the sepoys, without any distinction , took
^Bentinck's Minute, 23rd Sept. 1806, Home Misc. Ser. Vo. 509.
^Ibid.
more or le ss  active part in the mutiny. They did not find a 
single person who was ignorant of the mutinous proceedings. 
Even the sepoys on guard outside the fort came and joined the 
m utineers. Some of the sepoys were le ss  ac tive , but nonethe­
le s s ,  encouraged the insurgen ts.^  However, Col. Coombs 
and Lt. Col. Forbes recommended three alternative courses 
to deal with the prisoners: (a) to punish with death the most 
guilty by Court-m artial and to transport others; (b) to punish 
with death the most guilty and to grant an amnesty to all; and 
(c) to punish with death the most guilty and to keep the remain­
der in confinement.
Bentinck was obviously disappointed with the findings of 
Coombs and Forbes. As regards their propositions he discarded 
the first alternative. A mass transportation of prisoners for life 
would not make any d istinction  between punishment for murder 
and punishment for resistance  against an order. Such exile of
600 persons without tria l ’, according to Bentinck would alienate
2the sepoys as a whole and confirm the allegations of in ju stice .
^Report of Lt. Col, Forbes and Col. Coombs, 6th Sept. 1806, 
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 5 09.
2
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He considered the second alternative as "the most desirable 
if it could be adopted safely . " But he felt that to se t free 
people who were implicated in the m assacre might be an act 
fraught with future danger. He probably realised also  that 
in an atmosphere of tension , suspicion and alarm^general amnesty 
to prisoners would not receive much support from his colleagues.
So he pleaded for the adoption of the third alternative, namely, 
the confinement of the prisoners for the time being. Such a 
measure would provide the Government with sufficient time to 
efttjpire fully into the charges against the sepoys and to determine 
their future. At the same time the measure would relieve the 
Government from the accusations of in ju s tic e , severity and 
leniency. Bentinck therefore recommended that the court-martial 
should try only the most guilty ones and the rest be confined until 
their case was reconsidered by the Government.*
Bentinck's proposal was hotly debated in the Council and the 
Commander in Chief strongly opposed its  acceptance. In the 
treatment of the mutineers he was more in favour of propriety than 
legality and advocated summary tria l for them. General banish­
ment of the sepoys seemed to him the,only right,treatm ent. Cradock
* Bentinck's Minute, 13th Sept. 1806, Sec. Cons. B.P.
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believed that both the punishments, the indefinite confine­
ment and the outright banishment, would be painful to the 
sepoys. But confinement would do more harm to them than 
transportation for life by keeping alive their agitation and
revengeful d isposition .^  Petrie supported Bentinck's 
2proposal. O akes, the other Council member, though doubtful
whether a delay would be conducive to prove the guilt of the
sepoys convincingly, had no hesitation  in opposing the exile
3
of a large body of men without tria l and ju s tic e . Bentinck's
decision was thus accepted by a majority of the Council. The
ring-leaders of the mutiny were promptly brought before a Court-
Martial which was dissolved after pronouncing verdict on them.
On 23 rd September 1806, 6 of the principal leaders of the mutiny
4were blown away by guns, 5 were shot dead fiirvd 8 were hung. 
And the fate of the rest of the prisoners was s till left undecided.
"^Commander in C hief's M inute, 14th Sept. 1806, Home M isc. 
Ser. Vol. 509.
2
Petrie 's M inute, 16th Sept. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.509.
3O akes's Minute, 16th Sept. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.509.
4
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In December 1806, the Supreme Government of Bengal 
called Bentinck's Government for a prompt decision on the 
whole issue  and expressed their d istinc t preference for the
1transportation of prisoners as opposed to their imprisonment.
Bentinck was determined not to give up his policy of justice
and moderation. He appealed to the Governor General not to in s is t
2on banishment of the prisoners without ascertaining their gu ilt.
At th is point a change took place in the Government of Bengal.
In July 1807, Lord Minto came as the Governor General in place
3
of Barlow and concurred with Bentinck's view on the entire problem.
Regarding the treatm ent of the prisoners, the Supreme Government
finally decided to allow full d iscretion to the Government of M adras.
Following th is , Bentinck appointed two Special Commisions, -  one
a t Vellore and the other a t Madras -  for a final decision about the
4Vellore prisoners. According to the recommendations of these 
Commissions, the Government of Madras resolved not to call for 
any further court-m artial. They also  decided to liberate the majority 
1
Extract of a le tte r from the Gov. Gen. in Coun. to Gov. in Coun. 
Mad. Dec. 1806, Bentinck's Memorial, pp. 123-4.
2Bentinck's M inute, 8th Jan. 1807, Sec. Cons. B.P.
3
Gov. in Coun. to Sec. committee, 21st O ct. 1807, Sec. Letters 
from Mad. V ol.3, 2nd se rie s . '•
^Ibid.
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of the prisoners with the exception of those whose active
participation in the mutiny was proved beyond doubt. * The
Indian officers involved in the mutiny weBe to be dism issed
from the army. Bentinck, however, proposed to give them some
financial a ss is tan ce  for their future. He suggested that the cases
of the Indian officers and sepoys who were found implicated in
the m assacre, should be transferred to a regular Court of C ircuit.
He believed that such transfer would give the accused persons
the benefit of usual legal procedure. Lastly, he wanted to re lease
2the rest of the prisoners in succession . All the liberal proposals
of Bentinck received the consent of h is Council. In accordance
with the decision a number of Subadars and Jamadars of the
Vellore garrison were dism issed from their military duties with an
allowance of three and four pagodas per month respectively . The
innocent prisoners were re leased  by batches and they began to
3
se ttle  down peacefully.
Such was the end of the story of Vellore mutiny and the anguish
distrust and dismay accompanying i t .  The cruelties of the revolt and
the reprisals following the incident left a d istressing  memory in the
history of the Madras P resid en cy ..........................................
1 Resolution of the Gov. in Coun.M ad. 19th July 1807, Sec.Cons.B!
ry
BentinclCs M inute, 20th Sept. 1807, Sec. Cons. B.P.
3Gov. in Coun.M ad. to Sec. Comm. 21st O ct. 1807, See Letters fror 
M ad. Vol.3^ - 2nd se rie s .
CHAPTER VI 
THE VELLORE MUTINY : SOME OBSERVATIONS
The mutiny of Vellore led to lengthy and controversial 
d iscussions among the contemporaries as to its  causes. The 
d iscussion  was initiated by the Commission of Enquiry, which 
the Government of Madras institu ted to enquire into the incid­
ents at Vellore. The Commission found two factors responsible 
for the outbreak. The primary cause was the introduction of 
the new turban and dress regulations for the sepoys. The religious 
fanaticism  among the Muslim and Hindu sepoys, the Commission 
observed, had strongly prejudiced them against the new turban 
which unfortunately resembled the hats of the Feringhees (Europeans). 
The sepoys took it as a deliberate attempt on the part of the British 
to "Europeanise1 them and consequently they were alarmed. The 
other factor, the Commission stated , was the plot hatched by the 
Mysore princes. Tipu's sons were responsible for instigating the 
d issa tisfied  sepoys to fulfil their own object, namely, the restor­
ation of the rule of Tipu's family in Mysore. ^
Bentinck was satisfied  with the findings of the Commission, 
mainly because they corroborated his opinion to a great extent.
^Report of the Enquiry Commission, 9th August 1806, P .P. V ol.42, 
1861, p p .689-93.
He had no doubt that the turban and the dress regulations
issued by the military authorities in Madras were the real
causes of the mutiny. Hence the Vellore uprising, according
to Bentinck, was essen tially  a mutiny of the sepoys. "I have
as yet seen nothing to induce me to believe that the orders in
question (concerning dress and turban) were not the original
cause of the disaffection of the sepoys. The Commander
in Chief, Cradock, however, refused to accept what he called
"the inadequate findings" of the Enquiry Commission. Cradock's
views about the causes of the mutiny were totally  different from
those of Bentinck. He believed that the turban and the dress
regulations were of mere secondary importance. The outbreak
at Vellore was not a simple mutiny of the sepoys but an uprising
symbolising the general disaffection of the people. "The
Commission treated the mutiny as an upsurge of the- sepoys who
f<X\
were discontented", he wrote, "but the mutely was due to ^ rav e r 
2causes. " In Cradock's opinion the novel changes introduced 
by Bentinck's Government in the civil administration of the 
Presidency, especially  the revenue and judicial reforms had
^Bentinck's Minute, 5th Sept. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.510. 
^Cradock's M inute, 21st Aug. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
created disaffection among the people.
M aitland, the Governor of Ceylon, went further in
emphasising the political causes of the mutiny. According
to him the expansionist policy of W ellesley and the overthrow
of the Indian rulers caused political unrest. The resultant
suspicion and vengeance of the native ruling c lass  incited the
sepoys to rise in revolt. In M aitland's view the turban and the
dress regulations were nothing more than mere pretexts for the
mutiny.^" There was also  considerable d iscussion  on the role
of the Mysore princes in the' mutiny. Cradock believed that
the princes really engineered the outbreak by playing on the
2sepoys' fanaticism . Others like Bentinck believed that Tipu's
sons were not strong and active enough to engineer a revolt, but
3
they might have participated when it did take place. Such also
4was the view of the Governor General, Barlow. Petrie, the 
senior member of the Council, felt that Tipu's family, the tradit­
ional enemy of the British power in South India, fomented and led 
the mutiny at Vellore. Petrie, however, admitted that the mutiny
^Maitland to Minto, 21st Sept. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.510. 
2Cradock's M inute, 2nd Oct. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.510.
3
Bentinck's Memorial, pp. 13-14.
4
Barlow to Bentinck, 24th Sept. 1806, Home Misc. Ser. Vol.509.
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would not have taken place had there been no d issa tisfac tion
among the sepoys on account of the dress regulations.* O akes,
the other member of the Council, similarly believed that the
Mysore princes took advantage of a situation which was rendered
2explosive by the introduction of the new turban.
According to some views current in England and in Ind ia,
the real cause of the mutiny was the ac tiv ities of the Christian
3
m issionaries and evangelical chaplains. M issionary ac tiv itie s ,
it was alleged, had made the sepoys suspicious about the motive
of the British Government in introducing the new turban. The
hardships of the sepoys -  their poor pay and their ill-treatm ent
by the European officers and men -  were considered as additional
4causes of the mutiny.
Thus the people at the helm of affairs in Madras Presidency 
held a number of factors responsible for the outbreak. These fac­
to rs, though varied in importance, were the dress regulations, the 
Christian missionary ac tiv itie s , the startling changes in the civil 
adm inistration, the m aterial sufferings of the sepoys, the prevailing
*Petrie's M inute, 1st Aug. 1806, "Home M isc. Ser* V ol.510.
2O ake's M inute, 24th Aug. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 510.
3
Charles Grant to Bentinck, 17th April 1807, B.P.
4Bentinck's Minute, 11th Oct. 1806, Sec. Cons. B.P.
political unrest and the plot of the family of Tipu. It must be 
remembered, however, that these contemporary views were 
likely to be influenced by personal considerations, Bentinck, 
for example, was eager to prove that the mutiny was mainly 
due to the innovations in the dress of the sepoys. Such a 
conclusion would spare him and his administration from much 
of the blame leaving the responsibilities with the military author­
itie s , Similarly, Cradock's in terest would be fulfilled and the 
responsibility  of h is department shifted to executive authority 
if the mutiny could be ascribed to more general causes. It is 
necessary , therefore, to examine a ll the factors and determine 
their respective magnitudes.
Most of the sepoys, Hindus and M uslims, came from the 
rural areas where society w as generally conservative and narrow.
It was only natural that such men would possess strong religious 
sentiments and scruples as w ell as ignorance and superstition.
The introduction of the new turban and the dress regulations raised 
serious doubts in their mind as to the sincerity of the Government's 
secular policy. Their suspicions were not altogether ill-founded.
It was proved that the new turban had no connection with the
religions of the sepoys. But there is no doubt that the dress 
regulations interfered with the religious customs of both the 
Muslim and Hindu sepoys. While the prohibition of the 
whiskers was against the Muslim custom, the prohibition of 
caste marks and earrings was opposed to the Hindu practices. 
N evertheless, the authors of the dress regulations had no inten­
tion to hurt the religious feelings of the sepoys. But they could 
not prevent the sepoy from reading in the new army directives a 
clear encroachment upon his sacred religion. * Rumours soon 
spread and the passions were aroused. In his evidence before 
the Enquiry Commission, Col.M arriott observed: " . . .  the sepoys 
said that they had worn boots and gloves and now only a hat was 
needed to make them Ferinqhees. "?he situation soon became fren­
zied. Bentinck had no doubt that the mutiny would not have 
occurred at a ll if the religious feelings of the sepoys were not 
hurt by "the obnoxious" regulations. He substantiated his views
by pointing out that the rising completely subsided when the dress
3
regulation and the turban order were revoked. Same was the view 
of the majority of Bentinck's Councillors. The Supreme Government
^M arriott's evidence before the Enquiry Commission, 25th July 1806, 
Proc. of the Co<nm, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
^Ibid.
3
Bentinck to Minto, 11th Oct. 1806, B.P.
4also felt that the orders respecting the dress of the sepoys 
"constituted the active and vital principle of the whole plan 
(of mutiny) and were the real causes of the existing danger. "*
A number of mutinous sepoys outlined in their evidence before 
the Enquiry Commission the widespread resentment of the native 
battalions against the new turban. According to Sheikh Cassim , 
the sepoys generally believed that it was an infringement on their 
religions and as such they were willing to die rather than submit 
to it.
The argument loses some weight when it  is known that 
restrictions on the sepoy's dress had been introduced prior to 
March 1806. In order to maintain uniformity in dress and appear*- 
ance the military authorities in Madras had in practice in the past 
been opposed to caste  marks without arousing any hostility  among 
the sepoys. However, they had not passed any regulation in th is 
direction. The introduction of changes in the turban of the sepoys 
was in fact not new in the Presidency army. Several changes in 
the turban style resembling the new one had already been experimented
^Barlow to Bentinck, 24th Sept. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 510.
2
Confession of Sk. Cassim, 31st July 1806, Home Misc. Ser. Vol.508
without any resistance from the sepoys. The enquiries following
the in itial turban agitation proved that neither the shape nor the
materials of the new turban had anything to do with the religious
2faith of the sepoys. It may further be observed that only the
sepoys of W allajabad, Hyderabad and Vellore resisted  the new
turban. The native battalions in the Northern C ircars, in the
Ceded D istric ts, in Mysore, M alabar, Kanara and Southern
3Divisions manifested no apparent d islike for i t .  The agitations 
at W allajabad, Hyderabad and Vellore, therefore, did not repre­
sent the general sentiments of the whole body of sepoys in Madras 
Presidency. It may again be noted that the mutiny a t Vellore did 
not immediately follow the turban agitation. Normalcy had returned 
between the turban agitation of Vellore and W allajabad in May and 
the outbreak of mutiny at Vellore in July. This strongly suggests 
that the mutineers were not acting fanatically on the spur of the
moment. The mutiny was carefully planned and absolute]^ secrecy
4was maintained with regard to its  elaborate prepatations. Such
^Cradock's Minute, 2nd O ct. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.510.
2Proc. and Report of the Court of Enquiry at Vellore, 17th May 1806, 
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.507.
3
Madras D espatches, 29th May 1807, Vol.39.
4Confession of Sk.Cassim, 31st July 1806, Home Misc. Ser. Vol.508,
an organised move could not be the outcome of mere prejudices.
It is  true that the dress regulations and the new turban consid­
erably alarmed the sepoys. But it would be oversim plification 
to call these  the sole causes of the mutiny.
The sepoy 's suspicion about the Government interference 
in his religion brought into d iscussion  the works of the Christian 
m issionaries in India. The question was first raised in India by 
Cradock. Soon after the mutiny he observed that "the advance­
ment of C hristianity played a role behind the outbreak. Later 
on this view was taken up by some prominent persons in England . 
Some of the Company's Directors (Francis Baring, Swan^Toone, 
Thomas Turney, and William Elphinstone) believed that commotion
among the sepoys in the Carnatic had links withjthe ac tiv ities of
2the European Christian m issionaries. Some other Directors like
Charles Grant and Edward Parry had to battle against such opinions.
From the beginning of their rule it had been a settled  policy
of the Company's Government "in no way to meddle with the
4religious and social customs, of the Indians. " The m issionaries
^Minute of Commander in Chief, 25th July 1806, Home M isc.
Ser. V ol.508.
^Philips, C .H .,  East India Company, 1784-1834, p .160.
3
Embree, A ., Charles Grant and British rule in India, p p .241-45.
4
Philips, C .H . East India Company, p. 158.
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entered into the Indian territories but they never received any
encouragement from the British Government. In November 1804
the Court of Directors advised the Government of Madras not to
treat the m issionaries with any special favour.^- In 1807 Buchanon,
the Company's Chaplain in Bengal, was censured by the Govem-
2ment for his attacks on Indian relig ions. Carey, the Baptist 
m issionary at Serampore in Bengal, was similarly criticised  by
3
the Government for the same reason. In May 1807 the Court of
Directors made it further clear that in allowing the m issionaries
into India they had no wish to be associated  with the m issionary 
4ac tiv ities . Without any Government patronage, therefore, the 
Christian m issionaries were hardly a force to be reckoned w ith.
In Madras Presidency the number of m issionaires was small and 
they were "sadly neglected" by the Government.  ^ In the Carnatic 
there was only one missionary at the time of the mutiny and none 
near Vellore. There is  no evidence to show that missionary
^"Letter of the Court of Directors to the Govt, of Mad. 6th Nov. 1804. 
Madras Draft D espatches, Vol. 11.
2Embree, A ., Charles Grant and British rule in Ind ia, p .240.
3
Gov.Gen. to Gov. of Serampore, 1st Sept. 1807, Cited in A. Embree, 
Charles Grant and British rule in India, p .240.
4Madras D espatches, 29th May 1807, V ol.40.
5
Report on the various sec ts of the Church of Christ by Rev. Dr. Kerr, 
4th Nov. 1806, P .P . Vol.IX, 1812-13, p .442.
6Embree, A. Charles Grant and British rule in India. p .241.
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propaganda had any effect on the public mind in the neighbour­
hood of Vellore. Neither any responsible person other than 
Cradock in Madras mentioned or d iscussed  it as a probable 
cause of the mutiny nor any sepoy spoke of the m issionaries 
trying to convert them. It appears that the sepoy's refusal to 
aceept the new turban was caused not so much by their fear of 
being converted to Christianity but being ridiculed and looked 
down upon by the members of their communities.
Apart from their objection to the dress regulations and the 
new turban the sepoys had long suppressed grievances as to 
their pay and conditions of service. The hardships of the sepoys 
during the British wars at the close of the 18th century brought 
them no benefit.'*' They were generally treated very harshly by 
their European officers. The service of the Indian officers like 
Subadars and Tamadars was not attractive from the point of view
of power and influence and they were regarded as "the dowrjtrodden
2among officers. " Cradock him self admitted that the European
officers ill-trea ted  the sepoys and antagonised the Indian officers
3
through insolent behaviour. It may be recalled that the mutineers 
See Chapt. V. pp.
n
Bentinck to Minto, l$ix Oct. 1806, B.P.
3
Cradock's Minute, 2nd Oct. 1806, Home Misc. Ser. VolJ510.
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of Vellore were not only the sepoys but also  the Indian officers.
The Court of Directors sadly noticed th is fact and they had no
doubt that the Indian officers were alienated from the British by
the humiliation they suffered a t the hands of the European officers. ^
2To this was added the grievance of the sepoys for poor pay. In 
evidence given before the Enquiry Commission the sepoys them­
selves a ttested  that inadequate pay was a factor providing incen­
tive to their uprising. The Government records bore testim ony
that the Mysore princes attempted to rally the sepoys by promising
3
to double the amount of salary they received from the Company.
The sepoys at W allajabad explicitly  mentioned that poor pay,
excessive labour and rigorous d iscip line were their main com plaints.
In view of these  it may be observed that there was a general
resentment among the sepoys based on the grounds of their
insufficient pay and humiliating conditions of service.
Cradock, however, believed that not only the sepoys but
also  the people of the Presidency were discontented due to some
1 ~Madras D espatches, 29th May 1807, V ol.40.
^See Chapt. V, p. 289 .
3
Confession of Eusuf Khan, Havildar, 13th Aug. 1806. Campbell, 
Comm. Officer, Trichinopoly to the Govt, of Mad. 13th Aug. 1806, 
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508.
4See Chapt. V, p. 2>zt.
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hasty  and radical reforms introduced by Bentinck's Government. 
Indians were strongly attached to their ancient laws and usages 
and were averse to rapid changes. Without considering th is  fact, 
Cradock alleged, Bentinck introduced a new system of land revenue 
and established D istrict Courts to reform the laws of the country.
The people thus were "exasperated by a sudden introduction of a 
system of revenue, property and judicature unknown . . .  and 
adverse to their d isposition .
It is noticeable that while questioning the revenue and judicial 
measures of Bentinck, Cradock did not attempt to substantiate his 
criticism s. He never clarified what he meant by the m easures 
unknown and adverse to the disposition of the people. Bentinck's 
introduction of the Zillah courts reversed the previous adm inistration 
of justice  by the collectors of revenue and separated judiciary from 
the executive. In effect the measure offered security to the people 
against what Cradock mentioned "the oppression of Government 
o ffic ia ls" . Bentinck did not effect any drastic  reform in the laws 
of the Presidency. The Regulations passed in 1802 were mainly 
based on C ornw allis's reforms of 1793 in Bengal and they were not
1
Cradock's Minute, 21st Sept. 1806, and 2nd Oct. 1806. Home
Misc. Ser. Vol.510.
3*7
Bentinck's creation. The Madras Government on the whole 
retained the old system in which Muslim criminal law was 
administered to a ll , Hindu civil law to the Hindus and Mus lim 
civil law to the M uslims,  ^ Bn matters of land revenue Bentinck 
favoured the Rayatwari settlement which was not entirely new in 
the Presidency. The ray at s of Southern India were familiar with 
the direct system of land revenue. Besides, Bentinck wanted 
to introduce Rayatwari system only in the newly acquired unsettled  
d istricts of M adras. He did not interfere in the settled  areas 
like Northern C ircars, where the Zamindary system was in ex is t­
ence. The official documents have no evidence of any resistance  
on the part of the people of Madras either against the revenue 
arrangements or against the judicial regulations cf the Government. 
It is no wonder that neither the Court of Directors nor the Supreme 
Government nor the Councillors in Madras enquired into these  
factors as possible causes of the Vellore mutiny. None of the 
sepoys at any stage of the agitation or confession before the 
Enquiry Commission raised these issu es  as causes of the out­
break. The vague accusations of Cradock, therefore, cannot be 
considered as  causes of the sepoy mutiny.
* Bentinck's Memorial, pp. 19-23.
Though there was no popular discontent against the
Government on the questions of land revenue and judicial
system , there existed elements hostile to the Government,
Bentinck admitted the presence in the Presidency of a small
m i n o r i t y  o f  ' I n t e r e s t e d  p e r s o n s  w h o  a r e  d i s a f f e c t e d .  *  C r a d o c k
maintained that a large section of the Indian aristocracy was
2badly affected towards the British Government. The Court of
Directors a lso  believed that "disgruntled elements " were active 
3
in M adras. It is not difficult to specify these disgruntled 
elements in the context of the political situation of South India 
at the beginning of the 19th century. W ellesley 's expansionist 
policy resulted in the general weakening and gradual extinction 
of the Indian princes. Consequently their dependents and followers 
became powerless. In South India these dependents and followers 
included the relatives of the royal families and the members of the 
royal courts. This aristocracy w itnessed with deep concern the 
fall of Mysore, the absorption of Arcot and Tanjore and the humilia­
tion of Travancore. The nobility in Mysore and in the Carnatic
^Bentinck to Minto, l£;fc Oct. 1806, B.P.
2 Cradock's M inute, 2nd O ct. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.510.
3Madras Despatches, 29th May 1807, Vol.40.
suffered materially by the change of Governments in these p laces.
They lost position, power, wealth and privileges and consequen-
tly  became hostile  to the British Government.
The aggrieved elements of Mysore generally flocked around
the family of their m aster. In Vellore town alone 3 , 000 adherents
of Tipu's family settled  together.'*' The Enquiry Commission of Vellore
observed th is fact and commented that "the in terest of Seringapatam
2was transplanted in the C arnatic. " This large number of "outsiders" 
at Vellore were always eager to foment excitement on any pretext.
They were undoubtedly active in spreading the rumour that the
3
sepoys would become Christians if they wore the new turban.
One Lieutenant Er(/ing of Vellore garrison recorded that on the
night of the mutiny the bazzar (market) people a t Vellore were
4excited and seemed to know what was going to take place. The 
British resident at Hyderabad suspected that the nobles of Nizam's 
Court corrupted the sepoys of the subsidiary force stationed in the
1
Madras D espatches, 29th May 1807, V ol.40.
2Report of the Enquiry Comm. 9th Aug. 1806.
3
Evidence of Alleguiy sepoy before the Court of Enquiry instituted 
by G illespie, 16th July 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.507.
4
Evidence of Lt. ErvLng before Court of Enquiry, 13th July 1806,
Home Misc. Ser. Vol. 507.
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Mngdom. Rumours were current in Hyderabad that the 
Europeans were intending to m assacre the natives in order
2to obtain hundred heads to lay the foundation of a Church.
In this context it  is  a lso  necessary  to take note of the Poligars
-  the Hindu and Muslim military chieftains of Southern and
3W estern part of Madras Presidency. These powerful Poligars 
maintained private armies and bitterly resisted  the extension of 
British authority at the end of the 18th and at the beginning of 
the 19th centuries. When Bentinck arrived in M adras, most 
of the Poligars were subdued'. By 1806 the majority of them were
4either in confinement, expelled by force or deprived of authority. 
These humiliated Poligars naturally detested  the British rule in 
India and promised to a s s is t  Prince Muizuddin in course of the 
mutiny.
There is  no doubt as to the existence of an ti- British elements 
in the Presidency. Though they constituted a small minority among
the whole population, their grievances against the British Govern-
\
ment were deep-rooted. The role of Tipu's sons may be judged iri
* See Chapt. V, p. 3 z o ;
2Madras D espatches, 29th May 1807, V ol.40.
3
See Chapt. II, p. io£.
4
Madras Despatches, 29th May 1807, Vol.40.
th is context. The contemporaries are unanimous as to the 
involvement of the two sons of Tipu (Muizuddin and Mohiuddin) 
in the mutiny. There w as, however, some difference of opinion 
with regard to the importance of their part in the mutiny. Accord­
ing to the army authorities in Madras the Mysore princes took 
advantage of the sepoy agitation over the new turban, exploited
the situation and "led the conspiracy  ^ Army officials generally
2believed that the Mysore princes engineered the mutiny. Simi­
lar was the view of the Court of D irectors, who believed that
"behind the religious prejudices political factors were working "
3
at Vellore under Tipu's sons. O thers, like Bentinck and Barlow,
were not in favour of laying so much importance on the role of 
4Tipu's sons. They were of the opinion that Tipu's sons were 
prisoners and powerless. Consequently they were unable "to 
debauch the minds of the sepoys". Bentinck thought that the 
sons of Tipu would have loved to see the British Government in 
trouble, but they them selves had no capability to create it.
^Cradock's M inute, 2nd O ct. 1806, Home M isc. Ser. V ol.510.
2Harcourt and G illespie to C h.Secy. Govt, of Mad. 12th July 1806, 
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
3
Madras D espatches, 29th May 1807, V ol.40, Para. 17.
4Bentinck to Gen.Macdowall, 3rd Jan. 1807, B.P. and Barlow's
Minute, 11th Aug. 1806, Home Misc. Ser. Vol. 509.
About Muizuddin/ the most prominent among the princes,
Bentinck wrote that he was "a weak and foolish young man"
incapable of leading a rising.'*’
The facts, however, do not support the views of Barlow and
Bentinck. Numerous evidence proves the involvement of Tipu's
sons, especially of Muizuddin, with the mutiny. Muizuddin
organised and directed the sepoys for the mutiny through his
2attendants and agent -  Alanddin. It was Muizuddin who attempted
3
to obtain help for the mutineers from the poligars and allies in Mysore.
Before the mutiny he publicly disclosed that he would soon be out from 
4
his captivity. According to the plan of the mutiny, Muizuddin was
also supposed to lead the mutineers and his favourite horse was found
ready inside the palace ga te .^  There is no doubt whatsoever as to the
complicity of the palace people in the m assacre of the Europeans at
Vellore. It may be recalled that neither Mohinddin nor Muizuddin
were exatiyy "weak or foolish young men". In fact C ol.M arriott, who
6knew them intimately, entertained a differetit opinion. A genial,
^Bentinck's memorial, pp. 13-14.
2 Confession of Sk. Cassim , -31st July 1806, Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508,
3See Chapt. V, p. 3o£.
4
Evidence of Syded Churadmund Ally, former servant of Mysore Govt.
23rd July 1806, Proc. of Enquiry Comm. Home Misc. Ser. Vol. 508.
^See Chapt. V. p. j ofT
l^ Ibid., p. Zoo.
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impulsive prince of the esteemed family of Tipu was therefore
quite capable of assuming the leadership of an uprising.
Two other facts further demonstrate the entanglement of
Muizuddin and his asso c ia tes  in the mutiny. One was the object
which the mutineers promised to ach ieve, namely, the destruction
of the English and the restoration of Tipu's family to the throne of
Mysore. The other w as the use of Tipu's family flag in course of
the mutiny. A group of mutineers led by one Inam Khan replaced
the British flag a t the top of the fortress by Tipu's flat?.1 Muizuddin's
la ter explanation that the sepoys forcibly took away the flag from 
2his possession  was not supported by other evidence and was 
made probably for h is own safety . No direct evidence, however, 
could be obtained against Muizuddin and Mohiuddin to charge 
them for plotting against the Government. They were neither seen 
during the ac tions, nor appeared in the secret meetings nor openly 
preached rebellion.
From the above d iscussion  it may seem clear that of a ll the 
alleged causes of the mutiny some are tenable while others have
1 Evidence of Inam Khan, 9th Aug. 1806, Proc. of Enquiry Comm.
Home M isc. Ser. v o l .508.
2Evidence of Col.Marriott, 25th July 1806, Proc. of Enquiry
Comm. Home Misc. Ser. Vol.508.
no foundation at a ll . The ac tiv ities  of the Christian m ission- 
aires and the judicial and revenue m easures of Bentinck are 
not even the remote causes of the mutiny. The d ispossesed  
aristocrats and the disinherited sons of Tipu formed together 
a political factor in the Presidency. The Muslim nobility and 
the Poligars were aggrieved at the loss of their esta tes  and 
privileges. With the hope of recovering their former position 
they supported Tipu's sons in their bid for regaining control over 
the Kingdom of M ysore. The princes who had not forgotten the 
power and glory of their house found in the sepoy disaffection 
an opportunity to rise  against the British authority. The sepoys 
and their Indian officers were generally d issa tisfied  on account 
of their inferior position in the British army, their meagre salary 
and the insolent behaviour of the British officers. Their general 
d issatisfaction  needed a cause for an outburst which was provid­
ed by the dress regulations and the new turban. Alarms of 
"religion in danger" were soon raised  by the interested patties 
and the sepoy's fears were aroused. At th is point the princes 
took the active lead and the rebellion w as planned.
The uprising of Vellore was thus not a mere mutiny of the 
seppys. It w as secretly  planned and carefully organised. Recruits
to the plot were selected with great caution and every new 
member was required to take an oath before joining the con­
spiracy. In the presence of at le a s t two ring leaders of the 
uprising the new entrant had to drink milk and take oath on 
the Koran that he would fulfil the object of the plot, namely, 
the overthrow of the British power in M adras.1 The object 
definitely imparted a political character to the rebellion. The 
sepoy leaders, in fact, were moving with a political programme. 
Men like Sheikh Adam, Sheikh H ussain, Sheikh Cassim , Sheikh 
Ahmed, Inam Khan had no confusion in th is regard. But it is  
doubtful whether the common sepoys fully understood the object 
of the mutiny and acted for its  implementation. The efforts of 
the sepoy leaders and the palace attendants to keep alive the 
sepoy's apprehensions with regard to the new turban and the dress 
regulations prove that they relied heavL ly upon the religious 
prejudices of the sepoys.
It was the prevalent tendency among the British officials 
to characterise the Vellore mutiny as an uprising of the
1 Confession of Havildar Emsuf Khan, 1st Aug. 1806, Campbell, 
Comm. Officer, Trichinopoly to the Gov. of Mad. 1st Aug. 1806, 
Home M isc. Ser. V ol.508. The oath taking on the Koran obviously 
applied to the Muslim sepoys. The Hindu sepoys, presumably, 
were required to take oath on their religious tex ts . However, th is 
cannot, be confirmed.
Mohammedan sepoys. Bentinck him self referred to the mutiny
as an operation of "numerous moormen. 1,1 Cradock believed
2that the mutiny was the product of a Muslim conspiracy.
3
Important military o ffic ia ls, too , adopted the same view. As
a result of such belief in November 1806 the Muslim sepoys at
Palamcottah were disarmed following the rumour of a disaffection
4and were separated from their Hindu counterparts. However, 
the evidence of the Vellore mutineers proves that th is opinion is 
not correct. There is  no doubt that the sepoys of the troubled 
spots of Vellore, W allajabad and Hyderabad were predominantly 
Mohammedans. But the Hindu sepoys also  joined hands with them 
and played a significant role during the mutiny. Alleygurry, a 
Hindu sepoy was one of the ring leaders of the Vellore mutiny. It 
was alleged that in 'the  course of the mutinous proceedings he shot 
dead a prominent British officer, Major Armstrong.  ^ Col. M arriott,
1 Bentinck to Minto, 20th Oct. 1806, B.P.
^Cradock's M inute, 2nd Oct. 1806. Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 510.
3Petition of the M ilitary Officers to the Governor, Home M isc.
Ser. Vol. 507.
See Chapt. V. p. 3 5 ^  .
^Evidence of C ol.Forbes, Comm.Officer, 1st Batt. 1st Regt.
22nd July 1806, Proc. of the Enquiry Comm. Home M isc. Ser.
Vol. 508.
in his evidence before the Enquiry Commission, named a Rajput 
sepoy -  Ram Singh -  who incited the sentries of the palace to join 
the m utineers.1 There is evidence to show that the palace people 
made separate arrangements for the distribution of betels, sw eet­
meats and drinks among the Hindu and Muslim sepoys during the 
2mutiny. There is further proof that some Hindu sepoys like
Muthuswamy Naik, Muthulingam and Juggernath Naik, actively
3
participated in the m assacre of the Europeans.
Though all the sepoys, both Hindus and M uslims, took part 
in the mutiny; they were not supported by the common people.
The excitement, preceeding and succeeding the mutiny, made 
little  impression upon the inhabitants of the locality . The 
mutiny did not demonstrate any great flaw in the economic or 
political policies of the Company's Government. It did not voice 
any grievance of the people or raise any great enthusiasm in favour 
of the Mysore princes. Even the question of religion did hardly move
1Evidence of Col.M arriott, 31st July 1806, Proc. of the Enquiry 
Comm. Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 508.
2Evidence of Moorty, 13th July 1806, Proc. of the Court of Enquiry, 
Home M isc. Ser. Vol. 507.
3
Confession of Havildar Eusuf Khan, 10th Aug. 1806. Campbell,
Comm. Off. Trichinopoly to the Govt, of Mad. 10th Aug. 1806, Home 
M isc. Ser. Vol.508.
the populace to action. Hence once the sepoys were crushed,
the revolt, having no mass involvement, subsided. Tension died
after the transfer of the Mysore princes to C alcutta, discipline
restored and daily life returned to normalcy. Only five months
after the mutiny, Bentinck wrote without hesitation:”^the empire
1is  safer in my opinion than ever it w as in any former period".
The aim of restoring Tipu's dynasty in Mysore by destroying
the British authority in Madras was politically very lofty. But
an isolated uprising of the sepoys at Vellore, however prepared,
was too insufficient a means to atta in  this ambitious end. A
series of sepoy mutinies in a ll the military establishm ents of the
Presidency, a simultaneous rising of the Poligars and the a llies
of the princes and widespread popular support for Tipu's sons
might have seriously threatened British authority. Bentinckwas
relieved to find that no such great combination or connection of
2
in terests acted behind the outbreak of Vellore. The imprisoned 
princes, as the facts bear out, failed to make such a great move. 
With several hundred sepoys and vague promises of securing help
^Bentinck to M aitland, 8th Dec. 1806, B.P. 
2 Bentinck to Grenville, 1st Dec. 1806, B.P.
they desparately gambled against the consolidated might of the 
British in South India.
The lack of popular sympathy and the conspiratorial pseudo­
religious nature of the mutiny were its  g reatest w eaknesses. To 
this was added the general confusion of the ordinary sepoys who 
had no clear idea as to the aim of the mutiny. The inevitable 
result was the ultim ate failure even after in itia l su ccess . Soon 
after the fort was captured the sepoys found enormous wealth 
scattered in the paym aster's office and in the quarters of the 
European officers. Greed overwhelmed them and unrestrained 
scramble for looting began. The (Commission of Enquiry noted th is 
fact and observed "the eagerness with which the sepoys and men 
of the palace betook them selves to p lunder.. and to escape 
out of the fort with their booty, tended to weaken the general 
effect of insurrection".'*' The plundering converted the professional 
soldiers into an indisciplined horde and the high command of 
mutineers completely failed to control the sepoys. On the 
following morning a good number of sepoys had deserted and the
^Report of the Enquiry Commission. 9th August 1806, P*P. 42,
1861, p .p .692
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remaining were in no sta te  of mind to be organised to offer
resis tance . In his confession Sheikh Cassim bitterly lamented
over this failure* He w as of the opinion that the plundering
and the defection of the sepoys were the main factors that
contributed to the failure of the mutiny. ^
£
Bentirjk's main concern, after the suppression of the 
mutiny, was to soon inform the Court of Directors of the 
outbreak and the measures he had taken to overcome the great 
trouble. The first news of the mutiny, Bentinck determined for 
obvious reasons, must reach the Directors from the Madras 
Government. The intelligence was accordingly sent to the Court 
of Directors in August 1806. But that was not considered enough. 
Bentinck decided to despatch a special ship to England carrying 
the full official reports and documents and an officer of the 
Madras Government who could explain the details and reinforce 
the Madras Government's version of the causes and nature of 
the mutiny. The special ship Sara Christiana sailed from the 
Madras shore in the middle of October 1806 with Major Leith > 
who was well acquainted with "the la te  transaction of Vellore 
and generally conversant in our m ilitary, revenue and judicial 
system s.
^Confession of Sheikh Cassim . 31st July, 1806 Home M isc.Ser.V ol 50!
2 Bentinck's Minute 15th Sept. 1806. Home Misc. Ser. Vol. 509.
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The news of the Vellore M ut/iny reached England at the
end of December 1806 and as it was apprehended the Court of
Directors shocked and panic-stricken at the first intelligence.'*'
However, after going through the documentary m aterials which
arrived lfater in April 1807, the Court was able to form its  own
opinion on "the most brutal and murderous incident". In their
despatch to the Madras Government dated 29th May 1807, the Court
stated thair conclusion that the sepoy disaffection was produced by
the innovations of dress which was u tilised  by the captive sons of
Tipu and their adherents. The extravagancies of the mutiny at Vellore
the court stated , "did not proceed solely from religious zeal but were
2fomented by the political views of the family of Tipu. " However, in 
the Court's opinion, the most alarming part of the whole episode was 
not the existence of a plot but an absolute lack of its  knowledge on 
the part of the Government. The Directors were astonished to note 
that the mutiny originated and developed so secretly that it was not 
noticed even by a single English officer. "The country people", the 
Court of Directors observed, "who knew well of the mutiny prepar-
3
ations, never cared to convey any alarm to the Government. "
1  ~Allen, W .H. / .Lord William Bentinck's Administration", Calcutta
Review. Aug. 1844, Vol. 1, N o .l ,  p .344.
2
Madras Despatches, 29th May 1807, Vol.40, p.p. 31-153
3
Ibid. para. 5
From their examination of the incidents leading to the outbreak
of Vellore, the Court inferred that not only the military authority
but also the Government of Madras and their civil officials were
indifferent to and unaware of the feelings of the natives of India.
The Court thus censured Bentinck's Government for carelessness
and indifference in their dealings with the in itia l agitation of 
1the sepoys.
An analysis of the facts leaves no doubt that the failure 
to prevent the mutiny is to be borne by a ll engaged in the civil 
and military adm inistration of M adras. As the head of the 
Government Bentinck certainly possessed  immense responsibility 
for what was happening in M adras. In the M ilitary Administration, 
the Commander in Chief and his advisors had more specific 
responsib ilities. M ilitary officers like the Adjutant General, Col. 
Agnew, (who was in charge of the overall military establishment) 
and the Deputy Adjutant, General Major Pierce, (who framed the 
dress regulation) were directly responsible for the growth of 
sepoy discontent. Similarly, the paym aster Col. Marriot, the 
Supervisor and in charge of Tipu's family a t Vellore, could be 
charged for his failure to detect the conspiracy between the 
princes and, the sepoys. In, fact a ll the European o fficers, who
"^Madras Despatches, 29th May, 1807, vo. 40, pp 31-^153
were unable to discover the plot of the sepoys, should be 
accused for lack of vigilance and negligence of their du ties.
Petrie, the senior member of the Government, who had long 
experience in Indian affairs, likew ise failed to furnish the 
Government with the benefit of his judgments at the hour of 
c ris is . In order to decide, therefore, that on whom and in 
what extent lay the responsibility of the mutiny, the conduct 
of the individual officials should be examined.
As the head of the military establishm ent of M adras,
Cradock had his own share of responsibility . It was he who
authorised the new turban, Inspite of the in itia l resentment of
the sepoys against the new turban, Cradock compelled them to
wear it . Moreover, after the first show of sepoy resentm ent, he
did not care to pass the General Order as advised by Bentinck
to assure the sepoys of their religious sanctity . The Court of
Directors took an adverse view of Cradock's conduct. Consequently
he was suspended from his service and was recalled from India in
September 1807. Cradock, however, does not stand defenceless.
He was a newcomer to India and ignorant about the Indian
character and customs. He introduced the new turban on the sole
ground of its  being an improvement on the old one.'*' When
_  -  ~
Extract from Deputy Adj. G en 's, le tte r. Sec. Letters from Mad.
3 0th September 1806. Vol. 2, 2nd Series.
he found that the sepoy agitation on the issue  was formidable 
he lost no time in seeking the advice of the civil authority. He 
imposed the new turban on the sepoys only when he was authorised 
by the Government to safeguard the military d iscip line . As 
regards the dress regulations Cradock personally was not 
responsible. Not being himself conversant in lndian affairs, he 
authorised Pierce and Agnew to draft the Military Code of Regul­
ations. Both these officers had more than twenty years of service 
experience in India and Cradock relied on them as Indian experts.
He found nothing objectionable in the regulations prohibiting 
caste-m arks., earring and w hiskers, which were drafted by these 
two officers. All these prove Cradock's ignorance which in itse lf  
is  no defence. In spite of the errors of his advisors, Cradock 
could by no means avoid the responsibility for the new turban 
and dress regulations. The Court of Directors, too, admitted this 
fact.'*' Perhaps Cradock's greatest blunder lies  in his negligence 
to make a thorough investigation into the whole matter after the first 
sepoy agitation. He vas too eager to shift his responsibility to the 
Government by informing them of the turban issu e . Even at this point 
he did not mention to the Government of other dress regulations 
except the new turban.
"^Madras Despatches, 29th May 1807, Vol. 40.
He himself^toojdid not take care to find out to what extent 
the changes introduced in the d resses and appearance of the
sepoys had affected their religious p ractices. He considered
/
the new turban only and did not a s s e s s  the implications of 
the dress regulations.
Cradock might have been ignorant about the superstitions 
and prejudices of the sepoys but such was not the case with 
his advisors. Deputy Adjutant General Pierce was given the 
charge of drafting the Code of Regulations especially  for his 
long experience in Indian affairs. But he turned out to be 
equally ignorant of the religious feelings of the sepoys. 
Otherwise, he would not have incorporated the notorious dress 
regulations in the code. Similarly, Adjutant General Agnew, who 
had a long associa tion  with the Indian people, designed the 
new turban without thinking of its  probable consequences.
Even after the first agitation against the new turban neither Agnew 
nor Pierce realised  their m istakes. Agnew^on the contrary,treated 
the sepoy resentment as a trifle and commented that "it (the 
agitation) was merely a momentary effort of insubordination 7  
which ju st a degree of rigour was adequate to quell^and had, in 
fact, completely suppressed. The truth is that both Agnew
^Bentinck's Memorial, p. 4.
and Pierce had no idea that the dress regulations were
contrary to the policy of religious non-interference of the
Company's Government. This was why these  two officers
did not draw the attention of the Government when the Military
Code was d iscussed  and passed by Bentinck's C ouncil.
According to normal practice the Civil Government was not
supposed to examine a ll the clauses and sub-clauses of a
military code unless specially  mentioned by the military
administration. Bentinck and his colleagues, therefore, came
to know about the existence of the dress regulations in the
Code only when the mutiny was over. *
If Cradock lacked initiative and Agnew and Pierce failed
to appreciate the feelings of the sepoys, the military officers
at Vellore grossly neglected their du ties. The callousness among
the officers a t Vellore was symbolised in the way in which Col.
Forbes ruled out the information supplied by Mustafa Beg and
Col. Fancourt paid no heed to one M rs. Burke, who was eager
2to convey news about an atrocious plan . Petrie was right when 
he complained that "the plan, object and preparations^)**the 
revolt had been commonly talked of in the barracks of the sepoys 
and in the Pettah of Vellore for a month before the mutiny, without
■^ See Chapter V, p. 314..
2 See Chapter V, pf, 3 0 3 - ^ ,
5J7
hfovjw#. 1
its^comiSrj to the knowledge of even a single officer. " The
officers were even careless in performing their routine du ties.
On the night before the mutiny the European officers^out of
sheer indifference^shifted their responsibility  of going on a
2
fina l round in the barracks to the native officers. If the 
European officers had m eticulously carried on their duties they 
might have either suspected something unusual or actually  
detected the plot.
Among a ll the officers of VelloiQ, Col. M arriott's 
failure to obtain information was most conspicuous. Being 
entrusted with the sole charge of the Mysore princes, Marriott 
was in the most advantageous position to discover a coalition 
between the palace people and the sepoys. Knowing w ell all 
about the turban agitation he failed to perceive any political 
conspiracy in the palace. He knew the princes intim ately, but 
never doubted them of any complicity with the sepoys. He 
seemed unperturbed even when prince Muizuddin^on the eve of 
the mutiny,suddenly decided to buy a good horse, desired to 
pass the nights in his public room on the 8th and 9th July, 
and finally asked his permission to allow his personal attendants 
and one of h is cousins to stay with him during the night of the
^"Petrie's Minute, 21st August, 1806. Home Misc. Ser. Vol. 508 •
2
See Chapter V, p. 305*
mutiny. Petrie seriously took up the point and said that
M arriott's proceedings on the eve of the mutiny should be
2
investigated thoroughly. In fairness to Marriott it could be
stated that the behaviours of the princes though unusual were
not sufficiently significant to make him suspicious of a
treasonable plot. This, however, could not relieve Marriott of
his share of the responsibility of the mutiny. According to him
two of the Tipu's sons were quite capable and worthy to  keep the
3name of their father. In that case after the first turban agitation
he should have become more cautious and vigilant about the
movement of the princes. Neither Bentinck, nor Cradock, nor
the Enquiry Commission took any notice of M arriott's laxity .
Petrie 's own conduct is  not beyond question. Among all
the members of the Government Petrie was the most experienced
and well versed in Indian affairs. He was absolutely right, when
immediately after the mutiny, he observed that it was better to
concede to the prejudices of the sepoys than to allow the d is -
4affection to grow. But Petrie did not express such a view in 
May 1806, when the Commander in Chief, consulted,the
^See Chapter V, p. SOS'.
2 Petrie 's M inuter 21st August, 1806, Home M isc.Ser. Vol. 508
3
See M arriott's Character Sketch of the princes. Chapter V, pf>. 2.93-30  
^Petrie 's Minute, 14th July, 1806, Home M isc.Ser. Vol. 510
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Government on the turban question. Petrie 's moderation at that 
point might have been most effec tive . The Court of Directors 
seized this lapse and censured Petrie for not advising the Council 
in time against the enforcement of the  new turban. His advice, the 
Court believed, "would have properly restrained the Government's 
zeal for discipline.** In February, 1808, Petrie stated  in  his 
defence that he refrained himself from expressing his personal views 
in May 1806 for fear of m isrepresentation. He thought that his coll­
eagues would misunderstand him as a promoter of native superstition
2against the Governmental authority. W hatever might have been the 
reason, the Government of Madras did not receive the benefit of 
Petrie's widdom.
Bentinck as the Governor of the Presidency was held re s­
ponsible by the Directors for several specific m istakes which 
in effect helped the growth of a mutinous situation . In the first 
place, he was blamed for the choice of Vellore fortress situated  
at the heart of the C arnatic, as the residence of Tipu's captive 
sons. According to the Court of Directors such a prominent place
of residence like Vellore could eas ily  be turned into a centre of 
3
rebellion. Bentinck was also  critic ised  for treating the Mysore
* Madras D espatches, 29th May 1807, Vol. 40, para. 20.
^Petrie 's answer to the Court of D irectors, February 1808, B.P. 
^Madras D espatches, 29th May 1807, V ol.40.
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princes leniently by allowing them handsome grants and the
services of their numerous a ttendan ts. In the second place,
Bentinck was accused of his in itia l ignorance regarding the
"obnoxious” dress regulations. Bentinck and his Government
duly sanctioned the new M ilitary Code of Regulations for Madras
without caring to know its  full contents. In the third place,
Bentinck was severely critic ised  for his failure to institu te
adequate investigation into the origin of the first sepoy disaffection
%
at Vellore and W allajabad. A thorough enquiry would have 
brought the dress regulations to the notice of the Government 
and induced them to treat the turban agitation more seriously.
The Board of Control alleged that the decision of Bentinck's 
Government on 4th July 1806 to enforce the new turban was based 
on inadequate information derived from the Court-Martial proceedings 
against the accused sepoys and not on the grounds of thorough 
investigation.'*’ Lastly, Bentinck was censured for not rescinding 
the unpopular turban order at the right moment. The objection 
of the sepoys to the new turban, how ever,ill founded, was 
sincere and formidable. In the circum stances its  withdrawal
1
Report of the Board of Control on the Vellore Mutiny
April, 1807, B.P.
might have convinced the sepoys of the Government's 
tenderness towards their religious scruples. The Court of 
Directors believed, that had Bentinck ordered the withdrawal 
of the new turban following the first m anifestations of sepoy 
disaffection at VelloB2.and W allajabad in May, there would have 
been no mutiny on 10th July, 1806. * When the news of Vellore 
outbreak reached England, the Court of Directors decided 
without delay to recall Bentinck. Their decision was conveyed 
to the Government of Madras by the despatch of 15th April, 1807, 
and Bentinck was removed from his position with effect from 
11th September, 1807. The Court further censured three other 
responsible persons in Madras in connection with the Vellore 
mutiny. The Commander in Chief also  was recalled and Agnew 
and Pierce were dism issed from their serv ices.
For nearly two decades after his reca ll in 1807,
Bentinck vigorously defended a ll his decisions and actions 
relative to the Velloieoutbreak.  ^ It is  necessary to examine into 
the justifications of Bentinck's recall on the grounds of Vellore. 
mutiny and also  to ascertain  whether the Court had any reason 
other than the mutiny to inflict such a, severe punishment on him.
"^Madras D espatches, 29th May 1807, Vol. 40, para. 11
2 Following his recall Sir John Cradock also  attempted in
England to defend h is actions during the mutiny without
much su ccess .
3 '8Z-
On the first charge of housing the Mysore princes at Vellore 
Bentinck seems to bear little  direct responsibility . The 
sections of the Vellore fort as the residence for the princes 
was made by W ellesley himself before Bentinck came to India.
The elaborate arrangements for the supervision of the princes
were made by C live's Government in Madras following the
fall of Seringa pa tarn. Bentinck only le t the arrangements continue.
He in -fac t, had no reason to suspect that Tipu's sons would 
take advantage of the locality of their residence.  ^ On the 
question of Bentinck's leniency towards the princes, it may 
be observed, that the Government had no grounds to suddenly 
tighten their control over Tipu's sons. During their stay in 
the Vellore fortress for six year previous to the mutiny, the 
princes had done nothing to arouse the suspicion of the authorities. 
Besides, as Bentinck believed, some amount of generosity 
towards the princes was necessary to keep them satisfied  and 
inactive. A rigorous treatment would have irritated the princes 
and their well-w ishers and thus encouraged them to organise sedition, 
Theoretically, Bentinck can be charged for his ignorance 
about the dress regulation as he and his. colleagues had duly
Bentinck's Memorial, 12,
^Ibid. p. 13
sanctioned the Military Code. Had he known he would have 
attached greater importance to the turban agitation. The 
ignorance was unfortunate but not inexcusable and its  
responsibility  was not wholly Bentinck's own. Usually the 
Governor in Council did not scrutinize military documents 
clause by clause when they were agreed in principle to its  
general tenor. In th is particular case only special reasons 
(doubts regarding the propriety of dress regulations) would 
have prompted them to thbroughly examine 150 folio shee ts, the 
document ran into. Even the Court of Directors admitted that 
it was not unpardonable on the part of the Governor in Council, 
if they were unable to read the (Sode very minutely. It was the 
duty of the Adjutant General to point out to the Government a ll 
the important c lauses the document contained.^
Bentinck was accused of not instituting a thorough enquiry 
into the turban agitation soon after he came to know of it from 
Cradock. His difficulties in th is respect may also  be appreciated 
The introductions of the new turban and dealing with the 
consequent sepoy agitations at Vellore and W allajabad fell
"^Madras Despatches. 29th May 1807, Vol. 40, paras. 9 -  10
strictly  w ithin the jurisdiction of military adm instration.
The military authorities call for a Court-M artial to deal 
with the matter and the enquiry made by them revealed 
that the disaffection of the sepoys was unreasonable and 
baseless.'*’ Normally, the  civil authorities did not interfere 
in the deta ils  of military adm inistration unless the issu e  was 
of great importance. Bentinck, who at th is point was unaware 
of the regulations prohibiting w hiskers, castemarks and earrings 1 
regarded the turban issu e  as trifle and groundless. Moreover, 
up to the end of June the Commander in Chief did not ask  the 
Government to take any step in th is direction.
Finally, on 29th June, Cradock drew the attention of the
Government on the turban question. He explained the whole
situation (but did not mention anything about other dress
regulations) and even wanted to withdraw the new turban in  face
of w idespread sepoy opposition. This change in his attitude
was not due to the discovery of any new facts but to certain
2information he had received from some military offic ia ls. The 
disaffection of the sepoys was s till considered as irrational by 
the army authorities and they stood by the opinion of the 
• Court M artial. .........
1
See Chapter V, p. j2_93 .
2
See Chapter V, p. 2.95
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Bentinck, too , believed in the findings of the Court-M artial and 
considered the turban agitations as  irra tional, based on the 
sepoyrs ignorance and supersitions. In such a c a se  he followed 
the most normal course of action . Bentinck assured the Commander 
in Chief of his support and advised him to reinforce discipline 
among the sepoys, and to continue the new turban. But a t the 
same time he wanted Cradock to is su e  a  General Order to the sepoys 
positively stating that the Government had no intention to interfere 
in  their re lig ion . The General Order drafted by the Government of 
M adras, if  published, might have produced a quietening effect on 
the sepoys and the populace. But unfortunately, the Commander in 
Chief in the meantime had changed h is mind. Encouraged by the 
reports from subordinate officers -  th a t  tranquility had returned 
among the sepoys -  Cradock wrote to the Government: "the d isin­
clination to the turban (among the sepoys) oh as become more feeble, 
or perhaps that the reports have been exaggerated. Under that view  
i t  may be judicious to postpone the publication of the O rder.. .  as no 
longer the interposition of the Government Is  required.
* Cradock to Gov. in  Coun. 7th July 1806 , Bentinck*s Memorial 
p .59.
The proposition was therefore dropped. However, when
the mutiny did take place at Vellore and Bentinck came to
know a ll about the dress regulations he lost no time to
withdraw the new turban and the regulations regarding castem arks,
whiskers and earrings.^  Thus Bentinck could not be accused
for imposing the new turban only for the sake of upholding
Governmental authority against genuine grievances. In fact,
he had no special connection with the mutiny except the
general responsibility as the head of the Government. On the
grounds of the Vellore mutiny, therefore, Bentinck's recall
was uncalled for and an exceptionally harsh m easure. Even
the Court of Directors them selves expressed satisfaction  at
2
Bentinckfe intelligent handling of the mutiny affairs. After a ll 
the mutiny was promptly crushed, mutineers were properly 
dealt w ith, agitation subsided and the conspiracy did not survive. 
These were by no means insignificant achievem ents.
In recalling the Governor of Madras the Court of Directors 
either neglected a thorough examination of the circumstances of 
the mutiny or were influenced by their previous d issa tisfac tion
^See Chapter V, p. 315.
2
Madras Despatches, 29th May, 1807, vol. 40. paras 2 6 - 3 0
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with some of Bentinck's m easures. In their despatch dated
15th April 1807, the Court of Directors took the decision to
remove Bentinck from his position in M adras. But at that
moment the Court hardly knew all the details  of the mutiny,
as Major Leith with a ll his official documents concerning the
outbreak was s till on his way to England. In April 1807, the
Court's knowledge a^ewt-the mutiny was inadequate and they
were not in a position to express their considered opinion before
29th May, by when Major Leith arrived. The despatch of 29th
May 1807, however, did not arrive at Madras until Bentinck
left in September 1807. In their resolution, originally drafted
on 7th April 1807, the Court had decided to remove Bentinck
on the grounds of "the unhappy incidents -  which have lately
taken place at V ellore" and also  of some measures "in the
other parts of h is Lordship's adm inistration" which have come
1before the Court. The Board of Control was not satisfied  with 
this draft of the Court, as they realised that their knowledge c.bo^t the 
mutiny was s till too inadequate to make a specific charge against 
Bentinck. In their amended despatch of 15th April, the home 
authorities preferred not to mention the Vellore Mutiny but to
^Madras Despatches, 7th April 1807, Vol. 39.
refer vaguely to the "circumstances which have recently come 
under our consideration. "  ^ The despatch of 15th April points 
to the fact that Bentinck's removal was decided by the Court 
before they were furnished with the full information of the mutiny. 
This is further clear from, the most important despatch of the 
Court to the Madras Government dated 29th May 1807. In that 
despatch the Court wrote about Bentinck: " . .  • we have had
pleasure in expressing our satisfaction  with different measures 
of his (Bentinck*s ) Government, but others which we felt our­
selves obliged,in the course of the las t year to disapprove, 
impaired our confidence in him, and after weighing all the
considerations connected with the business of Vellore^we ielb
0
ourselves unable longer to continue that confidence X\n him -
which it is so necessary for a person holding his situation to 
„ 2p o ssess . "
Thus there were certain factors apart from the mutiny of 
Vellore which had d isp leased  and antagonised the Court against 
Bentinck. The question of the increase in expenses of the 
Madras administration and Bentinck's defying attitude towards 
the home authorities were probably two such factors. In several
"^Madras Despatches, 15th April 1807, Vol. 39.
2Madras Despatches, 29th May,1807, Vol. 40 Para. 24
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of their despatches to Madras the Directors had sternly criticised 
some of Bentinck s financial m easures which in their opinion had 
increased the expenditure of the Government. One such measure 
was the increase of the salaries of Government officials of diffe­
rent categories. On 9th April 1806, the Court of Directors warned 
Bentinck against his policy of financial extravagance:- ,rWe must here
repeat what had been so often pressed on your attention . . .  that 
- tk t,
the situation of^fLnances in India requires an earnest and unremitting
regard to economy and to the retrenchment of a ll superfluous and
unnecessary expenses. " Bentinck was also  criticised for making
"improper additions" to the Commander in C hief's allow ances. ^
The Court's great concern for economy in adm inistration was often
disregarded by Bentinck. In April 1807, the Court repudiated the 
cost of collection of revenue in certain d istric ts of Madras Pre­
sidency and warned Bentinck against any increase of expenditure.
On the same ground they also rejected Bentinck's proposal for the 
enhancement of the allowances of the revenue offic ia ls. Finally^
the court severely criticised  the expensive nature of some of the
2
Bentinck's judicial m easures. Bentinck's defiance to some of
^Madras D espatches, 23rd July, 1806, Vol. 37.
2Madras Despatches, 7th January, 1807, and 15th April,
1807, Vol. 39.
directives and warnings of the Court had further aggravated their 
feelings against him. At least on three occasions Bentinck's 
behaviour led to very unpleasant situations. In June 1805, the 
Court censured Bentinck's visit to Calcutta to d iscuss the 
question of revenue settlement of Madras with W ellesley and 
rebuked him for not submitting before the home authorities any 
report of his discussions with the Governor General. * The 
Directors always disapproved of Bentinck's measure of appointing 
military officers for the collection of revenue, even if these  offi­
cers were of Munro's calibre. They were displeased with Bentinck1
refusal to remove some of such officers and they deplored his
2defiant attitude and tone of reply. In connection with the
judicial administration of the Presidency, the Directors similarly
accused Bentinck for introducing certain changes in the Sadar
3
Diwani Adalat without their prior sanction. These incidents 
had led the Court to believe that Bentinck deliberately ignored 
their command and followed an independent policy of his/own.
The Court, being thus annoyed with their principal officer 
in M adras, were most likely to view the mutiny as a proof of
"^Madras Despatches, 10th Feb. 1807, Vol.39.
2
Madras D espatches, 15th April 1807, V ol.39. 
^Ibid.
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Bentinck's personal fa ilu re . Once decided in favour of Bentinck's 
removal on 7th April 1807, the Directors stuck to their decision and 
fe lt that Bentinck's Government "did not exercise the discernment 
and vigilance which a ll the circum stances of the timEerHquiired.
It may be noted here that on 7th April the Directors were not unani­
mous in deciding Bentinck's re ca ll. There was no difference of 
opinion on the question of recalling Cradock, but a  considerable 
debate took place on the propriety of Bentinck*s removal. Some of 
the prominent members like Charles Grant and Bosanquet deeply 
regretted the harsh decision . "I am extremely sorry for what has 
occurred", Bosanquet wrote to Bentinck, "and am s till  more sorry 
for the terms in which the  recall is  worded. The la tte r particularly,
1 think, was neither necessary  nor called for . . .  nor am I of opinion
that i t  has been wise or prudent to erect a  temporary Government (in 
2
M adrasi." Charles Grant, the then Deputy Chairman of the Court, 
a lso  deeply regretted the recall and stated  tha t he was not
3
a patty to the decision . A debated decision like Bentinck's 
d ism issal could have been reached
* Madras D espatches, 29th May 1807, Vol. 40, Para. 22.
2
Bosanquet to Bentinck, 15th April 1807, B.P.
3Charles Grant to Bentinck, 17thApril 1807, B.P.
i
iif
after a careful consideration of what Bentinck had to say. But 
the Court were reluctant to give Bentinck such an opportunity. 
This shocked Bentinck to a great extent. In 1809, he wrote 
b itterly ; "My removal was effected in a manner calculated to 
make it peculiarly mortifying and d isgraceful. " *
Thus ended ingloriously in September 1807 > the career of 
Bentinck in M adras. His concern for maintaining the Government 
policy of religious non-interference, h is confidence in the 
Indian so ld iers , h is precautions against the repetitions of 
Vellore mutiny and his liberality  in the treatment of the mutineers 
were a ll sadly neglected. Bentinck's firmness in dealing with 
the panicky m ilitary authorities at Na%\didroog, Palamcoit&h and 
Travancore were overlooked. It was also  forgotten that at the 
beginning of 1807, M adras-Presidency recovered quite s a tis ­
factorily from the effects of the mutiny and that none of the 
adm inistrative measures of Bentinck's Government proved to be 
unpopular . Bentinck was accused of m istakes made collectively 
by all and suffered an unjust punishment. It was only natural 
that Bentinck resented h is recall as an in justice . 'W hatever
have been my errors, " he wrote, "the^have not merited a 
punishment,than which a heavier could hardly have been
^Bentinck to the Court of Directors, 7th February, 1809,
Bentinck's Memorial, p. I
3 9 3
awarded to the most wretched incapacity , or the most criminal 
negligence. " ^
Bentinck^s Memorial, p. 49.
CONCLUSION
The mutiny of Vellore was the most unfortunate incident 
during Bentinck's tenure of office in M adras. It was one of such 
occurrences over which the head of the Government had.no control. 
The adm inistration of the army was the special responsibility of 
the M ilitary Board and the Governor in Council were not supposed 
to interfere in the d e ta ils . None of Bentinck's measures of reform 
had any bearing on the outbreak. He had little  opportunity to 
avert the c r is is . His behaviour and policy during and after the 
mutiny were vindicated by the circum stances. He did nothing in 
connection with the mutiny which could justify  h is reca ll. To 
hold Bentinck responsible for the Vellore outbreak in 1806 is like 
accusing Lord Canning for the uprising of the sepoys in 1857. If 
Bentinck's d ism issal is  not justified  on account of his incompet­
ence in relation to Vellore mutiny, it may then be, as it can be 
argued, for his failures in dealing with other adm inistrative or 
political problems. Was it so? A critical review of his adminis­
tration provides a negative answer.
At the time of Bentinck's arrival in Madras the Presidency 
was confronted with two major political problems, the war with the 
M arathas and the apprehension of a French invasion in South India.
From the point of view of policy both were matters for the 
Supreme Government to deal with. In connection with the 
Maratha w ars, Bentinck as a Presidency Governor played a 
subsidiary but useful role. He effectively a ss is ted  with men 
and money, thte British campaigns against the M arathas outside 
the Presidency limits (in Central and W estern India). Simul­
taneously, he took adequate steps for the security of Madras 
Presidency against sudden Maratha invasions. In insuring 
Southern India against a French menace, Bentinck carried out 
elaborate precautionary measures and arranged for the safety of 
the coastal lines. He was aware of the necessity  of preventing any 
coalition between the Marathas and the French. Similarly, Bentinck 
was vigilant against the growth of any combination between the 
protected Indian princes, the Marathas and the French. In his 
dealings with the Indian Kings he attempted to harmonise the nec­
essity  of British intervention in their sta tes with the ju stice  of 
respecting their jurisd ictions. On the whole, Bentinck's perfor­
mances in relation to the Marathas and the Indian princes and the 
French menace were satisfactory. At tim es, however, he appeared 
to be too much committed to W ellesley 's policy of expansion and
of subsidiary a lliance. Expansionism and expensive wars at th is 
time were straining the Company's resourees in India and the 
Court of Directors disagreed with W ellesley 's policy and decided 
to replace him by Cornwallis. Bentinck did not appreciate this 
change in policy and disliked C ornw allis's moderation as  manifes­
ted in his treaty with the M arathas in November and December 1805. 
Again, at the beginning of the same year he took advantage of an 
internal trouble in the friendly state of Travancore to impose a harsh 
and unnecessary subsidiary alliance on the Durbar. But the Court 
of Directors never censured him for th is .
The settlem ent of land was the most important question 
which Bentinck faced and it is in this field that he made one of 
his important contributions. Though an admirer of C ornw allis's 
system , he believed that the land policy should be based on 
thorough investigations. What was good for Bengal might not 
necessarily  be good for M adras. Hence the Supreme Government's 
policy of extending Permanent Zamindary settlem ent in other British 
territories should be re-examined in the light of regional variations. 
He therefore approached the question with an open mind and persu- 
aded the Supreme Government to withold official decision and to 
keep the question wide open until his own investigations were
completed. He initiated elaborate enquiries into the Village 
system and became convinced that the Permanent Rayatwari system 
was the best for Madras Presidency. It was then that he put his 
whole weight on the side of the Rayatwari settlem ent which in due 
course was implemented in Madras Presidency. As regards the day 
to day adm inistration of revenue he came across cases where the 
Company's collectors were guilty of corruption, negligence and 
oppression. By instituting thorough enquiries in such cases and 
by inflicting exemplary punishments on the cu lprits, Bentinck was 
able to arouse the confidence of the people in the fairness of the 
British adm inistration. It appears, however, that Bentinck's trea t­
ment of Garrow was too severe. But the Court of Directors did 
not oppose him in th is case . Also they never opposed or censured 
Bentinck's advocacy of the Rayatwari Settlement in M adras.
Bentinck attempted to system atise the irregular adm inistration 
of ju stice  in M adras. He extended the Regulations of 1802 throughout 
the Presidency and introduced the Zillah courts in a ll the unsettled 
d is tric ts . He abolished Collectors Cut cherry and put an end to the 
abuses arising from the unlimited use  of the judicial powers by the 
Company's executive officers. In order to separate judiciary from 
the executve he dispensed with the Governor's jud icial authority 
which he exercised as the President of the Sadar Adalat. Here he
followed the principles of Cornwallis's judicial reforms. Bentinck 
was also able for the first time in the history of Madras Presidency 
to establish  a regular police force to maintain law and order in the 
country. Bentinck; however, could not implement SDme of his 
favourite judicial ideas, e .g . reorganisation of the Company's 
courts, appointment of men of considerable l«gal experience in the 
courts of the Presidency, establishm ent of a uniform legal system , 
the abolition of the Supreme Court and the withdrawal of English 
law from Madras Presidency. These were too far-reaching changes 
to be undertaken loCally by a Presidency Governor. His opposition 
to the Supreme Court was possibly motivated to some extent by his 
personal relations with Justice Gwillim. Though the conflict between 
Bentinck and Gwillim was mainly due to the unreasonable behaviour 
and malice on the part of the la tte r, Bentinck did little  to easfethe 
tension. His in itia l refusal to sanction the expenses for the appoint­
ment of Indian law ass is tan ts  in the Supreme Court, his es tab lish ­
ment of the police force in Madras without consulting the judges 
previously, and his selection of a military official (from among 
his body-guards) as Superintendent of Police of Madras -  a ll only 
added fuel to the fire. But there is no evidence to show that the 
authorities at home took any notice of th ese . Once the quarrel
was started by Gwillim, Bentinck appears to have had no desire 
to come to a settlem ent. Yet on none of the issu es  of conflicts 
with Gwillim Bentinck exceeded h is authority or override the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This stand enabled him to 
emphasise that the judge, instead of co-operating with the Govern­
ment, was villifying and resisting it from the performance of its 
du ties. Bentinck's argument obviously had its  effect and the home 
authorities subsequently recalled Gwillim.
Bentinck inherited a depressed Madras treasury and worked
relentlessly  for its improvement. He was zealous in reducing the 
«
budget d efic its . His economy in military expenditure and his 
currency reforms were praiseworthy endeavours. His successfu l 
experiment with the creation of a Government Bank in face of 
opposition from the advocates of Laissez Faire was unique in the 
history of finances. At the same time he opposed the town duties 
which interfered with the free trade of the country. He also  favoured 
the introduction of a direct house tax much to the opposition of his 
superiors and a sso c ia te s . These financial measures left the Madras 
treasury with better prospects in 1807 than what it had in 1803.
The above review of Bentinck's adm inistration does not 
reveal any glaring failure. There is  a lso  no proof that any of the
major reforms effected by Bentinck were ever disapproved by the
home authorities. The only exception was the creation of the
Government Bank which the Court of Directors persistently  opposed.
As facts bear out the Court of D irector's decision  to dism iss
Bentinck was neither justified on the grounds of the mutiny nor
on account of adm inistrative failures, 
then
W h^w as Bentinck recalled? . Some minor acts of defiance 
on his part had displeased the Court and made them sceptical 
about him. However, these in them selves could not have led 
to his recall. The Court was bewildered at the sudden outbreak 
of the Vellore mutiny and became alarmed. The uprising coincided 
with the defeat of England's a llies by Napoleon and the introduction 
of the Continental system . While Napoleon threatened the English 
trade in Europe, the Vellore mutiny, as it might have appeared to the 
Directors in the heat of the moment, threatened their precious Indian 
possessions. In th is  circumstance they probably felt that somebody 
must be held responsible for this alarming episode. Also, in order 
to convince them selves that they were taking a drastic  step to set 
things right in M adras, the Court resolved to make Bentinck a scape­
goat for the mutiny. In this the then President of the Board of Control 
George Tierney, an enemy of Bentinck's father, might have played
an important role. The Court realised .later on that they were 
not right in dism issing Bentinck. Their offer of the Governorship 
to Bentinck in 1819 and his appointment as Governor General in 
1827 certainly point to th is direction.
With the Governors General and the Supreme Government
Bentinck, on the whole, was able to maintain good re la tions.
He usually received on a ll questions the approbation and support
of the Supreme Government. W ellesley was generally satisfied
with Bentinck. At one point in 1804 however, misunderstanding
developed on the issu e  of the actual sta te  of deficit of the Madras
Government and the measures that Bentinck adopted without prior
sanction of the Supreme Government. The estrangement did not
la s t long and cordiality was soon restored. Bentinck did not
hesita te  to acknowledge the support and advice he received from 
2W ellesley. Bentinck personally had great respect for Cornwallis 
who succeeded W ellesley. As regards Madrax, C ornw allis's short 
second term was not disturbed by any friction. Bentinck also  
enjoyed full understanding with Barlow , ttoe successor of Cornwallis.
^Bentinck's Journal, 1807, B.P.
2
Bentinck to W ellesley, 27th May, 1805, B.P.
*05
On all issues concerning the Vellore mutiny he received full
support from the Governor General. Minto, who arrived a t the
end of Bentinck's Governorship, gave him full discretion in the
disposal of the Vellore prisoners.
The members of Madras Council always co-operated with
Bentinck. Apparently Bentinck did not like one of his colleagues,
O akes, whose nomination to the Council he had opposed without
success."^ In his turn Oakes was not favourably disposed towards
the Governor. There is no proof, however, that personal factors
affected their public conduct. Oakes never opposed Bentinck in
his various m easures. He, in fact, supported the Governor during
the troubled days of the mutiny and held sim ilar views with Bentinck
on different aspects of the uprising. Petrie, the senior member of
the Council, was generally helpful to Bentinck. But he stood
against Bentinck on the questions of Government Bank and paper
currency. This opposition even led to some misunderstanding
between the two and Bentinck even imagined that Petrie and Oakes
2had formed a faction against him. The fear,was unfounded and the
^Boulger, D . , Lord William Bentinck. pp. 27-8.
2Bentinck to Pettie, 27th Feb. 1806, B.P. and Petrie to Bentinck
28th Feb. 1806, B.P.
misunderstanding was shortly se ttled . It could be pointed out 
here that the establishm ent of the Government Bank was the only 
point on which Bentinck decided to override the Council. Bentinck 
also encountered a divergence of opinion on the mutiny with the 
Commander inChief Cradock. But he had no difficulty in dealing 
with Cradock's predecessors, Stuart and Campbell, With John 
Chamier, whom Oakes succeeded, Bentinck had excellent relatioi£.  ^
Bentinck's record in Madras on the whole was satisfactory . 
Without being brilliant he proved himself to be an able and effective
Governor. From time to time his measures were appreciated by his
2 3superiors, by the European community in M adras, and by the
4
eminent Indians. But even without testim onies, Bentinck's 
Governorship w ill be notable for his endeavours to preserve the 
British Raj through good government and to tetrike a balance between 
the considerations of economy and efficiency in adm inistration. His 
success was in no standard small.
^Bentinck to Chamier, 22nd Feb. 1806, B.P.
^W ellesley to Bentinck, 18th Nove. 1805, B.P.
3
W alter Grant to Bentinck, 25th Sept. 1807, B.P.




Papers of Lord William Bentinck, Madras Period 1803-7, 
Portland Collection, Manuscript Department, Nottingham 
University Library, Nottingham.
This collection contains private and official communications 
between Bentinck and others. A substantial portion of these 
papers are loose and kept in bundles, files and boxes. The 
M anuscript Department of Nottingham University Library has 
performed a commendable job by classifying and detailing every 
single le tter and document. Some new acquisitions have 
recently been added to the Portland Collection of which a few 
relate to M adras. In th is thesis  an extensive use has been 
made of a ll the papers listed  below:
(a) In volumes:
1 General correspondence, P .W .J.B . 1-51 (1803-7)
2 Financial Department Correspondence, Memoranda 
e tc . ,  P .W .J.B . .52-56 (17981805)
3 M ilitary Department Correspondence, Memoranda 
e tc . P .W .J.B . 57-65 (1806-7)
4 Political Department Correspondence, Memoranda 
e tc . ,  P .W .J.B . 66-69 (1804-5)
5 M iscellaneous Correspondence, Memoranda e tc . ,  
P .W .J.B . 70-87 (1798 -  1808).
(b) In file boxes:
1 General Correspondence e tc . , P .W .J.B . 88-342 
(1797 -  1812)
2 Bentinck's letters to Petrie, P .W .J.B . 3 43-584
{ (1803-7)
(c) Loose:
1 Correspondence, P .W .J.B . 585-649 (1788-1809)
2 Memorandas, Reports, M inutes, e tc . P .W .J.B . 
650-701 (1786-1810)
3 M iscellaneous, P .W .J .B ., 702-721 (1798-1807)
(d) Letter books :
P .W .J.B . 722-728
1 Bentinck to W ellesley and Castlereagh, 1803-4.
2 Bentinck to various persons, 1804-7.
3 Bentinck to various persons, 1805.
4 Bentinck to W ellesley and C astlereagh, 1805
5 Bentinck to Governor General and President, 
Board of Control, 1806-7.
6 Bentinck to various persons, 1806-7.
7 M ilitary letters of Bentinck, 1807.
(e) M inutes:




Revenue & Judicial Departments
General, Commercial and Law Departments
(f) Recent acquisition on Madras Period
Madras Police, 1806-7
2
W ellesley Papers, Manuscript Department British Museum. 
Correspondences between W ellesley and Bentinck during the 
la tte r 's  stay in Madras are contained in the following three 
le tte r books, arranged chronologically:
(a) Draft and copies of letters from W elles ley to Bentinck, 
4th December 1805 - 11th April 1805. Additional Manu­
script 13 633
(b) Letters from Bentinck to W ellesley, 11th September 
1803 -  2nd May 1805. Additional M anuscript, 13634.
(c) Letters from Bentinck to W ellesley, 3 0th December 1803 
-  3 0th June 1805, Additional M anuscript 13635.
B Government Records. Record Section, India Office, 
Library, Foreign Office.
The numerous volumes of records of the Govemmentsof Madras 
and Bengal and the authorities in London on various subjects are very 
usefu l. Following records have been consulted and used in th is thesis
Madras Board of Revenue Proceedings 1803-7, Range 287,
Vols. 15-64. Range 288, Vols. 1-58 
R
Madras Revenue Proceedings, 1803-5, Range 275, Vols. 60-80, 
1805-8, Range 276, Vols. 1-25.
Madras Political Proceedings 1803-8, Range 316, Vols. 123-4. 
Range 317, Vols. 1-20.
Madras Judicial Proceedings, 1803-8, Range 321, Vol.95. 
Range 322, Vols. 1-40.
Madras Public Proceedings, 1803-7, Range 242, V ols.35-75 
Range 243, Vols. 1-35.
Letters Received from M adras, 1803-8, Vols. 29-35. 
D esptatches to M adrsa, 1004-9, Vol. 33-43.
Judicial Letters received from M adras, 1804-8, Vols. 1-2. 
Judicial ^ p a t c h e s  to M adras, 1805-14, V o l.l.
Military Letters received from M adras, 1803-7, Vols. 1-4. 
M ilitary D espatches to M adras, 1804-9, Vols. 1-2.
Revenue Letters received from Madras, 1803-8, Vol. 1-2.
Revenue Despatches to M adras, 1804-11, Vols* 1-2.
Secret Letters received from Madras (2. Series):
1st Series, 1804-9, Vol.3
2nd Series, 1798-1809, Vols. 1-3.
Bengal Secret and Political Consultations 1803-7, Vols. 119,111
131 ,134 ,136 ,138 ,140 ,143 ,144 ,150 ,155 ,157 ,162 ,163 ,164 ,165 ,
175,177,178,179,180
Bengal Public C onsultations, 1803-7, Vols. 23 ,2 4 ,3 3 ,3 6 ,3 7 , 
3 9 ,4 1 ,4 3 ,4 8 ,5 0 ,5 1 .
Bengal Judicial Consultations, 1803-7, Range, 6, V o ls.5-10.
Secret Letters received from Bengal, 1803-8; Vols. 5-10.
Board's Copies of Abstract of Letters, Secret, Political and 
Foreign Departments and Selections from other Departments, 
1803-13, V ol.6.
Correspondence between the Court and the Board 1801-13,
Vol. 2.
Draft Despatches submitted by the Court to the Board 1803-7, 
Vols. 10-14.
Board's C ollections, Vols. 178 ,179 ,180,190,191,197,198,
22?,240,274,291.




The Fifth Report of the Select Committee, 1812.
Administration of the Revenues of the ancient possesstions 
(Fort St. George); the Jaghire lands, introduction of the Bengal 
System of 1793, Modern possessions, Circars and Havelly 
lands, e tc . ,  V ol.7, 1812-13.
"I5<dLesley's Minute Srj uktU- recjfrftd ~k ^ M ^ e e s  ,
V& t' Ii > I go b •
New System of Revenue and Judicial Administration in Bengal, 
Madras . . .  Introduction of Christianity in India; Report by 
Rev. Dr. Kerr, Senior Chaplain of Fort St.George e tc . Vol.9 
1812-13.
Vellore Mutiny (Native troops), report of the Commission 
dated 9th day of August, 1805, Vol. 42, 1861.
Evidence by Lord William Bentinck, 1835, Vol.XL, 1836.
Regulations, Charters and other publications:
Regulations and Acts enforced in the Madras Presidency 
relating to revenue matters from 1802-82, Compiled by 
F .J.D aw es, M adras, 1882.
The Charter of the High Court of Judicature at Madras and the 
Courts which preceded it from 1687-1865. Edited by John Shaw, 
Madras 1888.
Orders, Rules and Regulations to be observed respecting the 
troops on the Coast of Coromandel in 1766, M adras, 1766.
Regulations for the Honourable Company's troops on the Coast 
of Coromandel. By M aj.£en.A .C am pbell, M adras, 1787.
The new arrangement with respect to the rank and promotions 
of the army in the East Indies, . . .  with the peace estab lish ­
ment for each Presidency of Bengal. Madras and Bombay,
By Committee of O fficers, London, 1796.
A new edition of the Code of Regulations for the internal 
adm inistration of the Madras territo ries, 1802-29, 2 Vols, 
edited by A .D .Cam pbell, M adras, 1830.
British India Analysed: the Provincial and Revenue estab lish ­
ments of Tipoo Sultam and of Mohamedan and British conquerors 
in Hindostan stated and considered, by C .T .G reville , London, 
1793.
T reaties. Engagements and Sattads relating to India and 
neighbouring courtries: edited by C .U .A itchison, 19 09,
Vols. Ill, IV, X.
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IIIl Contemporary Books and Pamphlets
Bentinck, Lord William Charles Cavendish, Memorial 
Addressed to the Honourable Court of Directors . . .
Containing an Account of the Mutiny a t Vellore with the 
Causes and Consequences of that E ven t,,February 1809.
London 1810.
Buchanan, F . , Tourney from Madras through the Countries 
of M ysore, Canara and Malabar in 1807. London 1810.
Dubois, J.A. , Hindu M anners, Customs and Ceremonies,
1823, Translated by H .H . Beauchamp, Oxford, 1897.
Hamilton, W. , Description of Hindoostan and the Adjacent 
C ountries. London, 1820.
Hatchard, J . , An essay  to show that no intention has existed 
or does not exist of doing violence to the religious practices 
of India, London 18033.
Heyne, B. , Tracts on India with Journals of Tour in the 
Peninsula and Account of Sumatra, London, 1814.
Hopkins, D . , Dangers to British India from French Invasion 
and M issionary EstablishmerttL London 1809.
Twining, Thomas, A Letter to the Chairman of the East India 
Company on the danger of interfering in the religious opinions 
of the natives of India, London 1807.
Waring, M aj.Scott, Observations on the present state  of the 
East India Company with prefatory remarks on the alarming 
intelligence lately  received from M adras, London, 1807.
A Late Resident of Bengal, Considerations of the practicability ,
policy and obligation of communicating to the natives of In d ia ..
observations on the prefatory remarks by M aj.Scott W aring, 
London 1808.
A Short Account of the M adras, Presidency, Published by 
the Government of M adras, 1805.
India Office Tracts. Vol.465.
Tracts Relating to India. 1813-77 (British Museum)
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